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Abstract 
 
Henry SMITH 
Inter-relationships between Small Arms Control and Peace Building Activities in 
Countries Emerging from Conflict 
Efforts to control small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the periods following 
violent conflict can have positive or negative impacts on peacebuilding 
efforts.  Similarly, peacebuilding activities can both support or endanger efforts to 
place SALW under greater control.  Despite the regular occurrence of SALW control 
and peacebuilding activities in the same time and space in post violent conflict 
contexts, there is insignificant analysis of how the two sets of activities interrelate, 
and how these interelationships can be strengthened to improve the contribution 
that SALW control efforts make to peacebuilding, and vice-versa. The effects of 
interrelationships over time (contingency); in the same geographic space 
(complementarity) and the effects of public perceptions and social construction are 
particularly important and provide a framework for establishing these 
interrelationships through analysing a wide universe of cases of SALW control 
attempted in countries emerging from violent conflict, five mini-cases studies and a 
major analysis of interrelationships in Kosovo.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The effects of uncontrolled small arms and light weapons (hereafter SALW) on 
intensifying and prolonging violent conflict are well documented.  Following the end 
of war, SALW can continue to play a negative role as countries and communities 
struggle to recover and work towards peace.  Since the end of the Cold War, efforts 
to control SALW more effectively have been attempted alongside a wide range of 
internationally-supported peacebuilding and conflict resolution efforts.  At the very 
local levels where peacebuilding activities are organised by residents and affected 
citizens, the availability and misuse of SALW is often an important issue that is 
either tackled directly, or desired as an outcome of other activities.   
 
It is sometimes assumed that efforts to control SALW will automatically contribute 
to peacebuilding efforts:  surely fewer weapons reduce the risk of a return to 
violence?   However, experience has demonstrated that how SALW control 
activities are designed and organised, and how they are located within other post-
war recovery and peacebuilding efforts is of great importance to the type and 
extent of the contribution they make.  There is also a growing acknowledgement on 
the part of academics, policy makers and practitioners alike that misconceived 
SALW control efforts that do not enjoy the support of conflict-affected groups can 
damage the chances of peace and can reignite, or intensify, existing violence. 
 
This thesis contributes to understanding how, and in what contexts, activities to 
control SALW can make a positive contribution to conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding efforts. It does this through exploring the nature of interrelationships 
between SALW control and peacebuilding and through analysing how positive 
interrelationships can be maximised in post-violent conflict contexts. 
 
This first chapter aims to introduce the focus of the thesis, its research strategy and 
analytical framework. It does this through (a) introducing the relevant literatures 
related to peacebuilding, conflict resolution and the control of SALW; (b) stating the 
overarching research question and hypothesis and establishing a framework of 
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further sub-questions which are used to focus and deepen analysis; (c) providing an 
overview of the research strategy and methodology, which includes an introduction 
to the universe of cases which are analysed in Chapter 3, and the main case study, 
which forms the basis of Chapter 4.  It concludes by describing the contents of each 
of the subsequent chapters which together comprise this thesis. 
1.1 Introduction to conflict resolution and peacebuilding 
and its relationships with efforts to control SALW 
For many years academics and others have invested significant effort in studying 
violent conflict, its causes and effects (for instance, see Lund (1996); Ramsbotham, 
Woodhouse and Miall (2005) and Wallensteen (2007) for detailed introductions to 
the field of peacebuilding as an area of academic enquiry).  In particular, the impact 
of conflict on development, human rights, governance and security and justice has 
been analysed in depth and this knowledge is increasingly being translated into the 
policies and programmes of those affected by, or working to resolve, violent 
conflict.   
 
In this context, interest in violent conflict and attempts to prevent and resolve it 
has been given additional recent impetus as international organisations, 
governments and others have sought to understand violent conflict and its 
relationships with governance and economic, social and political development.  
Consequently international commitments now accept a strong correlation between 
the least developed countries and those that are affected by conflict (UNGA, 2005a: 
paragraph 114) and also that conflict-affected countries are much more likely to 
remain poor (DFID, 2009; EU, 2001; Council of the EU, 2007; Collier, Elliot, Hegre et 
al, 2003; Elhawary, Foresti and Pantuliano, 2010).   
 
Further, in recent years there has been an increased focus by academics and policy 
makers on the relationships between violent conflict, insecurity and access to 
justice (Collier, 2009; Duffield, 2007).  Indeed, this relationship is now central to the 
policies and approaches of some of the world’s most significant development 
agencies.  For instance, the World Bank Human Development Report 2011 focussed 
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on the role of ‘security, justice and jobs’ in breaking cycles of violent conflict (World 
Bank, 2011) and the UK Government’s current strategy for international conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding places great emphasis on the role of security and 
justice in addressing conflict (Her Majesty’s Government, 2011). 
 
Since the mid-1990s, concomitant with this growing interest in the effects of violent 
conflict, there has been a significant increase in interest in the role of SALW, both in 
fuelling and sustaining violence, and in conflict prevention and peacebuilding 
processes.  This interest was illustrated in the ‘Supplement to the Agenda for Peace’ 
issued by the United Nations Secretary General on the 50th Anniversary of the 
United Nations in January 1995, which included a call for action to address issues of 
‘micro disarmament’ alongside statements promoting and supporting peacekeeping 
and preventative diplomacy (United Nations, 1995).   
 
In the period from the 1990s to the present day, considerable effort has been 
invested in addressing questions relating to SALW and the various ways in which 
more effective control can have positive benefits for promoting peace, security and 
development.1  Despite this interest, there is no internationally-recognised single 
definition for what constitutes SALW.  However, most academics and policy makers 
refer to that developed by the 1997 UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small 
Arms.  This definition states simply that the category of small arms refers to 
conventional weapons that can be carried and operated by a single individual, while 
light weapons are those which can be carried or operated by a small unit of up to 
four persons (United Nations, 1997).  The control of SALW is often regarded as the 
range of activities and actions which aim to reduce the impact of uncontrolled 
SALW possession and misuse. 
 
                                                       
1 See for instance Laurance and Meek (1996) for an early exposition of the emerging field of 
what they described as ‘Micro Disarmament’, and Greene and Marsh eds. (2011) for a 
contemporary examination of the use of SALW in violence and of the efforts of states to 
control them more effectively. 
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Consequently, numerous activities have been designed which target specific 
aspects of the control of SALW (see Chapter 2 for an analysis of the range of SALW 
control activities which are relevant to this thesis).  For instance activities relating to 
official stocks of SALW include stockpile security and management; destruction of 
obsolete or surplus stocks and training of military, police and other security 
agencies in the handling of weapons in line with international commitments and 
best practice are often prioritised in post-conflict contexts.  Similarly, considerable 
effort has been invested in controlling weapons held by civilians, which includes 
activities to collect and encourage the surrender of weapons by civilians following 
conflict, improving licensing systems to enhance control over weapons held legally 
by non-state groups and individuals and undertaking public education programmes 
with the aim of changing cultural attitudes and behaviours regarding SALW 
ownership and use.   
 
The role of the transfer of weapons from one user to another, through state-
sanctioned international imports or exports or between states or non-state groups 
and individuals through illegal transfers, has been well established as an area of 
interest for many years. Further, and importantly for the focus of this thesis, in the 
period following the cessation of violent conflict, numerous efforts have been made 
to encourage the disarmament and demobilisation of former combatants and to 
support their (re)integration into society, as well as in the reform of military and 
security institutions to enable them to become more appropriate to the challenges 
of establishing and maintaining peace. 
 
The development of the strategies and activities to control SALW introduced above 
has both been informed by, and has influenced, the relevant academic and ‘grey’ 
literatures on the subject.  At the international level, perhaps the most important 
initiative which sought to understand the relationships between SALW and a range 
of causes and consequences, including violent conflict and insecurity, remains the 
United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its 
Aspects (hereafter the UNPoA).  Agreed in 2001, the UNPoA was informed by the 
work of academics including Laurence and Meek (1996) who claimed in their 
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research that understanding the relationships between the availability of SALW and 
the factors that drove their proliferation was critical to controlling them more 
effectively, particularly in post-war situations.  It also built on and reinforced 
important work undertaken to elaborate the concept of ‘human security’, most 
notably described in the United Nations Human Development Report in 1994, 
which attempted to redefine security as a phenomena affecting individuals as well 
as states (UNDP, 1994).   
 
The UNPoA also stimulated and reinforced a significant amount of new research 
and policy development which aimed to understand better the ‘cause and effect’ 
relationships and, in important cases, to make connections between academic 
research and policy development.  These included understanding better the 
relationships between SALW, poverty and development (see Centre for 
International Cooperation and Security, 2004); SALW and armed violence (see 
Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011); SALW and other security-
building activities (see Garcia, 2006; Centre for International Cooperation and 
Security, 2006); and SALW and gender (see United National Department for 
Disarmament Affairs, 2001, and Farr and Kiflemariam, 2002).     
 
However, whilst there has undoubtedly been significant progress made to connect 
SALW control to a variety of important related issues, including aspects of conflict 
and violence, there has not to date been significant attention placed on the specific 
interrelationships that exist between efforts to control SALW and peacebuilding 
processes as they relate specifically to the periods following large-scale political 
violent conflict. 
 
Similarly, the literature on conflict resolution and peacebuilding is well developed in 
terms of understanding the linkages between the different phases of conflict and a 
variety of strategies and activities that can address particular dimensions of the 
problem. For example, Ramsbotham et al have developed an ‘hourglass model’ 
(2005:12) which offers an analytical framework through which what they term as 
the ‘contingencies and complementarities’ that exist in conflict resolution activities 
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can be described.  In a general sense, this model is useful as a basis for 
understanding how different aspects of SALW control could theoretically relate 
both spatially (complementarities) and temporally (contingencies) with activities 
that are more accepted as conflict resolution or peacebuilding contributions.   
 
However, there has to date not been a concerted effort from the perspective of 
those working on peacebuilding or conflict resolution problems to thoroughly 
investigate the interrelationships between peacebuilding and SALW control.  
Likewise, whilst there is now a considerable literature which relates to the role of 
different actors in peacebuilding processes and the importance of local people in 
areas affected by conflict being an important part of transformational 
peacebuilding (for instance: Curle, 1994; Lederach, 1997; Boulding, 2000; 
Richmond, 2008; Donais, 2009), there has not been a substantial effort to explore 
how, and to what extent, these concepts could be extended to SALW control and 
the contribution that it could make to conflict transformation.  This thesis aims to 
make a significant contribution to the literatures on both peacebuilding and SALW 
control by helping to develop understandings of the interrelationships between the 
two, and to offer an analytical framework within which they can be described and 
analysed in the future. 
1.2 Research questions and hypothesis 
To make a contribution to addressing the gaps in the literatures introduced above 
(and analysed in depth in Chapter 2), a research strategy was developed based on 
an overarching research question, a hypothesis and a series of more specific sub-
questions which frame the research and subsequent analysis.  These are introduced 
and explained in the following section, which begins with the overarching research 
question that this thesis seeks to address: 
 
 “What are the interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and build peace 
in countries emerging from periods of violent conflict?” 
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This has been identified as the main research question as it combines a focus on 
both peacebuilding and SALW control as substantive themes and situates the 
analysis of how they interrelate within the context of the de-escalation of violent 
conflict.  Each of these main elements (peacebuilding, SALW control and the conflict 
context) could be further defined or elaborated differently.  For example, 
consideration was given to whether the broad field of peacebuilding should be 
refined to focus specifically on the concept of ‘peacebuilding from below’ given its 
interest in the role of affected populations in peace processes, or to interpreting 
peacebuilding efforts solely through the perspective of the concept of ‘liberal 
peace’ summarised by Paris (1997), given that this is often linked closely to 
international post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery interventions (Ramsbotham 
et al 2011:198).  Similarly, thought was given as to whether SALW control efforts 
should be defined quite narrowly, focussing on the activities which are most 
associated with peacebuilding processes (such as disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration) or with the participation of wide groups of the civilian population in 
line with an interest in public participation in peace processes (such as voluntary 
civilian disarmament programmes).  Further, the temporal dimension of the 
question - ‘…emerging from periods of violent conflict’ - could be defined to focus 
specifically for instance on the immediate period following a ceasefire agreement, 
or indeed at a later stage when a political settlement is deemed to have been 
reached. 
 
However, these whilst these options were considered, ultimately they were 
discarded.  The decision to include a broad interpretation of peacebuilding and 
SALW control was taken to maximise the opportunities to analyse a wide variety of 
different interrelationships, including specifically those that are not necessarily 
intended or built into peacebuilding or SALW control programmes which are often 
based on specific interpretations of these terms.  Similarly, a decision was made to 
take a fairly wide perspective on the phase or period of conflict which is analysed.  
The primary reason for this was a desire to reflect the author’s personal experience 
of conflict contexts in which one violent conflict (for instance the civil war in Sudan 
from 1983 -2005) can feature multiple conflict contexts displaying very different 
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levels of intensity and proximity to violence, and importantly that these contexts 
can change quickly within a single overarching conflict context (for instance in 2005, 
despite the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the 
President of Sudan and the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, 
whilst this brought to an end political violence in many parts of southern Sudan, 
other regions of the country were either not included in the peace process and did 
not enjoy its positive implications (for instance in Darfur), or where they were, their 
conflict trajectory was significantly different than in other places (for instance, 
whilst violent conflict in the equatorial states of southern Sudan reduced 
significantly, in Jonglei and Upper Nile states, violence has increased and reduced 
sporadically in subsequent years in some cases linked to implementation of the CPA 
and in others seemingly unrelated to the overarching political agreement). 
 
Finally in terms of the development of the overarching research question, a 
decision was taken not to place a focus on the extent to which interrelationships 
between efforts to control SALW and build peace can be either positive or negative.  
It is the case – as is demonstrated in Chapter 3 – that peacebuilding efforts can 
have a positive or negative impact on efforts to control SALW, and conversely, that 
SALW control activities can both benefit and damage efforts to promote peace. This 
thesis aims to explore and analyse both the positive and negative effects of 
interrelationships, an aim which would have been limited if the main research 
question had been framed in terms for instance of the positive contribution 
specifically that SALW control activities can make to peacebuilding efforts. 
 
Based on this overarching research question, a hypothesis was developed to help 
refine the research contribution, which begins with the recognition of the positive 
and negative potential of interrelationships.  It then focuses on three specific 
variables, identified in the literatures reviewed in Chapter 2 which taken together, 
provide the framework through which the research and analysis for this thesis has 
been undertaken.  These are the importance of contingency and complementarity 
in post-war peacebuilding activities (for instance see Ramsbotham et al 2005), the 
importance of the involvement of a wide range of actors in conflict transformation 
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(for instance, see Curle, 1994; Lederach, 1997; Richmond, 2008), and the 
importance of contextual factors in the perceptions and attitudes of those affected 
by SALW problems in post-war settings (Atwood and Jackman, 2000; Brauer and 
Muggah, 2006).  Thus, the hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Efforts to control SALW can have a positive or negative effect on post-conflict 
peacebuilding; conversely their success can be damaged or enhanced by 
peacebuilding activities.  The interrelationships that exist between SALW control 
and peacebuilding are both temporal and spatial and are conditioned by the extent 
to which affected populations are involved.  Therefore, the role and influence of 
local people, and the extent to which complementarity and contingency is 
understood and acted upon, have a determining effect on the positive benefits of 
SALW control in post-conflict peacebuilding.  
 
This thesis makes a contribution to confirming the validity of this hypothesis, and in 
deepening understanding of the factors involved, in at least some relevant 
contexts.  It does this by developing a framework through which interrelationships 
can be described and analysed.  This is based on the three variables stated above, 
which affect the nature of interrelationships between peacebuilding and SALW 
control efforts (contingency, complementarity and context).  To explore each of 
these variables, and to make a contribution to the overarching research question by 
attempting to confirm the validity of the hypothesis, a small number of specific sub-
questions were identified.  These are described below, with those relating to 
contingency introduced first, followed by those which seek to analyse 
complementarity, and finally by those which are primarily concerned with the 
effects of context on interrelationships. 
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1.2.1 The effect of contingency on interrelationships 
 
At what stages of conflict de-escalation is the control of SALW relevant to 
peacebuilding efforts, and to what extent are SALW control activities located within 
existing phases of post-conflict peacebuilding? 
 
Models for describing violent conflict often trace the escalation of tensions into 
violence and then various phases of de-escalation towards an absence of violence 
and then peace.2  Given that this thesis is particularly interested in what is 
commonly termed as the post-conflict or post-war period, understanding how 
SALW control and peacebuilding are relevant in the ‘de-escalation’ stage is central. 
Further, Ramsbotham et al (2005) and Chetail (2009) amongst others describe 
several, sometimes nested (Dugan, 1996; Lederach, 1997), phases of post-conflict 
peacebuilding.  This thesis seeks to understand whether interrelationships are 
different in different phases and to what extent the effects of activities in one 
phase impact on those which follow.  
 
How does the nature of SALW control activity change over different phases of post-
conflict peacebuilding? 
 
Ramsbotham et al (2005) have developed a model drawn from analysis of 
international peacebuilding efforts since the early 1970s which establishes a 
number of peacebuilding phases which begin with peacemaking (which focuses on 
ending violence) and move through the de-escalation stages to peacebuilding 
activities (which promote changes in attitudes and  cultures).  This model builds on 
early work by Galtung (1975) which described the main groups of conflict resolution 
activities (peacemaking to address cultural violence, peacekeeping to address direct 
violence, and peacebuilding to address structural violence).  To date there has not 
been substantial work to identify which aspects of SALW control may be 
                                                       
2 These vary in complexity from simple bell curves or wave diagrams through to nested conflict 
cycles.  See Dudouet (2006) for a review and analysis of the different models used by academics and 
practitioners to describe conflict.  
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appropriate at different stages of post-conflict peacebuilding.  This thesis aims to 
make a contribution to addressing this gap in the current literatures. 
 
To what extent is the concept of nested paradigms appropriate to efforts to control 
SALW? 
 
Dugan (1996) and Lederach (1997) were early proponents of the concept of nested 
approaches to conflict resolution and peacebuilding.  To date, whilst there is some 
evidence to suggest that a nested approach is beginning to be more commonplace 
in the design of programmes to tackle insecurity in post-war environments, there is 
no analysis of how the concept of nesting could be appropriate to efforts to control 
SALW, and indeed whether SALW control activities could be located within a nested 
approach to post-war peacebuilding. 
1.2.2 The effect of complementarity on interrelationships 
 
What are the relevant intra- and inter-sectoral relationships between efforts to 
control SALW and recognised post-conflict peacebuilding interventions? 
Sector-specific or sector-wide approaches are championed by the UN, World Bank 
and a variety of governments, amongst others as a way of organising post-war 
recovery, peacebuilding and development support.  In a given context, these often 
involve security, justice and governance ‘sectors’.  SALW are sometimes located 
within one, often the security sector where they are co-located with support for 
defence reform, public security and policing.  However, SALW control is also 
relevant to the development or reform of governance frameworks and capacity and 
to other sectors including public health.  Similarly, peacebuilding activities can take 
place across a wide range of different sectors. This thesis explores whether and 
how interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding efforts are 
affected by whether SALW is treated as a sector-specific or a cross-cutting theme. 
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1.2.3 The effect of context on interrelationships 
 
How are different social groups involved in efforts to control SALW in countries 
emerging from periods of violent conflict – specifically what are the different roles 
played by those in the different tiers of Lederach’s Actors and  Approaches To 
Peacebuilding model? (Lederach, 1997) 
Lederach and others contend that the involvement of a wide cross-section of the 
population is important in moving beyond elite peace deals which often play critical 
roles in bringing violence to an end, but which don’t by themselves transform the 
underlying causes and drivers of conflict.  This concept has not been applied to 
post-conflict peacebuilding efforts in the context of the effects that this might have 
on interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding.  Chapters 3 and 4 
in particular aim to analyse the participation of different groups of citizens in SALW 
control efforts to assess to what extent the nature of this involvement affects the 
potential for them to make a contribution to transformative peacebuilding. 
 
What is the relationship between the involvement of different actors, specifically 
affected populations, and the role that SALW control plays in post-conflict 
peacebuilding, and how does this affect the contribution of SALW control towards 
longer term transformative peacebuilding? 
This thesis analyses whether the transformative contribution of SALW control 
activities is affected by the extent or nature of the involvement of affected 
populations.  This is important in terms of applying some of the principles of the 
concept of ‘peacebuilding from below’ (Curle, 1990; Boulding, 2000; Fisher and 
Zimina, 2008) to SALW control.  These state that without the involvement of those 
most affected by conflict (or in this case the availability and misuse of SALW in post-
war environments), the transformative potential of peacebuilding and conflict 
resolution activities will not be fully realised.  
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How does the range of actors involved and the nature of their involvement in SALW 
control efforts change over different phases of post-conflict peacebuilding? 
It is argued that different groups of actors are involved to differing degrees in 
conflict de-escalation phases.  For instance, Ramsbotham et al (2005) claim that the 
phases which are characterised by ceasefire arrangements and the deployment of 
peacekeepers often involve a relatively small number of people undertaking elite 
peace-bargaining.  However, at later stages where reconciliation is more important, 
they state that a wider cross-section of the population is involved.  This thesis 
analyses whether and to what extent this model is applicable to SALW control and 
whether the involvement of different groups of actors plays a role in the extent to 
which the transformative potential of SALW control activities is realised. 
It would perhaps be possible to focus solely on one of these specific areas - each of 
which is important in better understanding how SALW control and peacebuilding 
efforts interrelate - and indeed much could be learned from a detailed examination 
of one particular dimension.  For instance the role of public perceptions in target 
communities, and indeed the behaviours and beliefs of communities and 
individuals in terms of how they relate to SALW and to efforts to control them is a 
potentially significant area of enquiry.  The role of SALW in shaping opinions 
regarding personal and community security and vulnerability to conflict can differ 
significantly from one community to another, and between individuals within a 
community; women typically feel more threatened by the perception that SALW 
are widely held than men, who may feel that weapons provide a means of defence 
and act as an important deterrent, even if in reality they may be relatively 
ineffectual in dealing either with short term threats or achieving long term peace 
and security. Conducting research in a significant number of contexts to attempt to 
understand the social, cultural and economic conditions which may be conducive to 
enhancing control over SALW, and those in which greater control of SALW may act 
positively on causes and drivers of conflict and insecurity from the perspective of 
target communities, could in itself represent a significant undertaking.   
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Likewise, a contribution could be made to establishing the linkages between efforts 
to control SALW and peacebuilding activities through focusing solely on the means 
by which the activities are undertaken.  An approach which explores SALW control 
and peacebuilding methods could lend much to an understanding of the 
operational linkages which could be of significant value to those responsible for 
designing, managing and implementing programmes and projects (see for instance 
Ball and van de Goor (2013) for a comparable attempt to enhance the effectiveness 
of security sector reform programmes through focussing specifically on the process 
of reform rather than the achievement of pre-determined end goals).   
 
However, a combined focus on the (positive and negative) interrelationships that 
are created and which exist over time (first group of sub-questions), the ways in 
which interrelationships are affected by other events taking place in the same 
temporal and geographic space (second group of sub-questions), and the ways in 
which different aspects of context (third group) generate and affect 
interrelationships is, in the opinion of the author, more valuable. In particular it 
helps to express the interrelationships in different but highly connected ways.  For 
example, the way that, over time, communities experience peacebuilding and SALW 
control activities could shape their perceptions and behaviours and this could have 
a significant impact on the ways in which SALW are perceived, either as positive 
contributions to peace, or as necessary safeguards against the unintended 
consequences of peacebuilding activities. 
 
Through assessing each of the groups of sub-questions in detail by examining a 
wide range of SALW control activities in different contexts and by exploring the 
case of Kosovo since the end of its civil war in 1999, this thesis deepens 
understandings of the interrelationships between SALW and peacebuilding efforts 
and analyses why this matters, both in terms of the success of SALW control 
activities as well as for wider peacebuilding efforts. 
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1.3 The research approach 
This thesis follows a mixed methods approach which allows for the combination of 
elements of what Robson (2002:4-5) describes as flexible and fixed research 
strategies.   
 
A key characteristic of the mixed methods approach is that it combines qualitative 
and quantitative data gathering and analysis. In the case of this research, a 
premium was placed on qualitative data; however the existence of good quality 
quantitative data which can be used to establish trends and issues and to 
triangulate the results of qualitative data analysis was particularly useful.  Given the 
importance of understanding the role of contextual factors and the social 
construction of knowledge and understandings in establishing interrelationships 
between SALW control and peacebuilding efforts, a case study component was also 
built into the overall research methodology. The case study is of particular 
importance in terms of deepening understanding of exactly how SALW control 
efforts and peacebuilding activities have interrelated in specific cases which 
demonstrate characteristics that may be generalizable to similar contexts 
elsewhere. 
 
Within the overarching mixed methods approach, an important element has been 
the role of social construction. It is the author’s belief that the success or otherwise 
of efforts to control SALW and promote peace is heavily determined by the realities 
socially constructed by those involved.  The process of developing knowledge 
through social interaction, which is central to taking a social constructionist 
approach to research (see for instance Burr, 1995:4-5), is particularly appropriate to 
the research topic explored in this thesis.  In conflict- and post- conflict contexts, 
where interpretations of history and contemporary life are heavily determined by 
personal experience, and in a context where conflict has often driven different 
communities apart, creating further distance between different constructions of 
reality, understanding the existence of these differences and observing the ways in 
which they determine personal and community attitudes, is of central importance 
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to establishing the types and nature of interrelationships between SALW control 
and peacebuilding efforts.   
 
A number of other research approaches were considered and eventually 
discounted prior to the selection of the mixed methods methodology.  These 
included grounded theory, a pure case study approach and an action research 
methodology.  Grounded theory was attractive for its applicability to qualitative 
data gathering and analysis, and for its utility in exploring human interactions and 
generating theories.  It was discounted as although a significant element of the 
logic of this research is the development of theories, grounded theory was deemed 
less useful as an approach for testing and refining theories which combine 
conceptual as well as more practical, empirical research (see Glaser and Strauss, 
1967).  A pure case study approach would have been appropriate to a research 
study which focussed exclusively on specific cases of SALW control efforts. 
However, despite an important element of this research being the study of a 
specific case of SALW control and peacebuilding, significant other aspects of the 
research focus at the thematic level, drawing on concepts as well as experiences 
from a wide variety of different contexts.   
 
Finally, an action research methodology was considered. This would have been an 
appropriate methodology for the research topic.  It is certainly a real world 
problem, and it is hoped that the findings of this research will be of use to policy 
makers and others in responding to what is a critical element of designing more 
effective approaches to controlling SALW and promoting peace in post-conflict 
environments.  However, whilst the author is committed to sharing the findings of 
the research with those involved as well as with those with a role in controlling 
SALW and peacebuilding, in reality it is unlikely that a significant enough 
commitment can be given to a longer term process of which this research is a 
component, to justify a claim that this follows a true action research approach. 
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1.4 Research Strategy 
This thesis thus follows a clear research strategy:  The overarching research 
question, hypothesis and sub-questions provide the parameters for the research. A 
mixed methods methodology has been selected as a guiding philosophy which 
through its flexible approach provides for the inclusion of a soft social 
constructionist perspective.  
 
The strategy provides for initial analysis of a wide universe of cases where SALW 
control has been attempted in conflict-affected contexts.  Emerging issues and 
trends are then explored in more detail and further analysed through five mini-case 
studies representing a wide range of different types of SALW control and 
peacebuilding activity and contexts in which they were attempted.  The findings 
from these mini-case studies are then drawn together and analysed to identify 
initial theories for how peacebuilding and SALW control might interrelate and how 
these interrelationships are affected by complementarity, contingency and context.  
A detailed case study of peacebuilding and SALW control efforts in post-war Kosovo 
is then undertaken which builds on, tests and further elaborates these initial 
theories.  Finally, the findings from each stage (the universe of cases, the mini-case 
studies and the main case study) are drawn together, further analysed, and 
conclusions are drawn which aim to establish and explain interrelationships and 
how they are affected by time, space and context.  Each of these elements is 
introduced in greater detail below: 
 
Establishing an analytical framework:  A guiding analytical framework for this 
thesis was developed on the basis of reviewing existing literatures relevant to 
peacebuilding and efforts to control SALW.   This framework, which was organised 
around the three variables contained in the thesis hypothesis, was then used to 
identify and analyse interrelationships between aspects of peacebuilding and SALW 
control.   
 
Establishing a universe of cases: Initial analysis was undertaken through examining 
a wide variety of contexts in which SALW control efforts have taken place in the 
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context of emergence from periods of violent political conflict.  Through analysing 
this universe of over 80 cases, initial findings are identified which suggest particular 
types of interrelationship and begin to demonstrate what their existence 
contributes to the success or otherwise of peacebuilding processes or SALW control 
efforts.   
 
This initial phase of research places significant importance on quantitative data, 
drawing on existing published research.  It analyses the extent to which SALW 
control efforts occur in contexts which are affected by violent conflict.  Further it 
examines the range of different approaches to SALW control and the specific 
techniques that are employed, identifying which techniques are most significant 
from a quantitative perspective.  The data that this initial analysis draws on includes 
instances in which SALW control efforts have taken place within a national-level 
SALW control framework during a period in which the countries concerned were 
experiencing periods of violent conflict, or were in the early stages of emergence 
from violent conflict.   
 
The dataset is time-bound, beginning in 2001 when the UN Programme of Action on 
SALW was agreed.  This is commonly understood to mark the beginning of a 
particular period in the development and implementation of efforts to control 
SALW, given it provided for the first time an international framework within which 
States, international agencies and non-government bodies agreed to act.  It also 
provided the framework within which the most significant and internationally 
accepted research and analysis as to the effect of SALW control efforts have been 
undertaken.  It concludes in 2012 when the research phase for this PhD was 
completed.   
 
Analysing mini-case studies to identify initial findings: From the initial universe of 
cases, a small number of mini-case studies were identified for further and deeper 
analysis.  These were: Efforts to control civilian held SALW in Sri Lanka following the 
Cease Fire Agreement in 2002; Internationally supported SALW control efforts in 
the Western Balkans and their interrelationships with national and regional 
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peacebuilding efforts; Efforts to implement an integrated approach to 
peacebuilding and SALW control in Sudan/Southern Sudan since 2005; Analysis of 
efforts to control SALW as disarmament exercises in northern Kenya and Karamoja 
in Uganda in 2006; Analysis of efforts to control SALW and their interrelationships 
with peacebuilding frameworks and activities in Sierra Leone between 2001 and 
2004. 
 
In each of these mini-case studies, the framework established in Chapter 2 guided 
the research and analysis.  Each of the contexts selected were identified against a 
set of common criteria which are elaborated in depth in Chapter 3.  Taken together 
they aim to cover a substantial range of different contexts and therefore to provide 
a broad scope of analysis and potentially to enhance the relevance of the findings 
to a wide range of other contexts.  This analysis focuses primarily on qualitative 
data, drawing on published data and the author’s own experience, and is supported 
by a small number of interviews in each case. In this way, qualitative data is used to 
test, explore and deepen understandings emerging from the initial analysis of 
quantitative data contained in the universe of cases.  
 
Conducting an in-depth case study to test and refine emerging findings: These 
findings, along with those arising from the initial analysis of the universe of cases 
are then tested and further elaborated and explored through a detailed case-study 
of peacebuilding and SALW control efforts in Kosovo in the period between 1999 
and 2012.   
 
Since the end of its violent conflict in 1999, Kosovo has experienced very significant 
international attempts to support peacebuilding and conflict resolution.  These 
efforts have taken place at the same time as a wide range of different attempts to 
reduce legal and illicit SALW holdings and to promote greater control over 
remaining SALW.  The international peacekeeping and peacebuilding approach to 
Kosovo had a strong security-building dimension from the outset.  Post-war Kosovo 
has been a focus of a wide range of different research activities since 1999, which 
have included those which have analysed the nature and effectiveness of 
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peacebuilding efforts, and the role and effects of SALW in prosecuting the war and 
in the post-war transition towards Kosovo independence.   
 
Kosovo was selected as a case study as it demonstrates certain characteristics that 
are important for the further development and elaboration of findings emerging 
from analysis of the universe of cases and the mini case studies.  They included:  an 
immediate post-conflict context which featured aspects of civil war and inter-state 
conflict; a context in which international intervention at different levels had played 
a significant role in the conflict and in post-conflict security and peacebuilding 
efforts; an environment which includes both rural and urban settings from which to 
conduct specific field research; and a context in which efforts to control SALW and 
promote peace have been attempted and where there have been acknowledged 
successes and failures. 
 
Kosovo case study findings are generalizable to other contexts displaying similar 
characteristics, as well as providing the context in which a deeper analysis of 
interrelationships can be undertaken to test, refine and develop the findings 
emerging from the universe of cases and the smaller number of min-case studies.   
 
The Kosovo case study combines both quantitative and qualitative data.  
Quantitative data is used predominantly to provide the initial analysis of the 
context (for instance, survey data on public attitudes to weapons and conflict, data 
on numbers of weapons seized and surrendered, national and local crime rates) 
which is then explored in greater depth though analysing qualitative data (including 
for example that drawn directly from interviews with those affected by SALW 
proliferation or violence and those participating in programmes to address them). 
The Kosovo case study combines document analysis (including analysis of both 
quantitative and qualitative data), interviews, focus group discussions and 
observation.   
 
The geographic locations in Kosovo in which field research was conducted were 
selected from across the country.  The case study methodology and selection 
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criteria are described in Chapter 4.  However, in introductory terms, the criteria for 
selection included the following:  a mix of urban and rural locations; the extent to 
which communities had been the subject of SALW control and other peacebuilding 
activities; the geographic location of the community within Kosovo, the ethnic 
representation of the community; the geographic and population size and 
distribution; and the awareness of community members as to the existence of 
SALW control and peacebuilding activities.   
 
In the Kosovo case study, six focus groups were organised and facilitated according 
to a plan and guide schedule of questions prepared in advance.  The focus groups 
discussions took place in Albanian, Bosnian or Serbian depending on the audience 
and were facilitated by one of two interpreters who have both worked extensively 
with the author previously.  In addition to the focus group discussions, a significant 
number of structured and semi-structured interviews were held with community 
members as well as with representatives of local and national authorities and 
international agencies. In many cases where English was not spoken well, these 
interviews were conducted by the author but translated into either Albanian or 
Serbian depending on the context.   
 
Confirming key findings and drawing conclusions: The findings drawn from the 
Kosovo case study are then explored and further developed in the context of those 
arising from the initial universe of cases and the small number of more detailed 
contexts.  From this collective analysis, findings are then identified which have 
resonance across a wide range of different contexts, from which a series of 
conclusions are drawn as contributions to addressing the overarching research 
question and hypothesis.  These are offered as contributions to both the literatures 
on the themes of peacebuilding and SALW control, and where relevant to country-
specific literatures.   
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1.5 Ethical considerations 
SALW control is often by its nature a sensitive issue.  Much of the literature 
analysed during the research for this thesis is open source and some of it has been 
peer reviewed.  Where this is the case, it is referenced clearly and appropriately.  
However many of the interviewees and focus group participants in the Kosovo case 
study in particular do not for obvious reasons want their remarks to be attributed 
explicitly in this document.  In every case, interview logs were compiled by the 
author and all transcripts and records of meetings coded and anonymised.   A code 
book is kept by the author in a secure place and has not been shared.  In this way, 
where requested the identities of respondents remains confidential. 
 
Given the nature of the issue, the sensitivity of the context and the positions held 
within their communities by many of the respondents in this research, considerable 
attention was paid to the ethical considerations when designing and conducting the 
research.  In addition to issues related to confidentiality and anonymity described 
above, these included:  obtaining permissions (from both formal and informal 
power holders and representatives – in each case with the village council, a body 
with considerable local standing but no formal authority in legal terms) for access, 
particularly in the locations visited as part of the Kosovo case study; conducting 
interviews and focus group discussions in a manner which was sensitive to cultural 
and social realities (using the right language and being aware of the gender, 
ethnicity and age of research assistants), particularly when conducting research at 
the community level; remaining vigilant as to the distorting affects that the 
presence of an outsider asking specific questions could have both on the opinions 
and perceptions of respondents, but also in altering the power balance within the 
communities; and ensuring that research participants were given the opportunity 
to comment on the author’s analysis.    
 
In addition, the author’s prior knowledge and experience of the main themes 
covered in this thesis and of Kosovo in particular required attention from an ethical 
perspective.  The author has visited Kosovo over forty times since early 2002 and 
has developed excellent relationships with a wide range of different actors 
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performing different roles across society from ministers and senior military and 
police officials to local village representatives in communities in which he has 
worked.  To a slightly lesser but nevertheless important degree, this is also the case 
for some of the contexts identified for detailed analysis in Chapter 3, including 
Sudan/South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Kenya and South Eastern Europe. This prior 
knowledge and experience is valuable for a variety of reasons including accessing 
data, obtaining permission and consent to discuss sensitive issues at the community 
levels as well as with relevant officials, and the ability to sift information to identify 
that which was of particular importance and interest.  However, it was also very 
important to understand how the previous roles that the author has played may 
have had a distorting role in the research:  Prior knowledge of the issues may have 
meant that due attention was not paid and analysis was based on assumptions 
rather than evidence; familiarity with certain actors and interlocutors may have 
meant that other important actors were not accessed or asked to contribute; and a 
willingness to please a colleague may have led to some respondents trying to 
provide the contributions that they thought the author might want to hear, 
regardless of their veracity.   
 
Finally, to a large extent regardless of the previous role of the author, his presence 
in a given community will have played a role in the development and articulation of 
particular views and perspectives, an unavoidable reality for a researcher who 
believes in social construction as a means by which realities are created.  At the 
commencement of the research planning, the author ensured that an ethics section 
of the research plan was included which identified potential ethical impacts and 
described mitigating or management strategies in each case.  This was reviewed as 
the research progressed, and in combination with regular triangulation of data and 
progress reviews as research progressed, helped ensure that whilst ethical 
considerations were both recognised and addressed, they did not unexpectedly 
influence the direction or the outcomes of the research. 
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1.6 Chapter structure 
Building on the research strategy introduced above, this final section of Chapter 1 
summarises and further elaborates the thesis’ chapter structure.  
 
Chapter 2 has three main elements.  The first two sections locate the research focus 
for this thesis within the relevant academic literatures and current debates, 
principally those relating to conflict resolution and peacebuilding, and then the 
control of small arms and light weapons.  Specifically, it identifies where existing 
literatures make a contribution to understanding the interrelationships between 
efforts to control SALW and peacebuilding activities in countries emerging from 
periods of violent conflict and where further work is required.  In doing so it 
describes the contribution that this thesis will make to further elaborating existing 
understandings and literatures.  The third section reviews existing methods and 
models for analysing SALW, conflict and peacebuilding, establishes the analytical 
framework that will be used to organise research, and as part of this elaborates in 
detail the main research questions which were introduced in Chapter 1.    
Chapter 3 begins to elaborate understandings of how efforts to control SALW and 
build peace in countries emerging from periods of violent conflict interrelate.  It 
begins this through reviewing quantitative data relating to a wide range of efforts 
to control SALW that has taken place in a variety of different contexts since 2001, 
before refining this universe to focus on countries in which SALW control has been 
attempted during a period of, or immediately following, violent conflict.  Within this 
group, it describes the nature of the efforts to control SALW and identifies relevant 
trends and approaches.  From this wider group, it then identifies a smaller number 
of contexts which are explored in some detail. The purpose of this analysis is, 
through examination of qualitative data, to develop understandings of how SALW 
control and peacebuilding efforts interrelated in each case.  The chapter concludes 
by applying these understandings to the emerging model for describing them which 
was introduced in Chapter 2, and which is further tested and developed in Chapters 
4 and 5.  This chapter contributes to the literatures on the control of SALW and 
peacebuilding by mapping and analysing the trends and dimensions of SALW 
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control in countries emerging from violent, and describes the main interrelations 
between SALW control and peacebuilding efforts in five different contexts. 
Chapter 4 focuses on Kosovo as the major case study for this research.  It 
introduces the contemporary political, social and conflict context in Kosovo in the 
period leading up to, and following the end of the 1999 war.  This is followed by a 
description and initial analysis of attempts to control SALW and efforts to build 
peace in the post-war period.  The case study research methodology and methods 
are then described, including an introduction to, and initial analysis of, the different 
research locations that together comprise the Kosovo case study.  The findings from 
the case study research are then discussed within the analytical framework, with a 
particular focus on how the research findings relate to the main research questions.  
This chapter makes an original contribution to the literature both on SALW and 
peacebuilding, and to post-war contemporary Kosovo, as the first detailed analysis 
of the interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and build peace in a 
country emerging from a period of violent conflict.  
The final chapter reviews the substantive findings from Chapters Two, Three and 
Four.  Specifically, the findings from Chapters Three and Four are further analysed 
and developed.  There are two substantive aspects to this analysis:  firstly, the 
conceptual interrelations suggested in Chapter 2 are tested with findings both from 
the Kosovo case study (Chapter 4) and the contents of the wide review of previous 
examples of efforts to control SALW and build peace (Chapter 3).  From this, a 
narrative description of these interrelationships is offered as a substantive 
contribution to answering the overarching research question; secondly a model for 
describing this enhanced understanding is set out as a substantive contribution to 
the literature for describing interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and 
build peace in countries emerging from periods of violent conflict.  Chapter 5 
concludes by identifying areas in which further research could enhance the 
conclusions of this thesis in the future.    
  
26 
 
Chapter 2:  SALW Reduction and Control and Post-
Conflict Peacebuilding 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces and reviews the main literatures that are relevant to the 
overarching research question, hypothesis and sub-questions, and identifies the 
different areas in which it makes a contribution to existing knowledge.  It is 
organised in three substantive sections. First, it reviews concepts and models 
relevant to conflict and conflict resolution and analyses concepts relevant to post-
war peacebuilding and reconstruction, specifically those which: (a) attempt to 
combine a contingency-based approach with those that seek to understand the 
effects of complementarity and; (b) analyse the contributions that those affected 
by violent conflict can make to peacebuilding.  Secondly, the field of small arms and 
efforts to control them is reviewed in detail, with particular attention paid to 
literatures which describe and analyse the relationships between the control of 
small arms and light weapons and related areas of security and peacebuilding. 
Finally, on the basis of this analysis, the overall research approach and strategy 
taken to addressing the central and related research questions identified in Chapter 
1 is then described and justified. 
2.2 The field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the interrelationships between efforts to 
control small arms and light weapons and promote peace in countries emerging 
from periods of violent conflict.   
Different overarching terms are used to describe the concepts and process of 
tackling conflict. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall argue that in part these are a 
product of a debate between those who seek to transform conflict and those who 
seek to resolve it (2005:9). In simple terms, those who are primarily concerned with 
resolving conflict situate their work within the field of conflict resolution (for 
instance see Wallensteen, 2007:9) and those who are concerned with 
transformation of conflict (see Lederach, 1997: 20) who describe their contributions 
in terms of peacebuilding, reconciliation or conflict transformation.   
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Ramsbotham et al support the generic use of the term conflict resolution over 
other terms to describe the range of different ways of analysing conflict and 
designing responses to specific phases or characteristics.  They do this from a 
practical as well as an intellectual perspective, stating that: “In our view it does not 
matter in the end what label is used as the umbrella term […] so long as the field is 
coherent enough to contain the substance of what is being advocated in each 
case.”  Further, they give three very practical reasons to support their claim: (1) that 
conflict resolution is the earliest term used to describe the field referred to first in 
1957 in the establishment of the Journal of Conflict Resolution; (2) that it is the 
most commonly used term in academic publications in a survey from 1995 to 2004; 
and (3) that it is the most often used term amongst the general public and the 
media (Ramsbotham et al 2005:9).   
There are important claims to other terminology. For example, Lederach prefers the 
term ‘peacebuilding’, understanding it as “…a comprehensive concept that 
encompasses, generates and sustains the full array of processes, approaches and 
stages which are needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful 
relationships” (1997:20). Alternatively, Lund locates his work on preventative 
diplomacy within the overarching term of conflict prevention, which he sees as 
relevant both prior to, and following, the outbreak of violent conflict (1996:4).   
In addition to relating to the nature of the activity undertaken by those involved, 
these terminologies are also rooted in the different theoretical and conceptual 
ideas and traditions that underpin and guide specific approaches to tackling 
conflict.  One way of understanding these is in terms of a sliding scale with realists 
at one end and critical theorists and post-structuralists at the other.  Realists 
believe that cosmopolitan or pluralist conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts 
are not appropriate for focussing on the key characteristics, structures and drivers 
of contemporary conflict, including terrorism and asymmetric warfare.  
Realists understand that violent conflicts are centrally driven by structures and 
actors concerned with power, self-interest, and/or security dilemmas , and that 
they are thus not likely to be prevented, resolved or transformed by outsiders 
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unless such ‘peacebuilders’ can substantially either impose their will (by deploying 
coercive power) or by otherwise materially affecting power balances and 
structures.  Further, Realists believe that peacebuilding activities, including 
mediating political settlement, can sometimes prolong violence and suffering, 
whereas direct military intervention can bring war to a swifter conclusion. One 
aspect of this approach, for example, is reflected in Luttwak’s 1999 phrase ‘Give 
war a chance’.  Authors including Mearsheimer (1995) and more recently, Rynning 
(2011) contend that a more direct approach to promoting self-interest, including 
allowing one side to win a war through military means and using hard as well as soft 
power, is an appropriate response to contemporary challenges of addressing 
violent conflict.   
The realist approach differs significantly from those who follow a critical theorist 
perspective.  Critical theorists contend that contemporary conflict and war is a 
product of, and generates responses by, those living on the periphery of a modern 
globalised world and that they demonstrate new and important social formations 
and interactions (Duffield, 1997).  They believe that some differences and interests 
are irreconcilable and that a global perspective of oppression and exploitation is 
required within which positions should be taken in support of, or against, particular 
interests.  As such, they oppose external interventions to promote changes in the 
behaviours or practices of those inhabiting this new paradigm, in effect believing 
them to be overly focussed on solving problems rather than addressing the 
fundamental issues which cause and sustain conflict in the first place. Authors often 
associated with a critical theorist perspective, including Richmond (2008) and Pugh, 
Cooper and Tanner (2008), claim that a failure of those involved in promoting 
conflict transformation is that they are in danger of co-option by those promoting a 
realist or neo liberal agenda. 
Located between these two opposing perspectives are those taken by what 
Ramsbotham et al describe as the Pluralist/Cosmopolitan Heartland of Conflict 
Resolution (2011:396).  However, in practice those working with a pluralist or 
cosmopolitan perspective are a ‘broad church’ and widely differ - sometimes 
markedly.  Pluralist perspectives include a strong belief in principles of international 
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order and non-intervention norms associated with conflict settlement (Chandler, 
2009), whereas on the other hand, cosmopolitan perspectives are described as 
aligned with the term conflict transformation (Jackson, 2000). Cosmopolitan 
conflict transformation accepts the concept of intervention, although sets itself 
apart  from a realist perspective by claiming that when intervention occurs, it does 
so with the intention of promoting systemic and radical transformation.  Roland 
Paris (1997), who with Timothy Sisk (Paris and Sisk, 2009) has played a leading role 
in debates around the ‘liberal peace’ or ‘New York Consensus’,  which is based on 
“…transplanting western models of social, political and economic organisation  into 
war shattered stages in order to control civil conflict” (Paris, 1997:56), is often 
associated with a cosmopolitan approach to conflict resolution. 
This thesis generally adopts analytical frameworks drawn from a cosmopolitan 
approach to conflict resolution and peacebuilding, given the focus of the main 
research question and its interest in the nature and effect of international 
peacebuilding and SALW control efforts, in addition to those generated locally from 
within affected contexts.  Further, whilst recognising the different interpretations of 
terms including conflict resolution, conflict settlement, transformation, and 
peacebuilding, for the purposes of this thesis, the author takes the terms conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding as overarching definitions of the field within which 
efforts to promote and build peace are located.  As such, the terms conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding will be referred to throughout this chapter, and 
indeed the wider thesis, to describe the broader academic field within which 
specific research and literatures relating for instance to peacebuilding and 
specifically post-war peacebuilding are situated. 
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2.2.1 Theories and models for describing conflict and conflict 
resolution responses 
In addition to recognising different terminologies at the outset, it is also important 
to recognise some of the most well-regarded concepts and models for analysing 
conflict and ways by which it might be addressed.  Several of these models which 
are of particular relevance to the focus of this research are reviewed below.  
However, one of the most well-known and regarded models for describing conflict 
and the actions that can be taken to address its different dimensions was proposed 
by Johan Galtung in 1969, and then developed further in 1975.  Galtung is credited 
as playing an important catalytic role in the development of models for 
understanding conflict and peacebuilding, producing in the late 1960s a triangular 
model for describing the main components of conflict.  This saw attitude, behaviour 
and contradiction, at its vertices (leading Dudouet (2006:39) to describe this as the 
ABC model of conflict transformation).   
Writing almost forty years later, Wallensteen offers a slightly adapted model with 
incompatibility, action and actors as the three dimensions of the conflict triangle, 
replacing contradiction with incompatibility, and attitude and behaviour with actors 
and their actions.  He does this to reflect the dilemmas arising from conflict 
between employers and employees in industrial relations and between sovereign 
states in international relations (2007:16), where actors and their actions play a 
central role in building conflict into a given system.   
Galtung later developed his model to describe the types of violence involved in 
conflict which peace actors need to address (structural violence, direct violence and 
cultural violence), and the possible responses from a conflict resolution perspective.  
Thus structural violence arose from contradiction and required peace-building 
responses; cultural violence arises from conflict over attitudes and requires peace-
making approaches; and direct violence occurs when conflict is expressed through 
behaviour and requires peace-keeping responses (Galtung, 1975).  
In a further elaboration of the models described above, Galtung also popularised  
the terminology of ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ peace, with negative peace being the 
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absence of direct violence and positive peace being a state in which cultural and 
structural violence have also been overcome (Galtung, 1969:2).  This difference is 
critical to the debate around the relative merits of technical and transformative 
descriptions of peacebuilding and of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding 
which are reviewed later in this chapter (see Fisher and Zimina’s perspective on 
transformative and technical approaches to peacebuilding below and debates on 
the nature and effectiveness of ‘liberal’ peacebuilding involving Paris, Pugh, 
Richmond, Duffield and Mitchell (see above and below)). 
In addition to efforts to describe why and how conflict occurs there has been 
significant effort invested in modelling the different stages, or phases, of a conflict 
and when and how particular types of response can be applied.  Perhaps the most 
common approach is one that tries to understand conflict in a temporal sense, 
describing it as a series of events or actions which take place over a defined period 
of time.  The simplest model for describing this is probably the conflict wave 
(Brahm, 2003, in Dudouet, 2006:6).  This sees conflict escalating and then de-
escalating over time, often demonstrated in graph form as a bell curve with time 
and intensity as the axis.  Lederach (1997:43) describes this as a wave-like timeline, 
whereas Lund (1996:40) describes it as a smoothly curving bell in his version of the 
model “The Life History of Conflict”.   
Figure 1: Lund’s conflict bell curve from “The Life History of Conflict” (1996) 
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Ramsbotham et al (2005:11) use this model to identify the different stages leading 
up to war on the escalation side of the up-curve, and then the gradual de-escalation 
following ceasefire.  They label these different stages in ascending order as 
difference, contradiction, polarization, violence and ultimately war; and in 
descending order, ceasefire, agreement, normalization and reconciliation. This idea 
builds on earlier work by Mitchell (2005:13) in his model for describing the 
“Dynamics of Perpetuation, Exacerbation and Mitigation”, which identifies a series 
of ‘conflict exacerbating dynamics’ associated with the escalation phases of conflict 
- or the upside of the bell curve - and then for each exacerbating dynamic, identifies 
‘conflict mitigation dynamics’.  This model draws on a diagram offered by Curle 
(1971:186 in Dudouet, 2006:16) which set out the main stages of conflict:  latent 
conflict; overt conflict; settlement; and finally sustainable peace.    
This approach has been adapted to illustrate the different stages at which conflict 
resolution responses can be offered, and in doing so establishing conceptual 
contingencies between different actions as the conflicts develop, become violent 
and then recede.  For example, Lund develops this concept to identify diplomatic 
efforts that can be undertaken at different stages in advance of the outbreak of 
violent conflict (Lund, 1996:38), and Ramsbotham et al suggest in their ‘Hourglass 
Model’ a relationship between different phases of conflict, their expressions and 
the conflict resolution responses that are required in each case (2005:12).     
In addition to efforts to map and describe the different stages of conflict and their 
interrelationships, considerable effort has been invested in developing ideas and 
approaches for analysing violent conflict, focussing on generating and exacerbating 
factors as well as the intensity of conflict and its transition towards and away from 
violence. These have included Azar’s work on the concept of protracted social 
conflict which aimed to understand amongst other things the internal and external 
factors which generate sustained conflict and violence (see Azar 1990); 
identification of ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ as key generators of conflict (Berdal and 
Malone, 2000; Berdal, 2005; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Collier, Hoeffler and 
Rohner, 2009); and work to understand the characteristics of ‘weak’, ‘vulnerable’ or 
‘failed states’ by Ghani and Lockhart (2008).   
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The importance of different levels of conflict and factors causing conflict has 
similarly become clearer over recent years, from the effects of regional dynamics 
and the impact of ‘overspill’ (Cederman et al, 2009) to the importance of 
understanding conflict systems that can include multiple dimensions such as local, 
national, regional and international factors (see Ropers 2008).  These ideas and 
others including the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment methodology developed 
by the Berghof Foundation (Hoffman 2004) have been central to the development 
of methods for analysing conflict by major international and bilateral actors, 
including the World Bank’s Conflict Assessment Framework (Wam and Sardesai, 
2005) which places strong emphasis on internal sectoral analysis and the UK 
Department for International Development Strategic Conflict Analysis (Goodhand, 
Vaux and Walker 2002) which has since been developed through the combination 
of conflict analysis with analysis of governance and statebuilding challenges into the 
Joint Assessment of Conflict and Stability (DFID, 2012).  
What these authors and approaches have in common (in addition to their 
adaptation and use of aspects of the basic escalation and de-escalation model) is 
that there is a general awareness and acceptance of the reality that conflict is much 
more complex as a phenomenon that the bell curve or wave diagram suggests.  
Dudouet (2006:7) states that: “Even the most recent conflict resolution manuals rely 
heavily on the “conflict wave” model, while simultaneously acknowledging the 
impossibility of applying such idealised diagrams mechanically to the history of most 
protracted social conflicts”.     
The idea that violent conflict is not linear and that it is both dynamic and can move 
between different stages over time has, as noted above, been represented as a 
cycle with various different levels of complexity attributed by different researchers.  
At its most basic level, the key characteristics identified in various interpretations of 
the conflict bell curve described above are placed in a simple cycle to demonstrate 
the potential for dynamic movement between different phases of conflict 
(Melander and Pigache, 2007:9). In more complex form, attempts are made to 
demonstrate the different pathways between stages of conflict which are 
determined by the timing, nature and success of conflict resolution efforts:  Francis 
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(2002:55) attempts to map this as a flow diagram which identifies the different 
theoretical paths from latent conflict to settlement, resolution and conflict 
prevention; and Dudouet (2006:21) offers a model for adapting this diagram into a 
cycle format with the different pathways described as arrows moving across the 
cycle to describe the characteristics of conflict progression, which are harder to 
demonstrate, although often acknowledged in linear models. 
Similar to the conflict wave model, the conflict cycle has been developed and 
adapted to illustrate not only the different phases or stages of conflict and their 
relationships with each other, but also the different forms of resolution effort 
which are appropriate at different stages or times.  For instance, Ramsbotham et al 
(2005) apply Galtung’s analysis that peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding 
are important responses to different forms of violence which themselves are 
stimulated by attitudes, behaviours and contradictions to a conflict cycle.  This 
provides a useful representation of the relationships between specific resolution 
responses and phases of conflict: peacekeeping is required when conflict is 
characterised by violence, whereas peacemaking is important in the transition from 
violence to negative peace, and peacebuilding to transform negative to positive 
peace. 
The recognition that conflict and thus conflict resolution does not follow a 
predetermined path with a sequence of dynamics onto which conflict resolution 
activities can be easily mapped is central to Lederach’s concept of nested 
paradigms which attempt to address the reality that conflict is not one dimensional 
and that numerous conflicts may exist at different stages of their life cycle at the 
same time depending on the actors involved and the exact locations in which the 
conflict takes place (Lederach, 1997:55-85).   
Lederach bases his approach on previous work undertaken by Dugan (1996:9-20 in 
Lederach, 1997:55) which she termed ‘A nested theory of conflict’ which 
emphasised the importance of complementarity between different elements of a 
conflict (in her model described as issues, relationships, sub systems, systems) 
through developing a temporal dimension which aimed to map specific types of 
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response over a time continuum from immediate action to prevent crisis which 
should be taken within the first 2-6 months of identification through to the design 
and implementation of activities to promote social change which could take place 
up to 20 years following the initial identification of the conflict.    
This approach is different from the conflict wave or cycle in that it expressly tries to 
understand and demonstrate the complexity of multiple conflicts occurring within 
the same time and space.  However it also places emphasis on the importance of 
contingency – ensuring that responses are appropriate to the characteristics of the 
conflict at the time, and that their outcomes build on each other as time progresses 
and transformations occur.  This “Nested Paradigm: The Time Dimension to 
Peacebuilding” (1997:77) is then further developed into what Lederach terms his 
“Integrated Framework to Peacebuilding” (1997:80) in which he places Dugan’s 
conflict foci on one axis and the temporal dimension on the other, using the model 
to suggest that the different characteristics of conflict (rather than phases or stages 
as described in most conflict cycle models) can be addressed in different ways over 
time and space.   
In doing so, Lederach places important emphasis on the interplay between 
complementarity and contingency which is developed substantially by 
Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall in their Hourglass Model (2005:12).  The 
model draws together some of the aspects of conflict analysis discussed earlier in 
this chapter, and offers an additional dimension which is important from the 
perspective of conflict resolution response, and thus central to this thesis.   
In essence, the model contains three sets of categories: Galtung’s ideas on conflict 
containment, settlement and transformation; the stages of conflict often described 
as escalation and de-escalation in conflict wave models; and what the authors 
describe as ‘strategic responses’.  Thus, at one end of the conflict spectrum, conflict 
transformation, difference and cultural peacebuilding can be found. With the 
increase in conflict intensity, the conflict phases move through contradiction, 
polarisation, violence and war (with correspondingly different strategic responses) 
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through to ceasefire, agreement, normalisation and reconciliation as conflict de-
escalates.   
There have been prior efforts to map conflict concepts to escalation and de-
escalation ideas and to strategic responses (see the conflict cycle above).  However 
where the Hourglass Model makes an additional contribution is in the ideas that 
suggest the hourglass shape, with a wide top and bottom tapering to a narrow 
‘middle’.  This is intended to represent the space for resolution efforts to take 
place.  Thus, at the early stages of conflict, or in the periods during which 
normalisation begins, there is greater conceptual and operating space within which 
conflict resolution can be attempted. In contrast, during times when the conflict is 
most intense, and most violent, the opportunities for positive action are severely 
reduced.  Ramsbotham et al (2005) argue that whilst this suggests that the 
opportunities to act are greater in less intensely violent phases of conflict, this 
places greater emphasis on the importance of understanding and maximising the 
positive effects of complementarity between various actions and interventions. 
The Hourglass Model is then complemented by further analysis by the authors 
which seeks to map examples of tactical responses to the strategic responses that 
they link to different stages of conflict (2005:14).  This is particularly relevant to the 
challenges of addressing the main questions of this thesis as, at this stage, they 
begin to identify some aspects of security building which are appropriate at 
different stages and, which although not described by Ramsbotham et al at any 
level of depth, are very relevant to efforts to control SALW.  For instance at the 
ceasefire level of the escalation / de-escalation spectrum, peacekeeping is 
identified as a strategic response and examples of tactical response include 
disarmament, security sector reform, confidence-building and security-enhancing 
measures and security in the community.   
Ramsbotham et al argue that, on the de-escalation end of the spectrum, strategic 
and tactical responses are not linear, are nested and therefore will take place at the 
same time in particular contexts.  Taken together, the acknowledgement of the 
relationships between strategic and tactical responses over time and the 
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recognition of the importance of numerous related activities taking place in the 
same space, great emphasis is placed on the role of both contingency and 
complementarity in the successful application of conflict resolution efforts and 
specifically to the acts of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding in the de-
escalation phases of conflict.      
2.2.2 Conflict transformation and peacebuilding from below 
Concepts of contingency and complementarity, and models for describing their role 
and how they interrelate, such as the Hourglass Model, are sometimes criticised for 
focussing heavily on intervention by outside actors or third parties.  Critics of this 
approach suggest that whilst it might be possible for outside interveners to play a 
significant role in steps which bring violence to an end and begin the process of de-
escalation, the importance of affected communities and populations at large to 
conflict transformation which moves from negative to positive peace is both crucial 
and not represented well in existing models and approaches.   
During recent decades, partly in response to this critique, approaches to conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding have developed to encompass the term 
‘peacebuilding from below’.  This emerged from writers and practitioners including 
Boulding (2000), Curle (1994), and Lederach (1997).  Curle was one of the early 
proponents of this approach.  His experience of engaging directly with conflicts led 
him to believe that in addition to external and ‘objective’ support to mediation and 
peacemaking, it was critical that local capacities for peace were supported in ways 
which enabled them to build on what already existed and that this was essential for 
building long term and sustainable peace (Curle, 1994). 
This concept was developed further by Lederach, including through the 
development of his model for describing ‘actors and approaches’ (see below) (1997: 
39). This model, in the form of a triangle, identified at its apex elite power brokers 
including generals and national politicians, those with the highest profile and most 
powerful formal roles.  In the middle section of the triangle were those with some 
official power and influence such as commanders, local politicians and others.  And 
at the bottom, representing by far the most significant numbers of a given 
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population were those without significant power who were also those who were 
most likely to be most affected by violence and conflict, (significantly for this thesis, 
Lederach included frontline soldiers and combatants in this group).  Lederach 
contended that engaging with all three levels of actors across the range of different 
peacebuilding and transformative actions was essential to long term transition 
towards positive peace. To do this required not just a rethinking of the activities 
performed by external actors, including grassroots facilitation and support, as well 
as objective high-level engagement with elite groups.  It also required a rethinking 
of the sorts of activity by local people which might be promoted and supported by 
others.   
Figure 2: Lederach’s Actors and Approaches Model 
 
Reynolds Levy (2004) developed this model further, producing a “Framework for 
Peacebuilding From Below”  by categorising and identifying the different sorts of 
transformation which might take place and then applying them to Lederach’s vision 
of different levels of society engaging on different and complementary aspects 
peacebuilding.  In this model, the military and security dimensions of peacebuilding 
were identified and, at each level, specific military/security actors and actions 
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included. This deepened Lederach’s comprehensive but in some ways superficial 
treatment of the different sorts of actors who would need to engage on different 
levels on different issues for a successful approach to peacebuilding which 
combines peacebuilding from below with engagement in elite peacemaking.  
However, whilst conceptually this model helps to clarify the importance of the 
engagement by different actors, it does not describe the significant challenges in 
this approach working in practice.   
As Gultung, Curle, and others including Osamba (2001), Oda (2007) and Fisher and 
Zimina (2009) demonstrate, differences of opinion and interpretation of events and 
history are often centrally important in conflict and conflict resolution efforts.  
These can bring elite power holders and local people into direct competition 
regarding visions of what positive peace might look like and the processes of 
transformation which may be required to achieve them.  In the context of the 
model refined by Reynolds Levy, this would mean for instance at the elite level that 
generals agree to a particular form of demobilisation which is appropriate to 
requirements at the national level.  But for former combatants who have returned 
home and are faced with the challenges of reintegration and dealing with their new 
status as heroes or indeed failures or criminals  (depending on the conduct and 
outcome of the conflict), their interpretation of the issues and their role in 
peacebuilding may be significantly different, but critical to the success of any 
transition.  Understanding and addressing these differences and challenges is a 
critical aspect of combining peacebuilding from below with the realities of elite 
peacemaking. 
The concept of conflict transformation and its distinctiveness from what they term 
‘technical approaches to peacebuilding’ is analysed from a practitioner perspective 
by Fisher and Zimina (2009) in their essay “Just wasting our time? Provocative 
thoughts for peacebuilders”. 
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2.2.3 Transformative versus technical approaches to conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding 
For Fisher and Zimina (2009), the differences between transformative and technical 
approaches to peacebuilding are both stark and critically important to their 
ultimate effects and impacts.  They claim that much of the peacebuilding work 
undertaken by non-governmental organisations, governments and UN agencies is 
essentially technical in nature, that it attempts to address specific problems and:  
“…often seem to amount in practice to nothing more than ‘patching’ – 
attempts to create the minimal stability that would allow the current world 
order, driven by market forces and geopolitical power constellations to step 
in.” (Fisher and Zimina in Schmelzle and Fischer 2009:19) 
They argue that a failure to address ‘peace writ large’ (a term developed by 
Anderson, Chigas and Woodrow in their book Confronting War (2004)) prevents 
peacebuilding activity having a truly transformative effect on the societies in which 
it is undertaken.  They claim that a combination of funding pressure, deference to 
governments, inter-agency competition and a lack of expertise and experience 
contribute to organisations taking a technical approach to peacebuilding which fails 
to address issues such as social justice and to focus on fundamental political and 
social change. This critique is supported by Newman and Richmond (2006) in their 
work looking at the impact of ‘spoilers’ on peace processes where they point to a 
failure of international peacebuilding efforts to focus on the highly political nature 
of peacebuilding in preference to technical approaches which focus on issues such 
as institutional development and anti-corruption.   
Fisher and Zimina go on to offer a typology which describes the differences in the 
technical versus the transformative approach at the levels of goals, strategy, values 
and analysis.  Further, they argue that the approaches described are not necessarily 
all incompatible, and can be strongly reinforcing. For instance at the level of overall 
purpose, they state that whilst a technical approach may be to “end a specific 
situation or open conflict”, a transformative approach at the same level might in 
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addition focus on influencing the “underlying structure and culture as an integrated 
element in building something better” (Fisher and Zimina, 2009:21).   
In this model, there are clear echoes of Galtung’s ideas about negative and positive 
peace and the importance of moving from one to another as part of lasting 
peacebuilding.  This connection between, on the one hand, negative peace and 
technical approaches and, on the other, positive peace and transformative 
approaches, is central to the argument that Fisher and Zimina make about the 
importance of those engaged in peacebuilding moving from one set of approaches 
to the other, and their claim that, to date, much peacebuilding work has failed to 
meet its potential.   
This second theme was addressed previously by Lund (2003:21-40) in a stocktake of 
progress ten years after the publication of the Agenda for Peace, in which he 
offered a critique of progress which claimed that a failure to define peace clearly 
enough, the realities of donor requirements, political expediency and an implicit 
neo-liberal perspective which underpinned much of what was done under the 
rubric of peacebuilding, contributed to a situation in which the effects of 
peacebuilding activities on conflict transformation and positive peace were both 
often unclear and difficult to quantify. 
Fisher and Zimina’s model draws on Lederach’s model for mapping actors and 
approaches to peacebuilding (1997:39) which describes the different categories of 
actors involved in peacebuilding in terms of their roles within society, the size of 
their capacity and the types of activity that tends to be associated with each group.  
The model, in the shape of a pyramid, with elite peacemakers at the apex and the 
majority of citizens at the bottom, suggests that the work which is done with those 
at the top of the pyramid is often technical in nature and is conditioned by a desire 
not to offend, to maintain presence as a ‘guest’ in a host country and to focus on 
issues which do not directly challenge the existing politics or power structures in a 
given context, whilst work which is undertaken with people at the lower level is 
often more transformative in nature.   
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Fisher and Zimina further argue that the work of existing peace practitioners can be 
located on a continuum from technical peacebuilding to transformational 
peacebuilding depending on the characteristics of the organisations involved, and 
that this also affects, and is affected by, the levels of society in which they work 
directly (2009:27).  Thus, international agencies are characterised as working 
directly at the middle and only occasionally at the top and bottom levels of society 
and that they tend to work on the technical and mildly transformative end of the 
spectrum, whilst grassroots peacebuilding organisations tend to focus in more 
transformative ways, mostly at the community levels.  The role of civil society 
organisations in peacebuilding efforts has been studied by Paffenholz and Spurk 
(2006) and Paffenholz (2010), which draws similar findings regarding the different 
roles that different groups play and the dangers as well as the potential benefits 
inherent in working with locally rooted and legitimate organisations and national 
and international civil society groups alike. 
Fisher and Zimina’s typology for describing Technical and Transformative 
Approaches to Peacebuilding suggests that a tactical focus on different aspects of a 
peacebuilding effort with different audiences might be sensible.  However they also 
argue that, at the higher levels of strategy and vision, being clear about the nature 
and goals of transformation is critical to avoid focussing solely on technical aspects, 
particularly at the elite levels of society, where political change is probably most 
required (2009:20).  
Supporters of the concept of peacebuilding from below have levelled this critique 
(focus on technical reforms at elite levels of society) at activities commonly 
described as post-conflict reconstruction. The following section examines the 
development of ideas for undertaking peacebuilding activity in conflict reduction 
and de-escalation phases of violent conflict and reviews models which draw on the 
concepts of contingency and complementarity, conflict phases, nested paradigms 
and local ownership discussed earlier in this chapter.   
43 
 
2.2.4 Post-war peacebuilding – post-conflict reconstruction 
The terminology and meanings of post-war or post-conflict peacebuilding, or 
reconstruction are both diffuse and contested.  Whilst in some ways this gives 
credence to one of the criticisms of the endeavour – that it is amorphous and badly 
conceived (Chetail 2009:7), it is also perhaps unsurprising when the origin and 
contemporary history of the term is considered.   
Ramsbotham et al (2005:185-188), for example, chart the development of post-
conflict peacebuilding since the end of the second world war, when the victorious 
allies demobilised their defeated opponents, rebuilt social and economic 
infrastructure, installed governments and then gradually withdrew.  The 
intervention of the Cold War prevented systematic international action supported 
by the UN or significant numbers of supportive states.  However, as it came to an 
end, opportunities for intervening in countries affected by conflict arose once 
more.  Independence for Namibia presented the first opportunity of its kind – and 
the UN was mandated to lead international support for a transition until elections 
had been held and powers transferred to national institutions.  Ramsbotham et al 
argue that the UN-led model – featuring at its centre an enhanced peacekeeping 
mandate - pertained until the Dayton Agreements which brought to a close the war 
in Bosnia in 1995.  From this point, partly as a response to the perceived failure of 
the UN and its institutions to respond to the scale of violence experienced in both 
Rwanda and Bosnia, the lead role for international interventions fell to ‘coalitions of 
the willing’, led by one or a small number of powerful states.   
Chetail confirms this in his analysis of the development of post-conflict 
peacebuilding, in which he charts the development of the concept within the UN 
system (Chetail 2009:2-4).  He identifies peacebuilding in the inclusion of the 
Agenda for Peace alongside the three other dimensions of conflict management - 
preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping as an essentially linear 
process, coming after peacemaking and peacekeeping with the overall intention of 
acting “to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify 
peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (UN 1992: para 21).   
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The Supplement to the Agenda for Peace published in 2005 (UN, 2005a) contains 
both a restatement of support for the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding, but 
also emphases the need for integrated action, suggesting for the first time that 
ideas of complementarity as well as contingency (suggested in the earlier 
recognition of the linear progression of responses to conflict) had begun to 
influence thinking at the UN.   
Tschirgi (2004) argues that from this point, the concept of post-conflict 
peacebuilding evolved from an approach which was essentially linear to one that 
was at least two dimensional – understanding the importance of both temporal and 
spatial coordination of activity.  The 2005 World Summit, which established the UN 
Peacebuilding Commission to add institutional capacity within the UN system and 
to provide coordination between its various interested agencies emphasised “The 
need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict 
peacebuilding and reconciliation with a view to achieving sustainable peace” (UN, 
2005b:25).   
The language of institutions is identified by Barnett et al (2007) as one of the 
complicating factors in developing common understandings of the purpose, 
function and content of post-conflict peacebuilding.  They surveyed twenty-four 
governmental and non-governmental organisations to identify the language that 
they used to describe post-conflict peacebuilding.  Perhaps unsurprisingly there was 
a great variety in both terminology and scope of issues and actions of those actors 
studied. Barnett claims that in part this is due to the mandates and institutionalised 
language of some of the major actors. For example, NATO uses the language of 
peace support operations and stabilisation which fit well with its military mandate 
and terminology, whereas the EU describes its involvement under the rubric of 
civilian crisis response, which sits well with the framing and language of its 
European Security and Defence Policy priorities. 
A further factor in the contest and confusion over the language used to describe 
post-conflict peacebuilding is described by Chetail (2009:7).  He claims that the 
political nature of such a concept places it centrally within ideological debates 
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which go beyond the boundaries of post-conflict peacebuilding or reconstruction.  
He claims that it is an ideal battleground for “the larger and constant confrontation 
between different schools of thought in international relations:  the realist and the 
neo-realist schools; the theory of dependence; constructivism; functionalism and 
neo-functionalism; and critical theories” (1999:7). 
Writers including Pugh et al (2008) and Duffield (2007) who approach conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding from a critical theorist perspective represent positions 
which believe that post-conflict peacebuilding, and particularly the version which 
places emphasis on ‘reconstruction’ (see below) is a neo-liberal activity which seeks 
to replace the governance systems and processes and cultures of countries that are 
deemed to be undesirable with western ‘liberal democratic’ models.  Further, 
Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009) have undertaken research in a variety of 
contexts which suggests that actions which have taken place with a justification of 
peacebuilding, reconstruction and recovery have in fact had little positive impact, 
and in some cases have increased the likelihood of a return to violence.   
A further critique of the ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ concept is that the failure to 
take proper account of the needs of individuals and populations, and the cultural, 
economic and political histories in countries in which interventions are attempted, 
leads to misplaced analysis and initiatives which can further endanger the viability 
of the societies into which interventions are made (Chopra and Hohe 2004). 
Ramsbotham et al identify eight criticisms of post-conflict peacebuilding and 
reconstruction that are offered from a conflict transformation perspective, some of 
the proponents of which view post-war peacebuilding efforts as little more than 
ending violence and imposing a state of negative peace before withdrawing.  In 
addition to those introduced above they include the following: unease about the 
role of military undertaking what should be non-military tasks; criticism of the lack 
of a significant social-psychological dimension to interventions; a failure to promote 
‘bottom-up initiatives; and the failure of outside interveners to be accountable to 
host populations. 
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2.2.5 An emerging framework for analysing and assessing post-
conflict peacebuilding efforts 
On the basis of the literatures reviewed above, this section begins to establish and 
elaborate the analytical framework that shapes the remaining chapters of this 
thesis.  It develops the overarching research strategy introduced in Chapter 1 
(which is further elaborated at the end of this Chapter) and draws on conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding principles and concepts including the idea of 
‘peacebuilding from below’, Lederach’s ‘nested paradigms’ and the combination of 
complementarity and contingency developed by Ramsbotham et al in their 
Hourglass Model.   
Whilst it acknowledges aspects of the philosophical critique offered by Pugh, 
Richmond, Duffield and other critical theorists of the role of outside intervention in 
violent conflict, it is based on a belief that the humanitarian imperative legitimises 
the involvement of outside agency and, as such, approaches conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding from a cosmopolitan perspective. In this way, the analytical 
framework introduced below is intended both as a method by which 
interrelationships between conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities and 
efforts to control SALW can be analysed, and as a means by which lessons can be 
learned as a contribution to more effective future interventions.     
The starting point for the development of this analytical framework is the Hourglass 
Model developed by Ramsbotham et al (2005). This combines the temporal phases 
of an intervention with the different sectors in which intervention usually takes 
place.  As discussed, the authors base this on a review of all post-war peacebuilding 
efforts between 1978 and 2004 in which they identify four important 
characteristics:  
(1) interventions aim to build both negative and positive peace – that these tasks 
are interdependent (violence needs to stop before longer term transitions can take 
place) but also that they are sometimes in tension (the imperative to end violence 
might entail incorporation of unreformed militia into state security forces which 
might damage long term transition towards a professional army – or the need to 
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draw warlords into political discourse damages longer term political development 
and trust in political institutions);  
(2) there is significant commonality in sectoral tasks;  
(3) there is commonality of temporal phasing; and  
(4) withdrawal is staged. 
The two major variables which shape the Hourglass Model, which are particularly 
relevant to the analytical framework developed for this thesis and which are 
introduced in the hypothesis and sub-questions elaborated in Chapter 1, are 
complementarity and contingency.    
In relation to complementarity, the Hourglass identifies five key sectors – security, 
rule of law, government, economy and society.  These are closely in line with a 
similar sectoral approach taken by Lund in which he identifies five criteria for 
successful peacebuilding from his own review of post-conflict peacebuilding efforts 
since 1992.  The area of difference is that Lund incorporates ‘rule of law’ into 
‘government’ and replaces it with a focus on ‘accommodative political processes’ 
(Lund, 2003:26).   
As regards contingency, Ramsbotham et al establish four cross-sectoral phases of 
peacebuilding which they label as intervention (phase 1), stabilisation (phase 2), 
normalisation (phase 3), and continuing transformation post-withdrawal (phase 4).  
They situate these phases within a nested paradigm (after Dugan and Lederach – 
see previous analysis earlier in this chapter), stating that the phases are not linear, 
and that progress is required for instance across the sectors in phase 2 before 
phase 1 ends.  For each phase they identify both the common interventions by 
sector, but also collectively the range of different interventions across the different 
sectors by phase.  They claim that in the first two phases following intervention, 
security and rule of law priorities are usually most pressing; but that as the phases 
of intervention develop, the importance of ‘government’ and then ultimately 
‘society’ sectors is critical to both legitimacy in the eyes of those subject to 
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intervention, but also to long-term transformations to sustainable peace (or from 
negative to positive peace). 
A nested approach to contingency and complementarity demonstrates the 
complexity of post-conflict peacebuilding characteristics.  Of particular importance 
are the following: understanding the temporal dimensions of intervention in a 
sophisticated manner which looks beyond linear linkages and understands the 
‘nested’ nature of different tasks that occur over time; the coordination and 
integration of tasks both within and across sectors; and the interplay between the 
temporal and spatial dimensions of the context.  Further, it suggests that 
contributing to long-term sustainable peace requires engagement in multiple 
sectors over time, and being seen as legitimate by the host population – a task 
which becomes harder the further from violence the intervention becomes and the 
closer to issues of politics and society they get. 
The critical role that contextual factors appear to play in conflict and conflict 
resolution is not captured significantly in the Hourglass Model. Indeed, it would not 
be adequately reflected in the development of an analytical framework which was 
based only on contingency and complementarity as its main variables.  The 
interplay between internal and external conflict driving factors described by Azar, 
the existence of complex conflict systems analysed by Ropers and the analytical 
approaches contained in key conflict analysis tools, including Peace and Conflict 
Impact Assessment and Strategic Conflict Analysis, are all critical to a framework 
which seeks to understand the relationships between different dimensions of 
conflict and therefore to conflict resolution and peacebuilding responses.   
Similarly, Lederach’s work on Actors and Approaches, the concept of Peacebuilding 
from Below and research to understand the role that civil society organisations play 
in peacebuilding and conflict resolution processes suggest that the inputs of a wide 
variety of actors from across the social spectrum are important in conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding efforts. 
In this light, a third variable needs to be introduced as a complement to 
contingency and complementarity.  Thus ‘Context’ is included centrally in the 
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hypothesis and sub-questions for this thesis.   Together, these three variables, 
context, complementarity and contingency represent a further development of and 
departure from existing frameworks and models.  In the context of this thesis they 
comprise the main elements of the analytical framework within which the 
interrelationships between SALW control and conflict resolution and peacebuilding 
activities will be identified and explored. The framework described above appears 
to be applicable in terms of analysing the interrelationships between a broad multi-
sector and multi-phased approach to peacebuilding and specific thematic issues or 
interventions.  For example refugees and internally displaced people are often 
critical in conflict and conflict resolution efforts.  Kaser (2007) analyses how 
IDPs/refugees relate to peace process and recovery from conflict.  He suggests that 
refugees and IDPs can play both a positive and negative role in peacebuilding and 
identifies specific peacebuilding sectors that are particularly relevant to addressing 
IDP and refugee issues.  These include security, justice, property rights, inclusion in 
political processes and livelihoods.   
Further, Kaser claims that whilst specific sectors may be more critical than others in 
terms of direct relevance, the cross-cutting nature of IDP/refugee issues and 
challenges require that they are treated both in a sectoral and a more general 
multi-sectoral way if they are to be addressed fundamentally – and that strategies 
which focus on IDPs/refugees and their needs and roles, both in peacebuilding 
efforts but also in future visions for sustainable peace, provide strategic coherence 
even if in practice the implementation of projects and programmes are most likely 
to be located within specific sectors.   
In concert with Ramsbotham et al, Kaser also identifies a temporal hierarchy in 
terms of those issues which need to be addressed in the early phases of conflict 
reduction in order to facilitate other aspects of peacebuilding.  In the case of 
refugees and IDPs, he argues that the most important first phase priority is an 
improvement in basic security and protection – without which their return is 
unlikely.  Finally, he claims that whilst certain activities undertaken during early 
phases may be implemented by a relatively narrow group of actors (security 
provided by government or international peacekeepers for instance), moving 
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beyond reducing violence towards conflict transformation requires the active 
participation of a much broader range of actors, including the local communities 
into which IDPs and refugees may return.   
Similarly, the thematic issue of corruption would appear to be applicable to an 
analytical model framed around contingency, complementarity and context.  Le 
Billon (2008) analysed how corruption has been tackled as part of ‘liberal’ 
peacebuilding activities between 1998 and 2006.  He argues that the existence of 
corruption can be seen as a conflict generating factor, and conversely that efforts to 
reduce corruption can be an important part of conflict transformation strategies.  
He claims that anti-corruption activities can be undertaken either within specific 
sectoral interventions, or as a cross cutting approach.  He acknowledges the 
importance of phasing activities to tackle corruption, arguing that in the early 
stages of conflict reduction and the establishment of political processes and basic 
security that corruption is likely to be present, and that tackling it head on at this 
stage could endanger these processes.  He identifies a significant dilemma for those 
involved with peacebuilding efforts: addressing corruption is seen as a central 
element of liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding models; however it is often an 
embedded part of existing political and social processes which means that tackling 
it directly and centrally could damage the chances of wider conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding efforts. 
As is demonstrated in the following section, in common with other thematic issues, 
small arms and small arms control can be critical to post-conflict transitions.  They 
are also relevant in different ways to all five of the sectors identified by 
Ramsbotham et al and Lund, both as specific sectoral interventions and as a cross-
cutting issue which can be relevant to numerous sectors simultaneously.  As such, 
there is significant potential for peacebuilding efforts to positively enhance the 
opportunities for, and success of, small arms control efforts; and likewise, for 
efforts to control small arms to have beneficial implications for other sectoral or 
phased priorities.  Conversely, it is also the case that poorly conceived or executed 
small arms control activities can have a negative impact on other peacebuilding 
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efforts, and ineffective peacebuilding activities can negatively impact on the 
opportunities to bring small arms and light weapons under greater control. 
2.3 The control of SALW and its relationship to conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding 
The following section introduces the field of small arms control, identifying where 
appropriate the relationships between efforts to control small arms, peacebuilding 
in general and post-conflict peacebuilding specifically.  This section is followed by a 
summary of the relevant literatures to which this thesis contributes knowledge and 
a discussion of the research approach and strategy, the hypothesis and key 
questions which frame the research and the overall methodology and methods 
employed. 
Similar in some ways to the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding, the study 
of efforts to control small arms and light weapons (SALW) has developed 
considerably since the early 1990s (see table in Figure 3 below for a definition of 
what constitutes SALW).  Prior to this, attempts had been made nationally as well 
as at the international level over many decades to control access to certain types of 
weapons, including SALW.  For example, according to Karp (2006:12), the Brussels 
Act of 1890, Article 23 of the League of Nations Covenant of 1919, and the Treaty of 
St. Germain all attempted to control aspects of SALW; in the latter case, the 
internal control over weapons within state borders.3 However, whilst the origins of 
efforts to control SALW are far from new, the period since the end of the cold war 
has seen the greatest intensity of effort at the level of regional and international 
diplomacy, national implementation and in the efforts of academics and others to 
record, understand and assess both the nature of the problems posed by SALW and 
the various efforts to control them. 
 
                                                       
3 As a further illustration, the control over access to weapons was an important aspect of 
maintaining state security during the period of British rule over the Indian subcontinent: The 1878 
Arms Act was promulgated (and is still in force today unaltered in Bangladesh) with the express 
purpose of limiting the manufacture, import, export, sale and ownership of conventional arms 
(Benton and Smith 2007:78) 
52 
 
Figure 3: Definitions of SALW  
 
Since the 1990s numerous commitments have been agreed by states at the sub-
regional, regional and international levels.  However, despite this there is still no 
internationally recognized defining description of what constitutes SALW and even 
less so what constitutes SALW control. For the purposes of this research, the 
definition produced by the 1997 Report of the UN Panel of Governmental Experts 
on Small Arms and 1999 Report of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Small 
Arms is used.  This made the distinction between small arms and light weapons 
which has been the basis of attempts to categorize and define this subset of the 
broader category of convention weapons since.  The Panel defined SALW as:  
(a) Small arms:  
(i) Revolvers and self-loading pistols; 
(ii) Rifles and carbines;  
(iii) Sub-machine-guns; 
(iv) Assault rifles; 
(v) Light machine-guns;  
(b) Light weapons:  
(i) Heavy machine-guns; 
(ii) Hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers; 
(iii) Portable anti-aircraft guns;** 
(iv) Portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles;** 
(v) Portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems;** 
(vi) Portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems; 
(vii) Mortars of calibres of less than 100 mm; 
(c) Ammunition and explosives: 
(i) Cartridges (rounds) for small arms; 
(ii) Shells and missiles for light weapons; 
(iii) Mobile containers with missiles or shells for single-action anti-aircraft and anti-
53 
 
tank systems; 
(iv) Anti-personnel and anti-tank hand grenades; 
(v) Landmines; 
(vi) Explosives. 
During this period, research into efforts to control SALW has been characterized by 
research which examines the role of SALW in generating and in sustaining violent 
conflict (for example see Boutwell and Klare, 1999); methods and approaches for 
reducing the proliferation and misuse of SALW (for example see Laurance and Meek 
(1996); and exploration of the relationships between SALW and governance and 
wider public policy issues (for example see Greene, 1999).  Much of this research 
has included a focus on the relationships between SALW and large-scale violent 
social conflict. This is of particular importance to this thesis, which locates its 
examination of the interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and build 
peace within the de-escalation phases of conflict described by Lederach (1997), 
Lund (1996) and Ramsbotham et al (2005) amongst others.   
However, researchers interested in issues relating to controlling SALW have also 
explored the role of SALW in criminal violence, both in post-war contexts and in 
societies that are affected by criminal violence but not by large-scale social and 
political conflict (see Cukier, 1998, 2002; Small Arms Survey, 2007; and Bartolucci 
and Kanneworff, 2012).  Of these two criminal violence contexts, this thesis is 
primarily interested in the well-established relationships between criminal violence 
and large-scale social conflict (Godnick, Muggah and Waszink, 2002), and the role 
that violent conflict can have in facilitating the growth and development of violent 
criminal activity (Klare, 1999).  However, whilst acknowledging its importance both 
as a research topic and a real world problem, it is less concerned with gun violence 
in non-large-scale social conflict settings and as such this area of the literature will 
not be examined in depth in this chapter.   
Klare (1999) attempts to synthesise the main research undertaken on the topic of 
SALW and their role in conflict since 1994, following a meeting of the American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1994 which he claims was one of the first serious 
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efforts to look at “the increasingly lethal ramifications of the diffusion of small arms 
and light weapons to areas of conflict around the world” (Klare, 1999: xi) 
He groups his analysis of this research into five areas as a series of lessons to be 
learned: (1) There is a close and symbiotic relationship between light weapons 
trafficking and contemporary forms of violent conflict; (2) The outbreak of ethnic 
and internal conflict in weak and divided societies produces an “internal arms race” 
that further drives the acquisition of small arms and light weapons; (3) The 
emergence of internal arms races and the outbreak of conflict in weak and divided 
societies is fostered by an immense worldwide abundance of small arms and light 
weapons; (4) Even relatively small quantities of light weapons can prove highly 
destabilising in vulnerable and fractured societies; (5) Light weapons flow to 
existing and potential belligerents through a wide variety of channels, both public 
and private, licit and illicit. 
This analysis was a relatively early attempt to understand the dynamic role that 
SALW can have in conflict affected environments, where in addition to their direct 
function in being used to facilitate death and injury by conflicting parties, their 
presence can facilitate the development of criminal economies, stimulate 
trafficking in weapons and other tradable commodities, including people, and 
further blur distinctions between legal and illegal, public and private and formal and 
informal allocation of power and provision of security.  Research to further 
understand these issues became a focus for the Small Arms Survey, part of the 
Graduate Institute for International Relations in Geneva (2001-2011); as well as for 
peace researchers tracking and analyzing violent conflict from a conflict resolution 
perspective (Wallensteen, 2007: 272).    
During this period, and in the nascent stages of what became known as the UN 
SALW process, Greene (1999) emphasised the relationships between SALW and 
other issues, particularly the context in which they are a problem and where 
greater control is required to reduce their negative impacts. In particular, he 
introduced three areas which are especially pertinent for this research: arms and 
war; conflict prevention; and building peace.  In the first of these sections he makes 
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four important statements, which drew on work by Karp et al (1999) but until this 
point had not been articulated often or clearly in the existing literature:  (1) violent 
conflicts have a variety of different underlying causes which need to be understood 
well as an essential step in developing effective responses, including controlling 
SALW; (2) the regional and international dimension of conflict is of particular import 
for SALW control, specifically disarmament processes which can be neutralised by 
arms transfers across borders; (3) weak states have few mechanisms for good 
governance and non-violent management of conflict, meaning that conflict risks can 
be exacerbated by the availability of SALW; and (4) SALW can have an important 
economic, social or political value in conflict prone contexts which must be 
understood if efforts to control SALW are to be successful.  
In the section on SALW and conflict prevention, Greene makes the substantive 
point that whilst the success of efforts to control SALW are likely to be determined 
by how well they are understood and located in the context of the different stages 
of conflict, SALW proliferation and misuse can also have significant impacts 
following the end of formal conflict.  He cites the examples of Liberia and El 
Salvador where the numbers of people killed and seriously affected by SALW 
violence did not reduce significantly in the period following the formal end of 
hostilities.  This is important for this study as it underscores the importance of 
SALW control in post-conflict contexts as a means of reducing their impacts, which 
may be different – criminal violence as opposed to battlefield deaths for instance – 
but which are no less destructive to the societies in which it takes place. 
The third area of linkage covered in this paper is that between SALW and 
peacebuilding.  Greene suggests that reducing the demand for SALW can play an 
important part in the process of building peace in post- and conflict affected- 
countries; but that peacebuilding can also be aided through the implementation of 
successful efforts to reduce weapons availability and misuse.  This argument builds 
on that made by Laurence and Meek (1996) three years earlier, whilst adding a 
significant extra dimension.  Laurence and Meek focussed specifically on aspects of 
SALW control (or micro-disarmament to use their terminology) that focus on SALW 
as the artefact or the instrument of violence, such as for instance disarmament of 
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former combatants or the collection of weapons from civilians.  Greene makes the 
additional case of the importance of efforts that address the economic, social and 
cultural reasons for why people hold SALW, including understanding and addressing 
the cultures of firearms ownership which are particularly pertinent in certain 
contexts.   
Taken as a whole, this paper has particular value in helping to shape the topic 
covered by this thesis; it is important in that it started to set out for perhaps the 
first time the relationships between SALW control and other related issues, 
including conflict and peacebuilding.  However, whilst it introduces the main 
(inter)relationships, it does not explore them in great depth.  Thus whilst the 
importance of taking overarching, coordinated approaches to addressing post- 
conflict peace- and security- building is expressed convincingly, more remained to 
be done to elaborate them in detail and test them against contexts in which SALW 
and peacebuilding activities have been attempted. 
As the relationships between the availability of SALW and their proliferation and 
misuse became better understood, academics, policy makers and practitioners 
began to research ways in which they could be controlled more effectively.  In 
simple terms, these efforts focused both on the supply (which includes weapons 
production, transfers of weapons - including of SALW - particularly into fragile or 
conflict affected contexts, and the safety and security of arms holdings), and the 
demand for weapons from those engaged in, or affected by, conflict.  
In this first category of supply-side issues, research on arms production has focused 
in recent years on the challenges posed to existing controls on weapons 
movements and use as a consequence of the increased globalization of production.  
This has led both to a growth in the numbers of states with the capacity to produce 
their own weapons, and to a diffusion of production which can lead to a finished 
weapon comprising of components made in numerous different countries, 
sometimes through processes such as ‘licensed production’ which typically involves 
one company licensing another – sometimes as part of an agreement to sell 
weapons to the government of the country in which the licensed production takes 
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place.  The Stockholm International Peace Institute (SIPRI) publishes an annual 
yearbook which records changes and developments in international arms 
production capacity and is perceived internationally as an objective and well-
regarded resource.  Of particular interest to this thesis has been the increase in 
production capacity in fragile or conflict-affected states over recent decades (see 
Brauer (1991, 2000) or Brzoska (1989) for analysis of the globalization of 
production), and the emergence of significant new producing nations (see Bitzinger 
(2011) on changes to Chinese production capacity and Grimmett and Kerr (2012) 
for an overview of the changing dynamics of production in ‘emerging powers’, 
principally Brazil and China).   
The literature on the nature and processes by which conventional weapons are 
transferred internationally is well developed.  This includes that which focuses on 
the dynamics of arms transfer processes (see for instance Stohl et al (2012) for a 
contemporary review of small arms transfer processes and problems, Lumpe eds. 
(2000) on the dynamics of the conventional arms trade, and Wood and Peleman 
(1999) on the role of arms brokers and intermediaries in facilitating arms transfers 
to fragile and conflict affected contexts).   Transfers from specific exporting 
destinations form an important sub-set of this literature (see for instance Lumpe 
(1999) on US arms transfer controls and Davis (2002) on the UK, France and 
Sweden.  A further important category of supply-side literature is that given to 
efforts to regulate the regional and international production and transfer of 
weapons (see for instance Chalmers, Greene and Wulf (1994) on the development 
of the UN Register of Conventional Weapons), Bauer (2003) on EU controls on 
conventional arms transfers, and Da Silva (2010), Holtom and Bromley (2011) and 
Prizeman (2012) for analysis of efforts to agree an international arms trade treaty.   
Finally, issues relating to the existence and management of arms holdings and 
stockpiles are examined in arms supply-side literatures.  For example Wilkinson 
(2006) argues for enhanced national and international controls on the stockpiling of 
ammunition and other explosive ordnance and Bevan and Karp (2008) focus on the 
challenges of disposing of surplus stockpiled weaponry to prevent it falling into 
illicit ownership.  In addition to primarily thematic research focusing on stockpile 
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issues, there have been numerous studies published which approach the issues 
from a regional or national perspective.  For instance Tracey (2011) published 
research focusing specifically on challenges of stockpile security in Africa, Miller 
(2003) focused on stockpiles in Yemen, Pyadushkin (2003) on Russia and Jackson 
(2010) on Albania.  
Collectively, these writers demonstrate significant understandings of the role of 
arms production, transfers and the challenges of managing and disposing of 
weapons stockpiles in stimulating and sustaining violent conflict, and as such, this 
work has relevance to the focus of this thesis.  However, given the primary focus is 
on both the post-war period and on the control of weapons which already exist in a 
given context, it is not the primary concern.  Therefore, whilst acknowledging the 
potential impacts of supply-side issues, this chapter does not review the literature 
on this subject in any significant detail.  However, demand-side factors are 
extremely important and the relevant literature is reviewed in the section which 
follows. 
In any context, there are numerous factors which drive the demand for SALW.  
These include the legitimate requirements of security and law enforcement 
agencies, self-defense, and ownership for sporting and recreational purposes.  
However, in fragile and conflict affected contexts, these demand factors are often 
distorted, with weapons procured by governments to enhance their abilities to 
impose a monopoly on the use of violence, to suppress dissent and enforce the rule 
of law; civilians taking up weapons for self-defence purposes where they feel that 
the State is not able or willing to protect them; and from opposition, insurgent and 
criminal groups that either contest the legitimacy of the State, or that wish to take 
advantage of weak government for essentially criminal ends.   
Over recent years, the literature has developed significantly as it relates to 
understanding the demand for SALW in different contexts.  Brauer and Muggah 
(2006) conclude that demand is driven by the interplay between ‘motivation’ and 
‘means’, or willingness or ability. They claim that whilst ultimately it is almost 
always the individual that acquires the weapon, the motivation for doing so is 
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derived in part by social construction and is embedded in various social priorities 
and cultural norms (2006: 2).  They describe means as either financial or other, such 
as organization or contacts; and motivation as a combination of private beliefs and 
attitudes, social relations and the larger scale cultural and historical environment.   
This concept was taken up by the Small Arms Survey in its annual yearbook of 2006 
in which the authors recommended that the design, implementation and 
monitoring and evaluation of small arms reduction programmes must be demand 
sensitive – and further, that (a) successful reduction programmes are sensitive to 
the political and social context in which they took place, and (b) those that take a 
participatory approach appear to be most successful of all (Small Arms Survey 
2006:142). 
These findings built on and supported earlier research by Atwood and Jackman 
(2000) which argued that demand was stimulated by:  poverty and economic 
inequality; lack of fundamental human rights; poor governance; malfunctioning 
post-conflict programmes such as DDR; and cultural attitudes and identify.  The 
authors examined the role of communities in shaping attitudes towards demand 
and improving control, identifying that:  (a) most successful community 
programmes are directed by the residents themselves; (b) communities must be 
able to identify their needs and community resources should wherever possible be 
used to meet these needs; (c) outside intervention should be based on local needs 
and ascertained via dialogue; (d) successful programmes are often directed at 
specific groups; (e) difficult groups should be involved and not sidestepped; and (f) 
that working with former combatants is beneficial and helps with peace promotion.  
Finally, and importantly for the focus of this thesis, they concluded that whilst some 
of the programmes directly targeted weapons, in others, they were seen as an 
exacerbating factor in wider problems relating to community conflict, insecurity 
and socio-political development; and further that addressing these problems often 
brought about a concomitant reduction in what Brauer and Muggah describe as the 
interplay between means and motivation, resulting in fewer weapons in a given 
context as a consequence (Atwood and Jackman, 2000:13-16). 
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The idea that if motivation in particular could be addressed then demand would be 
reduced, and fear of SALW and SALW violence could be reduced, was translated 
into programming efforts by the peacebuilding non-governmental organization, 
Saferworld in 2005.  The initial focus of their activity was the Western Balkan 
countries of Kosovo, Serbia, Bosnia Herzegovina and Macedonia.  Each of these 
countries had been the subject of repeated and often unsuccessful efforts to 
control SALW in the aftermath of the various violent conflicts that had affected the 
region in the preceding decade (Chapter 3 of this thesis contains a review of these 
efforts).  Saferworld worked with local organizations in each case to identify areas 
in which SALW violence and fear of violence was high and where there was 
circumstantial evidence that SALW availability and ownership was significant and 
potentially destabilizing.  They developed a participatory engagement methodology 
which drew on the principals of participatory rural appraisal and worked over a 
period of at least 18 months in each case with local organizations to implement it.   
The concept was that through working with communities, encouraging them to 
identify their safety and security problems, and then supporting their engagement 
with local government, security actors and others to jointly develop responses, this 
would address the immediate needs identified by communities, empower 
community members to interact with local power holders, and encourage joint 
working across family, clan or other lines for the collective benefit of the 
community.  The overarching impact that the project sought to achieve was an 
increase in perceived and real security, derived from greater social cohesion and 
improved service provision.  A valuable corollary in several cases, including in 
Kosovo was that as confidence and security improved, the community came 
forwards to hand in to the authorities weapons that they had acquired during the 
preceding period of violent conflict (Sokolova and Smith, 2006).  The concept of 
community security, which Saferworld used to frame its work in the Balkans (which 
was then adapted and applied in numerous countries around the world, and 
influenced the thinking and programming of major international agencies including 
UNDP (see for instance McLean’s report from 2009 for UNDP which outlined an 
approach to Community Security and Social Cohesion which drew on a wide range 
61 
 
of community-based programmes which aimed to increase public security and 
through this, to improve community cohesion and resilience to future insecurity 
(McLean 2009), or Miller (2009) for a methodology published by UNIDIR for how to 
undertake community security programming) and governments including the 
United Kingdom), drew heavily on the more established and widely known concept 
of human security (UNDP, 1994; Krause, 2009). 
2.3.1 SALW, the UN and the UN Programme of Action on Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects 
As this concept was developing internationally, the United National Secretary 
General’s Supplement to an Agenda for Peace was published, which sought to 
outline the “hard decisions” (A/50/60 - S/1995/1:1995; para 6) which the SG 
believed UN member states needed to make in order for the organisation to make a 
telling contribution to global peace and security in the light of the end of the cold 
war were broader than just the international interest in the concept of human 
security and the useful framing that it provided described above.  This document 
included specific reference to SALW and their role in undermining peace and 
security.   
 
In the Supplement to  an Agenda for Peace, the UN Secretary General stated that 
there were four main reasons why light weapons needed to be controlled more 
effectively: the proliferation that took place during the cold war period; internal 
conflicts, some of which were stimulated as part of the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and of the bilateral power struggle between the USSR and USA and their allies; 
increased competition for international markets; and criminal activity exacerbated 
by the collapse of governmental law and order (Laurence and Meek 1996:7). They 
go on to describe the UN Secretary General’s position paper as a call to action 
rather than an agenda or framework for action, and claim that this call was heeded 
both by interested governments and a galvanised community of policy makers and 
academics. In the remaining years of the decade, considerable effort was thus 
invested in trying to understand why precisely SALW was a problem and what 
exactly could be done to address it.   
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Uribe de Lozano (in Boutwell and Klare, 1999:161-173) writes that modern 
international attempts to tackle aspects of conventional weapons proliferation 
followed the First Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament, which 
was held in 1978.  This session looked at both the gradual reduction of conventional 
weapons and potential limitations on the transfers of such weapons.  Following 
this, momentum built up during 1980s including in the 43rd session of the General 
Assembly in 1988 which focussed specifically on arms transfers for the first time 
(resolution 43/75). 
 
She also claims that growing concern about the global spread of SALW and risks 
posed to peacekeepers was the rationale for GA resolution 50/70 B adopted at the 
50th General Assembly in 1995, which focussed on SALW specifically and stimulated 
the work of Panel of Governmental Experts commissioned by the UN SG.  The Panel 
began its work in 1996 and reported in 1997. The report covered several areas, 
including safeguarding stockpiles and surplus SALW disposal.  It also recommended 
that the UN Secretary General consider organising an international conference to 
look at illicit SALW in all its aspects. A further resolution (52/38 J) authorised the 
Secretary General to make further progress on the issue including establishing a 
new GGE to review progress and discussion began in earnest on convening an 
international conference on the issue. 
In the period leading up (and subsequent) to the agreement of the UNPoA in 2001, 
a group of academics and others played a significant role in trying to work through 
the dimensions of the SALW problem and to address specific policy 
recommendations for inclusion in the UNPoA and other international and regional 
agreements.  Perhaps the two most significant interventions of this kind were the 
Small Arms Survey, a project of the Graduate School of International Relations in 
Geneva, and the Biting the Bullet Project, a collaboration between Bradford 
University and the peace and security non-governmental organisations Saferworld 
and International Alert.  The Small Arms Survey made significant attempts, most 
notably in their annual yearbook, the first edition of which was prepared just prior 
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to the UN PoA conference in July 2001 (Small Arms Survey, 2001) to understand 
which the main producers of SALW were, the means by which SALW are transferred 
from one user to another, the impacts of SALW proliferation and misuse and 
surveyed the initiatives that had been taken to date to address the issue at the 
national, regional and international levels.  The Biting the Bullet project published a 
series of 16 briefing papers which aimed to address all the significant areas of SALW 
control that the authors believed should be included in a final international 
agreement.4   
Finally in 2001, following several years of discussion and further development of 
the concept of SALW control at the United Nations, as well as regionally in certain 
parts of the world, particularly in Europe  and West Africa (where Mali had played a 
critical role in stimulating international interest in the issue following a request to 
the UN to support disarmament activities at the end of a period of intense civil war) 
the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (hereafter the UNPoA) was agreed 
by consensus at the UN Headquarters in New York.  
                                                       
4 These included:  Regional Initiatives and the UN 2001 Conference (Clegg, Greene, 
Meek et alI, 2000); Stockpile Security and Reducing Surplus Weapons (Greene, 
2001); The UN Firearms Protocol: Considerations for the UN 2001 Conference 
(O’Callaghan and Meek, 2000); Enhancing Traceability of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons flows: developing an international marking and tracing regime (Greene, 
2001a); Combating the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons: enhancing 
controls on legal transfers (Clegg and Greene, 2000); Combating the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons: Strengthening Domestic Regulations (Cukier, 2001); 
Controlling Arms Brokering and Transport Agents (Clegg and Crowley, 2000); Private 
Military Companies and the Proliferation of Small Arms (Makki, Meek and Musah, 
2001); Putting Children First: Building a Framework for Addressing the Impact of 
Small Arms on Children (Stohl, 2000); Reducing the stock of the Illicit Trade: 
Promoting Best Practice in Weapons Collection Programmes (Clegg, Faltas, 
McDonald, et al, 2001); Building comprehensive Controls on Small Arms 
Manufacturing, transfer and end-use (Crowley, Isbister and Meek, 2001); 
Implementing the UN Action Programme for Combatting the Illicit Trafficking in 
Small Arms and Light weapons in All its Aspects (Clegg, Crowley, Greene et al, 
2001). 
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The UN PoA is broad in its scope and ambitious in its intent.  It sets out a range of 
commitments that states agreed to implement nationally as well as initiatives that 
should be taken regionally and internationally to support implementation 
(UN:A/CONF 192/15). Importantly for this thesis, the PoA contains significant 
references to related issues of peace and security, disarmament and development 
which suggest a level of recognition amongst drafters of the interrelated nature of 
SALW to a range of factors which drive insecurity, sustain conflict and undermine 
development.  Specific references included an acknowledgement that SALW sustain 
conflict (page 5, para 5); and inter-alia commitments to destroy surplus and 
collected weapons (page 10, para 16), ensure stockpile security and management 
(page 10, para 17), promote confidence building through SALW control activities in 
conflict affected contexts (page 11, para 20), and implement effective DDR 
programmes (page 20, para 21).  These aspects of SALW control had been practiced 
in different forms prior to the UNPoA being agreed.  However, the UNPoA was the 
first time that they had been brought together as part of an international 
agreement which explicitly related them to reducing conflict and promoting 
security for individuals as well as states.   
The agreement of the UNPoA at the end of July 2001 was a watershed moment for 
many of those interested in SALW control.  Whilst some groups, particularly some 
international NGOs (Laurance and Stohl, 2002:26) condemned the contents and 
nature of the agreement as a failure, many others saw it as an imperfect but 
nevertheless important international focus for future action at all levels.  The 
agreement of the UNPoA, the first significant international initiative of any sort 
relating to SALW in a fairly broad sense was due to the actions of many individuals 
and groups in many countries from around the world.  However, in their different 
ways, both the Biting the Bullet and Small Arms Survey initiatives can claim to have 
had some influence over its final contents and over efforts since to transform what 
is essentially a series of political commitments into operational activities.   
The Small Arms Survey has been published annually since 2001 and the Biting the 
Bullet Project continues to organise dialogue opportunities for policy makers and 
others on specific aspects of PoA implementation and publish reports on specific 
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aspects, most notably in recent years on the issue of the diversion of SALW to illicit 
end uses or end users (see for example Greene and Kirkham, 2009).  Both initiatives 
have played an important role in monitoring the implementation of the UNPoA and 
in exploring the needs for further policy development.   
The Biting the Bullet Project published three major reports of book length which 
sought to review progress made by states in implementing their UNPoA-and related 
commitments.  They were organised thematically, covering the main topics 
included in the PoA: at the national level, the establishment of national 
coordinating agencies and points of contact, and legislative and administrative 
procedures relating to SALW transfers, illicit manufacture, possession and trade and 
relating to stockpiles, disarmament, weapons collection and destruction.  They also 
contained significant sections focussing on reviewing implementation progress at 
the regional and national levels.  However, important as they were to the 
development of understandings among policy makers, international and non-
governmental organisations and others, they focussed strongly what they saw as 
the core elements of UNPoA implementation and closely associated the contents of 
their reports with the international SALW control priorities of the day.  
Consequently they did not look in any great depth at some of the issues which were 
included in the non-operative parts of the UNPoA, including crucially the 
relationships between SALW control and peacebuilding:  Whilst their assessment of 
states performance in implementing their UNPoA commitments was often rigorous, 
quite how they related to other activities, including peacebuilding was not a 
significant focus. 
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2.3.3 SALW control as disarmament diplomacy and public policy 
One of the major critiques of the UNPoA was that it didn’t recognise fully the public 
health and other impacts on society of SALW proliferation, and that consequently, 
SALW control remained an issue rooted in international relations and disarmament 
diplomacy rather than being addressed through public policy making responses.  In 
this light, Krause (2007), building on earlier work by Laurance and Stohl (2002), 
makes a distinction between efforts to control SALW that relate to the well-
established fields of international disarmament diplomacy, arms control and norm 
building, and what he describes as ‘public policy’ approaches, which place greater 
focus on addressing the causes and impacts of weapons proliferation and misuse.  
In this grouping he includes the importance of those attempting to control SALW 
engaging closely with communities focussing on issues including criminal justice, 
public health, development, humanitarian action and human rights (Krause.2007: 
8). 
One of the main criteria he uses to make the distinction between these two 
categories and types of approach is the focus of the intervention: the first being 
essentially about multilateral diplomacy focussing on the SALW as an artefact to be 
controlled; and the second focussing on their causes and effects. He categorises 
these different areas as first and second generation control measures. Krause 
makes the case for greater focus on what he calls second generation issues which in 
his description have a stronger focus on demand-side factors, in opposition to first 
generation measures which historically have focussed more on supply issues.  He 
sets out the main areas of SALW control that he considers should be located in the 
second generation set of measures:  Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (DDR), small arms and Security Sector Reform programmes (SSR), 
national regulation of civilian possession, and armed violence prevention and 
reduction (AVPR) programmes (Krause 2007:8). 
For this thesis, completed in 2013, this distinction is no longer new, although at the 
time it was written, the increased focus on armed violence reduction programmes 
in particular was an important departure.  During the first decade of the 2000s it is 
undoubtedly the case that a much greater focus was placed on demand side issues.  
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The development of the concept of armed violence reduction, framed 
internationally through the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and 
Development, which responded to a perception that SALW control efforts had 
focussed on large scale violent conflict and post-conflict contexts over the impact of 
gun violence in contexts characterized by social and criminal violence is a case-in-
point.  The concerted effort by some governments and international NGOs to 
promote an armed violence reduction agenda advocated an inclusive public policy 
focussed approach to dealing with the causes and effects of armed violence rather 
than focussing on weapons as artefacts, as they argued had been the case 
previously.   During this period, the interrelations between SALW control and other 
areas of security building such as DDR and SSR were established.   
Whilst Krause undoubtedly captured some of the main trends in understandings of 
SALW and their relationship to security, public health, crime and other related 
areas, there is a significant gap in his paper which this thesis aims to contribute to 
addressing.  The distinction between first and second generation SALW control is 
compelling.  However, his second generation policy responses focus almost 
exclusively on instrumental, usually top-down, security-building measures; 
reforming militaries and police, dealing with former combatants following the end 
of formal conflict.  There is arguably another - possibly third generation - set of 
approaches which could contribute to enhancing the control over SALW and 
reducing their impact on security, development, human rights and other related 
areas.  This could include areas of positive peacebuilding ranging from political 
settlement of conflict to local-level peacebuilding activities.  The research 
conducted for this thesis aims to explore the interrelations between SALW and a 
wide range of peacebuilding activities, including both the areas described by Krause 
(which can be designed as either security, confidence of peacebuilding 
interventions) and this third group of specific peacebuilding approaches. 
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2.3.4 The development of activities to control SALW  
One of the earliest attempts to identify the different SALW control activities that 
could be undertaken in post-war contexts was produced by Laurence and Meek in 
1996. This work is important both for understanding the issue of the control of 
SALW and its interrelationships with other issues, including security- and peace- 
building and peacekeeping and for beginning to develop technical approaches to 
SALW control.  It is one of the defining texts of the period in the mid-1990s in which 
SALW began to receive serious attention from academics and policy makers alike.  
Rather than focussing primarily on the effects of SALW on conflict, Laurence 
attends to the ways in which disarmament could be affected and the positive 
benefits that this could accrue for communities affected by violence perpetrated by 
SALW. 
Laurence and Meek provide an introduction to the issue, citing the end of the Cold 
War as a primary factor in the increased focus on SALW as a contributor to violent 
conflict.  They provide a review of progress within the UN system to address SALW 
control challenges, introduce some of the tools that could be useful in practical 
disarmament activities and discuss what they describe as micro disarmament in 
practice (Laurance and Meek, 2006:19).  It is this section which is of most relevance 
for this thesis.  Laurance and Meek focus on three areas of particular importance:  
post-conflict peacebuilding; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; and 
SALW collection and reduction strategies. 
The most significant point of relevance to this thesis made by the authors in this 
paper is that small arms control has obvious interrelationships with DDR 
programmes and specifically as it relates to the first ‘D’ – disarmament.  They set 
out the reasons for why careful disarmament is essential as a micro-disarmament 
activity in post-conflict peacebuilding, including the importance of protecting 
stockpiles of collected weapons and of collecting all weapons in the possession of 
combatants.  Writing 15 years after the original publication, these observations no 
longer seem new.  However at the time, this was one of the first serious attempts 
to describe some of the relationships between SALW control and related areas of 
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what Ramsbotham et al call the security and law and order sectors in their model 
for analysing post-conflict peacebuilding.   
Since the publication of this paper, a great deal has been written about different 
approaches, sectors and techniques for controlling SALW, which range from direct 
approaches such as DDR and SSR through to those which focus more on changing 
the socio-economic and political environment in contexts in which SALW are 
deemed a particular challenge.  Of particular interest to this thesis are post-war 
disarmament and reform of the security sector: 
2.3.5 Post-war ‘disarmament’ and weapons control 
Ramsbotham et al (2005:14) include various disarmament related issues within 
their menu of tactical responses to the initial de-escalation phases included in their 
Hourglass Model.  Muggah (2005) makes the distinction between disarmament 
efforts which target former combatants and those which primarily target civilians.  
He suggests that the two most developed responses to these different actors and 
their attendant needs are DDR for former combatants and Weapons Reduction 
programmes to address civilian owned weapons.  From the literatures reviewed for 
this thesis it is possible to add a third dimension, Security Sector Reform.  
2.3.5.1 Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration 
Lamb (2008:3) charts the development of DDR as a concept, identifying roots in the 
first and second World Wars and further back to the Anglo-Boer wars in 1902. He 
concurs with Muggah’s assessment that DDR is in simple terms a process which 
aims to disarm former combatants and (re) introduce them into society, either as 
civilians or as part of military or security structures such as the army or police.  
Lamb describes the different initiatives that have been generated at the 
international level over recent years.  He begins with the World Bank, which he 
claims was the dominant actor for many years.  Muggah agrees with this 
assessment and claims that part of the reason why DDR programmes have failed to 
meet expectations is that that their disarmament dimension has often not received 
the attention that was required, in part at least as a consequence of the difficulties 
that the World Bank has had in terms of its mandate to engage on peacekeeping-
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related issues or provide direct support for disarming former combatants (Muggah, 
2005:244).  The attempt by the UN to develop a comprehensive approach to DDR, 
the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) 
was important for several reasons, not least because it represented a recognition of 
the fact that DDR could not exist in a post-war space as a stand-alone activity, and 
highlighted the importance both of phasing, and of coordinating or integrating DDR 
activities with other peace- and security building activities taking place at the same 
time. Thus, and importantly for this thesis, the importance of contingency and 
complementarity discussed earlier in this chapter was recognised (Lamb 2008: 23). 
This acknowledgement drew on previous work undertaken through the auspices of 
the Stockholm Initiative on DDR in 2005 and the development of a DDR best 
practices handbook in 2004.  In both cases, the importance of linking to other 
programmes comprising what Muggah refers to as the post-conflict orthodoxy 
(2005:242) and understanding the critical issues of phasing was recognised.  The 
DDR practical Field and Classroom Guide attempted to map the different stages of 
DDR against a time continuum with the disarmament and demobilisation phases 
taking place in the immediate post-war period following the signing of a peace 
agreement or accord (as part of what they termed Peace Enforcement Operations), 
with the remaining programme elements following later and connecting to wider 
development programming.   
The issue of integration with other peace and security building activities in post-
conflict settings, specifically security sector reform is taken up by Brzoska 
(2005:104).  He claims that activities which are commonly associated with SSR, 
including police reform, rule of law and defence reform are seen as downstream 
priorities and not part of the immediate priorities of post-war contexts.  Whilst 
recognising that this might be the case, he also makes the claim that better 
understanding the relationships that exist over time (contingencies) requires 
further research – pointing to the very real connection between the success of 
reinsertion/reintegration programmes and criminality and the relationships this has 
with police reform and other elements of SSR.  However, despite the temporal 
connections made between actions, Brzoska does not assess the opportunities for 
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greater complementarity between elements of DDR and SSR offered by Lederach’s 
concept of nested paradigms which could envisage a range of security and peace 
building activities taking place at the same time where appropriate as well as 
sequenced over time to meet the requirements of a changing context. 
The University of Bradford led a research project which culminated in 2008 which 
explored DDR and Human Security.  The project assessed the coordination and 
integration challenges between DDR and other post-conflict security building 
activities, including SALW control (Greene and Urquhart, 2008) and SSR (Rynn and 
Greene, 2008).  The project identified a range of ways in which coordination and 
integration could be improved to enhance outcomes for poor and vulnerable 
people.  However they stopped short of recommending the level of integration 
which had been suggested by others, claiming instead that whilst integration might 
be possible between certain sets of activities and at particular levels of 
engagement, this was not always beneficial, and in these cases, closer coordination 
would be preferable.   
Muggah provides a more critical assessment of the concept of DDR and the way in 
which it is implemented.  He claimed four major challenges in trying to identify 
whether and to what extent DDR and, to a lesser extent, attempts to disarm 
civilians has been effective, and thus how valuable it is as part of wider approaches 
to post-war security- and peace- building:  (1) that success is poorly defined and is 
often judged by the number of weapons that are collected rather than whether the 
programme had any substantive impact on the security of affected populations; (2) 
there is ambiguity as to what DDR programmes are actually for; (3) expectations are 
often mismanaged with donors and host populations and governments alike 
believing that they will have more wide-ranging and faster effects than in reality is 
possible; and (4), that funding allocated to DDR programmes is often grossly 
insufficient given the severe challenges implicit in the goals of DDR (Muggah, 
2005:247/8). 
72 
 
2.3.5.2 Security Sector or System Reform 
Perhaps the most commonly accepted interpretation of the concept of SSR is that 
developed by the OECD in its 2005 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance.  They claim that there are 
three elements to successful reform of a given security system: firstly the 
development of a clear set of institutional arrangements for the provision of 
security which includes all relevant actors; secondly, action to strengthen 
governance of security institutions; and finally to build capable and professional 
security forces that are accountable to civil authorities. (OECD, 2007:13). 
 
Bryden and Hanggi (2005) provide a useful overview of the origins of SSR and an 
early exploration of the issues, which have since developed as a significant body of 
literature. They claim that SSR as it is understood and implemented today 
developed as a concept and an activity for three main reasons, each of which can 
be traced back to the period following the end of the Cold War.  The first relates to 
the desire on the part of Western states to develop relationships with the security 
institutions of the newly independent former Warsaw Pact countries.  The second 
reason is the emphasis that development agencies, led by DFID in the UK, placed on 
the relationship between development and insecurity and the role that security 
actors and institutions could play both in creating the conditions in which 
development could take hold, but also the damage that insecurity could do in terms 
of undermining development efforts.  Finally, they state that an increased interest 
in the post-Cold War period in what has become known as post-conflict 
reconstruction or peacebuilding brought with it an interest in the reform and 
development of security and justice actors as part of wider reconstruction and 
peacebuilding efforts (Bryden and Hanggi, 2005: 23-24). 
 
Hanggi (2009:339) discusses the still-contentious understandings of the terms 
security ‘sector’ or ‘system’ reform.  He claims that narrower interpretations of the 
concept which focus on security institutions and more specifically on their 
effectiveness in providing security are often described using the term Security 
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Sector Reform. Later interpretations which were framed increasingly in terms of the 
relationship between security and development were often described as Security 
System Reform. In recent years, this term has been challenged and a new 
terminology offered which describes interventions in terms of Security and Justice, 
placing emphasis on the outcomes (improvements in security and justice) rather 
than the organisations, institutions or reform activities (a better trained police 
force) that give rise to them.  In its 2009 White Paper, the UK Government DFID 
committed to treating security and justice as basic services and subordinated SSR 
(security sector reform in this case) to this commitment. It also committed to 
prioritising improvements in security and justice in conflict affected environments, 
making the link explicit between security and justice outcomes, SSR as a 
contributory intervention and post-war peacebuilding (DFID, 2009:75).  This 
commitment was further developed in 2011 with the publication of the UK 
Government’s Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS), which represents a cross-
governmental commitment to peacebuilding and conflict prevention.  BSOS placed 
increased emphasis on the importance of security and justice from a defence and 
diplomatic perspective as well as a development priority (Her Majesty’s 
Government 2011:12). 
There has been a significant amount of research and analysis over recent years on 
the role that SSR can have in post-war peacebuilding efforts.  One of the earlier 
contributions was produced by Cawthra and Luckham (2003), which emphasised 
the importance of accountability and oversight issues in SSR activities.  Further, 
those with an interest in post-conflict peacebuilding frameworks (see for instance 
Schnabel (2002); Lund (2003); Tschirgi (2004); Chetail (2010); Ramsbotham et al 
(2011)) have identified SSR as both a sector intervention, a priority in early phases 
of post-war peacebuilding and a desired outcome of reform efforts.   
In addition, and of importance to the focus of this thesis there have been efforts to 
understand the relationship between SSR and efforts to control small arms.  For 
instance, Ebo (2005) analyses the role of SALW control in SSR activities in Liberia, 
and Albrecht and Jackson (2010) discuss SALW control in the context of an analysis 
of SSR efforts in Sierra Leone.  Areas of activity which have both a SALW control 
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dimension and which could be included within an SSR framework, including DDR 
and military-defence reform have been examined from a range of different 
perspectives (see for instance Richards and Smith (2007) for the regulation of 
private security providers and its impacts on SALW control through SSR).  The 
University of Bradford and Saferworld conducted research in 2008 on the 
opportunities for integration and coordination between SALW control and SSR 
activities in terms of their contributions to improving human security (Greene and 
Hiscock, 2008).  However this research did not focus explicitly on immediate post-
war environments or on the relationships between SALW control, SSR and 
peacebuilding activities. Therefore, to-date there has not been a significant analysis 
of the relationships between SALW control and SSR in post-war environments in 
terms of their interrelationships with peacebuilding activities.   
Finally as regards SSR and its relationship to the hypothesis and analytical 
framework, is the literature relating to local ownership of SSR activities.  The 
importance of the ownership by affected governments of the SSR activities taking 
place in their countries is recognised by the OCED, which states,  
“Experience shows that reform processes will not succeed in the absence of 
commitment and ownership on the part of those undertaking reforms.  Assistance 
should be designed to support partner governments and stakeholders as they move 
down a path of reform, rather than determining the path and leading them down it” 
(OECD, 2004). 
Nathan (2007) took the principle of local ownership a step further in his book No 
Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector 
Reform.  He argues that in addition to the ownership and active participation of 
governments in affected countries, SSR activities should also involve, and 
wherever possible enjoy the consent of the public.  Further, and of particular 
relevance to the development of the analytical framework developed later in 
this chapter, he identifies three main contextual factors as a significant 
determinant of the success of a given SSR activity.  These are (a) the nature of 
the political system; (b) the extent of political leadership; and (c) the capacity of 
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government and civil society institutions to both undertake and benefit from SSR 
efforts.    
2.3.5.3 SALW control in post-conflict contexts 
SALW control activities have been particularly prevalent in countries emerging from 
periods of violent conflict since 2001.  In part this was in response to increased 
international engagement with the concept of liberal state-building, post-war 
reconstruction and stabilisation discussed earlier in this chapter. In part though it 
was also the logical extension of the interrelationships established by Klare, Greene, 
Krause, Laurance and others prior to 2001. These approaches to SALW control in 
post-war environments have been designed by various regional and international 
agencies and initiatives.  This has been explored as part of previous work by the 
author of this thesis from the perspective of understanding the interrelationships 
between SALW and security building activities in countries emerging from periods 
of violent conflict.  It drew on a desk review of countries that had experienced 
violent conflict and in which efforts to control SALW had been undertaken, 
identifying the main methods by which SALW control had been attempted and 
described their specific roles in a post-conflict context (Smith, 2010).   
The research suggested that the priorities for SALW control in post-conflict contexts 
may differ from those at other times and described the types of SALW control 
which have been prioritised in post-conflict contexts, identifying where applicable 
its relationships with other aspects of security building and provision.  The main 
elements can be summarised as follows: 
 SALW collection programmes 
Muggah (2005:224) categorises civilian disarmament efforts as either ‘command’ 
driven or ‘voluntary’.  Command-driven activities include search and seize 
operations and are usually located within peacekeeping operations, whereas 
voluntary activities tend to be based on collective or individual incentives.   
Voluntary disarmament has generated a significant amount of literature since the 
middle of the 1990s in part driven by the significant number of post-war 
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disarmament initiatives supported by the UN, its various agencies and a variety of 
regional and national bodies.  This subject is discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis and as such is not reviewed in depth here.  The following introduction is 
however useful to situate civilian disarmament within the wider range of post-
conflict SALW control options.  
High levels of weapons possession need not in itself be a problem (for instance, 
Canada and Switzerland have very high per capita levels of civilian weapons 
ownership but relatively little SALW violence) and as society becomes more 
peaceful, people may have less motivation to own or use weapons illegally. 
However, during the recovery period, when competition for power and resources is 
typically intense and the role of the state both contested and weak, those 
supporting SALW control programmes often prioritise attempts to reduce both the 
quantities of weapons in circulation and the motivations for using them.  
Weapons collection can take many forms. For example, weapons owned by ‘official’ 
security actors such as the police or military can be collected and inventoried prior 
to being reallocated as part of demobilisation or defence reform programmes (see 
above). Another key target in immediate post-conflict contexts is weapons held by 
civilians who were not formal combatants (often termed ‘Weapons Collection’, 
‘Weapons Surrender’ or ‘Civilian Weapons Control’). This has sometimes been 
linked to incentive schemes to encourage civilians to hand in weapons in exchange 
for either personal or community-based advantages. These vary from ‘buying back’ 
weapons from civilians, as attempted in Croatia (Greene, Bourne, Yankey et al, 
2003), to weapons in exchange for the chance of personal material gain (such as 
weapons for lottery tickets in Macedonia, (Rynn, Taylor, Wood et al, 2005:97), to 
weapons in exchange for development programmes, as attempted in Albania 
(Faltas and Paes, 2003) and Kosovo (Sokolová, Richards and Smith, 2006:78). More 
recently, attempts to provide direct personal benefit combined with improvements 
in opportunities to access education and alternative livelihoods have been designed 
and analysed (see Weiss (2011) for a review of civilian disarmament in Liberia). 
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 SALW destruction programmes 
Several regional and international agreements state that surplus weapons should 
be destroyed, particularly in post-war environments when control over stockpiles is 
often weak (see Karp (2009) on destruction of surplus SALW). However, states 
interpret the word ‘surplus’ in very different ways. Sometimes, weapons that are 
collected are indeed destroyed (Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Sri Lanka have 
undertaken significant public weapons-destruction events as a demonstration of 
intent and to send signals to those still owning weapons illegally). In many cases, 
however, only unusable weapons are destroyed, while serviceable weapons are not 
considered ‘surplus’ but are incorporated into state stocks or considered available 
for domestic sale or export.  
 Cross-border and arms transfer control measures 
Wars are fuelled by the transfer of weapons into conflict-affected areas, both 
legally and illegally (see discussion on supply-side measures earlier in this chapter). 
An effective system of national and international controls is required to ensure that 
SALW transferred legally do not undermine security and to prevent illicit shipments 
of weapons into conflict zones. Just as importantly, however, following the end of 
violence the same weapons may be re-sold to criminals, insurgent groups and 
sometimes other governments, often within the same geographic region (See, for 
instance UNSC, 2001: para 21). Reducing illicit outflows of weapons is thus equally 
important to prevent future conflict in neighbouring countries as well as further 
afield. Achieving this is a complicated process which includes more effective border 
management and security and close cooperation between law-enforcement and 
intelligence agencies across borders (see for instance Seniora and Poitrevin (2010) 
for an analysis of measures to control SALW movements across land borders). 
 Legislative and regulatory measures 
In the period immediately following the end of violence, there may often be only a 
weak legal basis and little or no policy framework for a range of different activities 
focussed on promoting recovery and development. Governance in general is often 
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fragile, with poor institutional organisation and communication, further 
complicated by chronic under-resourcing and international agencies competing for 
the attention of local decision-makers. Without a clear legislative or regulatory 
basis, any form of SALW control is very challenging. Clarity on issues such as who 
has the right to bear arms; what sorts of weapons they can own; the circumstances 
in which they can be used; and the process by which unregistered or illegal 
weapons can be surrendered, is important for planning effective SALW control 
activities.  In the first and second phases of the Ramsbotham et al post-conflict 
peacebuilding model, achieving this will be difficult. However it is an essential 
element of phase three (government) onwards and preparation for this should be 
undertaken as soon as possible (demonstrating the importance of the nested 
paradigm concept embedded in the model). 
 SALW Surveys 
SALW control programmes normally fail when they are not based on a clear 
understanding of both the nature of the problem and the potential benefits and 
drawbacks of the solutions on offer (SEESAC, 2006a). Surveys are a useful way of 
attempting to capture this information, and are increasingly used as a baseline 
against which progress and success can be judged. A small number of specialist 
non-governmental organisations and university research centres have developed a 
specialism in this area over recent years, undertaking survey work on behalf of 
national governments and international agencies, principally the UNDP (see for 
instance Holtom et al, 2005; Sokolová, Richards and Smith, 2006; Saferworld et al, 
2007; Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment, No 15, 2009).  As this area has 
developed, methodologies have become increasingly sophisticated, often explicitly 
aiming to capture the relationships between weapons ownership and misuse, and 
related issues such as the capacity of the state to promote security and justice 
services for their populations (see for instance Saferworld et al, 2007). 
 SALW awareness and communications strategies 
Public education activities, which can support efforts to control SALW, are now 
commonplace. For instance, the international NGO Saferworld has supported 
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numerous ‘Ballot not Bullets’ campaigns in places in South Asia where SALW 
violence has traditionally played an important role during elections, such as 
Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Local and national organisations often run awareness 
campaigns, ranging from radio shows through to street actions and events (for 
further information about the role of awareness raising in SALW control see Coe 
and Smith, 2003; Rynn and Desvignes, 2003).  Where progress has been made on 
awareness and communications, this has not been as evident in engaging 
populations in diagnosing problems and monitoring and holding to account those 
responsible for projects – a critical aspect of the ‘legitimacy’ required for conflict 
transformation. 
 Management of information 
Reliable information is often hard to come by in post-conflict environments. This is 
especially the case with sensitive issues such as weapons ownership and use. 
Furthermore, communications channels between those responsible for different 
aspects of SALW management are usually weak and sometimes non-existent. 
Improving the operational exchange of information, as well as the development of 
integrated policy is frequently a stated intention but in many cases is unsuccessful 
due to the extremely contested and confused nature of governance which often 
characterises post-war environments. 
 SALW stockpile management and security 
This includes activities such as securing stockpiles held by non-state combatant 
groups as well as by state security actors. In some contexts, facilities for stockpile 
security are limited: there are no written inventories of weapons or to whom they 
have been given; ammunition is often stored with weapons; and the stores in which 
weapons are kept are poorly secured, providing opportunities for both semi-official 
‘losses’ and large-scale thefts by criminal or other armed groups (as happened 
during the collapse of the Soviet Union) (Greene, Bourne, Yankey et al, 2003:94). 
Post-conflict transitions usually involve resource shortages and often a significant 
reduction in defence expenditure; in such circumstances, stockpile management is 
not only about preventing theft, but just as importantly about preventing 
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explosions in poorly managed ammunition stocks (see for instance Greene, Holt 
and Wilkinson, 2005:8-10). 
The major omission in the research described above is that it focussed exclusively 
on the relationships between SALW and SALW control and security building, with 
very limited focus placed on peacebuilding activities.  So whilst it goes some way to 
helping to explore the relationships between efforts to control SALW and some of 
the factors (i.e. insecurity) which may underpin and drive violence and conflict, it 
does not provide evidence either of the ways in which SALW control can positively 
impact peace, or of how efforts to promote peace can or should interrelate with 
efforts to control SALW. 
2.4 The overarching research question, hypothesis and 
main sub-questions 
The following section draws together the different literatures discussed above and 
identifies their relevance to the hypothesis and main research questions below 
which frames this thesis, and which the research tests.  It builds on and elaborates 
the overarching research question, hypothesis, sub-questions and research strategy 
introduced and justified in Chapter 1.  It begins by locating the research questions 
and hypothesis within the literatures reviewed in this Chapter.  It does this by 
identifying which of the literatures reviewed are of particular importance and 
relevance before demonstrating specifically the areas within which a research 
contribution will be made.  The research strategy which was briefly introduced in 
Chapter 1 is then elaborated in the context of the relevant literatures before the 
research approach and methodology is further developed through reviewing 
literature relevant to the chosen mixed-methods approach and by describing and 
discussing the different research methods employed.   
The overarching research question which this thesis seeks to contribute towards is: 
   
What are the interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and build peace in 
countries emerging from periods of violent conflict? 
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This question has been designed in an attempt to address a real problem: SALW 
control efforts often take place in the context of conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding activities in periods following violent conflict.  However, the evidence 
(see Chapter 3) suggests that there is more that could be done to increase the 
positive effect of these programmes; further it suggests that in some cases, poorly 
conceived and implemented SALW control activities can have a negative impact on 
conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts.  Similarly, it is the case that conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding processes that are seen as illegitimate, exclusionary or 
ineffective by those affected by conflict can damage the legitimacy and effect of 
SALW control programmes that take place over similar time and space.   
 
Understanding more precisely and in more depth how conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding efforts and SALW control activities interrelate is important in 
enhancing their positive contributions, both to their immediate aims and to wider 
peacebuilding and conflict transformation objectives. It is also very interesting from 
a wider thematic perspective to better understanding the interaction between 
programmes to address relatively specific sectoral issues and problems  (such as IDP 
return, SALW control, and anti-corruption) and overall peace-building processes in 
post-conflict contexts. 
 
The hypothesis that guides the research and analysis for this thesis has been 
developed to reflect the three main variables identified as of particular importance 
in the first major sections of this Chapter, as well as the authors experience of 
working on conflict prevention and SALW control issues.  They are contingency, 
complementarity and context.   The hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Efforts to control SALW can have a positive or negative effect on post-conflict 
peacebuilding; conversely their success can be damaged or enhanced by 
peacebuilding activities.  The interrelationships that exist between SALW control 
and peacebuilding are both temporal and spatial and are conditioned by the extent 
to which affected populations are involved.  Therefore, the role and influence of 
local people, and the extent to which complementarity and contingency is 
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understood and acted upon have a determining effect on the positive benefits of 
SALW in post-conflict peacebuilding. 
Whilst the overarching research question and hypothesis frames and provides the 
parameters for this research, an additional group of specific sub-questions have 
been developed which elaborate each of the three variables stated above.  These 
questions are introduced and justified as part of the overall statement of the 
problem that this thesis aims to resolve in Chapter 1 and are as follows: 
Category 1: The effect of contingency on interrelationships  
 At what stages of de-escalation is the control of SALW relevant to 
peacebuilding efforts, and to what extent are SALW control activities 
located within existing phases of post-conflict peacebuilding? 
 How does the nature of SALW control activity change over different phases 
of post-conflict peacebuilding? 
 To what extent is the concept of nested paradigms appropriate to efforts to 
control SALW? 
 
Category 2: The effect of complementarity on interrelationships 
 What are the relevant intra- and inter- sectoral relationships between 
efforts to control SALW and recognised post-conflict peacebuilding 
interventions? 
 
Category 3: The effect of context and actors 
 How are different social groups involved in efforts to control SALW in 
countries emerging from periods of violent conflict – specifically what are 
the different roles played by those in the different tiers of Lederach’s Actors 
and  Approaches To Peacebuilding model? 
 What is the relationship between the involvement of different actors, 
specifically affected populations, and the role that SALW control plays in 
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post-conflict peacebuilding, and how does this affect the contribution of 
SALW control towards longer term transformative peacebuilding? 
 How does the range of actors involved and the nature of their involvement 
in SALW control efforts change over different phases of post-conflict 
peacebuilding? 
 
Taken together, the questions and hypothesis aim to make a significant 
contribution to literatures on conflict resolution and peacebuilding, and to the 
control of SALW in post-violent conflict contexts.  They also aim to contribute to 
literatures on specific post-conflict settings, most particularly Kosovo, which as the 
major case-study, forms a significant part of the overall research strategy (the 
relevant geographically focussed literatures on Kosovo are reviewed and analysed 
in the early stages of Chapter 4).  The section which follows draws together the 
most important elements of the literatures which are reviewed earlier in this 
chapter before describing the specific research contributions that this thesis will 
make. 
2.4.1 Relevance of literatures reviewed and the contribution that 
this thesis aims to make to their development 
Despite efforts to understand the role of SALW in conflict, and efforts to address 
SALW control as a contribution to security building through related interventions, 
there has to-date been insufficient attention afforded to the relationships between 
SALW and SALW control and peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict contexts.    
Whilst there has been some attempt to understand complementarity as regards to 
other security building activities (Greene and Hiscock, 2008; Smith, 2010), and there 
has been limited work to establish sequences of SALW control activity with a stand-
alone goal of reducing SALW and their impact on conflict and security (SEESAC 
2006a), existing models and frameworks for post-conflict peacebuilding do not 
explicitly attend to the role of SALW and SALW control.   
This thesis aims to make a contribution to the literatures relevant to SALW control 
by establishing and exploring the ways in which SALW control interrelates with 
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peacebuilding models and approaches from the perspective of complementarity 
and contingency and context.  This is highly relevant to the hypothesis in the sense 
that weapons play a significant role in conflict and therefore reducing numbers is 
likely to have a positive effect on both reducing the duration or intensity of conflict; 
and reducing the chances of it recurring as easily.  It is also important in that SALW 
are perceived very differently by different groups depending on their perspectives 
of the wider conflict and that responding to the ways in which these 
understandings and perceptions are constructed is critical to the success of SALW 
control efforts.   
In making a contribution both to conflict resolution and peacebuilding and SALW 
control literatures, this thesis builds on the existing post-conflict peacebuilding 
models (The Hourglass Model (Ramsbotham et al, 2005), Actors and Approaches 
(Lederach, 1997) and Nested Paradigms (Lederach, 1997)) identified above.  It 
responds to the critique of contemporary post-conflict peacebuilding activities 
regarding the lack of involvement of different sections of societies and the 
awareness of the role of social construction in the ideas which form and drive 
factors which cause and sustain conflict and ownerships and use of SALW.  The 
overarching framework within which the research for this thesis is conducted has 
three significant dimensions:  Complementarity; contingency and context.  As such, 
the contributions that this thesis makes to the literatures relevant to post–conflict 
peacebuilding and the control of SALW are as follows: 
It applies the concepts of contingency and complementarity in post-conflict 
peacebuilding to the control of SALW.  It develops the framework established by 
Ramsbotham et al to analyse the sectoral and phasal dimensions of 
interrelationships over time and space as they relate to SALW control efforts, both 
embedded within other sectoral programmes such as DDR, and as a cross-cutting 
issue which has relevance to the range of different post-conflict sectoral 
interventions. 
It applies Lederach’s framework model for understanding actors and approaches to 
a post-conflict peacebuilding and SALW control setting, to test the assumptions 
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which underpin the model and its applicability to the specific subject of SALW 
control in particular in Kosovo but also through analysis of other mini-case studies 
contained in Chapter 3. Through this it will contribute to the literatures on both 
leadership within post-conflict peacebuilding and to that relating to transformative 
peacebuilding and ‘peacebuilding from below’ by analysing the role that affected 
populations can play in predominantly civilian-focussed SALW control efforts and 
the role that these efforts can play in longer-term transformational peacebuilding. 
It contributes to the SALW literature by enhancing understandings of the 
interrelationships between peacebuilding activities in post-conflict environments 
and efforts to control SALW by assessing whether and to what extent peacebuilding 
efforts have positively or negatively affected the outcomes of SALW control 
activities. 
Finally, it will contribute to the literatures which relate to post-conflict 
peacebuilding in the specific countries and regions explored in this thesis.  In this 
context, the most substantial contribution will be to the literatures on Kosovo given 
that this research includes a significant case-study of the interrelationships 
between SALW control and peacebuilding in contemporary post-war Kosovo. 
The research questions described earlier in this section were developed specifically 
to explore the contingency, complementarity and context framework articulated 
above.  In the following section they are located within the overall research 
strategy, which discusses and further justifies and elaborates the research 
methodology and methods described in Chapter 1.  
2.5 Research Strategy and Methodology 
In seeking to address the overarching research question and contribute to 
validating the framing hypothesis, this thesis aims to make a contribution to the 
literatures reviewed above by exploring: 
 how efforts to control SALW can be more effectively located within 
approaches to post-conflict peacebuilding;  
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 how peacebuilding efforts can contribute positively to SALW control goals; 
and  
 how these approaches can be informed by a greater understanding of the 
construction of ideas and knowledge as regards to their role in society and 
in stimulating or reducing violent conflict   
 
The research strategy described in Chapter 1 is guided by a mixed methods 
approach. This combines qualitative and quantitative data and includes a soft-social 
constructionist perspective.   
 
This approach guides the implementation of a strategy which gradually builds up 
and deepens understandings of interrelationships between conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding efforts and activities to control SALW.  It does this through initially 
establishing and analysing a universe of cases in which SALW control has been 
attempted in conflict affected contexts to identify issues and trends with regards to 
the nature and type of SALW control attempted, and the interrelationships that 
might exist either between SALW control efforts, or SALW control and wider 
peacebuilding activities. 
 
From this Universe five mini case-studies are identified and analysed in greater 
detail.  The variables of contingency, complementarity and context are used to 
frame this work, which builds on initial analysis of the universe of cases.  The case 
studies have been identified on the basis of criteria introduced in Chapter 1 and 
justified in greater depth in Chapter 3.  Whilst care must be taken to ensure that 
the emerging findings arising from the analysis of these cases are not generalised 
inappropriately, they have been selected with clear boundaries that represent 
contexts and conditions which are of relevance to other conflict affected contexts in 
which SALW control efforts have been attempted. 
 
The emerging findings are then tested and further elaborated through the main 
case-study undertaken for this thesis.  Kosovo was selected as the most significant 
case-study for the reasons introduced in Chapter 1 and elaborated in Chapter 4.  
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The data arising from the Kosovo case study research are analysed using the 
complementarity, contingency and context framework, with particular attention 
paid to developing understandings in the areas framed by specific sub-questions in 
each case. 
 
The findings resulting from the Kosovo case-study are then combined with those 
arising from the analysis of the universe of cases and the mini-case studies and 
collectively analysed using the contingency, complementarity and context 
framework.  In addition however, attention is also paid to substantial findings which 
emerge from the analysis which either challenge the analytical framework or 
question is comprehensiveness.  From these, conclusions are drawn which seek to 
provide specific responses to the detailed sub-questions and to validate - at least in 
some contexts - the hypothesis and through doing this, make a contribution both to 
tackling the overarching research question and to the relevant literatures and 
debates.  
 
The mixed methods methodology selected for this research draws on a number of 
methodologies employed by researchers seeking to understand the different 
dimensions of the proliferation and misuse of SALW.  A mixed-methods approach is 
also consistent with the methodologies used by peace researchers to understand 
the field of post-war intervention and peacebuilding, and specifically, the concept 
of ‘peacebuilding from’ below. 
 
The mixed methods approach to research emerged from the debate between 
positivist and constructionist approaches and perspectives (see Teddlie and 
Tashakkori, 2003; Denscombe, 2008; Creswell, 2009).   Until the later part of the 
20th Century, positivist approaches, which focussed predominantly on quantitative 
data sources, maintained a predominant role in social and behavioural research.  
This was challenged by the emergence of a constructionist world view which placed 
emphasis on qualitative data and which Eliot (1996) described as a perspective 
which places emphasis on the use of language to construct accounts or versions of 
the social world in which they exist.  The mixed methods approach developed partly 
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as a consequence of these debates; where researchers with a strong interest in the 
utility of their work in addressing real world problems began to develop an 
approach which combined qualitative and quantitative data within an overarching 
pragmatist world view (Denscombe (2008:271) refers to this as the ‘Third Research 
Paradigm’).   
 
The emphasis on combining qualitative and quantitative data sources with a 
particular focus on using different data sources to triangulate theories and findings 
has become a popular choice amongst social researchers.  The benefits are that the 
results from one method can be used to deepen and inform those of another 
employed as part of the same mixed methods research design; that one method 
can be nested within another to deepen understandings; and that the process of 
combining different methods can have transformative benefits for the problems 
which the research seeks to address (Creswell, 2009:18).   
 
Denscombe (2008:272) lists the defining characteristics of mixed methods 
approaches as they apply to research design, stating that: quantitative and 
qualitative methods should be combined within the same research project; a mixed 
methods research design should clearly specify the sequencing and priority that is 
given to the quantitative and qualitative elements of data collection and analysis; 
the importance of an explicit account of the manner in which the quantitative and 
qualitative aspects of the research relate to each other, with heightened emphasis 
on the manner in which triangulation is used; and that pragmatism is the 
philosophical underpinning for the research. 
 
In adopting the mixed methods approach to this research, this thesis follows that of 
other researchers in this area, and which are associated with some important 
contributions.  As much of the SALW literature that is relevant to this thesis is ‘grey’ 
in nature, the research methodologies employed by researchers are often not 
articulated explicitly.  However, it is apparent that key aspects of the mixed 
methods approach described above are commonly used.  Several of the most 
important studies produced by academic and policy researchers, often working 
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together, which have attempted to evaluate the breadth and depth of action to 
address SALW control issues internationally, have adopted methodologies which 
combine qualitative and quantitative data.  The annual Small Arms Survey Yearbook 
(SAS: 2001-2011) or the occasional Biting the Bullet series (2003, 2005, 2006) 
combine the results of survey data with semi-structured and structured interviews, 
both of which are designed to access qualitative and quantitative data.  Whilst the 
methodologies they use are not expressly identified, in general terms they can be 
seen as following an overall mixed methods approach, although the extent to which 
they combine quantitative and qualitative data and the methods used to gather and 
interpret the data are not explicit. 
 
At the national and sub-national levels, significant effort has been invested in 
attempting to understand the nature of SALW control challenges as a contribution 
to supporting the development of policies and programmes.  This research adopts 
methods which are directly relevant to this thesis. Often termed as ‘Surveys’, it 
typically combines household survey data, document review, semi-structured and 
structured interviews and focus group discussion and collect both quantitative and 
qualitative data (see for instance Holtom et al, 2005; Richards, Smith and Sokolova, 
2006; Wepundi et al, 2012; Florquin and Pezard, 2007) .   
 
There are cases in which research into aspects of efforts to control SALW focus on a 
research methodology other than mixed methods.  Quantitative data sets have 
been used for instance to establish the extent and nature of firearm injuries in 
certain contexts.  For instance, the World Health Organisation has developed an 
approach which has been applied to Mozambique amongst other countries (WHO 
et al 2009) which reviews existing data produced by health authorities which 
records the numbers and extent of firearms deaths and injuries over a particular 
period of time.    Likewise, research projects have been conducted which focus 
solely on quantitative surveys to obtain a snapshot of the perceptions of the 
population regarding the role and impact of SALW (see for instance Gilgen and 
Nowak, 2011).  There are also examples of longitudinal surveys which seek to 
measure changes in public opinions over time regarding the role of SALW in society 
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(see Hvindemose and Istrefi, 2009) which track changes in opinions, through 
comparing responses to questions over time, but which don’t employ qualitative 
data analysis methods such as discourse analysis which would allow for a more 
rigorous approach focussing on inter-subjectives closely relating to the construction 
of understandings of the relationships between SALW and peace, conflict and 
security between individuals and by communities.    
 
However, given the questions and hypothesis which frame this thesis, and the 
experience which can be gained from existing attempts both to understand SALW 
proliferation and misuse, and peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict contexts, a sole 
quantitative approach has been rejected in favour of a selected combination of 
different research methodologies.  In theory, these range from those which would 
provide a deep understanding of the interplay between issues and people in a 
particular context, which are informed by a constructionist world view (such as case 
study) to those which interpret patterns on a much wider and more generalizable 
scale which equate more closely to a positivist perspective (quantitative surveys 
and document review). 
   
Whilst all these are relevant methodologies for responding to particular research 
requirements, the requirement of this thesis to identify a combination of 
generalizable quantitative and context-specific qualitative data with a focus on the 
construction of knowledge and understanding between and within communities 
requires that an approach which brings together different forms of data, and 
combines particular research methods reinforces the value in taking a mixed 
methods approach.  As such, within the framework of a mixed methods 
methodology, the following research strategy was developed to guide the research 
contained in later chapters.  
 
The overarching approach is multi-level (international; national; local) in that the 
research focuses on: a universe of data that explores the relationship between 
conflict, post-conflict peacebuilding and efforts to control SALW in over 80 
countries; Kosovo as a national entity; and specific locations within Kosovo at the 
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sub-national level.  The information sought at each of these levels is different in 
nature, scale and quality and requires a different blend of quantitative and 
qualitative data where initial theories and findings can be further developed 
through triangulation and nesting of one approach within another to deepen and 
further inform analysis. As such the ways in which data is gathered and analysed is 
significantly different at the international level (hereafter the macro-level), and 
nationally and sub-nationally in Kosovo (hereafter the micro-levels).  It is also 
simultaneous in terms of the phasing of quantitative and qualitative data gathering 
and analysis at each level; rather than beginning for instance with qualitative and 
then triangulating with quantitative data, the research aims to access both sorts of 
data simultaneously in a nested approach which permits simultaneous 
triangulation, deepening and substantiation across different data sources over 
time. 
 
At the macro-level, quantitative is prioritised over qualitative data: a group of 80 
different examples of conflict affected contexts in which SALW control has been 
attempted form the overarching universe of cases.  These are interrogated to 
develop understandings of the numbers of cases in which specific forms of SALW 
control has been attempted (for example the numbers of countries which have 
attempted to collect weapons voluntarily from its population, or the number of 
cases in which specific SALW control legislation or policies have been developed).  
The primary data sources are existing publications which have aggregated statistics 
arising from questionnaires sent to and completed by government and 
international agencies, and reports from the governments of the countries 
concerned through international information exchange frameworks, such as the 
process for reporting progress in implementing the UN Programme of Action on 
SALW (the quality of this data and their different sources is discussed in Chapter 3).   
These data are then cross-checked where appropriate with a small number of 
publications which analyse the returns from government and international agencies 
where data is unclear or where its quality is particularly poor.  The method selected 
for data gathering and analysis at this macro-level is predominantly document 
review, with a small number of clarificatory or confirmatory interviews with 
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researchers or others who have been closely involved with researching the data 
described in the existing documentation as part of a process of triangulation. 
 
At the micro-level (Kosovo as a country and locations within Kosovo), priority 
(although not phasing) is given to qualitative data, which aims to deepen the 
quantitative analysis undertaken at the macro level – and which is itself then 
triangulated with national and local level quantitative data.  This is intended to help 
establish a detailed picture of the nature of attitudes and perceptions towards 
SALW, peace and conflict and to analyse both how these contribute to the 
construction of knowledge and understanding, and the nature of the response from 
policy makers and others.  The research methods employed at the Kosovo national 
and sub-national levels are: document review and analysis; semi structured and 
unstructured interviews; focus group discussions; observation and discourse 
analysis.  From each of these data sources both qualitative and quantitative data 
was obtained.  At the national level the sequence of data analysis began with 
quantitative data drawn from national reports and existing surveys published by the 
Kosovo Government, local market research groups (specifically Index Kosova) and 
international research organisations (specifically Small Arms Survey and 
Saferworld).  This established a national picture regarding the spread of SALW, 
public perceptions, the existence of SALW control and peacebuilding activities and 
the numbers of groups and other actors involved.  This was then analysed further 
using qualitative data drawn from interviews and document analysis to deepen 
understandings of public attitudes and perceptions and the quality of SALW control 
and peacebuilding interventions. 
 
At the sub-national levels in Kosovo the sequence in which the data was analysed 
began with qualitative analysis, with quantitative data used to triangulate and 
support initial analysis and findings.  Thus, data obtained from focus group 
discussions and semi-structured interviews in specific locations within Kosovo were 
triangulated using the quantitative data contained within population surveys 
regarding people’s perceptions relating to peace, conflict and the role of SALW that 
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are contained in reports published in nationally and internationally commissioned 
market research. 
 
Taken together, the research strategy can be seen to reflect the characteristics 
identified by Denscombe (2011): a pragmatist approach; the use of triangulation; 
the transformative potential; and the value of nesting.  The research aims to 
contribute to addressing a real world problem and to directly support the 
development of ideas, approaches and activities which seek to enhance the 
effectiveness of both efforts to control SALW and peacebuilding in post-war 
contexts.  It explicitly combines qualitative and quantitative data sources in a 
sequence which begins with an overarching quantitative assessment of the universe 
of cases of SALW control efforts in post-war contexts where initial findings are 
triangulated and deepened with qualitative data; a quantitative assessment of 
relevant data at the national level in Kosovo which is then deepened through 
nested qualitative data sources at the sub national level, which is finally 
triangulated with qualitative data to corroborate and confirm findings. 
 
Thus, the questions which help frame the research and which were introduced in 
Chapter 1 and qualified above, which seek to address the three main dimensions of 
the analytical framework (the existence and characteristics of contingent, 
complementary and context-aware interrelationships) will be approached from a 
pragmatist world view and an overarching mixed-methods approach.  This places 
emphasis on both qualitative and quantitative data sources, and emphasises the 
role of social construction in the development of understandings and knowledge 
within communities and between individuals, which is critical to understanding how 
SALW are understood in relation to understandings of peace and conflict and how 
this shapes the decisions and choices of those in post-conflict contexts. 
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2.6 Chapter conclusion 
There are well established interrelationships between the availability and misuse of 
SALW and the intensity and duration of conflict.  Similarly the role that violent 
conflict has in creating the conditions for SALW proliferation is significant.  Public 
perceptions of the role played by SALW however differ, with SALW being seen as an 
item of value and both a threat and a means of protection.  Since the end of the 
Cold War in particular, considerable international focus has been placed on 
attempts to control SALW in conflict affected and post-war environments.  These 
have often taken place alongside, and sometimes as part of, peacebuilding efforts.  
Whilst the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding is well established, and well 
regarded models exist to explain the different stages of conflict, and of efforts to 
resolve it, to-date, there has been only limited research which seeks to understand 
the interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and peacebuilding. 
 
This thesis builds on existing research and analysis by providing a framework which 
draws on Ramsbotham et al (2005) which looks at the role of complementarity and 
contingency, and Lederach (1997) which analyses the role of different actors in 
peacebuilding, to establish an analytical framework with three variables: 
complementarity; contingency and context. 
 
A mixed methods approach has demonstrated utility in SALW control and 
peacebuilding research and is employed in this thesis, enabling the analysis of 
quantitative and qualitative data.  The research strategy, which identifies an initial 
universe of cases before analysing a small number of mini-case studies and then a 
detailed case study of post-war Kosovo, enables broad understandings of 
interrelationships to be elaborated and for these to be analysed in detail.  In 
consequence, this thesis makes a contribution to literatures on SALW control, 
peacebuilding and conflict resolution.  It also contributes to understandings of post-
conflict peacebuilding efforts in Kosovo and to some extent, to the countries 
analysed through the mini-case studies in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3: Analysis of interrelationships between 
efforts to control SALW and conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding activities in post-war environments  
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify contexts in which efforts to control SALW 
and conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities have taken place contiguously 
and to analyse interrelationships through (i) quantitatively reviewing and analysing 
the universe of examples since 2001; and (ii) qualitatively analysing a selected sub-
set of examples in greater detail where the dynamics of these interrelationships are 
particularly relevant to the focus of this thesis.   
 
Thus, the contributions that this chapter will make to addressing the overall 
hypothesis and research questions are: (i) mapping significant examples in which 
SALW control and peacebuilding efforts have taken place in the same time and 
space since 2001; (ii) identifying the types of interrelationships that exist in these 
cases; (iii) analysing these interrelationships as they exist in specific contexts; (iv) 
applying the analytical framework developed in Chapter 2 and suggesting ways in 
which it can be refined and developed further; and (v) identifying additional 
questions for further research and for exploration and analysis in Chapters 4 and 5.  
 
The research methods employed in this chapter collect and analyse qualitative and 
quantitative data in line with the overarching pragmatist and mixed methods 
approach described in Chapter 2.  It begins with an assessment and analysis of a 
wide range of instances of contexts in which SALW and peacebuilding activities 
have been attempted.  From this universe of data, five instances are identified for 
further analysis as mini case-studies.  These have been selected on the basis of a set 
of criteria which include the nature of the conflict (including its intensity and 
duration and the role of outside interveners) the nature of the SALW control 
activity attempted, geographic coverage and scale.  These criteria are developed 
and justified in more detail later in this chapter.  This analysis is predominantly 
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qualitative in nature drawing on available literature (including programme and 
stakeholder documentation), the author’s experience as participant/observer and a 
small number of interviews with those involved.  These five instances are analysed 
using the framework identified in Chapters 1 and 2 arising from a review of the 
relevant literatures on conflict resolution, peacebuilding and SALW control. The 
aims are to both test the assumptions emerging from this review, and to establish 
further questions that will form the basis of the analysis of SALW control and 
conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts in Kosovo contained in chapters 4 and 
5. 
 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the various data sets which describe efforts 
to control SALW since 2001.  This is combined with data sources which identify 
countries experiencing violent conflict to establish a universe of cases of SALW 
control efforts in conflict affected contexts.  This Universe is further developed 
through exploring the types of SALW control attempted and through providing an 
initial analysis of the interrelationships between the two variables.  This is followed 
by a more detailed explanation of the criteria used for selection of mini case-
studies.  Each mini case-study is then analysed to identify the nature of the 
interrelationships between SALW control efforts and peacebuilding activities, with a 
particular focus on how activities interrelated over time and how they were 
effected by contextual factors (including the roles of different actors and the 
perceptions of those both targeted by SALW control and peacebuilding efforts, and 
those responsible for enacting them).  The chapter concludes with (i) a further 
analysis to identify trends and cross-cutting issues (ii) a discussion of ways in which 
the research framework could be further refined and (iii) the articulation of 
emerging findings for further analysis and development in later chapters.  
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3.1.1 Establishing the universe of efforts to control SALW in 
conflict affected countries 
There is no international and widely accepted database of efforts to control SALW, 
partly as new attempts are made on a regular basis and there is no body or agency 
with the authority to compile and review such a database; and partly because as 
discussed earlier, the definition of an activity to control SALW is broad and remains 
undefined by international standards.  As such, the universe offered below does not 
necessarily include all instances of SALW control in conflict affected countries. 
Nevertheless it includes all examples reported by states to the UN as part of 
commitment to implement the UNPoA up to 2006 and then all further efforts 
identified by the author from a combination of personal professional experience, 
reviewing contemporary literature and a small number of interviews with 
practitioners and others. It is therefore at least adequately comprehensive. 
3.2 Review of data sources of efforts to control SALW 
Potential sources for identifying the range of SALW control efforts include both 
official and independent agencies.  Officially, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs 
keeps a record of all states’ reports on implementation of the UN Programme of 
Action on SALW.5  These reports, often in the form of statements delivered at the 
biennial meetings of states to assess progress in implementation provide some data 
on both SALW control activities that have taken place under the supervision of the 
state concerned, as well as some data relating to the activities of donors and other 
supportive parties, including UN agencies in supporting these activities.   However, 
this information is incomplete in several important areas:  Only states that chose to 
report have done so; the quality of reporting varies widely with some states 
reporting only successes, others only changes to administrative arrangements; 
there is no verification process to assess whether these reports are accurate in 
what they portray; in most cases, but crucially not all, they only provide an 
overview of activity during a particular period of time and are not cumulative.   
                                                       
5 The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA), maintains a web-based Implementation 
Support System or ISS where records of State’s implementation of the UN PoA and other related 
commitments are kept.  http://www.poa-iss.org/PoA/PoA.aspx.  Accessed 5August 2011. 
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Of the unofficial or officially sanctioned independent assessments, the main 
attempts to take a global approach to gathering and analysing data on efforts to 
control SALW are those produced by the Small Arms Survey, United Nations 
Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the International Action Network 
on Small Arms (IANSA).  The Small Arms Survey publishes an annual yearbook.  In 
each case, it focuses on a particular issue or issues (for instance the proliferation 
and misuse of firearms by criminal groups in urban areas in Latin America – see 
Small Arms Survey (2010). It also publishes an annual index focussing on one aspect 
of SALW control - transparency in the annual reports provided by states on the 
implementation of their commitments relating to transparency in the arms trade, 
called the Transparency Barometer (for an overview of the Small Arms Survey work 
in this area see Lazarevic, 2010).   
 
Collectively, this effort provides valuable detailed information on specific contexts 
or dimensions of the SALW issue.  But it does not lend itself easily to establishing an 
overall picture of the range and nature of efforts to control SALW both by states 
and by non-state groups.  The UNIDIR publishes periodic assessments of the 
contents of states’ reports on implementation of the UNPoA.  This is useful in that it 
draws together common themes reported on by states and attempts to provide 
some quantitative analysis on for instance the numbers of states reporting on any 
given year, or the number of coordination mechanisms in existence on the basis of 
the contents of reports submitted by  those states which chose to do so.  But there 
are also considerable weaknesses which include the fact that the analysis only 
reflects the information provided by states, which is often partial and incomplete 
for the reasons described above (for an overview of States reporting on 
implementation of the UNPoA prepared by UNIDIR see Cattaneo and Parker, 2008).   
 
Perhaps the most useful independent assessment of the range and scale of efforts 
to control SALW is the work undertaken by the Biting the Bullet research team on 
behalf of IANSA; however as with other data sources, this also has weaknesses 
which should be recognised.  IANSA published three book length reports, in 2003, 
2005 and 2006, led by researchers from Bradford University (Greene, Bourne, 
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Yankee et al, 2003; Watson, Page, Godnick et al, 2005; Bourne, Godnick, Greene et 
al, 2006). In each case they attempted to provide both a qualitative and 
quantitative assessment of progress made by states in implementing their 
commitments to enhancing the control over SALW.  The reports were timed to link 
in with UN meetings to review the progress made by states in implementing the UN 
PoA. However they covered a much broader range of commitments, including those 
at the international, regional and national levels.  Whilst important for helping to 
identify the countries and examples of efforts to control SALW that are examined 
later in this chapter, there are two primary weaknesses with using the Biting the 
Bullet series as a single data source, without also considering other data. 
 
Firstly, the reports focus significantly on efforts to control SALW that had been 
undertaken within the context of the implementation of the UN PoA.  Whilst it is 
certainly the case that the UN PoA provides the broadest and most widely accepted 
international framework within which SALW control has been attempted, it 
maintains a focus on a specific international norm which creates the potential for 
some SALW control activities to be undertaken by States’ authorities and others 
which are not perceived as fitting within the framework set out by the UN PoA.  In 
other words, the UN PoA and therefore the Biting the Bullet (and UNIDIR) 
publications which focus primarily on its implementation can only be seen as a 
proxy for a complete picture of all efforts to control SALW  as this does not exist for 
the reasons described above (principally the wide variety of potential activities that 
can be claimed to include an element of SALW control, and the failure to-date of 
any individual or body, whether formal or informal, to collate and maintain an 
accurate data-set of all efforts to control SALW around the world).  
 
The second significant weakness is that the Biting the Bullet series only provides a 
detailed assessment at a specific point in time.  The last full assessment was 
undertaken in 2006, over five years ago at the time of writing this thesis. Since this 
time, there have been numerous other efforts made to control SALW in post-war 
and post-conflict settings which are relevant to the area of study.  This presents a 
dilemma in that whilst the work produced by the Biting the Bullet team is the most 
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detailed, exhaustive and qualitative, it only provides data for a period of the time 
covered by the research conducted for this thesis and is thus by itself not sufficient 
to provide a data set from which countries for further study can be selected.  The 
only other study which might have been appropriate as a single complement to the 
Biting the Bullet series (Cattaneo and Parker, 2008 (see above for a short 
description)) is also weakened by the fact that it covers only a slightly longer period 
of time; it is also a record only of States’ perspectives and as such is partial in its 
coverage. Therefore whilst it is an important source document in informing the 
establishment of a detailed picture of attempts to control SALW, it is not in itself 
the only other data source on which to draw. Therefore, in the absence of one 
single source, the author proposes a ‘Biting the Bullet Plus’ formula which combines 
the 2006 Biting the Bullet data with a combination of other published sources 
including those described above and the author’s own knowledge as a professional 
working closely on contemporary SALW control issues covering the years between 
2006 and 2011.   
 
Following the publication of the last relevant Biting the Bullet research in 2006 
there have been numerous SALW efforts in a variety of different contexts.  The 
following description is based on the personal experience of the author working as 
a researcher and practitioner in the fields of SALW control and peace building as 
well as through reviews of relevant recent project documents, reviews and 
evaluations and analysis of the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs database.  The 
framework for selection is (i) the country experienced large scale political violent 
conflict either immediately leading up to or subsequent to 2006; (ii) Efforts to 
control SALW took place between 2006 and 2011; (iii) SALW control efforts were 
initiated in the post-conflict period as part of broader processes of security or peace 
building. It is organised regionally with a short overview in each case followed by 
specific bullet-pointed descriptions of relevant activities. 
 
In Asia, post-war disarmament exercises in Nepal, Sri Lanka and Aceh in Indonesia 
all involved SALW control activities, although they varied considerably in their 
nature and means of implementation.  In Aceh for instance, disarmament was 
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mostly voluntary and non-coercive and was framed by a peace agreement between 
conflicting parties whereas in Sri Lanka, however, disarmament activities in the east 
of the country had significantly coercive characteristics. The war in Afghanistan and 
its regional dimensions and implications, particularly in Pakistan gave rise to a range 
of activities with a SALW control dimension, including DDR and civilian weapons 
management programmes.   
 
The SALW control activities in Asia between 2006 and 2011 of most interest to this 
thesis are as follows: 
 An attempt to disarm and demobilise former Maoist Army combatants in 
Nepal following the agreement of a peace deal between the Maoist 
leadership and the government in 2006. (See for example Rynn and Greene, 
2008:11-12). 
 Forced disarmament of former LTTE cadres in the East and North of Sri 
Lanka following the military victories of the government between 2008 and 
2010, first in the east of the country and later in the north.6 
 Numerous attempts to more effectively control SALW in Afghanistan, 
including coercive and voluntary surrender programmes.  Voluntary 
programmes focussed in the early part of the ISAF engagement on 
incentives in exchange for small arms ammunition. (See for example Bhatia 
and Sedra (2008)). 
 Numerous attempts by the government of Pakistan to disarm militants in 
various parts of the country, most recently in the Malaakand and Dir 
districts of the Khyber Puktoon-khwa province bordering Afghanistan. 
 Ongoing efforts in Indonesia to encourage disarmament in the context of 
implementing the peace agreement which brought to an end violent conflict 
between the Indonesian Government and an armed  secessionist movement 
in Aceh. (See for instance Beek (2007)). 
 
                                                       
6 Authors interviews with Government of Sri Lanka integration commission officials (2009). See also 
programme documents for UNDP support to Sri Lanka DDR efforts available at: 
http://www.undp.lk/SubProjects/Pages/detail.aspx?itemid=48.  Accessed 3 November 2012. 
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In the Horn and Great Lakes of Africa in particular, numerous SALW control 
activities have been attempted at national (for instance in Burundi) and sub-
national levels (Sudan, Kenya, Uganda).  Where countries had most recently 
experienced violent conflict these activities included DDR and other disarmament 
efforts. In western Africa the time that has elapsed since the most intense periods 
of violent conflict in the cases of Liberia or Sierra Leone has contributed to a 
stronger focus on developmental aspects of security sector reform within which 
elements of SALW control are located. The SALW control activities in Africa 
between 2006 and 2011 of most interest to this thesis are as follows: 
 
 Various attempts from 2006 to the present (both coercive and more 
peaceful) to disarm civilians and reform parts of the former fighting forces in 
Sudan following the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).  These 
include formal DDR arrangements linked explicitly to the CPA, civilian 
disarmament efforts and defence transformation. (See for example Skinner 
(2012) and Preston and Smith (2008)).  
 Efforts by the respective national governments in northern and eastern 
Uganda and northern, western and eastern Kenya to disarm pastoralists and 
others suspected of illegally possessing firearms in response to widespread 
low intensity conflict from 2006 until the present day. (See for example 
Wepundi et al (2011).) 
 Ongoing efforts to reduce the impact of armed violence in Ethiopia, 
including through SSR. 
 Ongoing efforts in the DRC to promote DDR and SSR, focussing on a range of 
different security actors as well as in specific parts of the country, including 
currently the east of the country. (See for example Scheye (2012).) 
 A DDR- and SSR- process in Burundi which includes a substantial 
disarmament dimension. (See for example Florquin and Pezard (2007) and 
Ball and van de Goor (2011).) 
 Ongoing SSR including efforts to control SALW in Sierra Leone. (See for 
example Albrecht and Jackson (2010). 
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 Ongoing DDR and SSR efforts in Liberia. (See for example Baker (2010).)  
 
In Europe and Central Asia, with the exception of a small number of ongoing 
activities to reduce and manage weapons and ammunition stockpiles more 
effectively in former Warsaw Pact countries, the Western Balkans continued to 
provide the main focus for SALW control activities that had a strong demand-side 
and civilian focussed dimension.  Whilst some small scale activities were attempted 
in Serbia and Croatia to address SALW violence in the context of armed violence 
reduction programmes, the most significant activities in a post-war context took 
place in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. The SALW control activities in Europe and 
Central Asia between 2006 and 2011 of most interest to this thesis are as follows: 
  
 Ongoing efforts to promote disarmament and SALW control by the 
Government of Kosovo. (See for example Hvindemose et al (2009).) 
 Ongoing efforts to promote more effective SALW control integrated into 
police reform efforts in Bosnia Herzegovina. (See for example Merlingen 
(2009).) 
 
In Brazil, Central America and in parts of the Caribbean in particular, periodic and 
targeted attempts were made to tackle SALW availability and misuse as part of 
efforts to reduce the impact of criminal violence.  However, in Latin America and 
the Caribbean more generally, Colombia and Haiti represent the only major 
examples of efforts to control SALW in post war contexts between 2006 and 2011.  
They can be summarised as follows:  
 Ongoing SALW seizure activity and limited destruction of seized weapons 
and those collected during locally specific amnesty periods by the 
Government of Colombia (Government of Colombia, 2008). 
 Security-building activities with a SALW control dimension in Haiti in 2006 
and subsequent sporadic efforts to address the impacts of SALW 
proliferation and misuse on public health and urban violence. (See Muggah 
and Krause (2009) for violence reduction research in Haiti; Kolbe et al (2010) for a 
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study of mortality and crime before and following the Haiti earthquake; and 
Pachon (2012) for a review of SSR expenditures in Haiti.)  
3.3 Initial analysis and compilation of the universe of SALW 
control efforts since 2001 
From this ‘Biting the Bullet Plus’ combination of data-sources, the following section 
provides an overall picture of the scope and scale of efforts to control SALW in the 
period between 2001 and 2011.  Between 2001 and 2008, Cattaneo and Parker 
report that 148 different states provided reports on their implementation of the UN 
PoA (Cattaneo and Parker, 2008:xvii), itself a voluntary requirement of the PoA as a 
demonstration of State’s progress in its implementation.  Similarly, the authors of 
the Biting the Bullet report in 2006 stated that 150 counties had identified a 
national point of contact (Bourne et al, 2006:31); which along with the commitment 
to report on progress can be seen as the very basic initial bureaucratic steps that 
States should take when taking action to control SALW within the context of 
implementing the UN PoA.  Whilst impressive in the sense that it suggests that 
aspects of PoA implementation and therefore efforts to control SALW more 
generally is widespread, it does not provide a significant sense of the depth of the 
efforts undertaken by states and does not in itself suggest whether, and to what 
extent, very practical efforts were attempted that had the express purpose of 
controlling specific aspects of the problem of SALW proliferation and misuse. To 
achieve this, a more detailed examination of the data is required. 
From the ‘Biting the Bullet Plus’ dataset, it is possible to establish which countries 
had demonstrated some progress with implementing their UN PoA commitments, 
and therefore could lay claim to having taken steps to control SALW. However, 
analysis of this sort would have one significant shortcoming:  whilst it would include 
all those states that claimed to have taken the basic administrative steps it is 
unclear whether the various actors involved in these states had in actual fact 
undertaken any specific activities which directly aimed to control SALW more 
effectively.  Further, it would not provide any analysis of the sort of activities which 
may have been attempted if indeed they had been.  The challenge of moving 
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beyond the most basic indicators of activity was a challenge for the authors of the 
Biting the Bullet report in 2006.  They attempted to disaggregate the different sorts 
of activity through establishing four categories of related activities which broadly 
followed the content of the UN PoA: 
 Foundations   
This group covered the administrative steps that states were committed to taking 
including establishing a national focal point and coordination agency and reporting 
progress with implementation on a regular basis.  They found that 150 states had 
established focal points, and by 2006, 135 had reported progress in some form, 
although the quality and content of the reports varied very considerably (Bourne et 
al, 2006:31). 
 Laws and procedures 
This category included information on whether states had reviewed relevant 
legislation to ensure that it was appropriate for enabling the commitments 
contained in the UN PoA to be implemented effectively and if not, whether 
legislative changes were made. It also included information on whether states had 
an expressed national policy on SALW which would guide the design and 
implementation of specific activities.  It reported that over 100 states have 
legislation of some sort covering aspects of SALW including regulating the import, 
export and possession of SALW (Bourne et al, 2006:31). 
 Weapons management  
This includes information on the sorts of practical activities that were undertaken 
by states which have a direct relationship to the control of SALW.   These include 
the management of official stocks of SALW, disposal of surplus weapons, 
disarmament, and marking, record keeping and tracing of SALW and associated 
ammunition.  The analysis of the data allowed the authors to establish that 30 
states had reviewed their standards and procedures for the management and 
security of stocks since 2001 (Bourne et al, 2006:32) and 39 states had destroyed 
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some surplus stocks of SALW.  Further, they concluded that between 2001 and 
2006 62 states had conducted some form of disarmament including: 
o 20 engaging in post-conflict DDR 
o 32 engaging in voluntary weapons collection programmes 
o 37 conducted amnesties 
o 13 organised forcible disarmament programmes  
 
 International cooperation and assistance 
Activities by states were included where they either fostered cooperation regionally 
or internationally with other states or bodies or attempted cooperation with civil 
society organisations either locally nationally or internationally with a view to 
enhancing SALW control efforts.  By 2006, 68 states had developed cooperation of 
some sort with civil society organisations and 26 states had provided some sort of 
donor support for activities aiming to increase the control over SALW (Bourne et al, 
2006:33). 
From these four categories, ‘Weapons Management’ is of very obvious importance 
to this study.  Due to their practical nature, weapons management activities are 
those which are most likely to have a direct relationship with peace- and security- 
building efforts in countries emerging from periods of violent conflict.  Specific 
aspects of the activities grouped under the other categories described above are 
also of importance, including for instance the existence of coordination 
mechanisms (the existence or otherwise and quality of coordination being a vital 
aspect of how efforts to control SALW relate to peace- and security- building).  
However, for the purposes of this study, the states that have undertaken activities 
grouped under the category of ‘weapons management’ require further analysis to 
identify which have experienced periods of significant political violent conflict to 
enable the development of a single dataset which combines two variables (i) the 
experience of violent political conflict and (ii) efforts to control SALW.  
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3.4 Data sources for identifying incidences of conflict 
affected contexts 
As with basic data on the range of SALW control efforts attempted, there is no 
common internationally recognised database recording either where violent 
conflicts have taken place or where they are ongoing from which to extract a 
definitive list.  However,  there are several initiatives which aim to monitor violent 
and armed conflict round the world.  Each has a particular focus and purpose and 
all are relevant to this study. Perhaps the most authoritative and well established 
databases of armed and violent conflict are: 
IISS Armed Conflict Database: The UK-based International Institute for Strategic 
Studies maintains a database called the Armed Conflict Database which claims to 
provide “…an authoritative online source of data and provides independent analysis 
on current and recent conflicts”.7 It contains information on a country-by-country 
basis and includes both factual information relating to the history, geography and 
demographics of counties affected by conflict as well as analysis on the nature of 
the violence, actors and the weaponry used.  Use of the database is restricted to 
paying subscribers, which are often from the business sector using the information 
to measure corporate risk.  The database is very comprehensive and covers a 
number of years, enabling users to establish some longitudinal information relating 
to conflicts over time. 
The Uppsala Conflict Data Program provides a long established database of 
information relating to armed violence.  Located within the University of Uppsala in 
Sweden and overseen by Professor Peter Wallensteen, the Program has since 1976 
collected information on armed conflicts since 1946. Its data is published annually 
in numerous formats including: States in Armed Conflict since 1987, in the SIPRI 
Yearbook since 1988, the Journal of Peace Research since 1993 and in the Human 
                                                       
7 Taken from the introductory text explaining the purpose of the database: 
http://www.iiss.org/publications/armed-conflict-database/about-the-armed-conflict-database/IISS 
Armed Conflict Database.  Accessed 5th August 2011 
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Security Reports since 2005.8  In addition to including data on the numbers of 
armed conflicts that occur in any given year, the database also provides data on 
related issues including numbers of ceasefires and peace agreements. 
Project Ploughshares Armed Conflict Report:  The Armed Conflict report is a 
research project based in Waterloo in Canada which maintains a database of active 
armed conflicts as a web-based resource.9 The report, which is published annually 
and updated on-line regularly aims to track and describe ongoing conflicts and 
provide information regarding conflict trends over time.   
Taken together, the data-sets which underpin the three well developed resources 
introduced above provide the information required to establish the conflict status 
of the countries attempting to control SALW over the period from 2001 to 2011 
described in the Biting the Bullet series, UNIDIR reports, other literatures and the 
author’s experiences as participant/observer in the earlier part of this chapter.   
 
The table below sets out the range of geographic contexts in which weapons 
management has been attempted since 2001 and then identifies which of these 
were also either experiencing or immediately following a period of violent conflict.  
It draws heavily on the data included in the 2006 Biting the Bullet report (Bourne et 
al 2006: 56-66).  This is then supplemented for the period between 2006 and 2011 
from a broad range of sources, including published research and the authors own 
experience (see previous elaboration).  The categorisation of countries according to 
whether they were experiencing violent conflict or its aftermath was made on the 
basis of information provided by the three different conflict mapping tools 
described above.   
 
                                                       
8  Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Database: www.ucdp.uu.se/database, Uppsala University 
Accessed 5 August 2011 
9 For further detail see: http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/armed-conflicts-report-0.  Accessed 5 
August 2011 
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Figure 4: Geographic contexts of weapons management, 2001 to 2011 
Country context in 
which SALW 
control attempted 
Outline of type of activity Violent 
conflict 
context? 
Africa 
Angola DDR, destruction Yes 
Botswana Surplus destruction No 
Burundi DDR, SSR Yes 
Cape Verde Weapons collection No 
Central African 
Republic 
Surplus disposal No 
Chad DDR Yes 
Congo (Rep of) DDR Yes 
Democratic 
Republic of Congo  
Destruction and DDR Yes 
Djibouti Destruction No 
Ghana Destruction and weapons collection No 
Guinea Destruction, DDR, Forcible disarmament Yes 
Guinea Bissau DDR, Forcible disarmament Yes 
Kenya Collection and destruction Yes 
Lesotho Destruction No 
Liberia DDR, weapons collection Yes 
Malawi Destruction, amnesty, weapons collection No 
Mali Weapons collection, surplus destruction, DDR Yes 
Mauritius Surplus destruction No 
Mozambique Weapons collection, destruction Yes 
Niger Weapons collection, destruction Yes 
Nigeria Collection, destruction, voluntary and forcible 
disarmament 
Yes 
Sierra Leone DDR, voluntary and forcible disarmament, 
amnesty, destruction 
Yes 
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South Africa Destruction, amnesty, collection No 
Sudan DDR, voluntary and forced disarmament, 
amnesty, destruction 
Yes 
Tanzania Weapons collection, destruction No 
Uganda DDR, voluntary and forced disarmament  Yes 
Zambia Amnesty, voluntary collection, destruction No 
Americas 
Argentina Surplus destroyed No 
Bolivia Voluntary weapons collection, surplus 
destroyed 
No 
Brazil Amnesty, voluntary collection, weapons 
destroyed 
No 
Canada Voluntary collection No 
Chile Weapons destruction No 
Colombia DDR, voluntary collection, surplus destruction Yes 
Costa Rica Amnesty, voluntary collection, weapons 
destruction 
No 
Ecuador Confiscated weapons destroyed No 
El Salvador Confiscated weapons destroyed No 
Honduras Amnesty, voluntary collection, weapons 
destruction 
No 
Jamaica Confiscated weapons destroyed No 
Mexico Voluntary weapons collection, weapons 
destruction 
No 
Nicaragua Surplus destruction, amnesty No 
Panama Voluntary collection, weapons destroyed No 
Paraguay Weapons destruction No 
Peru Weapons destruction No 
USA Amnesty and voluntary weapons collection, 
confiscated weapons destroyed 
No 
Venezuela Forced disarmament, weapons destruction No 
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Europe 
Albania Voluntary weapons collection, weapons 
destruction 
No 
Belarus Civilian collection, weapons destroyed No 
Bosnia DDR, voluntary weapons collection, amnesty, 
forcible disarmament, weapons destruction  
Yes 
Bulgaria Surplus destruction No 
Croatia Voluntary collection, amnesty, weapons 
destroyed 
Yes 
Denmark Amnesty No 
Estonia Amnesty, forcible disarmament No 
Finland Amnesty, confiscated weapons destroyed No 
France Confiscated weapons destroyed No 
Kosovo DDR, voluntary collection, amnesty Yes 
Macedonia DDR, amnesty, weapons destruction Yes 
Moldova Voluntary collection, amnesty No 
Netherlands Voluntary collection, amnesty No 
Norway Amnesty  No 
Russia DDR, voluntary collection, amnesty, forced 
disarmament, destruction 
Yes 
Serbia Voluntary collection, amnesty, destruction Yes 
Slovenia Amnesty No 
Tajikistan DDR, voluntary collection, amnesty, forced 
disarmament 
Yes 
UK Amnesty, destruction No 
Middle East 
Kuwait Amnesty No 
Yemen Forced disarmament, weapons collection Yes 
Asia 
Afghanistan DDR, amnesty, forced disarmament Yes 
Cambodia DDR, voluntary collection, forced disarmament Yes 
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China Forced disarmament, confiscated weapons 
destroyed 
No 
Indonesia DDR Yes 
Nepal DDR Yes 
Pakistan Voluntary collection, amnesty, confiscated 
weapons destroyed 
Yes 
Philippines Amnesty, destruction Yes 
South Korea Amnesty, destruction No 
Sri Lanka Voluntary collection, amnesty, destruction Yes 
Thailand Amnesty, destruction No 
  Oceania 
Australia Surplus destruction, amnesty, voluntary 
collection 
No 
Fiji Voluntary collection, amnesty Yes 
New Zealand Amnesty No 
Papa New Guinea DDR, voluntary collection, amnesty, 
destruction 
Yes 
Solomon Islands DDR, amnesty, destruction Yes 
 
In total, at least 81 countries have experienced some form of weapons 
management between 2001 and 2011.  Of these, 38 were either experiencing 
periods of violent conflict or had recently emerged; the table below identifies these 
38 countries. 
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Figure 5: Weapons management in conflict affected countries, 2001 to 2011 
Country context in 
which SALW control 
attempted 
Outline of type of activity 
Africa 
Angola DDR, destruction 
Burundi DDR 
Chad DDR 
Congo (Rep of) DDR 
Democratic Republic 
of Congo  
Destruction and DDR 
Guinea Destruction, DDR, Forcible disarmament 
Guinea Bissau DDR, Forcible disarmament 
Kenya Collection and destruction 
Liberia DDR, weapons collection 
Mali Weapons collection, surplus destruction, DDR 
Mozambique Weapons collection, destruction 
Niger Weapons collection, destruction 
Nigeria Collection, destruction, voluntary and forcible disarmament 
Sierra Leone DDR, voluntary and forcible disarmament, amnesty, 
destruction 
Sudan DDR, voluntary and forced disarmament, amnesty, 
destruction 
Uganda DDR, voluntary and forced disarmament  
Americas 
Colombia DDR, voluntary collection, surplus destruction 
El Salvador Confiscated weapons destroyed 
Honduras Amnesty, voluntary collection, weapons destruction 
Nicaragua Surplus destruction, amnesty 
   Europe  
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Bosnia DDR, voluntary weapons collection, amnesty, forcible 
disarmament, weapons destruction  
Croatia Voluntary collection, amnesty, weapons destroyed 
Kosovo DDR, voluntary collection, amnesty 
Macedonia DDR, amnesty, weapons destruction 
Russia DDR, voluntary collection, amnesty, forced disarmament, 
destruction 
Serbia Voluntary collection, amnesty, destruction 
Tajikistan DDR, voluntary collection, amnesty, forced disarmament 
Middle East 
Yemen Forced disarmament, weapons collection 
Iraq Forced disarmament 
Asia 
Afghanistan DDR, amnesty, forced disarmament 
Cambodia DDR, voluntary collection, forced disarmament 
Indonesia DDR 
Pakistan Voluntary collection, amnesty, confiscated weapons 
destroyed 
Philippines Amnesty, destruction 
Sri Lanka Voluntary collection, amnesty, destruction 
Oceania 
Fiji Voluntary collection, amnesty 
Papa New Guinea DDR, voluntary collection, amnesty, destruction 
Solomon Islands DDR, amnesty, destruction 
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3.5 Initial analysis of nature of SALW control efforts 
undertaken in conflict affected contexts 
This section provides a brief analysis of the data represented above.  It does this by 
analysing the phasing of SALW control activities in relation to the existence of peace 
agreements or processes and the proximity from violent conflict, and by exploring 
the nature of how different activities were combined, or were organised within 
similar periods of time.  It begins to identify issues and themes to be explored in 
more detail through the mini-case studies later in this chapter and through the 
Kosovo case-study contained in Chapter 4. 
 
Of the 38 national instances of SALW control being attempted in conflict affected 
contexts, at least 21 involved efforts to undertake Disarmament, Demobilisation 
and Reintegration (DDR).  This is likely to be quite accurate given the nature of the 
activity, and suggests in each case that the countries concerned were at the time 
undergoing a conflict de-escalation, possibly framed by, or involving, a peace 
agreement or ceasefire (for instance Burundi, Liberia, Sudan, Colombia and 
Indonesia).   This suggests the existence of links between peace processes and DDR 
activities in which conscious efforts had been made by those involved to tackle 
particular aspects of SALW control as part of wider peacebuilding strategies.  In 
these cases it may be possible to assume that potential interrelationships and the 
benefits that they may bring had been explored as part of planning and negotiating 
peace processes.   
 
There are at least 25 instances of where SALW collection efforts were organised by 
government, in most cases with the support of external donors and others.  This 
suggests a certain level of commitment on the part of the host government and the 
existence of conditions which were relatively conducive.  It is possible for instance 
from the data to identify that many countries (for instance Kenya, Mali, 
Mozambique, Serbia and Sri Lanka) in which voluntary SALW collection efforts took 
place and where DDR activities were not attempted at the same time were at that 
point at a more mature stage of conflict de-escalation.   
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It is not clear in all cases to what extent the different SALW collection activities 
were co-operative or coercive; whether coercive and non-coercive activities were 
attempted together; or indeed whether they were differentiated to reflect 
approaches to different groups or locations.  However the relationship between 
SALW collection efforts and the later phases of conflict de-escalation does appear 
to be relatively strong.  
 
This suggests that contingency does have a role in decision-making as regards 
specific SALW control activities worthy of further exploration: where DDR activities 
may often take place in the periods immediately following a ceasefire or peace 
agreement, over time as the conflict conditions permit, a civilian-focussed and less 
coercive approach to SALW control may be attempted.   
 
The destruction of SALW stocks took place in at least 21 cases, comprising a range 
of different conflict intensities and contexts.  This suggests both a willingness of 
authorities to reduce total SALW stocks and the existence of a relatively permissive 
context.  The data does not allow for a qualitative interpretation which would 
suggest to what extent destruction of SALW represented obsolete state stocks or 
those removed from the civilian population or indeed non-state armed groups.   
However, it is possible to note that destruction activity was regularly reported in 
the context of other SALW control activities, principally DDR (for instance in Angola, 
Macedonia, DRC, Guinea) and weapons collection (for instance in Nigeria, Niger, 
Croatia).   
 
This suggests that destruction activity may be closely linked to other forms of SALW 
control which themselves may have a relationship with the nature of the conflict 
context at the time.  In this case, there is at least some evidence indicating that 
decisions to undertake certain SALW control activities (DDR and voluntary weapons 
collection) are determined at least in part by temporal factors, and therefore their 
appropriateness and possibly their success or otherwise may be linked through 
contingency to previous activities earlier in the de-escalation period.   
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However other activities, specifically the destruction of SALW, can take place at 
different stages of post-war de-escalation and recovery but are closely linked to the 
existence of other SALW control efforts (for instance DDR or weapons collection).  
In this case, complementarity may be an important factor in decisions to 
undertaken them, and therefore their interrelationships with overarching 
peacebuilding efforts may be influenced more by how they interact with other 
SALW control activities taking place in the same time and space, than by specific 
phases of post-war peacebuilding. 
 
The importance of complementarity does appear to be significant:  From the data it 
is striking to observe that there would appear to be very few examples of one 
aspect of SALW control being attempted in isolation.  In all but three of the 
countries analysed, multiple SALW control activities were recorded to have taken 
place over a similar period of time. The data is not sufficiently detailed to determine 
whether in each case these activities were attempted sequentially over a short 
period of time or contiguously.  However it suggests that multiple SALW control 
efforts are often attempted either together or in very close temporal proximity.  
Understanding how different SALW control activities taking place in a similar time 
or space relate and what their individual and collective interrelationships are with 
conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes appears to be important and 
worthy of deeper analysis. 
 
It is clear that whilst it suggests some interesting emerging findings, this initial 
analysis has significant limitations which should be recognised. Firstly, the 
categories of SALW control were identified by the Biting the Bullet research team 
(Bourne et al  2006) on the basis of the main themes contained in the UNPoA (and 
were used as the frame of analysis for including subsequent efforts to control 
SALW).  The reports by States and independent research by others has been 
assessed by Bourne et al and whilst in many cases there is clarity and thus minimal 
room for uncertainty, in some cases there is likely to have been some ambiguity as 
to how a particular activity could be described (for instance a voluntary weapons 
collection process is likely to be accompanied by an amnesty period, however an 
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amnesty does not in and of itself equate to an organised voluntary weapons 
collection process).  The decision by Bourne et al as to how they interpreted and 
thus recorded a particular activity should therefore be recognised as having a 
potential effect on the way in which the data that they published is interpreted.   
 
Secondly, as stated above, the data does not allow for detailed enough analysis of 
how the different SALW control efforts interrelated either over time or space; nor 
does it permit analysis of the different actors involved in each case.  This latter 
point is of critical importance to the overarching research question and framing 
hypothesis.  Without a more detailed understanding of the conflict context within 
which SALW control activities were attempted, it is not possible to analyse and 
assess the role of individuals, communities and the social, political or security 
related factors which might influence their success or otherwise.   
 
Thirdly, the data is organised using the nation-state as the main organising variable, 
which does not easily lend itself to an analysis of the regional and cross border 
dimensions of conflict or of the implications for SALW control nor of the role of 
locally generated conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts or SALW control 
activities.   
 
Finally, whilst all the countries included in the dataset had experienced significant 
violent conflict either in the period leading up to 2001 or subsequently, and 
consequently almost inevitably will have experienced some form of conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding activity, whether supported by international actors or 
addressed exclusively from within their borders, there is no data included on the 
nature or extent of peacebuilding efforts.  This information could be of significant 
interest in terms of analysing the phasal and sectoral interrelationships between 
SALW control efforts and peacebuilding activities. 
 
For these reasons, it is important to provide a further and more in-depth and 
qualitative analysis of how SALW control activities interrelated with peacebuilding 
efforts.  Using the six criteria described below, five mini case studies of SALW 
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control in conflict affected contexts were drawn from the dataset above and are 
analysed in greater depth in the following section.  This builds on the initial 
quantitative analysis described above in line with the mixed methods approach set 
out in Chapters 1 and 2, which combines qualitative and quantitative data analysis 
in a way which allows for qualitative analysis to provide greater depth and to 
explore amongst other things, the construction of the contexts within which 
peacebuilding and SALW control efforts were attempted.   
 
The intensity of violent conflict is important to the analytical framework set out in 
Chapter 2. It allows for analysis of how peacebuilding and SALW efforts may be 
affected by their proximity to active violence, and thus helps to explore the 
contention of Ramsbotham et al (2005) that interrelationships may be different 
through different post-conflict phases.  It is also important in terms of helping to 
explore Lederach’s theories about the involvement of different actors in 
peacebuilding processes.  This is particularly the case in terms of  how these relate 
to Ramsbotham et al, and Fisher and Zimina’s argument that when violence is being 
brought to an end, it may be more likely (even appropriate) for outside interveners 
to play a more direct role alongside other elite peace-makers; whereas as violence 
recedes, communities and citizens must play a more active part if the 
transformation from the absence of violence to sustainable peace is to be achieved 
(See Lederach, 1996; Ramsbotham et al, 2005; Fisher and Zimina, 2008).   
 
Violent conflict can differ significantly in intensity, from periods of high intensity 
violence which might only last for a relatively short period of time in the context of 
a longer term conflict (such as specific periods of open warfare between two states) 
to longer term periods of lower intensity (such as ongoing rebellion in parts of a 
country against central rule).  To some extent, the intensity of violence, as with its 
nature and causes, may influence the way in which SALW are accessed and used, 
and therefore could potentially determine the sorts of options available for SALW 
control.  Conflict intensity could also have a relationship with what other security- 
or peace- building activities are attempted concurrently, and therefore will affect 
the sorts of interrelationships which exist with efforts to control SALW.  Ensuring a 
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range of conflict intensity in the mini-case studies selected in therefore the first 
criterion for selection.  
 
The second criterion focuses on the causes and drivers of the violent conflict. 
Violent conflict is often the expression of a complex and inter-related set of 
grievances and contests over political power, resources and ideas.  The primary 
focus of this thesis is political conflict rather than social or criminal violence without 
wider dimensions of political competition or mobilisation.  As such the examples 
identified for further analysis below are examples of efforts to control SALW in 
contexts in which periods of violent political conflict have reduced or come to an 
end.  However within the scope of political conflict, there are many different drivers 
or causes of conflict, such as for instance, access to land and natural resources, an 
independence struggle against perceived oppressors or a rejection of the behaviour 
of institutions responsible for providing security and justice to the population at 
large. The second criterion is therefore establishing a range of different causes and 
drivers of violent conflict. 
 
This criterion is central to the exploration of the research hypothesis and questions 
in that the role that security providers and indeed wider government is perceived to 
play in a conflict situation is likely to condition the speed and extent to which 
citizens are willing to engage with them in post-conflict peacebuilding or SALW 
control activities.  If the government and its security actors are perceived by the 
majority of the population to be positive actors, or protectors, it could reasonably 
be expected that they will be more predisposed to responding positively to 
peacebuilding entreaties.  If however, these actors are widely considered to be 
causes of the conflict then the opposite is likely to be true.  One of the complexities 
in applying this criterion is that a government and its security agents are likely to be 
perceived differently by different groups, particularly when the conflict is between 
one or more groups in a given context. 
 
The type of activity aimed at controlling SALW is an important third criterion.  As 
the tables in Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate, efforts to control SALW can take many 
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different forms, from those which are embedded within other activities with an 
objective which includes, but which is slightly different to SALW control (such as 
DDR for instance), to those whose primary objective is to place SALW under greater 
control of a responsible authority, or place them beyond use completely (such as 
weapons collection and destruction).  This is of close interest to the development of 
the research framework for this thesis:  SALW can be viewed as a sectoral 
intervention, associating closely with either the ‘security’ or ‘rule of law’ sectors 
identified by Ramsbotham et al (2005).  It can also be seen as a cross cutting issue 
where the weapon as an artefact has resonance across multiple sectors (see Greene 
1999).  This is important in terms of analysing the potential complementarities 
between SALW control and other activities located either within one or across 
several sectors.  It is also important in analysing the contingent interrelationships 
which may exist between nests of different phases of activities. 
 
To address the ‘context’ variable in the hypothesis, it is important to focus on the 
types of actors involved in peacebuilding or SALW control activities and as such this 
was identified as the fourth criterion.  One of the defining characteristics of 
peacebuilding and SALW control efforts is who is involved and what roles they play.  
In most cases, a cursory analysis would suggest that the primary actors are a 
combination of local people, state institutions and often international agencies and 
donor countries (see Small Arms Survey 2001).   This is highly consistent with 
Lederach’s Actors and Approaches model (see Lederach 1996).  
 
However a deeper assessment is required to develop an understanding of how 
these actors are involved and precisely which actors within these general groupings 
play a role.  For instance, within the group of ‘local people’, are local leaders, young 
people or women involved in the design and review of any efforts? Was the 
definition of SALW availability or misuse as a problem their definition and was any 
idea to attempt to control SALW theirs, or something that was suggested elsewhere 
first? 
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The nature of conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts was identified as an 
important fifth criterion in the selection of mini case-studies.  In all post-war or 
post-conflict contexts in which SALW control has been attempted that the author 
has reviewed there are other efforts, either locally developed and undertaken or 
imposed from outside which aim to improve security or promote peace.  However 
the range and intensity of these activities will likely have an impact on efforts to 
control SALW, potentially both negatively and positively and it will certainly affect 
the types of interrelationships that exist between them.  Analysing and 
understanding the nature and range of peacebuilding activities in a given context is 
essential for establishing  complementarities and contingencies, both of which are 
critical components of the research framework set out in Chapter 2.  
 
Finally, the scale and size of SALW efforts was identified as a sixth criterion for 
selecting mini case-studies.  Attempts have been made to control SALW variously at 
the regional, national, provincial and very local levels.  There have been attempts to 
tackle multiple dimensions of a SALW problem consecutively (sometimes aiming 
consciously to benefit from contingency) or as part of the same programme 
(sometimes aiming to make the most of opportunities presented by 
complementarity with other relevant programmes taking place in similar time and 
space) as well as efforts that focus on just one aspect in a specific location.  The 
scale and size of SALW control efforts is likely to effect in some ways the types of 
inter-relationships which may exist in a given context (for instance a national-level 
approach which included changes to legislation may well interrelate strongly with 
efforts to promote good governance or the legislative aspects of security system 
reform, themselves often essential peacebuilding strategies).  This criterion is 
important in that the scale of SALW efforts may be a factor in the extent to which 
efforts are made by planners to establish interrelationships from an early stage, and 
may thus play a role in determining to what extent contingencies and 
complementarities are designed ‘in’ to peacebuilding efforts. 
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3.6 The selection of cases 
On the basis of the criteria established and discussed in the section above, five mini 
case-studies were selected: 
 Efforts to control civilian held SALW in Sri Lanka following the Cease Fire 
Agreement in 2002;  
 SALW control efforts in the Western Balkans and their interrelationships with 
national and regional conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes;  
 Peacebuilding and SALW control efforts in Sudan/Southern Sudan since 2005;  
 Analysis of efforts to control SALW as disarmament exercises in northern Kenya 
and Karamoja in Uganda in 2006;  
 Analysis of efforts to control SALW and their relationships with peacebuilding 
frameworks and activities in Sierra Leone between 2001 and 2004. 
 
Taken together, these cases reflect the criteria discussed above and represent two 
country-specific examples in which peacebuilding and SALW control efforts were 
undertaken in the context of recovery following civil war; one case of a context 
which began as a civil war and translated into a conflict between two independent 
states; a case of sub-national but cross-border responses to a regional conflict 
system; and one case which features a strong relationship between national and 
cross border conflicts and an internationally supported, regionally framed response.  
 
The first country-specific mini case study is Sri Lanka.  This is interesting as it 
presents a relatively unusual example of an attempt to promote voluntary civilian 
SALW control in a period following a ceasefire but in the absence of a negotiated 
political settlement (from 2003 to 2006).  The SALW control efforts were 
government-led with relatively little involvement from international actors.  They 
were however closely linked to the UNPoA and to PoA implementation and sought 
to address the fear of escalating armed crime through collecting and destroying 
civilian owned SALW. 
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Given the level of international focus it received and the effect of experiences of 
peacebuilding and SALW control on international approaches applied elsewhere in 
subsequent years, the Western Balkans as a sub-region and specifically the 
experience of regionally-framed peacebuilding and SALW control efforts on Bosnia 
Herzegovina was selected as the second mini case-study.  The civil wars and other 
armed conflicts that affected the Western Balkans from the declaration of 
independence by Slovenia in 1992 to end of the war in Kosovo in 1999 were 
characterised inter-alia by the widespread proliferation of SALW across borders 
including within the civilian population and by a variety of national and regional 
peacebuilding efforts and activities.   As a regional external multilateral power, the 
EU played a significant role, alongside various UN Missions and agencies, principally 
the UNDP in promoting SALW control as part of wider peace and reconstruction 
efforts from the late 1990s to the present day.  As such, much of the practitioner-
based experience and evidence used in the design of internationally supported 
SALW control programmes since has been shaped to varying degrees by activities in 
the Western Balkans. 
 
Sudan-South Sudan is both recent and very relevant to the overarching research 
question and hypothesis for the following reasons.  SALW control efforts were 
heavily linked to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 between the SPLA 
and the Government of Sudan.  A range of different activities with a SALW control 
component, including DDR, community security promotion and civilian 
disarmament were designed in to the peacebuilding framework that set out how 
the two sides would manage their differences.  The CPA was an attempt to bring to 
a close many decades of violent conflict in which millions of people were estimated 
to have died. 
 
Sub-national efforts to undertake SALW control as part of conflict resolution and 
development efforts in northern Kenya and Uganda present an interesting 
combination of dynamics which are of strong relevance to the criteria for selecting 
mini case-studies. Sporadic civilian disarmament efforts in Kenya and Uganda have 
followed similar patterns, being both voluntary and coercive at different periods, 
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targeted largely at pastoralist groups, sometimes cross-border in their design and 
implementation and to a greater or lesser degree, always described under the 
rubric of bringing peace and development to otherwise restive remote parts of both 
countries. In both countries this disarmament efforts took place in contexts that 
were heavily conflicted and characterised by political as well as criminal violence.  
However in both cases, these conditions were relatively localised, occurring in 
national contexts in which large scale violence was not widespread across the 
countries concerned.   
 
Finally, the fifth country-specific case is Sierra Leone.  Its recovery from a long 
period of violent conflict is of interest for the following reasons:  It was 
characterised by a weak state; the involvement of external regional and 
international actors; high levels of poverty affecting a large portion of the 
population; inequality, weak governance; and the existence of a rebel movement 
that sought to overthrow the government using SALW and armed violence.  Sierra 
Leone has also been the target for extensive post-conflict peace- and security- 
building and development programmes since the end of the war.  Finally and 
importantly for this thesis, since 1999 there have been several high profile 
programmes which have had  a significant SALW control component, including DDR, 
a coercive weapons collection effort and a voluntary collection project. 
 
Taken together the selected cases represent a wide range of different contexts, 
conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts and various SALW control activities 
and processes.  They are broadly representative of the spread of SALW control 
efforts undertaken in conflict affected contexts set out in earlier in this chapter.  
They represent activity which has been led by national governments with significant 
international support, those that are more locally generated, those in which SALW 
control efforts were specifically intended as part of peacebuilding efforts and those 
where the relationships were much less explicit – and changed over time.  
 
The following section analyses each of these cases in some detail, drawing out the 
nature of interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding and conflict 
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resolution efforts, and where appropriate, the effect on these interrelationships of 
contingency, complementarity and context.  
3.7 Mini case studies 
3.7.1 Efforts to control civilian held SALW in Sri Lanka following 
the Cease Fire Agreement in 2002 
This mini case-study begins with an analysis of the context in which a cease-fire 
agreement was established in Sri Lanka and of its relationship with efforts to 
control SALW that began shortly after the cease-fire was agreed.  It then describes 
and discusses the nature of the SALW control activities and identifies areas which 
were both positive and negative in terms of their success and contribution to wider 
peacebuilding efforts.  The effects of contingency, complementarity and context on 
SALW control activities and their relationship to peacebuilding are analysed before 
concluding with analysis of the overall effects of attempts to control SALW in post-
Cease-Fire Agreement Sri Lanka. 
 
Sri Lanka has for many years been a focus for researchers addressing conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding questions and the success or otherwise of 
peacebuilding efforts remain contested.  Sri Lanka has been a testing ground for a 
variety of different tools and processes aimed at understanding conflict, which 
range from the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment of development projects 
undertaken by Bush (1998) to the Strategic Conflict Analysis produced by Goodhand 
in 2001 and reflections on the role of Systematic Conflict Transformation by Ropers 
in 2008.  Goodhand et al analyse the application of liberal peacebuilding 
approaches to Sri Lanka (2010) whilst Rupersinge (1996), Rajasingham-Senanayake 
(2005), Donnais (2009) and Venugopal (2009) all analyse specific elements, most 
notably economic reforms and reliance on economic, military and political elites to 
lead peace processes, in critical assessments of internationally supported peace-
building efforts. 
 
In 2002, the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) signed a Cease Fire Agreement (commonly referred to as the CFA) which was 
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according to Pavey and Smith (2009) a welcome respite for both sides from a 
conflict which neither was able to win.  The ceasefire brought to an end over two 
decades of civil war between the separatist LTTE and the Colombo-based 
Government of Sri Lanka.  By 2008 this agreement was in effect no longer in place, 
with the Government and LTTE rearming, training and exchanging fire, a period 
which culminated in 2009 with an intense assault on the LTTE and the areas under 
its control, first in the east of the country and later in the north which resulted in 
the military defeat of the LTTE, the death of its leaders, and huge damage inflicted 
on the civilian population caught up in the fighting.  In the period between the 
ceasefire being agreed and the re-ignition of the conflict, several efforts were made 
to address some of the negative legacies of the earlier periods of conflict. 
 
In the period following the CFA, there was a general recognition within Government 
that the proliferation of SALW had the potential to destabilise what was 
undoubtedly a more peaceful context. The sources of these weapons were not 
clear. However there were reports of significant numbers being looted from the 
battlefields in the north and east of the country and being sold on the black market 
by former combatants and civilians alike (see Smith 2003).  In addition, it was 
estimated that around 60,000 Sri Lankan Army soldiers had deserted over recent 
years, some taking their weapons with them, and others taking looted weapons 
back to their home areas, largely in the south of the country and either selling them 
on or using them as virtually untraceable sources of weaponry for conducting illegal 
activities.  Finally, it appeared clear that weapons obtained either with or without 
official sanction as part of attempts to provide personal security - including 
substantial numbers of weapons issued to politicians – had not always been issued 
in line with existing policy, accurate records had not been kept and weapons had 
not been recalled following the end of periods covered by individual licenses.10  
Collectively, this problem of controlling SALW – both legally and illicitly took place 
in a wider context which was characterised by a significant movement of people 
around the country following the end of hostilities, a flourishing black market in the 
                                                       
10 NCAPISA Chairman’s speech at a side meeting of the Biennial Meeting of States to Review 
Progress in Implementation of the UNPoA, July 2005. 
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major urban centres, particularly parts of Colombo, and the ongoing weakness of 
many of the institutions of government, including the police as they struggled to 
transition from an active conflict to a fragile peace (Smith 2003).   
 
The CFA did not explicitly contain references to DDR or other arms management 
related processes, which represented the beginning of what was hoped would be a 
peace process, rather than describing a comprehensive political settlement. Smith  
argues that the CFA was in effect a pause in the fighting whilst the protagonists 
assessed whether they were in position to engage in a peace process or resume 
fighting once they had rearmed and prepared for future combat, “For Sri Lanka, the 
most important political and constitutional questions had yet to be asked or 
answered” (Smith 2003:6).  It did however provide a mandate for Sri Lankan 
government thinking about what a post-conflict defence and security sector might 
look like through establishing a Defence Review Committee which began to think 
about future force size and structure.  Whilst referencing the challenge posed by 
SALW, the Committee did not specifically prioritise action to address it, or indeed 
related public security issues such as the role and effectiveness of the police.    
 
Whilst the CFA was relatively silent with regards to the challenges of uncontrolled 
SALW, there was increasing public unease, generated in part by the perception that 
violent crime was increasing significantly and on the part of government officials.11 
In recognition of this emerging problem, the UN Under-Secretary General for 
Disarmament Affairs, the Sri Lankan diplomat, Jyanta Danapalla helped to facilitate 
contact between the Government of Sri Lanka and the UN to request assistance 
through the Department of Disarmament Affairs and the Department of Political 
Affairs in New York. Following several scoping missions in 2002 and 2003, a 
programme of support, funded by the Japanese Government was established to 
help the Government of Sri Lanka address its SALW problems. The programme 
contained numerous components, including administrative arrangements such as 
the establishment of a national coordinating body charged with leading 
                                                       
11 Author’s interview with Sri Lankan government officials, 2003. 
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government efforts to control SALW and establishing baselines in terms of existing 
controls, dimensions of the perceived problem, and public perceptions and 
attitudes towards SALW.  It also made provision for supporting specific forms of 
SALW control to be determined by the National Commission and/or the Ministry of 
Home Affairs, later subsumed within the Ministry of Defence following the transfer 
of power from President Kumaratunga to President Rajapaksa and his brother 
Gotabaya, the new defence Secretary in 2006 (Saferworld et al, 2008).  
 
In the early years of its partnership with the UN, the government undertook 
numerous activities aimed at fulfilling its commitment to reducing illicit SALW in Sri 
Lanka.  These included: establishing its National Commission which drew together 
officials from all relevant parts of government, as well as the police, army and 
customs and representatives from civil society; commissioning a survey of all the 
areas under the control of the Sri Lankan government of the nature of the problem; 
and supporting the development of civil society engagement on the issue, 
particularly in relation to generating public awareness of the potential negative 
consequences of illicit weapons ownership and misuse.   
 
During this period, two attempts to collect illicit SALW were made, one for a month 
in 2004 and the second for a period of four months from October 2005 until 
January 2006.12  Both efforts were essentially similar; the government offered 
amnesty for those who held weapons illegally, providing them with the opportunity 
to either surrender the weapon or to re-register it if it had originally been 
registered and it still fell within the scope of existing legislation and procedures.   
 
In the first instance, the campaign resulted in a small number of weapons being re-
registered, many of these belonging to politicians and other public figures to whom 
they had been allocated during the previous conflict.  It did not however result in 
any significant numbers of weapons surrendered outright by members of the 
public.  Undeterred, in 2005/6 the Government announced its second amnesty 
                                                       
12 For a detailed elaboration of SALW collection efforts and the wider activities of the NCAPISA see 
Saferworld et al (2008)  
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period.  This time it differed from the previous effort in one major way; 
compensation was offered to those willing to surrender their arms at between 
5,000-50,000 Sri Lankan rupees for a weapon and 50 rupees per round of 
ammunition.  Whilst the official results of this second attempt have never been 
made public by the Government or National Commission, it is accepted by officials 
that it had no significant success – and in fact that the primary reason for the three 
periods of extension offered by the Government was in an attempt to generate 
momentum, hoping for a positive outcome, rather than a decision to sustain an 
existing success.13 
 
It is clear that the Sri Lankan experience of offering periods of amnesty during 
which illicit SALW could be surrendered was not a success.  In the national survey of 
SALW control issues in the areas under government control introduced above, 
respondents to a household survey and focus group discussions suggested that the 
main reasons why the collection efforts had failed were a combination of fear of 
insecurity which remained amongst significant sections of the population; a 
mistrust of the police and other authorities that the offer of amnesty would be 
honoured if individuals came forwards; and a very low level of knowledge, both 
about existing SALW ownership rules and thus, knowledge about what was legal 
and illegal, and about  the actual existence of an amnesty period (Saferworld et al, 
2008). 
 
However, whilst the amnesty periods specifically did little to impact on the 
perceived SALW problem in Sri Lanka in the middle years of the decade, they were 
part of a wider programme of activities – introduced above – which taken together 
can be seen to have produced significant outputs, whilst not being evaluated 
effectively enough to judge whether in the end they had much actual impact.  
These included the public crushing of almost 35,000 confiscated weapons on July 
8th 2005 which were taken from police stations and other locations from around the 
country where they had been accumulating for many years, reducing a significant 
                                                       
13 Author’s discussion with NCAPISA Chairman, Colombo 2008. 
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future risk of pilferage and theft (Saferworld et al, 2008).  The national Firearms 
Ordinance was also reviewed, tightening up controls on whom and for what 
reasons weapons could be licensed to individuals.14   
 
The National Commission Against the Proliferation of Small Arms (NCAPISA) was for 
a while one of the more operational official Commissions at work in Sri Lanka, at 
which genuine debate took place amongst officials from across government on 
challenging and sensitive questions relating to arms ownership and use.  Civil 
society began to play a credible and effective role on aspects of SALW control, 
particularly those related to public awareness and education.  In 2007 and into 
2008, the political and security context in Sri Lanka began to change significantly 
and the space within which the NCAPISA and associated SALW control activities had 
been able to take place in contracted very significantly, leading to the withdrawal of 
funding from certain donors, including the UK Government, non-renewal of the 
Government’s programme relationship with the UN and an end to civil society 
involvement following a period of hostile government scrutiny and aggressive 
media attacks on leading figures.  Conducting the research for this thesis over five 
years since the main SALW efforts took place in Sri Lanka, it is difficult to detect any 
lasting legacy in the country; civil society groups have disbanded and the leading 
figure is now dead; all the relevant officials in the Ministry of Defence have moved 
on or left government service; there are no government-led or donor-supported 
programmes seeking to encourage the voluntary surrender of weapons from 
outside the main areas in which the conflict took place in the east and north of the 
country; and, anecdotally in the absence of any official statistics or large scale 
surveys, the link between SALW use and criminality appears if anything to be on the 
increase across the country.   
 
There has to-date been no attempt to systematically assess the benefits and 
drawbacks of the type of approach attempted in Sri Lanka, or to look specifically at 
the interrelationships between SALW control efforts and activities to promote 
                                                       
14 NCAPISA presentation on progress towards PoA implementation at the 2005 Biennial Meeting of 
States 
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peace. Perhaps the most comprehensive and authoritative study is the national 
small arms survey, researched on behalf of the government and published in 2008 
(Saferworld et al, 2008).  This highlights some of the challenges which may be of 
benefit in the future to similar efforts elsewhere. 
 
An analysis of this document suggests that there was initially an explicit relationship 
between the desire to enhance control over SALW and the transition towards peace 
which was envisaged in the 2002 CFA.  Whilst this was never developed in detail in 
either official government pronouncements, or in programme documents or 
reports, it is undoubtedly the case that senior figures in the government saw the 
pursuit of more effective SALW control as a contribution to peacebuilding.15  
However, despite being only one party to the peace agreement, there was no 
official contact with the LTTE, which controlled many of the areas that had seen the 
most intense fighting during the previous period of conflict.  Without reciprocal 
activity it is doubtful how in reality SALW control on one side of the border in the 
context of a ceasefire between conflicting sides could in fact be described as a 
peacebuilding activity in the sense that it promoted conflict reduction between 
contesting views or institutions.  Perhaps rather than contributing actively to 
finding peace between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, it instead aimed 
to promote a more peaceful society in the area under the control of the 
government through removing some of the tools by which violence and 
intimidation could be conducted.   
 
The Sri Lankan experience between 2002 and 2008 is of particular interest to 
exploring and testing the hypothesis which frames this thesis.  There were limited 
formal links (other than the recognition of the SALW problem and a commitment to 
defence reform which has certain sectoral and functional relationships) between 
the perceived SALW control problem and the Cease Fire Agreement.  From this 
                                                       
15 Authors interviews and discussions with NCAPISA members in London and Colombo in 2008 
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perspective the interrelationships were either not well understood, or prioritised, 
or were deemed inappropriate for inclusion.16   
 
At a more operational level within the area under the control of the Sri Lanka 
government, it is clear from the initial programme documents that  the 
development of a programme of work to address SALW challenges was facilitated 
by the existence of the peace agreement and was seen by the government as a 
necessary effort to reduce one of the unwelcome effects of the conflict (the 
proliferation of weapons in the centre and south of the country and their increased 
use in the commission of violent and organised crime).  
 
From the perspective of the effect of contingency and complementarity on the 
interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding activities the following 
observations can be made:  Firstly, the SALW programme was seen as a cross-
cutting and stand-alone issue. This statement is supported by the existence of a 
national commission drawing together a wide range of government departments to 
oversee the development and implementation of action.  It was explicitly not 
subsumed within the nascent defence transformation process or efforts to support 
the development of the police and other public security bodies. It was therefore not 
a sector specific programme in the sense outlined by Ramsbotham et al (2005) or 
Lederach (1997).  As such, there were no significant efforts to link the work of the 
NCAPISA with other security or justice sector interventions and thus there was no 
attempt to understand and maximise potential beneficial effects of contingency on 
interrelationships with other sector specific interventions.   
 
Within the SALW programme itself, there were attempts to understand and act on 
the potentially beneficial effects of contingency.  For instance, there was a 
sequential commitment to establish the NCAPISA first, commission the SALW 
                                                       
16 Discussions between the author and researchers that closely followed the establishment of the 
CFA suggest that a political decision was taken by the Sri Lankan government not to include steps to 
address SALW problems given that it was an issue that they believed would only be addressed in the 
areas under the control of the Government, surmising that it would be seen as an act of unilateral 
disarmament by many, including the nationalist movement in the south of the country (led by the 
JVP political party) 
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survey to develop a better understanding of the problem, followed by the 
development of a national action plan to address the problems.  However, this was 
undermined by decisions to undertake specific activities with little planning or 
notice, apparently on the whim of the Secretary of the Home Ministry who 
effectively chaired the NCAPISA.17  
 
Secondly, it appears that little attempt was made to understand or programme for 
the potential benefits of complementarity across sectors during the same phases of 
time.  There were police reform and development efforts, reforms to the oversight 
committee system in parliament and ongoing defence reforms taking place at the 
same time, but there is no evidence to suggest that these were seen as particularly 
relevant by those planning and managing SALW control activities. 
 
In terms of the range of actors involved in efforts to more effectively control SALW, 
Sri Lanka offers some interesting experiences.  The decision to develop a SALW 
control programme was taken at the most senior levels of the government.  The 
NCAPISA comprised secretary-level officials from all the key ministries of State.  And 
operational decisions regarding collection methods, licensing systems and payment 
for voluntary surrender were all taken by a small number of senior officials, 
military, police and politicians.  However, there were two places on the NCAPISA 
reserved for civil society groups.  One of which was gifted to the chairman of an 
organisation that closely supported the government; the other was allocated to the 
representative of a community consultation process that involved local-level 
meetings in all 16 of Sri Lanka’s accessible districts at the time at which several 
hundred local people participated through identifying their SALW problems and 
selecting a representative who would sit on a national civil society steering group, 
and select their representative on the NCAPISA.  
 
                                                       
17 The author was closely involved in this programme for several years and attended a significant 
number of NCAPISA meetings.  Decisions by the Secretary to initiative amnesty periods or to offer 
funds for surrendered weapons were not sanctioned by the NCAPISA and appeared to be the 
decision of the Secretary alone. 
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This local-level involvement later extended to a number of projects being 
developed by a national coalition of NGOs which became active on SALW issues.  
The South Asia Small Arms Network, Sri Lanka – part of a wider regional network 
with national chapters – funded a series of education and awareness activities 
developed by local community organisations and others.  In this sense all the actor 
groups represented in Lederach’s Actors and Approaches triangle were 
represented.   
 
The effects of this can be viewed in different ways depending on the perspective of 
the analyst.  For someone who was heavily involved in all stages of the SALW 
control efforts in Sri Lanka at this time the following are of particular importance:  
the involvement of local people legitimised the NCAPISA civil society 
representative, allowing him to play a very active and forthright role in a body that 
was otherwise entirely dominated by government elites; the existence of the NGO 
network placed pressure on the government to sustain its interest and 
engagement, although at times this was a challenging relationship; the failure of 
the NCAPISA and the dropping of SALW control as a priority was a direct result of a 
change of government and a fairly radical change in posture towards the LTTE and 
the prospects of a military victory; the fact that the SALW control process survived 
as long as it did without a comprehensive political settlement or peace process is 
due at least in part to the levels of engagement of local people, evidenced by their 
participation in weapons collection and destruction activities, peace meetings and 
events locally and ongoing support for the national network after the NCAPISA 
ceased to operate. 
 
It is possible to conclude from the analysis of this mini case-study that SALW control 
activities or objectives were not explicitly designed into the CFA.  However, the 
political space and the opportunities for leverage both of and for the UN were 
created by the CFA and the wider commitment to reform on the part of the Sri 
Lankan government that it enabled.   
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The commitment to SALW control and the activities that were designed by the 
Government, UN and others were significant: high-level and high-profile 
government architecture was established to oversee and manage the SALW control 
programme, which included the allocation of government resources to staff and 
host a secretariat and national commission; relatively large numbers of weapons 
were collected and destroyed; and there was considerable public engagement 
including from people at very local levels who were not accustomed to being asked 
for their opinions on government policy.   
 
These positive dimensions occurred in a country which appeared at the time to be 
emerging from decades of civil war.  However in reality the SALW control efforts 
were taking place in a context in which no political settlement had been reached 
between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE.  As public attitudes and the 
government changed, the political perspective in Colombo hardened towards the 
LTTE and a decision was taken to deploy a much more aggressive strategy for 
breaking the deadlock on the basis of which the CFA had been agreed. 
Consequently, the space for SALW control initiatives and the legitimacy of the CFA 
as an enabling framework was severely undermined.  The Sri Lankan experience is 
instructive for the reasons described above.  It is also interesting as it underlines 
the political as well as technical nature of post-conflict settlement processes:  It 
highlights the implications of a failure to move from an absence of violence towards 
positive peace and consequently to tackle SALW control as part of longer term 
transformational peacebuilding. 
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3.7.2 SALW control efforts in the Western Balkans and their 
interrelationships with national and regional conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding processes 
This mini case-study analyses the relationships between the peace agreements 
which brought to an end the conflicts affecting Yugoslavia in the decade following 
the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 and efforts to 
control SALW.  It begins with a regional perspective including analysis of the 
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and the South Eastern Europe Small Arms 
Clearinghouse (SEESAC) which was mandated to provide support and capacity on 
SALW control issues as part of its implementation.  This analysis is then deepened 
through studying SALW control efforts in Bosnia Herzegovina following the signing 
of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995. 
 
The conflicts which affected the Western Balkans in the 1990s have been important 
in the development of literature on conflict resolution and peacebuilding as well as 
in the area of SALW proliferation and control.  Paris (2002, 2004), and Chandler 
(2009), offer (from somewhat differing perspectives) analysis of the effects of the 
success and otherwise of international peacebuilding efforts.  The role of the EU in 
the region and the effect of engagement in the Western Balkans on EU foreign and 
security policy are well documented (see for instance Belloni (2009) or Richmond et 
al (2011)).  Further, the lessons and impact of peacebuilding in the Western Balkans 
on international policy are also well documented (see Miall, 2007). 
 
Yugoslavia’s decade of conflict and violence included war between Croatia and 
Yugoslavia (1991-1995), civil war in Bosnia Herzegovina (1992-1995), a war of 
independence for Albanians living in Kosovo (1998-1999) and violence between 
Macedonian Albanians and Slavs, which ended in 2001 (see Glenny (2012: 634-662) 
for an introduction to, and analysis of, the wars of the former Yugoslavia and the 
peace agreements that brought them to an end).   
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In each case, specific peace agreements were brokered which framed post-war 
governance systems, established peacekeeping mandates for international forces 
and referred to the importance of improving and maintaining security, including 
aspects of SALW control.  For example, the Dayton Accords signed by 
representatives from Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia provided the NATO IFOR and its 
successors with responsibility for ensuring security, which included the ability to 
seize illicit weapons through both coercive and peaceful means.18 
 
The implementation of these agreements was supported by a variety of 
international actors. Some such as the IFOR/SFOR mission in Bosnia, or 
KFOR/UNMIK in Kosovo were backed by UN Security Council Resolutions.19 Others, 
such as the role of the OSCE in Bosnia in promoting military-security confidence 
building, were mandated by the peace agreements themselves - in this case the 
Dayton Accords.20  They were also supported by a variety of regionally-focussed 
peacebuilding mechanisms, most notably, from 1999 onwards, by the Stability Pact 
for South Eastern Europe.21  The goal of the Stability Pact was to support the 
countries of South Eastern Europe: 
 
 “…in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights and 
economic prosperity in order to achieve stability in the whole region.”22  
 
The Stability Pact was initiated during the German Presidency of the EU, but also 
included a number of other nations, including the USA, Canada and Japan which 
supported its attempt to “...improve coordination on international assistance, while 
emphasising regional cooperation.” (ICG 2001:239).  It was organised around four 
‘working tables’; security, democracy, economy and regional affairs.  In each case, 
countries of the Western Balkans were invited to develop Stabilisation and 
                                                       
18 Dayton Peace Accords Annex 1B 
19 UNSC Resolution 1031 in the case of IFOR/SFOR and UNSC Resolution 1244 in the case of KFOR 
20 Dayton Peace Accords Annex 1B 
21 For an introduction to the background and history of the Stability Pact see 
http://www.stabilitypact.org/about/default.asp.  Accessed 29/12/2012. 
22 Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe founding conference.  Cologne 10th June 1999. From: 
www.stabilitypact.org. Accessed 30/12/2012 
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Association Agreements, which were intended to support reforms which would, 
over time, integrate them further within Euro-Atlantic systems and institutions.  
The third working table focussed on security and included a ‘sub-table’ on initiatives 
to improve the coordination of SALW.  Stability Pact members agreed an 
Implementation Plan for SALW and identified the recently established South 
Eastern and Eastern Europe Small Arms Clearinghouse (SEESAC) as its implementing 
agency.   
 
In this way, both through the conflict-specific peace agreements (for example, The 
Dayton Accords, or the Ohrid Agreement) and at the regional level through the 
Stability Pact, SALW problems and efforts to enhance their control were explicitly 
connected to international peacebuilding efforts. Thus, at the highest political 
levels, the relationship between SALW availability and misuse and conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding were recognised from an early stage.   
 
Given the fluid nature of weapons movements across the region during the 1990s, 
with for instance, weapons looted in Albania in 1996 being trafficked to Albanian 
separatists in Kosovo and Macedonia in the years that followed23, countries 
involved in the establishment of the Regional Implementation Plan claimed that in 
addition to action at the national level, regional action was also required.  SEESAC 
was funded by a combination of the UNDP and EC and for its first years focussed on 
(a) facilitating contacts between governments at the regional level promoting 
cooperation and understanding on security and SALW control related issues and (b) 
supporting specific SALW control efforts in particular countries in line with national 
government requirements.24   
 
In 2003 SEESAC began to place significant effort on a systematic and process-based 
approach to SALW control across the region.  It developed a series of regional Micro 
Disarmament Standards or RMDS covering all aspects of SALW control from 
                                                       
23 International Crisis Group (ICG), The View from Tirana: the Albanian Dimension of the Kosovo 
Crisis, 10 July 1998, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a6d610.html. Accessed 
30/12/2012 
24 See www.seesac.org for a list of the organisation’s objectives and activities.  Accessed 29/12/2012 
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administrative and coordination tasks to information gathering and analysis and to 
specific SALW activities such as weapons collection, destruction and stockpile 
management.    The RMDS were used to support SALW control activities at the 
regional and national level across the western and later eastern Balkans.25    
 
This regional, directive, approach to SALW control, which often took place in the 
context of a wide range of other activities and reforms, sometimes focussing 
specifically on security- and peace- building is unusual and for this reason, it is 
interesting to explore the effects it had, both on SALW control as an intervention in 
post-conflict context, but also in terms of how it related to other activities taking 
place contiguously. The approach favoured by SEESAC at this time was linear in 
nature.  It began with a mapping of the SALW problem in a given context, followed 
by the development of policy and an action plan with specific SALW control 
activities designed to meet specific goals in the plan.  The mapping process was to 
be undertaken using a specific methodology developed jointly by SEESAC and the 
Geneva based Small Arms Survey.26  This brought together a variety of data 
gathering tools including a house-to-house survey questionnaire, focus group 
discussions and in depth interviews with ‘key informants’.    The elements of the 
SALW plan, which was intended to be based on survey findings, were pre-
determined; it should include goals on inter-alia legislation, capacity building of 
state institutions, awareness-raising amongst the public, cooperation between 
government agencies and with neighbouring countries.  
 
The activities that SEESAC and national UNDP offices supported included civilian 
weapons collection and community security building activities in Kosovo (see 
Sokolova, Richards and Smith (2006); and Bennett (2011)) and Macedonia (see 
Grillot 2004); destruction of surplus and collected SALW in Serbia (Taylor and 
Phillips 2004) and Bosnia Herzegovina (Paes et al, 2004); training and other capacity 
                                                       
25 To access all RMDS published since 2003 see: http://www.seesac.org/resources/standards-
rmdsg/1/.  Accessed 30/12/2012 
26 Regional Micro Disarmament Standard G05.8.  Available from: 
http://www.seesac.org/uploads/rmdsg/RMDS-G_05.80RMDS_05.80_Survey_(Edition_4).pdf.  
Accessed 29/12/2012 
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building support for civil society groups (Desvignes, Rynn and Wilkinson 2003) and 
supporting local research on specific aspects of the small arms problematic, 
including trying to establish whether there was evidence of a gun culture in the 
Western Balkans (SEESAC 2006). 
 
From the reviews undertaken of these various activities by the authors cited above, 
it appears that they had the following common characteristics.  They were loosely 
linked (through the Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan) to national and 
regional peacebuilding goals, however activities were linked more explicitly to 
SALW control specific goals, such as increasing government capacity in the area, or 
reducing stocks of SALW rather than as contributions to higher level peacebuilding 
goals set out it either national or regional agreements. The activities were designed 
on the basis of survey findings however they were uniform in the sense that there 
were a range of activities that programmers were required to adapt to their 
particular context (Richards et al 2006).  The implementation of the planned 
activities were usually planned in a sequential sense, with an understanding that 
particular activities were better suited to particular phases of the de-escalation 
process and that certain activities were required before others could be 
undertaken.27  Most SALW control programmes, particularly those led by UNDP 
(which was usually the partner of choice for SEESAC which itself was hosted and 
part funded by UNDP) appear to have been conceptualised as stand-alone or cross-
cutting activities rather than being linked explicitly to a particular sector 
intervention.28  However it is unclear to what extent issues of complementarity or 
contingency were considered in terms of the effect that they may have had on the 
contributions that SALW control made to peacebuilding efforts and vice-versa.  It is 
                                                       
27 A template for governments to design National Action Plans was produced by SEESAC which set 
out the categories of objectives that should be included and recommended sequencing and 
management arrangements.  The template can be downloaded from: 
http://www.seesac.org/resource.php?l1=69&l2=73 (accessed 30/03/2013) 
28 For example, the author of this thesis worked closely with UNDP project teams from 2002 – 2007 
in Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macednoia and in each case SALW programmes were considered 
as both a stand-alone engagement with their own offices, staff, budgets, government coordinating 
departments, and cross-cutting, with considerable effort invested in the role of SALW in other 
related areas of reform and development, including for instance, police, border security, trafficking 
and public health. 
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also not clear from this initial analysis to what extent the context informed 
programming decisions and consequently the nature of the interrelationships 
between SALW control and peacebuilding activities.  To explore these questions 
further, SALW control activities that took place in Bosnia Herzegovina, principally 
but not exclusively by UNDP between 2002 and 2005 are analysed below.  
 
The Dayton Accords, which were signed in Paris in December 1995 by 
representatives from Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia brought to an end the war and set 
out amongst other things an administrative structure for Bosnia Herzegovina 
(Heinemann-Gruder and Pietz. 2003). Whilst being in-part focused on preventing a 
return to war, the Accords did not specify how SALW control related issues from 
civilian weapons control to the disarmament of former combatants would be 
achieved.  They placed international authority for peacekeeping and peace-
enforcement in the hands of NATO’s IFOR mission for the first year of Dayton 
implementation, after which under UNSC 1031 it passed to SFOR, (and then in 2004 
to EUFOR) and responsibility for military confidence and security building, including 
the control of heavy weaponry under the authority of the Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
 
During the years of SFORs mandate, it undertook a range of different SALW control 
related efforts as part of what it termed Operation Harvest.  This included voluntary 
civilian SALW surrender programmes and so called search and seize activities:  By 
2004, SFOR had collected and destroyed somewhere in the region of 40,000 SALW 
(Paes et al, 2004:37).   
 
As with elsewhere in the Western Balkans, UNDP has played an active role in 
internationally supported efforts to enhance control over SALW in Bosnia.  Paes et 
al (2004) reviewed the success of two consecutive UNDP SALW control programmes 
as part of an in-house review of UNDP’s SALW control programmes globally. They 
describe the two programmes, the first of which started in 2003 and the second in 
2005.  The programmes contained elements which were commonly employed 
across the region, and which were consistent with the approach advocated by 
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SEESAC (an initial SALW assessment followed by a programme of capacity building, 
legislative and policy development, and the collection and destruction of illicit 
SALW).   
 
Neither programme was conceptualised as a contribution to peace-building per-se.  
However it is evident through their design and by the Paes et al (2004) assessment 
that it was intended that the programmes would make contributions to areas which 
are often included in post-war peacebuilding activities (see the diagram produced 
by Ramsbotham et al which describes the most oft-employed activities by sector 
and by phase of implementation (2005:199).  For instance, a programme of 
awareness-raising in schools on the dangers posed by SALW and ammunition is 
consistent with landmine risk education often located within the ‘education’ sector. 
Further, one of the central objectives of the second programme which began in 
2005, “To develop the capacity of the Bosnian Government to address the 
challenges of SALW” (Paes et al, 2004:40), is consistent with capacity building 
activities which are often located within support for the ‘governance’ sector.   
 
However, despite these obvious linkages with other areas of support, it appears 
that the UNDP activities were not sector-specific in terms of where or how they 
were located within other peacebuilding or statebuilding initiatives.  This is 
supported by the manner in which the UNDP undertook its government capacity 
building work:  It suggested and supported the establishment of a SALW 
Coordination Board which drew together relevant government departments and 
agencies, much in keeping with the national commissions established in other 
countries. This suggests that UNDP-supported SALW control activities in Bosnia 
were intended as stand-alone and cross-cutting in nature, as indeed they were in 
Kosovo, Serbia and Macedonia (see Rynn and Mariani 2006 for an analysis of SALW 
control efforts in the Western Balkans).  This is further reinforced by the fact that 
activities to achieve the third main objective (“To reduce the number of illegal, 
privately owned SALW”) never took place as SFOR continued to maintain the lead 
on weapons collection issues as part of its mandate to ensure security in Bosnia.   
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In Paes et al (2004) analysis, in addition to listing the successes of the programme, 
they identified areas of the UNDP engagement which had not been as successful as 
hoped.  Principle amongst these was (a) the loss of momentum, leadership and 
direction which ensued as a lack of coordination between the first and second 
programmes, which included key staff moving on as one programme finished and a 
gap ensued before the other began; and (b) the challenge to coherence and 
effectiveness of the second programme due to it being “designed as a set of 
separately identified components that different donors can fund within their 
funding year [which] makes planning very difficult” (Paes et al, 2004:48).   
 
This raises important points which relate closely to the some of the challenges of 
post-war conflict resolution and peacebuilding analysed in Chapter 2.  It would 
appear that the weak coordination between the first and second phases of SALW 
control led to a lack of momentum and confusion amongst government and other 
partners as the first phase concluded.  It suggests that considerable benefit could 
have been accrued through applying Lederach’s concept of nesting phases of 
programming to ensure that the ‘follow on’ programme was designed before the 
first programme ended.  Further, the second phase of programming was distinct 
from the first in that it was to a large extent based on SALW control issues being 
integrated into other sectoral interventions (such as the development of the Police) 
rather than treating it as a cross-cutting issue as was the case during the first phase.   
As was demonstrated in Chapter 2, there are benefits to both a sectoral and a 
cross-cutting approach.  However whilst there are obvious challenges in terms of 
ensuring integration with sectoral interventions linked to a cross-cutting approach, 
a multi-sectoral engagement may require greater coordination, and in this case 
nesting the components of the second programme, as was the case with activities 
that took place in Kosovo around the same time (Sokolova, Richards and Smith 
2006), may have been beneficial to the overall contribution that SALW control 
activities made to peacebuilding efforts. 
 
Paes et al (2004) also highlight the importance of programmers understanding and 
responding to changes in the political context, and the importance of ownership of 
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SALW programmes by government and others ‘locally’.  As regards the changing 
context, they claim that a defence transformation programme which was being 
undertaken at the same time as the second SALW control programme was being 
designed “has had enormous implications” which were not considered or factored 
into planning, and surmise that in future, “Project activities need to be realistic and 
relevant in a changing context”.  Regarding local ownership, the authors suggest 
“…the buy-in of the beneficiary government is crucial... NGOs and other important 
actors also need to be engaged in these processes.” (Paes et al, 2004:48) 
 
In addition to raising the obvious challenge of ensuring that programme 
conceptualisation, design and implementation is highly aware of the political 
context and is flexible enough to adapt to change when required, it also highlights 
the importance of understanding how complementarity can be important as a 
factor in determining how effective a stand-alone programme can be as a 
contribution to a wider set of objectives.  The failure of the SALW programme to 
understand the implications of the defence reform programme (which included 
large quantities of SALW and ammunition being declared as surplus) led in part to 
its design being inadequate to the scale of the problem and therefore not as 
effective as could have been the case in terms of contributing to overall military 
and security sector reform as part of the implementation of the Dayton Accords. 
 
The examples of SALW control efforts in the Western Balkans, and particularly in 
Bosnia are instructive for this thesis for the following reasons.  They suggest the 
value in taking a nested approach to the planning and implementation of SALW 
control activities in terms of maximising the potential effectiveness of the 
programme, as well as being able to respond more effectively to changes in the 
external context.  It also suggests that careful attention should be paid to potential 
challenges to coherence that arise from moving between phases from a stand-
alone to a sector-specific approach to SALW control. Further, they imply that 
although a cross-cutting or stand-alone approach may be beneficial in terms of the 
contributions that a programme can make to multiple sectors, maintaining strong 
coordination with similar activities undertaken within specific sectors is important.  
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In conclusion, it reinforces the importance of contingency (the impact of the break 
between the two UNDP programmes), complementarity (the importance of 
coordination with other sector specific engagements), and context (the impact of 
the failure to fully understand and respond to changes in the political context or to 
achieve strong buy-in from government).   
3.7.3 Peacebuilding and SALW control efforts in Sudan/Southern 
Sudan since 2005 
This mini case-study begins by providing a brief overview of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement.  It then discusses the interrelationships between the CPA 
and SALW control efforts, including DDR and community security programmes and 
analyses the effect of these interrelationships on SALW control and peacebuilding 
objectives.  It concludes by identifying relevant findings in terms of the effect of 
contingency, complementarity, context and other factors on these interventions. 
 
Unlike some of the other mini-case studies analysed in this chapter, the literature 
on post-war peacebuilding in South Sudan in particular is less well developed.  
However, researchers have made important contributions through analysing 
Sudan/South Sudan in the period leading up to and following agreement of the CPA 
in the following areas: the role of the AU and other regional actors and the regional 
dimensions of conflict and peacebuilding are assessed by Murithi (2007) and Leff 
(2009) respectively; further, the potentially transformative effect of the violence on 
power and governance (Elnur, 2009) and the effect of post-intervention effect of 
international peacebuilders (Duffield, 2010) have been analysed from a critical 
perspective.   
 
In 2005, the CPA was signed between President Bashir for the Government of 
Sudan and Dr John Garang, the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement 
(SPLM), and Commander in Chief of the Sudan People’s Liberation army (SPLA) (See 
Brosche (2009) for a comprehensive review of the CPA).  The CPA brought an 
official end to several decades of civil war between the Sudanese government 
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based in Khartoum and its allied militias and the SPLA, which sought greater 
autonomy for the South and acceptance of non-Arab and Muslim cultures across 
Sudan.   
 
The CPA was a product of many months of negotiations between the two sides, 
supported by the UN and a group of seven engaged member states, including the 
US, UK, Italy, Norway and France.  It provided a framework within which 
preparations for a longer-term peace could be conducted and focussed on a wide 
range of issues from military and security cooperation to power sharing 
arrangements within a Government of National Unity.  It was intended initially as a 
five year agreement which would culminate in a national census, elections and a 
referendum on southern secession.29  It did not however provide a process for 
addressing some of the more sensitive unresolved conflict driving issues, including 
jurisdiction over the oil rich area of Abyei and over the states straddling the border 
between Southern Sudan and the rest of the country, Blue Nile and Southern 
Kordofan.  Amongst its various elements, the CPA provided a commitment within 
which the first phase of a Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
programme would be undertaken for former combatants on both the Government 
of Sudan and SPLA sides of the conflict.  Crucially, it did not clearly address the issue 
of whether and how to disarm what became known as Other Armed Groups, or 
OAGs, groups which had played a role in the conflict but had not agreed to align 
formally with either side as part of the peace agreement.30 
 
The CPA commitment to DDR31 was developed at a time when the concept was 
popular amongst donor governments and UN agencies as a means to integrate 
former fighters into civilian life, but also widely challenged by those who were often 
critical of the success of DDR efforts over recent years (Muggah 2006).  The DDR 
commitments in the CPA were designed at a time when the UN had just published 
                                                       
29 The elections and then referendum took place and Southern Sudan was finally created in 2011 
30 For a description of the nature and challenges faced by the existence of armed groups in Sudan 
see: Small Arms Survey (2006) Armed Groups in Sudan.  Small Arms Survey. Geneva.  
31 CPA, Chapter VI: Security Arrangements, Annexure 1: Permanent Ceasefire and Security 
Arrangement Implementation Modalities and Appendices, Part III: Demobilisation, Disarmament 
Reintegration and Reconciliation, pp118-121 
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its International Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) 
which aimed to take a broad approach to DDR, taking into account issues such as 
the security of host communities to which those being ‘inserted’ would be sent in 
the design and implementation of DDR programmes.  When the various CPA 
commitments were translated into action plans, supported heavily in this case by 
the UNDP and UNDPKO through its Integrated DDR Unit, based in Khartoum, in the 
form of its Integrated DDR Programme (IDDRP), there were joint commitments 
both to beginning the process of disarming, demobilising and reintegrating 
qualifying former combatants, and to improving the security of communities across 
Sudan.    At the government level, the IDDRP32 would be coordinated by a national 
DDR commission based in Khartoum and by separate southern and northern DDR 
commissions responsible for leading implementation in the south and north of the 
country respectively (Preston and Smith, 2008:7).   
 
In the initial years following the signing of the CPA, there was much effort 
undertaken by international supporters, principally the UN but also NGOs and 
bilateral donors to encourage action on DDR through the three commissions.  It 
became apparent however to those who followed the process closely33 that in 
reality, with final decisions outstanding on whether the country would eventually 
split into two or how the oil rich border areas would be divided, there was little real 
interest in disarming or demobilising personnel who could be critical to the 
direction of any future conflict.34  Thus, over time it became clear that for both the 
South and North, DDR would only be attempted for those which the two armies did 
not rely on and who in the case of the south in particular, they needed to remove 
from the army payroll to reduce expenditure.  This translated into the language of 
Special Needs Groups; children (combatants and camp followers); disabled people; 
and then women, leaving the majority of ‘regular’ troops within the command 
                                                       
32 The IDDRP can be found here: http://www.sd.undp.org/projects/cp4.htm.  Accessed 4th 
November 2012. 
33 The author of this thesis spent six months in South Sudan over several visits to South between 
2006 and 2008 providing independent analysis of, and contributions to, SALW control efforts, 
including on different aspects of the DDR programme.  
34 Author’s interviews with Southern DDR Commission members, UN staff and engaged international 
NGO personnel in Juba 2007/8. 
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structures of the SPLA and the National Army and readily deployable in times of 
trouble.  By 2011 some progress had been made in terms of registering potential 
candidates and beginning the DDR process in the South of the country, although 
there remain significant challenges relating to the ‘reintegration’ aspects of the 
programme; principally how to reintegrate a person who has never previously been 
a part of a settled community into a community that don’t want them. (For a 
review of progress see Stone (2011).) 
 
In the sense that a part of any DDR process - Sudan included - is to place under the 
control of the relevant authorities, weapons possessed by former combatants, 
there is a relationship between DDR activities and SALW control in the case of 
Sudan/Southern Sudan, and clearly by the fact of the IDDRP’s stated contribution to 
the CPA, between DDR and peacebuilding efforts.  In Southern Sudan in particular, 
because the DDR programme focussed on particular groups who had already for 
the most part been disarmed, it is perhaps of less direct relevance to SALW control 
efforts than the second aspect of the broader DDR commitment arising from the 
CPA, which focuses specifically on the effect of SALW availability and misuse on 
community security. 
  
As part of the UN’s commitment to an integrated approach to DDR, evidenced 
through its lead role in the development of the IDDRP introduced above, a 
commitment was made at the outset in translating CPA commitments into 
strategies and action plans to focussing on the security of communities across 
Sudan as well as on the importance of addressing the needs of former combatants.  
As the IDDRP was linked closely to the CPA, any approach to community security 
required action in the north as well as the south of the country. Thus, initially, the 
commitment to improving community security was located within the DDR 
commission structures, and was supported by the UNDDR Unit based in Khartoum.  
As such, it quickly became caught up in the inertia that affected the DDR 
Commissions, which were themselves political institutions (Preston and Smith, 
2008).   
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In 2006, the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) became increasingly worried 
about the numbers of people being killed and seriously affected by violence that 
was breaking out between different tribes and militias.  The reasons for the 
violence were various, ranging from traditional hostilities between different groups 
linked to access to grazing land and water, through to battles between armed 
groups which had previously been allied to the SPLA but were now splintering off 
frustrated with the lack of material benefit that their allegiance brought.   
 
Faced with what they saw as a growing problem, the GoSS deployed the SPLA to 
collect weapons from civilians and non-state groups in affected parts of the 
country.  This was described by some, including the Vice President, Riak Machar 
Teny under the rubric of enhancing community security35, although to others it was 
seen as an attempt by the GoSS to establish a monopoly on the use of violence in 
Southern Sudan– a concept which is not necessarily at odds with enhancing the 
security of affected communities. However intended, these efforts had a significant 
impact – thousands of people were killed during disarmament operations, partly by 
ill-disciplined SPLA cadres, but also as a consequence of those being targeted by 
disarmament campaigns fighting back against the SPLA; O’Brien (2009:11) records 
that in one operation alone in northern Jonglei State over 1,600 people were killed 
when they resisted SPLA disarmament activities.   
 
The significant negative impacts of this activity gave rise to additional efforts on the 
part of some international actors, and individuals within government to establish a 
less coercive, and ultimately more successful, approach in the future.  
Consequently, the issue of Community Security and Arms Control became a specific 
area of work, detached from DDR and set apart from the responsibilities for DDR 
held by the Southern DDR Commission.   Initially it was located within the purview 
of the Vice President, and later the Minister of the Interior.  With the support of the 
UNDP and a small number of NGOs and supportive donor states, a Bureau for 
Community Security and Arms Control was established within the Ministry of 
                                                       
35 Author’s interviews with HE Riak Machar-Teny, Juba, 2007 and 2008. 
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Interior with executive responsibility for taking forwards work in the areas across 
the South of the country.36   
 
In 2008, through a Presidential Order the GoSS committed to another attempt to 
collect weapons in the hands of civilians and other non-state groups.  
Implementation was the responsibility of the Governors in each of the 10 states 
which make up Southern Sudan (Skinner 2012).  In Jonglei, perhaps the state most 
affected by violence since the signing of the CPA, and the location of much of the 
forced and ultimately unsuccessful disarmament two years before the UN and 
others worked closely with the Bureau of Community Security and Arms Control 
and the State Governor to establish a programme of conflict sensitive development 
projects in exchange for weapons surrendered through non-violent means.   
 
In the case of Southern Sudan in particular, there were clearly linkages between 
efforts to control SALW and other peace- and security- building and development 
activities. The genesis of the community security and arms control concept was 
linked to the formal peace agreement between the main warring parties and to a 
commitment to integrate former combatants into society.   The early conflation of 
community security and small arms control in the initial Integrated DDR 
Programme, itself the main document intended to translate the CPA commitments 
into action clearly recognised the relationships between weapons and security at 
the community level; indeed it recognised that to some extent, the availability of 
arms was a source of security and protection for isolated communities at risk of 
cattle raiding or banditry and in the absence of rule of law and effective law 
enforcement.   
 
At the operational levels however, in the initial efforts to disarm civilians, scant 
regard was paid to the interrelationships between SALW control and peace and 
                                                       
36 For a review published by the Government of South Sudan in 2009 on its Community Security and 
Arms Control work see http://www.goss-online.org/magnoliaPublic/en/Independant-Commissions-
and-Chambers/Bureau-for-Community-Security-and-Small-Arms-
Control/mainColumnParagraphs/0/content_files/file0/Annual%20report%2020090001.pdf 
(Accessed 30/03/2013) 
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security building.  Arguably, these initial efforts, particularly those in Jonglei State 
actually increased insecurity. (For a detailed analysis of the impacts of disarmament 
activities in Jonglei see Garfield (2007).)  The recognition of the failure of these 
initial attempts and the consequent willingness to commit to both undertaking 
SALW control efforts in a non-coercive way, to linking them explicitly to accessing 
forms of development, and to committing more seriously to the security-building 
aspects of the wider peace and security building agenda reflect well on the GoSS 
and the main supportive international partners.     
 
There are however, many lessons to learn from efforts to control SALW in Southern 
Sudan since the CPA was signed in 2005.  Some of these have been documented by 
the Small Arms Survey37 and Saferworld.38  For the purpose of this thesis, perhaps 
the most important lessons are as follows:  Initially, there was an attempt in the 
early stages of planning to relate DDR with SALW control and broader efforts to 
enhance community security, and importantly to link SALW control to the 
implementation of the CPA, which suggests a clear analysis of the interrelationships 
between SALW control and conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts. However, 
this did not translate into early programming, which quickly became isolated both 
from other related peace and security building efforts taking place at a similar time 
and place, and thus failed to either build on or mitigate their potential effects.   
 
Therefore whilst conceptually complementarity was important and a decision was 
taken to locate SALW control within a sectoral intervention to ensure that this 
complementarity was ‘built-in’ at an early stage, this conceptual clarity quickly 
dissipated. 
 
Secondly, the lack of a legal basis on which SALW control efforts were undertaken 
created a context in which the local SPLA commanders or government officials were 
responsible on a case-by-case basis for deciding what was ‘legal’ ownership and 
what was not, undermining faith in the process and creating disparities in terms of 
                                                       
37 See the Human Security Baseline Assessment project available at www.smallarmssurvey.org 
38 See Preston and Smith (2008); Skinner (2010) 
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who was disarmed and why, which had the potential at least to entrench and 
further create localised rivalries.   
 
This demonstrates a failure to adopt a phased approach to SALW control efforts 
which would have allowed for initial legislative steps to have been taken prior to 
the disarmament process beginning and which could have contributed to SALW 
control having a more positive outcome, thereby strengthening the 
interrelationships between SALW control and broader peacebuilding processes. 
 
Thirdly, the efforts to control SALW were not undertaken consecutively across the 
territory of Southern Sudan.  Along state borders this mattered significantly; a tribe 
on one side of the border refused on numerous occasions to hand over their 
weapons as they saw no requirement for those on the other side of the border to 
do the same, creating an imbalance of local capacity and in the absence of effective 
state protection, potentially increasing the risk of attack.   
 
This suggests that a lack of attention was paid to local motivations for owning 
weapons and a failure to engage vulnerable communities in SALW control efforts, 
leading them to damage rather than enhance opportunities to promote peace. 
Further, it reiterates the importance of contextual factors in determining the nature 
of the contribution that SALW control efforts can make to conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding processes. 
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3.7.4 Analysis of efforts to control SALW as disarmament 
exercises in northern Kenya and Karamoja in Uganda in 
2006 
This mini case-study examines and analyses disarmament and wider SALW control 
efforts in both northern Kenya and the Karamoja region of Uganda in the context of 
government-led efforts to promote peace and development in both contexts.  It 
begins with a brief introduction to the contexts and to regional and national conflict 
prevention and SALW control agreements and policy frameworks.  It then 
introduces the civilian focussed disarmament efforts as the major outputs from 
these frameworks before analysing to what extent interrelationships between 
SALW and peace and conflict initiatives and processes existed, and whether they 
were conditioned by factors including complementarity, contingency and context. 
 
Kenya and Uganda are often included in regional analysis of conflict systems and 
peacebuilding activities.  For instance, Menkhaus and Penderghast (1999) and Healy 
(2011) offer assessments of regional conflict trends affecting the Horn of Africa and 
of capacity of regional actors to play positive peacebuilding roles. The role of the 
Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda as well as sub-regionally has been analysed, 
particularly in relation to its effect on peace and security in the north of the country 
(for instance, see Allen and Vlassenroot 2010). Similarly, northern Kenya has been 
analysed in terms of the relationships between conflict and pastoralism (for 
example Menkhaus (2008) assesses the role of locally negotiated power sharing as 
an alternative to central government control).  Finally, research has been 
conducted in both Uganda and Kenya to analyse the relationships between conflict 
and electoral and wider governance processes (see Dunning (2011) for Kenya and 
Blattman (2009) for Uganda).  The regional dimensions, the role of, and impact on, 
pastoralist life and the complex power sharing and governance relationships 
between the centre and the northern territories of both Kenya and Uganda are all 
directly relevant to this mini-case study.  
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Although close in geographic terms and in the approaches of the governments 
concerned, the two examples have some important distinctions:  Whilst Kenya and 
Uganda are both party to the Nairobi Protocol39 and have over recent years 
followed similar administrative steps in the organisation of Government and civil 
society work to support its implementation, the conflicts and the peace and 
recovery architecture that act as a chapeaux to consequent SALW efforts are to a 
large degree separate.40  However, the reason that they are analysed together in 
this study is that they share some interesting characteristics which are of 
importance to the focus of this thesis.   
 
Firstly, in both cases, disarmament efforts since 2000 maintain similarities both in 
terms of the groups targeted (Turkana and Pokot in Kenya and Karamajong in 
Uganda) and in some common history in terms of efforts to control SALW during 
colonial times (Wepundi, NDung’U and Rynn, 2011). Secondly, whilst it was more 
explicit in the case of Uganda, both sets of disarmament activities were 
conceptualised as part of what the governments of Kenya and Uganda described as 
post-conflict development plans.  In Uganda this was the Karamoja Integrated 
Disarmament and Development Plan which was designed as a response to the 
effects of the conflict with the Lord’s Resistance Army and as a means by which the 
Government of Uganda could both increase its control over what had historically 
been a contested part of the country, and encourage a level of security and 
development in the region which had hitherto lagged significantly behind other 
parts of the country (Powel, 2010:6).  In Kenya whilst not framed as explicitly, 
disarmament in the north of the country has become synonymous with attempts to 
address the highly weaponised pastoralist communities, who often share identity 
                                                       
39 The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons  
in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa is accessible here: 
http://www.recsasec.org/publications/Nairobi_Protocal.pdf.  Accessed 30/03/2013. 
40 In Uganda this was the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Plan, a Government 
initiative supported by international basket funding and overseen by President Museveni’s wife, 
Janet.  Official Government of Uganda information about the KIDDP can be found here: 
http://www.kiddp.org.ug/ (accessed 30/03/2013).  In Kenya SALW control work in the northern Rift 
valley has been undertaken as part of the specific law enforcement operations discussed later in this 
section and under the auspices of the National Steering committee on Conflict Management and 
Peacebuilding.  For a detailed overview of the different relevant policy commitments and 
institutional mechanisms see Wepundi et al (2012). 
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and land with those on the Uganda side of the shared border.   In Kenya’s case, 
from a government perspective these efforts have been framed as ‘operations’ and 
have since 2005, included at least six different phases (Operation Dumisha Amani 
(2005); Operation Okota (2006); Operation Okoa Maisha (2008), Operation Chunga 
Mpaka (2008) and Operation Dumisha Armani II (2010)).41 
 
In addition to the targeted intra-national disarmament programmes introduced 
above, Kenya and Uganda are linked by their common involvement in a number of 
sub-regional agreements and processes and initiatives, as well as by a small number 
of bilateral initiatives.  Regionally, both Kenya and Uganda have been active since 
the late 1990s in developing and supporting multilateral responses to the 
proliferation and misuse of SALW.  These included action within the auspices of the 
East African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation, and through the Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development. In 2000 the Nairobi Declaration was 
agreed, committing states from the African Great Lakes and Horn of Africa 
(including Kenya and Uganda) to a series of measures to reduce SALW proliferation. 
Finally, in 2005, this Declaration was codified with the agreement of the regional 
Nairobi Protocol which established a series of legal commitments related to SALW 
control to which signatories were bound (See Wepundi and Ndung’U (2011) and 
Wepundi et al (2012) for an introduction to the regional agreements to which 
Uganda and Kenya are party).   
 
The Nairobi Declaration and then Protocol committed states to a series of practical 
and policy steps to address various aspects of the SALW problematic.  This included 
the establishment of national commissions to oversee the development and 
implementation of national SALW control policies and action plans. In both cases, 
commissions were established and national action plans (NAPs) developed 
following long and detailed research processes (described as mapping exercises) in 
which the nature of SALW problems were explored along with the government’s 
capacity to address them.  In both cases, these mappings were conducted by a 
                                                       
41 See Wepundi M, NDung’u, J and Rynn, S (2011) for a chronology of different SALW efforts in 
northern Kenya and Northern Uganda.  
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consortium of organisations led by NGOs Saferworld and SaferAfrica.  Further in 
both cases, National Action Plans set out how the problems identified in the 
mapping exercises would be tackled, in each case establishing pilot SALW control 
projects and identifying local government and local police and military structures as 
the mechanisms of government through which implementation would take place. 
 
Finally, in both Uganda and particularly in Kenya, the period covered both by the 
National Action Plans and other Nairobi Protocol commitments as well as the 
specific incidences of disarmament in the northern parts of each country, significant 
efforts were undertaken to develop and reform the police and other security 
actors.  These included ongoing efforts in Kenya both before and following the post-
election violence in 2008 to improve the performance and accountability of the 
police42 and in Uganda to restructure the Ugandan People’s Defence force (UPDF).43 
 
Within these overarching regional and international policy frameworks, 
disarmament efforts have been undertaken in both Kenya and Uganda since 2005.  
These are introduced and analysed below with a particular focus on (a) the 
interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding efforts and (b) the 
effects of contingency, complementarity, context and other factors on these 
interrelationships.   
 
In 2006 the Government of Kenya launched what was the largest disarmament 
exercise of its kind to date, covering seven districts in the country’s North Rift 
region.  Operation Okota combined coercive and more voluntary approaches (some 
targets were given the option of surrendered weapons voluntarily – if they didn’t 
respond they were targeted for forcible disarmament).  This initiative was directed 
by the Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security and was 
                                                       
42 For instance see: World Bank (2009) Kenya - Economic Development, Police Oversight, and 
Accountability: Linkages and Reform Issues, and Saferworld (2008) Implementing Community Based 
Policing in Kenya.  
43 See for instance Kings College London (2007) The Uganda Defence Review: Learning from 
Experience. 
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implemented largely by the military. The action was coordinated with the Ugandan 
government which was at the time conducting similar exercises across the border. 
 
In Uganda the concurrent phase of KIDDP implementation included a military-led 
disarmament campaign.  This began as a voluntary process, but due to a lack of 
engagement from local communities, who still harboured negative experiences of 
previous violent disarmament campaigns, the operation quickly became much 
more coercive, with the military undertaking an approach consisting of “cordon, 
search and disarm” Wepundi, Ndungu and Rynn (2011:13) 
 
In response to concerns regarding the effects of the disarmament campaign in 
Kenya, in June 2006, a conference of government officials, parliamentarians, 
foreign diplomatic representatives and NGOs identified areas in which the 
disarmament activities had had unexpected results.  The report of the conference, 
“Developing a strategy to respond to the government of Kenya’s disarmament 
programme” (Saferworld and Amani Forum 2006) included five specific areas of 
concern. 
 
An analysis of this document and interviews between the author of this thesis and 
community leaders, government officials and civil society representatives at the 
time suggests that of these areas, three in particular of highly relevant for this 
thesis.  Firstly, disarmament was perceived by many of those involved as a 
collective community punishment: the military (the agency responsible for the 
disarmament campaign) were perceived as targeting entire communities rather 
than focussing on known or suspected criminals.  This was supported by claims 
amongst pastoralist people that the requirement to round up their cattle was not as 
the military claimed, to identify rustled cattle and return them to their owners, but 
an opportunity for the military to confiscate them and profit from their sale at 
market, leading to resistance amongst cattle owners to cooperate and thus, 
increased tension between them and the military. 
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Secondly, due a fear – real or perceived – of likely unfair treatment by the military, 
it was claimed that many pastoralist men moved away from the North Rift as a 
consequence of the disarmament campaign, often to Uganda, leaving their families 
and possessions behind.  The conference participants claimed that this had led to 
significant displacement and livelihood disruption.   Thirdly, perceptions regarding 
the purpose of the disarmament campaign and who it was targeting varied 
considerably, with some communities claiming that they had been targeted 
specifically because of their identity.  A primary cause for this confusion appears to 
have been that there was very little communication from the government or 
military, either locally or nationally in advance of the disarmament campaign 
beginning and no attempt to sensitise communities or to negotiate with them to 
obtain buy-in prior to operations beginning (Saferworld and Amani Forum 2006). 
 
Other criticisms of the disarmament campaign were that it had no single strategy 
and was not organised within the context of a specific disarmament policy.  As such 
it was not seen as a part of the existing Kenyan National Action Plan for the Control 
of Illicit SALW, which itself was being implemented in parts of the Kenyan Rift Valley 
or of the nascent National Small Arms Policy.44  In addition, the disarmament took 
place at a time when other Kenyan Government supported initiatives were ongoing 
that had a disarmament dimension to them, and which were seen to be more 
accepted by communities and possibly more successful as a result. This included a 
UNDP funded, Oxfam supported and government facilitated programme on 
“Violence Reduction in Pastoral Conflicts in Kenya” which sought to address arms 
reduction, attitudes towards arms, violence reduction and public (human security) 
in the context of development (see Leff (2009) for an analysis of pastoralist conflict 
issues and strategies and programmes to address them).   
 
The Uganda and Kenya examples are both instructive when analysed using the 
framework developed in Chapter 2.  In both cases the disarmament campaigns took 
place as part of efforts to increase peace and security, although they differed in the 
                                                       
44 Author interviews with influential NGO (from Security Risk Information Centre (SRIC) and Africa 
Peace Forum (APFO)) leaders in 2006 in the context of the review of the Kenyan National Action Plan 
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sense that in Uganda it was closely connected to a broader peace and development 
framework which was imposed from the centre (the KIDDP), whereas in Kenya, the 
relationship between the intervention and the variety of different development 
initiatives and programmes that were operational at the time in the same 
geographic areas was much less explicit.  In neither case however was either 
initiative linked to an explicit peace process or settlement which involved the range 
of different groups contesting power and authority, as is the case in other contexts 
examined in this chapter.   
 
In terms of the existence of other SALW control initiatives, in both cases these were 
significant, most importantly in each case the process of implementing national 
commitments contained in the Nairobi Protocol.  This presented good opportunities 
for the disarmament efforts to take advantage of interrelationships from both a 
contingency and complementarity perspective.  However in both cases there were 
in practice minimal linkages, other than the involvement of the national 
commissions in each case having a role in the communication of the disarmament 
campaigns. In both cases it appears that the campaigns were initiated outside the 
government mechanisms responsible for coordinating SALW control activities, 
suggesting that they were also connected to different policy frameworks and 
priorities.   
 
Despite this difference, in both cases, it is clear that ongoing SALW control efforts 
and the disarmament campaigns were explicitly linked to national development 
priorities, suggesting that SALW control in each of the forms covered in this mini 
case-study were seen as having a strong sector focus (development and security) 
rather than a stand-alone cross-sector focus.  In this sense, the opportunities for 
benefiting from complementarity across different sets of activities implemented at 
similar times were not taken.  Similarly, whilst it is clear that in the case of Kenya, 
the ongoing series of disarmament efforts had the potential to benefit from 
contingent interrelationships, from the perspective of those targeted (see analysis 
from the roundtable meeting above (Saferworld and Amani Forum 2006)) these 
were not clearly understood, nor were they acted upon.      
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In terms of the involvement of host communities in the disarmament activities, the 
coercive nature of the interventions and the reports from communities, including in 
Kenya those expressing their opinions at the Amani Forum meeting, were neither 
involved nor felt that the interventions had had any particularly positive effect (the 
impact of SALW control efforts in the Karamoja region of Uganda are analysed by 
Flew et al (2010)).  The interventions in both cases appear to be strongly led by the 
centre and rolled out at a local level with minimal involvement from the population.  
Analysed in the context of Lederach’s Actors and Approaches triangle, and through 
the lens of a Peacebuilding from Below approach described in Chapter 2, it is 
perhaps not surprising that the interventions failed to generate significant local 
ownership and indeed that the problems that they sought to address still pertain. 
 
Given the available evidence it is possible to conclude that the interrelationships 
between peacebuilding efforts and the disarmament campaigns in Uganda and 
Kenya were not well understood or acted upon by the authorities in either case.  
This is partly due to the nature of the disarmament interventions and partly due to 
the nature of the post-conflict peacebuilding responses, which in both cases were 
neither significant nor comprehensive.  Other attempts to tackle SALW control 
problems existed in both countries and had in some ways developed significant 
momentum.  Likewise, in both cases, there were significant ongoing reform and 
development programmes targeting other security actors and processes (for 
instance defence reform in Uganda or police reform in Kenya).   
 
However in neither case is it possible to identify a significant relationship between 
the disarmament efforts and these SALW control and security building initiatives.  
Opportunities presented themselves in terms of benefiting from the effects of 
contingency over different phases of engagement and complementarity across 
different sectors.  But for reasons that are not explicit in the literature, or on the 
basis of the author’s regular engagement with both contexts since 2002, these 
potential benefits were not significantly explored or exploited.   
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The failure to generate support or engagement from local actors and the different 
actor groups at the national level in each case that were responsible for the 
disarmament and other SALW control initiatives suggest that the interrelationships 
which are required for the development of an effective policy and enabling 
environment within which transformational activities can be undertaken was not 
present.  It also suggests that contextual factors including target communities 
perceptions of their own security and the contributory role of SALW in sustaining it 
and the interrelationships between community conflict, access to resources and 
representation did not significantly influence the development of SALW control 
initiatives.   
 
Therefore, to conclude this mini case-study it appears that there was not a strong 
positive interrelationship between the overarching peace and development policy 
architecture and SALW control efforts.  Opportunities to strengthen them through 
enhancing either their complementarity or through maximising the benefits of 
contingency and greater contextual awareness were not taken. 
3.7.5 Analysis of efforts to control SALW and their relationships 
with peacebuilding frameworks and activities in Sierra 
Leone between 2001 and 2004 
This mini-case study analyses the interrelationships between different phases of 
SALW control activity and between efforts to control SALW and wider 
peacebuilding activities in Sierra Leone in the initial years following the end of its 
civil war.  It begins by setting SALW control efforts in the broader post-war 
peacebuilding context before introducing and reviewing the main SALW control 
initiatives which took place over this period of time.  It then assesses the effect that 
contingency, complementarity, context and other factors had on interrelationships 
between peacebuilding and SALW efforts and between different phases of SALW 
control. 
 
The Lome Peace agreement signed in July 1999 was critical in the de-escalation of 
the civil war which had affected Sierra Leone since 1991 when the Revolutionary 
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United Front, backed by Liberian President, Charles Taylor, launched a campaign to 
depose the government.  Initially RUF fighters, which included mercenaries from 
Liberia and Burkina Faso, numbered around 300.  However by 1998 when the 
conflict was at its height it is estimated that between 60,000 and 80,000 
combatants were involved in the conflict in Sierra Leone out of a population of 
around 4.5 million.  The peace agreement allowed for the deployment of a UN 
Peacekeeping force in October 1999 which by its height consisted of over 17,500 
peacekeepers (Ginifer, 2005:10). 
 
The roles that natural resources played in stimulating and sustaining the conflict in 
Sierra Leone is well documented and relevant to this case study (see for instance 
Maconachie and Binns (2007)). Similarly, post-conflict attempts to establish a 
system of transitional justice which was both appropriate to the nature of the 
crimes committed and to public attitudes is important as an element of the 
international presence in the country (for instance, see  Cryer et al (2001)).  Finally, 
in terms of wider literatures, of particular relevance to the success or otherwise of 
approaches to SALW control, is the role played by Chiefdoms and other local 
governance structures in post-conflict Sierra Leone (see Jackson (2007) and 
Fanthorpe (2006)). 
 
The government of Sierra Leone, with support from the UNDP and others, launched 
a programme to reduce civilian SALW holdings and improve SALW management. 
The Arms for Development programme (AFD) was launched in 2002 and continued 
for several years, concluding in 2006.  Its preparatory phase, which began in 2002, 
was titled the Community Arms Collection and Development Programme (CACDII), 
later transitioning into the longer term AFD programme.  These programmes were 
reviewed by UNDP in 2006 as part of a wider review of support to efforts to control 
SALW.  This review, authored by Ryan Nichols (Nichols 2006: 349-374) provides 
important background to this study, which is then elaborated through other 
literatures and the author’s personal professional experience.  
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The CACDII-AFD programme followed the relatively successful DDR Phase II 
programme, which was part of the Lome peace agreement and was led by the 
National Commission for DDR and supported by UNAMSIL. A previous DDR 
programme was attempted between September and December 1998 as part of an 
attempt by President Kabbah to produce a peace agreement on his return to 
Freetown from exile (Ginifer, 2005).  This was not widely seen as a success in terms 
of the numbers of weapons collected; Berman records interviews with the deputy 
UK High Commissioner at the time and others who claimed that, “…most of the 
weapons turned in during the DDR programme were in appalling condition.  Some 
of them were unworkable” (Berman 2000:24). This was followed by a DDR Phase III 
programme, again under the auspices of Lome which concluded in 2002, and 
combined with the initial CACD programme led to the collection and destruction of 
around 70,000 SALW (of which the CACD programme, which had very limited 
geographic coverage collected 9,662 weapons and over 35,000 pieces of 
ammunition) (Nicholls, 2006:351). 
 
CACDII was established in 2002 as a follow-up programme and was supported by 
the UNDP.  Nichols (2006: 352) reports that the initial motivations for undertaking 
the programme were fivefold (1) the continuing need to reduce SALW whilst 
adopting a less coercive approach than that followed previously with the original 
CACD programme, which combined community engagement with the involvement 
and leadership of national authorities; (2) explicitly linking SALW control to 
development challenges through incentivising the surrender of weapons through 
the provision of development benefits, and placing greater emphasis on capacity 
building of those involved in an attempt to promote longer term sustainability; (3) 
for UNDP to apply the lessons that it had learned in similar arms for development 
programmes in Albania and Cambodia amongst others; (4) the programme offered 
the opportunity to bring together experience and expertise within Sierra Leone, 
both from government and from international agencies that had worked on aspects 
of development, arms control and security over previous years; and finally (5) to 
explicitly link the intervention to broader peacebuilding and security-building 
efforts, which at the time was particularly pressing given the potential risk of 
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instability which could have been caused by the imminent drawdown of the 
UNAMSIL peacekeeping mission - it was perceived by UNDP at the time that 
“Continued disarmament, capacity building at government and community levels, 
and sensitisation to the importance of violence prevention…are of critical 
importance to the Sierra Leone’s peaceful future” (Nicholls 2006: 352). 
 
CACDII, was framed around three objectives. Of these the most significant in terms 
of funding and other resource allocation, and arguably to the focus of this thesis 
was the implementation of pilot projects aiming at establishing the extent of SALW 
proliferation in Sierra Leone and the testing of pilot approaches. This began with a 
nation-wide SALW survey which involved interviews with former combatants, 
victims and a range of local actors (see Berman 2000).  The project was overseen by 
a steering group which brought together a range of Government of Sierra Leone 
(GoSL) actors, including the police, Ministry of Internal Affairs, the national DDR 
commission, national SALW commission and a variety of NGOs.  The programme 
had four guiding concepts (Nicholls 2006) which included placing the arms 
collection responsibility with communities (whilst providing them with immunity 
from prosecution), decentralising the arms collection centres to bring them as close 
as possible to communities, providing development support to those areas 
(Chiefdoms) declared as ‘weapons free’, and finally a public education and 
awareness component which aimed to promote a culture of peace. 
 
The AFD programme, which succeeded CACDII in June 2003, was explicitly intended 
as a further development and elaboration of the approach applied through its 
predecessor.  According to Nichols however, it differed in one way which is of 
particular interest to this research, “The AFD was defined within an institutional 
and legal framework.  Specifically, within national and international frameworks for 
peace-building in the Manu River Union and ECOWAS, including the 1999 Lome 
Accord, the Government of Sierra Leone National Recovery Strategy; the ECOWAS 
Moratorium on SALW, the UN Development Assistance Framework for Sierra Leone 
and the UNDP Interim Recovery Project” (Nichols, 2006:355).  The Programme 
aimed to achieve three objectives; the reduction of the cross-border illicit trade of 
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SALW into Sierra Leone, the implementation of a community arms collection 
programme supported by development projects in return for the voluntary 
surrender of weapons, and capacity building of local and national organisations. 
 
The following part of this mini case-study assesses the effects of CACD II and AFD 
programmes in terms of meeting their stated objectives and as a contribution to 
wider conflict reduction and peacebuilding efforts.  It concludes with an analysis of 
the role of complementarity and contingency in particular as factors affecting how 
SALW and peacebuilding activities interrelate.   
 
The effects of the AFD programme and its predecessor can be assessed as both 
positive and negative.   Many of the weapons collected were old and in many cases 
in poor repair.  Combining this with an assumption that part of the reason why it 
was hard to ascertain the extent of SALW related injury and crime during the 
programme design stage was that there were in fact relatively few incidences of 
SALW being used to kill and injure.  This claim is substantiated by Ginifer (2005:11) 
who writes that whilst the country was by no means a gun-free state prior to the 
outbreak of conflict, “…it did not have a culture of armed violence where SALW 
were widely distributed or used within society”. On the more positive side, he 
claims that “…by far the greatest effect on communities has been the major 
increase in community cohesiveness, capacity building and awareness of the SALW 
issue which has taken place in the target Chiefdoms…Consequently they have 
benefited tremendously from a feeling of pride, ownership and empowerment 
often never experienced…” (2005:365).  
 
However, whilst supporting the claim that community based activities were 
beneficial from the perspective of those who participated, Ginifer argues that those 
former combatants who had not benefited from DDR programmes and who were 
not targeted by the AFD and CACDII programmes in effect became further distant 
both from the communities that they had not integrated or reintegrated with and 
from the wider disarmament process, leading some to maintain ownership of their 
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weapons for sale into the criminal market, or to facilitate criminal activity 
(2005:34). 
 
Whilst it is difficult to test and verify these claims without undertaking significant 
additional primary research, it is possible from the existing literature to identify and 
discuss some initial findings which are of particular interest to this thesis’ analytical 
framework.  Firstly, in terms of the relationships between SALW control efforts and 
peacebuilding activities, the explicit link between the AFD programme and the 
overarching peace and recovery architecture is important and differs from other 
efforts examined in this chapter (for example the Sri Lanka civilian SALW control 
programme).  In this light it is interesting to note that whilst this initial DDR 
programme which followed very closely to the formal end of the conflict was 
explicitly linked to the Lome Accords and was heavily supported by the UN Mission 
in Sierra Leone, the first phase of the SALW control programme, CACD was not, and 
in effect was a project led by the Sierra Leone police.  Therefore, in terms of the 
phases of the post-conflict period, SALW control activity was closely linked to peace 
architecture in the very first and then later phases, but not as explicitly in the 
‘middle’ phase between 2001 and 2003.   
 
As regards the involvement of different groups of actors at different stages of the 
SALW control activities, in the CACDII phase of work, it appears that significant 
effort was invested in bringing together a wide range of interested groups, 
particularly at the national level, and involving formal national actors.  There was 
also considerable importance placed on the decentralisation of the implementation 
of the programme, placing responsibility for weapons collection for instance in the 
hands of local people.  The role of the UNDP and other facilitators, both local and 
international appears to have played an important role in catalysing and energising 
the programme. The extent to which it appears that local people benefited from 
the programme in terms of their confidence and capacity is also important.   
Taken together, this suggests that there was significant involvement of a range of 
different actors across the spectrum included in Lederach’s model of Actors and 
Approaches.  The nature of the benefits accrued by local people (confidence and 
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cohesion (Ginifer 2005)), suggests a transformative element to the success of the 
programme which is perhaps greater than the value of the collected weapons 
(especially given that it appears that weapons misuse was not a significant problem 
at the time).  Therefore, this approach suggests that whilst the programme was 
connected to peacebuilding architecture, in reality the SALW issue was treated in 
CACDII (as opposed to CACD where it was clearly explicitly linked to other security 
sector interventions through its connection to policing capacity) as a stand-alone 
cross-cutting issue rather than one that was located solely within a single sector 
approach. 
 
Finally, as regards the effects of contingency and complementarity on 
interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding efforts, in terms of 
temporal relationships between CACDII and other SALW programmes it appears 
that there was a high degree of contingency.  The DDR programme was closely 
followed by CACD which aimed to remove illicit weapons through police operations 
which were not extracted during the DDR process.  CACDII attempted explicitly to 
take a more consensual approach and piloted a methodology which sought to 
promote the relationships between SALW control and development, which was 
then developed into a fully-fledged programme through AFD.  It appears that a 
slightly more sophisticated nested approach was not taken however, with instead, 
one programme concluding before another began.  However there are signs that 
the overall SALW control efforts benefitted from an element of nesting, in that 
CACDII designed the approach which was then taken up by AFD, and that CACDII 
was still operational at the pilot level at the same time that the AFD programme 
was being designed. 
 
It is less clear however whether and to what extent the SALW control programme 
was linked to wider peacebuilding efforts in phases which took place either before 
or following their implementation.  For example, there is no indication as to 
whether or how the outcomes of the CACD programme affected the development 
of future police development programmes, or indeed to what extent the 
reintegration challenges of the DDR programme were significant in the design of 
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the community-focussed elements of the AFD programme which followed in later 
years.  It is perfectly possible to develop conceptual links between these different 
issues and phases; however there is no evidence in the UNDP programme design 
documents for instance that these interrelationships were understood and applied 
in practice.   
 
Likewise, given the cross-sectoral nature of the interventions, it is unclear to what 
extent the potential complementarities between SALW control efforts and other 
activities taken place during the same phases of post-conflict peace and security 
building activity were understood or acted upon. Whilst the UNDP claim that the 
lessons learned in terms of community engagement and capacity building informed 
future efforts (Nicholls 2006), there is no evidence to suggest that the 
improvements in confidence and capacity translated into complementary benefits 
for other programming priorities taking place at the same time.  However, and 
probably more importantly, it can perhaps be assumed that if Nicholls is indeed 
accurate in his assessment that community confidence and capacity was enhanced, 
the benefits of this change will have been felt outside the parameters of the 
programme activities, and thus it could be assumed that they brought wider benefit 
to communities and to their recovery and transformation from conflict.  
 
3.8 Overall analysis of the universe of cases and the mini 
case-studies 
This section identifies initial findings which emerge from the analysis contained in 
this chapter as a whole.  It concludes with a series of questions and requirements 
for further research which are explored in depth in Chapters 4 and 5.  The analysis 
which is contained in this section focuses on what can be learned, both from the 
universe of SALW control efforts in conflict affected countries, and from the more 
detailed examination of the mini case studies focussing on Kenya and Uganda, the 
Western Balkans, Sudan/Southern Sudan, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka.  It does this 
through applying the framework for research and analysis set out at the end of 
Chapter 2. 
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At a conceptual level, given the significant numbers of incidents of SALW control 
being attempted in conflict affected countries, it is reasonable to assume that many 
involved in post-conflict policy making and programming believe there to be a 
positive relationship between reducing access to, and misuse of, SALW and 
promoting peace and security.  From the research contained in this chapter it is 
clear that in certain instances this relationship is indeed positive:  the public acts of 
disarmament in Serbia and Bosnia Herzegovina were seen as demonstrations of a 
willingness to find peace; and the SALW control efforts in Sierra Leone were, 
despite not reducing SALW numbers significantly, generally viewed as positive in 
terms of the capacity- and confidence- building effects that they had on those 
involved.   
 
However, in other contexts, the interrelationship between SALW control and 
peacebuilding is much less positive:  the experience of post-CPA Southern Sudan 
perhaps illustrates this point most starkly; the coercive and selective nature of 
efforts to reduce civilian SALW holdings stimulated conflict between the 
government and specific tribes and exacerbated existing tensions between tribes 
sharing common borders and natural resources. 
 
From the examples analysed in this chapter it would appear that both the planning 
and implementation phases of peacebuilding and SALW control efforts are critical 
to the nature of the interrelationships between the two.  It is also apparent that the 
three main dimensions of the research framework established in Chapter 2 – the 
effects of complementarity, contingency and context - are important and deserve 
further analysis and development. 
 
Regarding the effects of contingency on interrelationships, it is apparent from the 
universe of cases that there are numerous linkages between different efforts to 
control SALW. Further, it appears that at certain stages following periods of violent 
conflict, particular interventions occur more frequently than others, which might 
suggest that they are perceived to have a particular relevance to specific 
peacebuilding phases and conflict contexts.  For instance, in Sudan in the 
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immediate period following the signing of the CPA, DDR was identified as a priority.  
In Bosnia Herzegovina however, where activities were taking place sometime after 
the end of the war, SALW were perceived as an integrated sectoral intervention 
linked to SSR and defence reform.  Conversely, there appears to be at least one 
specific SALW control issue which does not seem to be particularly linked to a 
specific peacebuilding phase.  In the case of weapons destruction, there seems to 
be a strong relationship with particular SALW control activities and therefore 
potentially with several different peacebuilding phases.  This suggests that in this 
case, interrelationships between weapons destruction and other SALW control 
activities are particularly important from a complementarity perspective in terms of 
disposing of weapons collected or seized through disarmament processes, rather 
than locating destruction activities within particular peacebuilding sequences which 
aim to maximise the benefits of contingency. 
 
Further, from analysis of the mini case-studies, it is clear that the extent to which 
these linkages are understood and acted upon is a significant determinant in the 
contribution that SALW control efforts make, both to their specific objectives but 
also to peacebuilding processes.  For example, the ways in which the various SALW 
control efforts built on each other in Sierra Leone, with one project testing 
approaches and methods whilst another was being prepared to take over and 
deliver the project to scale is a good example of the benefits of a lightly nested 
approach to different phases of activity which ensured that the activities taken 
together over several phases probably benefited significantly from their contingent 
relationships.  Conversely, the failure to understand the opportunities presented 
through maximising the beneficial effects of contingency in Sri Lanka, Kenya and 
Uganda appear to have hampered efforts to both enhance SALW control and its 
contribution to peacebuilding. 
 
From the examples analysed in this chapter it appears that understanding and 
maximising the potential benefits of complementarity between different sets of 
activities taking place during the same temporal phases can be important to 
strengthen positive interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding 
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activities.  It would appear from analysing the universe of cases, that often a 
number of different SALW activities take place either simultaneously or within a 
short period of time.  The data also suggests that in certain cases particular types of 
SALW control activity takes place relatively frequently.  For instance, civilian 
weapons collection often occurs at a similar time and space as DDR, suggesting that 
understanding and acting on potential complementarities is important.  This is 
borne out to some extent by the close relationship between DDR and SALW control 
in both Sierra Leone and South Sudan.  
 
However, it is unclear as to whether this suggests that programmes that are 
designed with complementarity built into them at the earliest stages are more 
appropriate than those in which opportunities are sought and exploited for 
benefiting from complementarity as a given programme develops.  For example, in 
post-CPA Sudan there was a conscious effort to build complementarity into the 
peace process.  However the complexity of the process and the highly political 
nature of all aspects of implementation meant that little of the pre-planned activity 
was in fact possible in reality.  Contrasting this with the experience of stand-alone 
SALW control programmes in the Western Balkans where opportunities for closer 
coordination were sought out and where the benefits of complementarity for 
enhancing the positive interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding 
activities appear to be relatively significant suggests that in some instances at least, 
better coordination rather than integration may be more appropriate. 
 
Finally, regarding the third element of the research framework – context – the 
analysis contained in this chapter suggests some interesting emerging findings for 
further research and analysis.  Perhaps most pertinent, it would appear that the 
active involvement of the different actor groups identified by Lederach are of great 
importance to the existence of positive interrelationships between SALW control 
efforts and peacebuilding.  For example, the lack of public consent for, let alone 
participation in, SALW control activities in Southern Sudan, Kenya and Uganda seem 
to have been critical to the role that these activities had in further stimulating 
conflict and tension.  The active engagement of the public in an act of public 
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disarmament in Serbia following the assassination of the former Prime Minister 
Djindic provides an interesting example to further reinforce this point:  When the 
public fully engaged with the public surrender of firearms in central Belgrade many 
thousands of weapons were surrendered, but perhaps the most significant effect of 
the act was to underline a popular desire to transition from a highly conflicted 
country to a more peaceful society.   
 
In between these two examples which could be seen to sit on either end of a 
spectrum of public engagement in SALW control efforts and the consequent effect 
on interrelationships with peacebuilding is the experience of Sri Lanka.  The public 
were actively consulted during the development of national strategies for 
addressing SALW control challenges and in many localities, communities played an 
active role in articulating their problems and supporting local level public education 
efforts.  However this support did not translate into the surrender of weapons 
during any of the various amnesty periods established by the government.  The 
reason for this appears to be relatively clear:  whilst there was a willingness 
amongst the public to acknowledge the negative impact of SALW, and a desire for 
there to be greater peace, a lack of trust in the ability of the government to keep 
families safe from either the LTTE, predatory government security forces or from 
criminal activity discouraged participation in weapons surrender programmes.   
 
This last point is important from the perspective of the contribution that SALW 
control efforts could have to transformative approaches to peace and conflict, and 
to operationalizing the concept of Peacebuilding from Below:  The construction of 
reality by communities is heavily dependent on how they experience issues such as 
security, justice and peace and consequently how they view the role of SALW in 
society.  Without a belief that they would be protected from threat by the state and 
in a context where conflict does not feel finished, it is highly unlikely that people 
would willingly disarm in significant numbers.  Sierra Leone presents a positive 
example of how the involvement of citizens in SALW control activities can 
strengthen the interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding.  Whilst 
the numbers of SALW surrendered during the AFD programme were limited, it is 
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interesting to note that reviewers identified the positive effect on the confidence 
and capacity of people involved as a major outcome of the project. 
 
This chapter has helped to test the assumptions contained in the overarching 
research question, hypothesis and sub-questions which together frame this thesis.  
The universe of cases and the more detailed mini case-studies have allowed for an 
initial and broad analysis of the effects of contingency, complementarity and 
context on the interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding 
activities.  However, it has important limitations.  Firstly, it does not explore any 
case in enough depth to reach firm conclusions nor to explore the interplay 
between different questions.  For example, it is not possible from the data analysed 
in this chapter to develop specific theories regarding the relative importance of the 
different variables of contingency complementarity and context:  Neither is it 
possible to explore the effect of social construction and the role of local people and 
their perceptions in the extent to which SALW control efforts can positively 
interrelate with peacebuilding activities and processes. 
 
The following Chapter seeks to explore these and other questions further and 
constitutes an in-depth analysis of how SALW and efforts to control them have 
interrelated with local and national level peacebuilding efforts since the end of the 
conflict between the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Government of the Republic 
of Serbia in 1999.   
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Chapter 4: The interrelationships between efforts to 
control SALW and activities to build peace in 
Kosovo:  a case study 
4.1 Introduction 
This Chapter analyses efforts to control SALW and build peace in Kosovo since 
violent conflict was brought to an end in 1999.   As the major case-study it has been 
selected to deepen the exploration of the interrelationships between SALW control 
and peacebuilding activities. In doing so, it has an important role in the overall 
research strategy introduced in Chapter 1 and elaborated in Chapter 2: It tests and 
further develops the findings emerging from Chapter 3 using the analytical 
framework established on the basis of literatures reviewed in Chapter 2.  In doing 
so it aims to make a significant contribution to addressing the overarching research 
question: What are the interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and build 
peace in countries emerging from periods of violent conflict? Through this it 
contributes to proving the validity of the hypothesis (see below), both in the case of 
Kosovo and in at least some other contexts: 
 
Efforts to control SALW can have a positive or negative effect on post-conflict 
peacebuilding; conversely their success can be damaged or enhanced by 
peacebuilding activities.  The interrelationships that exist between SALW control 
and peacebuilding are both temporal and spatial and are conditioned by the extent 
to which affected populations are involved.  Therefore the role and influence of local 
people, and the extent to which complementarity and contingency is understood 
and acted upon have a determining effect on the positive benefits of SALW control 
in post-conflict peacebuilding 
 
The research sub-questions discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 are particularly relevant 
to this case-study and help to frame both the analysis of the Kosovo case but also to 
organise the comprehensive analysis of all the data examined during this research 
which is contained in Chapter 5.  As such, the findings from this chapter will be 
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analysed further in the context of those emerging from Chapters 2 and 3 in 
particular when overall findings will be elaborated and conclusions drawn. 
 
This chapter begins with a description of the specific case-study research strategy 
and methodology.  An introduction to the different geographic research contexts 
selected is contained in Annex A.  The conflict resolution and peacebuilding 
frameworks which were put in place in the post-conflict period are then introduced 
and analysed and specific peacebuilding activities which are of particular relevance 
to this case-study are identified.  The role of SALW in the conflict and the SALW 
control challenges that existed in the post-war period are then reviewed and 
analysed.  This is followed by two major sections. The first of these analyses the 
interrelationships between different peacebuilding activities and then between 
different SALW control efforts. The second further develops this through an analysis 
of the interrelationships between SALW and peacebuilding efforts using the 
Contingency, Complementarity and Context framework.  The chapter concludes 
with the description of emerging findings which are then combined with those of 
earlier chapters in the thesis conclusions, which are described and analysed in 
Chapter 5. 
Figure 6: Map of Kosovo with major towns marked in Albanian and then Serbian 
 
 
 
 
  
177 
 
4.2 Case study strategy and methodology 
The Kosovo case-study follows a mixed-methods approach.  It combines qualitative 
data drawn from interviews, focus group discussions, document analysis and 
observation with quantitative data taken from nation-wide household surveys 
conducted over recent years by credible research centres and market research 
companies.   
 
As noted, it forms an important part of the overall research strategy, deepening and 
substantiating previous analysis and providing initial findings and conclusions for 
further analysis in Chapter 5.  The strategy designed for this case-study is described 
in Chapter 2 and can be summarised as follows:  an initial literature review 
examining peacebuilding processes and initiatives, and efforts to control SALW in 
Kosovo in the period following the end of the war in 1999, drawing on both 
quantitative and qualitative data; a series of in-depth local studies, featuring a 
combination of different - predominantly qualitative data - gathering methods; a 
wide range of interviews with those working at or analysing relevant macro-level 
peacebuilding and SALW control initiatives in Kosovo; an analysis of the ‘locally’ and 
‘nationally’ obtained data using the analytical framework established in Chapter 2 
and refined in Chapter 3. 
 
The remainder of this section describes the boundaries of the case study; 
introduces the research process and field visits; and describes data sources and 
data gathering methods.  It is then followed by an introduction to Kosovo in the 
period leading up to and following the end of the violent conflict in 1999. 
4.2.1 Case-study Boundaries 
The boundaries are geographic as well as temporal and thematic.  Geographically 
the boundary follows the borders established by the constitution of Yugoslavia in 
1974 (which covered five republics – Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia, Macedonia – 
and three provinces – Montenegro, Kosovo and Vojvodina).  Although they are 
currently contested, they are still in place and form the borders of the newly 
independent Republic of Kosovo.  Thematically the case study covers the issues of 
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small arms, efforts to control small arms and activities to support conflict resolution 
and peacebuilding.  The definitions used to describe these activities are introduced 
in Chapter 2. The time period covered by this case study is from the lead up to the 
end of the armed conflict which took place in Kosovo in 1999 until the present day 
(2013), although the period between 1999 and the end of the executive mandate of 
the UN in 2007 is of greatest interest given that this covers the period immediately 
following the end of the war during which most conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding and SALW control efforts took place. 
4.2.2 Outline of the research process and field visits 
Field research in Kosovo was undertaken during four visits to the country in late 
2010, early 2011, mid-2011 and early 2012.  In each case, one week was spent in-
country, both in Pristina and in a wide range of other cities, towns and villages.  
During the first visit an initial list of potential interviewees based predominantly in 
Pristina was developed and initial discussions took place with key interviewees 
involved in government in Kosovo.  This was important for obtaining the consent of 
government officials to speak candidly and freely, and to mitigate any potential 
future challenges to the research from government officials or law enforcement 
agencies.   
 
The second visit was used to achieve two tasks: to continue to develop the list of 
potential interviewees and to begin the process of selecting potential locations for 
local research including focus groups, observation and interviewees.  During the 
visit an initial list of potential locations was developed and then each place was 
visited with a view to making a final selection on return to the UK.  The criteria that 
were used to make the final selection are described below, but vital amongst them 
was obtaining the permission and consent from residents and local power holders 
to conduct the research.  Thus, significant time was invested during this second visit 
in discussing the content and purpose of the research with those living in 
communities that had been identified as potential research locations.  To aid this 
process, a description of the proposed research and the background of the 
researcher was prepared and translated into Albanian and Serbian and both sent to 
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local power holders in advance of a visit, and used as an aide to discussion during 
meetings with power holders and communities alike.   
 
At the village level specifically, Kosovo still retains strong traditional power 
structures.  Villages typically have village councils which comprise long-term 
residents, elders and those occupying positions of local importance, such as school 
teachers or businessmen.  These structures are in some ways not representative of 
their communities, particularly in a demographic sense – there are for instance few 
women or young people - and the means by which a person becomes a part of the 
village council is not always clear.  However, they remain an important part of how 
decisions are taken in Kosovo and are usually the most important decision-making 
forum at the village or community level.  As such, their consent was critical to 
obtaining the authority to visit the village and conduct the research.   
 
The role of the author and his prior experience in Kosovo in the selection process 
should also be acknowledged.  As described in Chapter 1, the author has extensive 
experience of Kosovo gained through his professional work.  He has visited Kosovo 
over 40 times during the past decade.  This experience includes having visited all 
Kosovo’s municipalities at different times, and being actively involved with 
community projects in a number of different locations, as well as involvement in 
relevant policy-making processes.  Some of the locations that were selected as 
detailed research locations for this study were places that the author had visited 
and in some cases, worked in over recent years.  This has very positive dimension in 
that it was significantly easier to obtain permission and consent to undertake the 
research; there exists already a level of trust and willingness to speak candidly and 
openly without the need for long-term relationship building.  But there is also a 
potential challenge in that familiarity could encourage the author to make 
suppositions and draw conclusions on the basis of prior knowledge or experience 
without applying the level of rigour required in academic enquiry.  This was 
addressed initially through the recognition of the potential for this to happen, but 
then also through the development of a clear methodology and the preparation of 
detailed interview schedules and focus group guides, and through periodic checking 
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with local colleagues and other engaged individuals to be sure that process was 
being followed and understandings generated through the research were 
consistent. 
 
On return to the UK following the second research visit, a near-definitive list of 
locations was developed.  This was then used to plan the third visit during which 
the majority of the field work was undertaken.  Upon arrival in Kosovo in early June 
2011 it became clear that in one proposed location, a change would be required.  
Lubinje in Prizren municipality had been identified as a focus group location.  
Subsequent to discussions with the village council during the second visit it became 
clear that they thought it would be important to involve their ‘sister’ village in the 
discussions as their experiences of small arms and conflict were connected, but 
somewhat different.  As a consequence, the near final draft prepared in the UK was 
revised whilst the author was in Kosovo to include a focus group discussion which 
drew together residents from two neighbouring villages rather than from just one 
as was initially intended.   
 
During the third visit, five focus group discussions and 25 detailed interviews were 
undertaken over a period of 7 days.  The focus group discussions took place in 
Albanian, Bosnian and Serbian and were translated by one of two interpreters.  The 
author took extensive notes on the basis of these translations in addition to 
observing the body language and delivery style of participants.  These notes were 
typed up in the evening of each day and facts and names checked with the 
interpreters whilst the information was still fresh.  In a small number of cases, the 
interpreters contacted previous focus group participants or interviewees to clarify 
matters of fact following the end of the discussions.  At the end of the research 
period, the author and the interpreters held a meeting to review progress, ensure 
that all available data had been collated and to identify areas that required further 
follow up in the future.   
 
Following his return to the UK, the author prioritised analysing the data gathered 
during the visit over preparing other parts of this thesis to ensure that nothing was 
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lost with the passage of time.   In February 2012 a further confirmatory research 
visit was undertaken. The priorities at this point were to hold some additional 
interviews with those who had fought as part of the KLA in 1999 and to interview a 
small number of representatives of relevant international organisations.  In both 
cases, whilst some progress had been made during previous research visits, it was 
felt that more detailed data was required.    
4.2.3 Description of data sources and data gathering techniques 
Both quantitative and qualitative data were gathered from a variety of different 
sources.  They are described in more detail below: 
 
Qualitative data was gathered using three primary methods: structured and semi-
structured interviews; focus group discussions; and document analysis.  In addition, 
the author observed the actions and behaviours of interviewees and the general 
public as well as more physical aspects of the area of study, including handling small 
arms and light weapons; observing the national and international military presence 
and infrastructure intended to support security- and peace- building; and visiting a 
range a police and military establishment, local public facilities and specific 
locations which had been particularly affected by the conflict which had significant 
resonance for those interviewed. 
 
Structured and semi structured interviews 
Interviews were organised with a wide range of different individuals who have 
either been involved in planning SALW control activities, targeted by them, or who 
have observed or commented on these activities over the past ten years.  Given 
that a primary focus of the case study was to understand how those affected by 
SALW possession and misuse and those targeted by efforts to control them 
perceived these efforts, a greater weighting was placed on interviews with them as 
opposed to commentators or planners from international organisations. 
 
For illustrative purposes, the categories of interviewees included: 
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 Community members in towns and villages targeted by efforts to control 
SALW and to promote peace and reconciliation; 
 Relevant government officials, both in service now and in key positions at 
the time of earlier attempts to control SALW; 
 Civil society leaders, including NGOs, research institutes, community 
organisations and journalists. 
 
Separate interview schedules were prepared for structured interviews with those 
involved in planning SALW control activities, for those targeted and for those who 
observed or commented on their development and implementation.  These were 
used to guide interviews, although in each case the schedule was adapted to the 
specific experience and role of the interviewee.  In addition a number of 
unstructured or semi-structured interviews were held on a more ad-hoc basis when 
opportunities allowed.  These took place for instance with waiters in cafés, 
interpreters, friends and their family members and a small number of police and 
security and government officials who did not want to speak on the record or be 
interviewed in any formal sense. 
 
Interviews took place in Pristina as well as in a number of other locations in Kosovo, 
including in northern Mitrovica, Gracanica, Debellder in Viti Municipality, Lubinje 
and Prizren in Prizren Municipality, Zubin Potok, Leposavic and Ferizaj. 
 
Focus Group Discussions 
Focus group discussions were organised to obtain the views and opinions of 
community members regarding the issue of small arms ownership, activities to 
control small arms and the security, political and economic context in which these 
activities tool place.  The locations were selected according to the following criteria: 
 Different geographic areas of the country; 
 Different ethnic makeup of communities; 
 The extent to which the community was affected by the war and the nature 
of its involvement;  
183 
 
 The extent to which the community was targeted, either by efforts to 
control small arms or by activities to promote peace and reconciliation. 
 
From these criteria, the following communities were selected as places in which to 
organise focus group discussions: 
 Germova village in Viti Municipality 
 Debellder village in Viti Municiplity 
 Ferizaj City in Ferizaj Municipality 
 Lubinje villages in Prizren Municipality 
 Gracanica. 
 
In addition to the locations in which formal focus group discussions took place, a 
small number of other locations were visited where interviewes (both structured 
and semi-structured) took place.  These were also selected on the basis of the 
criteria listed above, and taken together with the focus group locations represent 
large and small urban and rural areas, Kosovo’s different ethnic communities, a 
wide range of different geographic contexts, and a broad range of conflict impacts.  
These locations are as follows: 
 Mitrovica 
 Gjakova 
 Peja 
 Gjilan 
 Pristina. 
Interviewee and focus group participant profile  
The precise make-up of focus groups and those identified as potential interviewees 
in each location differed from place to place, and depended significantly on the 
precise nature of how SALW related to peace, security, conflict and development.  
However, the participation of the following groups was sought in each case: 
 Women 
 Men 
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 Young people (from 16 years upwards) 
 Elderly people 
 People of Albanian, Serbian, Bosniac, Turkish and Macedonian ethnicity 
 Students 
 Local elites and professionals 
 People employed in manual, agricultural or industrial roles 
 Unemployed people of working age 
 Stay at home mothers 
 Relatively wealthy people 
 Relatively poor people 
 Small arms owning civilians including those who owned licenced and 
unlicensed weapons 
 Community members who also worked for police and other security and law 
enforcement agencies 
 Former KLA fighters who described themselves publicly as veterans 
 Former KLA fighters who did not publicly acknowledge their previous 
relationship or role with the KLA 
 Former members of the Yugoslav National Army 
 Those who had participated in effort to control SALW or promote peace, 
and those who had not. 
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4.3 Kosovo in the period leading up to, and following the 
end of violent conflict in 1999  
This section provides a brief background to, and analysis of, Kosovo’s history 
leading up to, during and following the war. This provides the background and 
context for the analysis of peacebuilding and SALW control processes and activities 
which is undertaken in the sections which follow. 
 
Kosovo’s history is marked by periods of war, occupation, conquest, empire and 
violence.45  Its geographic location in the centre of the Balkan peninsula and at the 
juncture between Ottoman and central European empires and more recently 
between western Europe and the countries of the former Warsaw Pact 
undoubtedly shapes the social, political and economic landscape of the country 
today.  A detailed analysis of these factors as they have developed over many 
decades is outside the scope of this thesis; readers are advised to consult Glenny 
(1992), Malcolm (1998), Vickers (1998), Ignatieff (2000), Judah (2000), IICK (2000), 
Mazower (2000) amongst others for in-depth historical analysis of Kosovo, its 
relations with its neighbours, and the wider Balkans region.   
 
However, to provide suitable context in which Kosovo’s post-war period can be 
understood it is important to first outline the major events leading up to the 
outbreak of war and to describe the post-war settlement and subsequent 
reconstruction efforts within which the control of SALW and broader peacebuilding 
efforts were attempted.  In the framing of the section below, three publications 
were of particular importance. Noel Malcolm’s 1998 book Kosovo, a Short History, 
and in particular Chapter 17 provides a detailed introduction to the period 
following the death of former Yugoslav President Tito, up to the NATO intervention 
in 1999.  Tim Judah’s book, Kosovo: War and Revenge provides a detailed narrative 
of the conflict from the perspective of a writer and journalist who covered the war 
from inside Kosovo.  The Kovoso Report, published by the International 
                                                       
45 For a literary account of Kosovo’s role in history of the wider Balkan region from the Ottoman 
period to the present day, see Kadare, I (2000).  Three Elegies for Kosovo.  Vintage Books. London 
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Independent Commission on Kosovo in 2000 is perhaps the most authoritative 
account of what happened during the war.   
 
Kosovo was an autonomous province of Serbia and a constituent part of the 
Federation of Yugoslavia under the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federal 
republic of Yugoslavi (for a detailed analysis of the 1974 constitution and Kosovo’s 
status within it see Curtis (1990)).  In the periods both before and after, Kosovo 
enjoyed a significant degree of independence.  This changed however following the 
death in 1980 of Josip Broz Tito, the President of Yugoslavia, which was followed by 
a significant period of economic deterioration across the Federation.  In Kosovo, 
following Tito’s death, the context quickly began to change, with a more ethno-
nationalist approach to politics and the distribution of resources affecting the social 
and economic wellbeing of its citizens (IICK 2000:34-35).  
 
These tensions came to a head on 11 March 1981 when students at Pristina 
University began a protest focusing on conditions at the University.  What was 
essentially a local complaint against poor services began to grow following police 
action to arrest some of the protesters.  The actions of the police soon brought 
other young people onto the streets to the point where there were reportedly 
between three and four thousand protesters in the centre of the city.  The police 
arrested significant numbers of people and disbursed the rest with tear gas 
following a night of tense stand-off. This did not deter protesters however, who 
were joined by others over the ensuing weeks demanding not just improved 
facilities for the students, but also much more political change, including both 
unification of Kosovo with Albania and independence of Kosovo as a republic within 
the Yugoslav Federation (Malcolm 1998: 335). 
 
By April 1981 demonstrations were much more significant, with students from 
other towns and cities joining their colleagues in Pristina.  These protests were met 
by tanks on the streets of the city which in turn helped stimulate protests in many 
of the industrial towns and cities across Kosovo, including importantly Mitrovica 
and Ferizaj , Kosovo’s second and third cities respectively.  A General State of 
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Emergency was declared and thousands of security personnel were drafted into the 
province from other parts of the Yugoslav Federation (IICK 2000:36). 
 
These demonstrations had for the first time for many years, given Albanian citizens 
in Kosovo a voice to call for changes in the way they were governed and to 
economic and social conditions under which they lived.  However, they also had a 
significant fall-out, both politically and socially.  Over 500 officials from the 
Communist Party of Kosovo (mostly Albanians) were purged from the party, 
students were thrown out of university and those who held jobs in the state sectors 
and had been active were dismissed from their posts.  Leaders in Belgrade linked 
the protests to what they saw as calls for unification with Albania, when in reality 
this was not at the time a commonly held desire.46   
 
Malcolm notes that the protests and the subsequent efforts to put them down and 
stifle dissent brought Albanian and Serbian nationalism into sharp focus with 
accusations of Serbs and Montenegrins being pushed out of Kosovo on one hand, 
and accusations of Serbs and other Slavic people taking much higher numbers of 
state jobs than they were entitled to on the other (Malcolm 2008: 336).  Malcolm 
argues that what in effect became a ‘Culture War’ began, particularly in Serbia.  
This was supported and stimulated by two significant events in the 1980s: the 
publication in 1995 by Dimitrije Bogdanovic, a well-known Serbian academic of ‘A 
book about Kosovo’, which accused Albanians of working to create an ethnically 
pure province; and the case of Djordje Martinovic, farmer and civilian army 
employee who publically accused his Albanian neighbours of raping him with a beer 
bottle, which gave rise to demonstrations and acts of revenge47 (Judah, 2000: 46-
47).     
 
                                                       
46 The IICK argues that it was not until 1991 following the Slovene and Croatian declarations of 
independence that Kosovo’s Albanian leaders began to demand independence rather than a 
republic within Yugoslavia (IICK 2000: 44) 
47 The voracity of this claim has been questioned since it was first made.  The role that the case had 
in stimulating Serbian nationalist sentiment is described in detail in Bracewell, W (2004).  
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As these tensions grew, a young member of the Serbian Central Committee, 
Slobodan  Milosevic, began to play an increasingly active and engaged role in these 
debates, which centred around his perception that Serbia and Serbian culture was 
at risk as a consequence of the power and autonomy of Yugoslavia’s, provinces, 
including Kosovo.  Milosevic’s most significant intervention to-date came in April 
1987 when he deputised for the President of the Serbian Communist Party at a 
meeting of Serbian nationalists at Kosovo Polje, a site of central importance to 
many Serb’s sense of identity and nationhood.48 Milosevic made an impromptu 
speech, caught on television camera which included a phrase which would both 
help propel him to the highest levels of populist Serbian politics, and provide a 
rallying call to his supporters: “Comrades…you should stay here.  This is your 
country, these are your houses, your fields, your gardens and your 
memories…Yugoslavia and Serbia are not going to give up Kosovo” (Judah 2000:52-
53).   
 
In 1987, Milosevic succeeded Ivan Stambolic to the Presidency of the Serbian 
League of Communists.  In the two years that followed, he focussed on changes to 
the Serbian constitution to give Belgrade a direct role in all aspects of government 
in Kosovo. After much political turmoil, this was achieved in 1989 when the 
Provincial Assembly of Kosovo and the Serbian assembly agreed changes which, 
amongst other things, gave Belgrade direct control over policing, law and order and 
education policy – which was quickly adapted to require the use of Serbian as the 
official language in the province.  These changes in effect ended Kosovo’s 
autonomy and gave rise to significant unrest with predictable responses from the 
government and security agencies (Ignatieff 2000:12).   
 
The changes were further embedded in 1990 when the Serbian Assembly passed its 
Programme for the Realisation of Peace and Prosperity in Kosovo (Krieger, 
                                                       
48 See Gottlieb, G (1994) for a description of the role of the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389 in Serbian 
and Albanian cultural histories where contested history claims either that the last Serbian Prince was 
defeated by Turkish armies whilst defending the southern geographical borders of Christianity, or 
where Serbian invaders were repulsed in their attempts to overrun Muslim lands that were already 
under Turkish rule. 
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2001:vvvi).  This included provisions for new municipalities for Serbs, incentives for 
Serbs to settle in Kosovo and for Albanians to leave, and which annulled property 
transfers from Serbs to Albanians.  This was quickly followed by the Law on the 
Activities of Organs of the Republic in Exceptional Circumstances, which led to 
closing down Albanian language media, the Kosovo Academy of Arts and Sciences 
and the sacking of thousands of Albanian state employees.  Rejection of these 
changes by the Albanian members of the Kosovo Assembly led to the dissolution of 
the assembly and local government and to further wide scale expulsion of 
Albanians from their jobs.   
 
At this point, an important response from Albanian elites and others began to be 
heard, which was to have far reaching effects, and which are of particular relevance 
to the focus of this thesis:  Albanian politicians who had been stripped of their 
power and other influential people, including writers and thinkers began to meet in 
secret.  They proposed the establishment of a ‘Republic of Kosovo’ (within the 
framework of the Yugoslav Federation) and organised a secret referendum and 
elections which returned a republic assembly and a shadow government-in-
waiting.49  As the President of the Association of Writers in Kosovo, Dr Ibrahim 
Rugova became first the leader of the Democratic League Kosovo (LDK) and then 
the President of the Republic of Kosovo.  One of key aims of the LDK and the 
government in exile was to deny the legitimacy of Serbian rule.  This was done 
through establishing parallel institutions of state which began to deliver goods and 
services for Albanians in Kosovo funded through a system of voluntary donations 
and to refuse to negotiate directly with Belgrade without the presence of foreign 
countries, thus internationalising a conflict which Rugova saw as being between 
two independent entities (Judah 2000:66). 
 
 
 
                                                       
49 The IICK claims that as many as 87%of eligible voters took part in the referendum, with 99% voting 
in favour (IICK 2000:44)   
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Figure 7: The role of the LDK in shaping Kosovo’s civil society 
 
In their paper NGOs and Peacebuilding in Kosovo, Llamazares and Reynolds-Levy 
(2003) contend that understanding how the delivery of services, including parallel 
systems of healthcare and education, which drew on traditional Albanian clan 
hierarchies and disbanded communist structures was organised is central to 
understanding some of the challenges of post-war peacebuilding and 
reconstruction in Kosovo.  They claim that: 
 
“The powerful hybrid role of the LDK - simultaneously a resistance movement, a 
civil society and a one-party state bureaucracy, is one source of the difficulty 
Kosovo has had establishing a pluralistic civil society in the post-settlement period.” 
(Llamazares and Reynolds-Levy 2003:3) 
 
Further, the authors claim that the origins of contemporary Albanian civil society 
can be found in the movement led by the LDK.  This gave rise to a range of different 
social and cultural associations and groups that played a significant role in the 
delivery of a wide range of services, including education and health.  These 
organisations, which endured during the war were characterised in part by the fact 
that they existed and operated within the framework of the LDK and the wider self-
determination movement.  There was no space for internal dissent at this time, and 
consequently, whilst these organisations gained significant credibility amongst the 
wider population by virtue of the material benefits that they brought to an often 
impoverished community, they developed a culture of not questioning the political 
leadership of the LDK and were seen, and saw themselves, as a part of a political 
movement, partial in nature and partisan in perspective.  The authors claim that 
this history and culture created real challenges, as well as opportunities in the post-
war period during which international and local civil society organisations were 
identified as the prime delivery agents for peacebuilding and development work. 
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Despite the powerful role that Rugova had played in galvanising resistance to the 
Belgrade reforms of Kosovo’s governance, as Yugoslavia slipped further towards 
war in early 1991, calls for more direct and violent rejection of Belgrade began to 
gain more traction amongst some in Kosovo.  In June 1991, when Slovenia and 
Croatia declared independence, these calls became louder and harder to ignore, 
and Rugova’s position of non-violent opposition less popular. (Judah 2000:98). The 
desire to respond more robustly was heightened following the onset of war in 
Bosnia in 1992, when the focus by Bosnian Serb authorities on the ‘Islamic Threat’ 
gave greater emphasis to the religious and ethnic dimensions of simmering conflict 
in Kosovo (Malcolm 1998). 
 
President Rugova was damaged by the outcome of conflict in Bosnia as it 
undermined his contention that the international community would in some way 
step in to prevent Serbian aggression and safeguard the rights of minority and 
religious communities across the Balkans.  His position was further weakened in this 
regard by the fact that he could demonstrate little international condemnation for 
what was happening in Kosovo at the time, and little support for the LDK’s claims 
for greater autonomy or for its means of achieving it; during the wars in other parts 
of Yugoslavia, repression continued in Kosovo as institutions were closed down, 
arbitrary arrests increased and the settlement in Kosovo of Serbs from Croatia was 
actively encouraged.  Rugova was caught between two sets of opinions: to some he 
was too fixed in his view that he should not negotiate with Belgrade outside an 
international process; whereas for others who believed that more direct action 
needed to be taken, he was seen as weak.  From 1996, systematic acts of targeted 
violence against Serbs and Serbian institutions in Kosovo began to be observed, 
although initially it was not clear either to the LDK leadership or outsiders where 
the violence was being directed from.  However, by 1997, this position had changed 
to the extent that representatives of the Kosovo Liberation army (KLA) were giving 
interviews from their base in Switzerland to journalists on the armed struggle that 
they were engaged in with the authorities in Belgrade and their proxies in Kosovo. 
This created significant tension between the LDK, for some time the most 
influential voice of the liberation movement and the more recently established and 
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much more violent KLA.  This distrust and enmity came to a head between 1998 
and the autumn of 1999 when KLA activists targeted LDK members including 
Rugova in the run up to the first municipal elections held following the end of the 
war, actions which led to the deaths of several LDK supporters. (ICG, 2001:89).  
4.3.1 The war, its effects and the international peace support 
operation  
The pressures that had been brought to bear in Kosovo, both from within and 
outside its borders came to a head on 24th March 1999, when the internationally 
sponsored negotiations at Rambouillet near Paris broke down without agreement 
and NATO began a 78 day mission of bombing and military action again Serbia and 
the government of Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade (see Ignatieff (2001) for a 
detailed account of the NATO action).  This led to direct reprisals against Albanian 
and other civilian targets in Kosovo (see IICK 2000 for a widely accepted account of 
the immediate period in Kosovo following the end of the war).   
 
The numbers of people displaced, killed and injured remains contested.  However, 
the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (IICK) claims that well over 1 
million people (out of a population at the time somewhere in the region of 2 million 
people) became either refugees or internally displaced (IICK, 2000:i).  Figures for 
those killed during the conflict likewise vary, however a total of up to 10,000 people 
killed during the Serbian – Albanian violence (see for instance US State Department, 
1999:3) and just over 500 killed as a direct impact of NATO bombing (Human Rights 
Watch, 2000) are generally seen as credible estimates. 
 
Following the formal end of the conflict in June 1999, the UN quickly approved UN 
Security Council Resolution 1244 which sanctioned NATO action and granted the 
province substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration (UN, 1999).  This 
paved the way for the arrival of the first of the over 40,000 strong Kosovo 
Protection Force (KFOR), which provided security across Kosovo throughout the 
period of the UN’s executive mandate.  The agreement of UNSCR 1244 was 
followed by months of reprisal attacks against Serbs and other minorities perceived 
to have supported Belgrade during the war (IICK 2000:108); and by October 1999 it 
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was claimed that only about half the original population of Serbian citizens 
remained in the territory, most of whom lived in enclaves heavily protected by 
KFOR soldiers (Matveeva and Paes, 2003:21-30).    The impact of years of conflict 
and neglect on Kosovo was considerable and the scale of the development and 
rehabilitation task ahead was significant:  The World Bank and EU claimed that at 
least $2.4 billion would be needed over an initial four year period to tackle the most 
pressing needs, but that reconstruction and rehabilitation would take many years.  
A report by the UN Secretary General on Kosovo immediately following the retreat 
of the Serbian military describes the situation thus: 
 
Empty streets.  Shattered shops.  No water.  No work. Smoking ruins.  
Murders in the open streets.  Dead bodies and piles of garbage.  Not a 
newspaper to buy, not even a loaf of bread.  Not a child in school.  No fields 
safe to plough.  Most of the livestock lost.  No one in charge.50   
 
UNSCR 1244 mandated the establishment of a wide ranging UN peace support 
engagement in Kosovo.  The Kosovo Force (KFOR) comprising NATO and other non-
NATO contributing nations was responsible for the military-security aspects of the 
operation, including the disarmament and transformation of the KLA.  The civilian 
aspects of the engagement were entrusted to the UN Mission in Kosovo, or UNMIK, 
which was headed by a highly empowered Special Representative of the Secretary 
General.   
 
From the outset, this was the most ambitious UN mission ever planned, with 
executive responsibility for the administration of the territory until such a time that 
the provisional institutions of self-government set out in UNSCR 1244 could take 
over responsibility for administration of governance themselves.  From this point 
the international intervention in Kosovo became known as an example of attempts 
to promote the concept of liberal peace discussed in Chapter 2.  Consequently the 
Kosovo experience is often viewed through the lens of debates around the ethics, 
                                                       
50 Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo, 6th June 
2000, page 294. 
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efficacy and effects of liberal peacebuilding models.  As regards the international 
intervention in Kosovo, prominent critics such as Richmond and Pugh have 
identified contradictions between concepts of democracy and empowerment 
assigned to liberal peacebuilding by its supporters and the imposition of particular 
governance systems in the absence of a political settlement (Franks and Richmond 
2008) or economic models based on free market reforms that have the potential to 
increase the vulnerability of poor people and encourage the development of 
shadow economies (Pugh et al, 2009). 
 
Whilst Franks and Richmond argue that Kosovo is a good example of the challenges 
of local co-option of international liberal peacebuilding objectives, Chandler (2004; 
2010) and Heathershaw and Lamback (2008) identify Kosovo as an example of 
where local politics became detached from peacebuilding efforts, increasing the 
chances of co-option and reducing the relevance of peacebuilding efforts for local 
people.  Narten (2008) uses Kosovo to illustrate his claim that the speed and nature 
of the transfer of local ownership is critical to sustainable peace, contending that 
delays in the case of Kosovo undermined the chances of reaching a political 
settlement. 
 
These criticisms reflect more general concern with the concept of liberal 
peacebuilding and of the priorities and approaches which it promotes.  Others, 
including former UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), Soren 
Jessen-Petersen (2005), former special adviser to the first Kosovo SRSG, Bernard 
Kouchner (Yannis 2000), Scheye (2008) and Mason and King (2006) argue that 
whilst recognising the challenges inherent in the concept of liberal peace that the 
stabilisation of Kosovo was a qualified success, and that challenges of transitioning 
to sustainable peace were often programmatic (Scheye 2008), a reflection of 
changing international priorities (Mason and King 2006) or inevitable but 
unavoidable given the lack of a credible alternative (Visoka 2011; Petersen 2005). 
  
Whilst all areas of government were within the mandate given to UNMIK, a 
significant priority was placed on areas closely related to conflict prevention and 
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peacebuilding.  UNMIK was organised around a cluster of four ‘pillars’ (which are 
used by Franks, Richmond and Pugh to illustrate the extent of liberal peacebuilding 
ambitions and their contradictions – for instance, Pugh (2009) identifies Pillar 4 as 
an example of where an EU-led free market solution was proscribed within an 
overall approach that aimed to promote democracy and local decision making).  For 
most of the time during which UNMIK was present in Kosovo, the four pillars, each 
with their own lead agency comprised the following:   
 Pillar 1 focussed on the civil administration of the territory and was lead 
directly by the UN 
 Pillar 2 focussed on police and justice, again under the direct leadership of 
the UN  
 Pillar 3 covered democratisation and institution building, led by the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)  
 Pillar four focussed on economic reconstruction and was led by the 
European Union.51 
4.4 Peacebuilding in Kosovo 
4.4.1 National-level peacebuilding frameworks and initiatives  
The Head of the democratization and institution building pillar in the first years of 
the UN mission, Daan Everts, described how these pillars were intended to be 
reflected in the phasing of UNMIK engagement, setting out the five phases initially 
envisaged for the delivery of the UNMIK mandate, each of which has significant 
peacebuilding dimensions: 
 
“The general strategy of UNMIK was envisaged in five integrated phases: in the first 
phase, the mission would set up administrative structures, deploy an international 
civilian police and provide emergency assistance to returning refugees. Throughout 
the second phase, the focus would be on the administration of social services and 
utilities and the consolidation of the rule of law. In the third phase, UNMIK would 
finalise preparations and conduct elections for a Kosovo Transitional Authority. 
                                                       
51 For a detailed analysis of the role of the different pillars as regards security provision and 
oversight, see Dugolli I and Peci L (2005: 10-20) 
196 
 
Thereafter UNMIK would help Kosovo’s elected representatives organise and set up 
provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous institutions. The concluding 
phase would depend on a final settlement of the status of Kosovo” (Everts 2001).  
 
In their paper, NGOs and Peacebuilding in Kosovo, Llamazares and Reynolds-Levy 
explore each of these five phases in terms of the particular peacebuilding priorities 
and challenges posed in each case (2003:7).  They categorise the five phases 
described by Everts into three broader peacebuilding phases: emergency, 
transition, and consolidation.  These categories borrow heavily from the previous 
work of Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (for instance see Ramsbotham, 
Woodhouse and Miall, 2005) and aim to describe how each of the phases of 
UNMIK’s pillar-approach relate to specific phases in their conflict cycle.  In 
summary, they describe Everts’ phase 1 as the emergency phase in which 
humanitarian support and provision of basic security was of critical importance. The 
second and third phases are grouped together as the transition phase, which had a 
medium-term perspective and where greater emphasis was placed on institution-
building and consolidating progress in areas of administration of law and order; the 
fourth and fifth phases of Everts’ description were described as the consolidation 
phase, where following elections, the nascent Kosovar institutions would play an 
ever greater role until the final status of Kosovo was agreed.52 
 
The paper described above was prepared in 2003 and provides an introduction to 
the role of the UN, principally through UNMIK in providing peace support in post-
war Kosovo.  However, with the benefit of a longer perspective it would appear that 
Llamazares and Reynolds-Levy’s analysis was incomplete in one significant area.  It 
underestimated the length of time that it has taken to date to address the 
challenges set out by UNMIK in its early months.  It is now clear that the initial 
hopes that a transition could be undertaken within the timeframe initially 
envisaged were very wide of the mark.  Explanations have ranged from the 
continued existence of ‘parallel structures’ of governance linked to Belgrade 
                                                       
52 These ‘peacebuilding phases’ and their relationship to specific aspects of the SALW control 
problematic are explored in detail in Chapter 5. 
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preventing Kosovo-Serb participation in a political process, which in effect removed 
the political dimension therefore preventing a transition (Visoka, 2011), to those 
who claim that the failure to transition quickly enough to local ownership 
disempowered the political process (Narten, 2008). 
 
At the time of writing in spring 2013, a final resolution to the territorial claims over 
the territory of Kosovo appears as distant as ever despite some recent progress 
with EU brokered talks between the Serbian and Kosovo governments, and the 
levels of open hostility and enmity between the majority Kosovo Albanian 
Government in Pristina and many of those living in, or claiming to represent Kosovo 
Serbs in the northern municipalities bordering Serbia remain daunting.  There are 
make-shift barricades across all roads into the north, manned by vigilantes and self-
appointed community defence groups that prevent almost all transit from, and into, 
the rest of Kosovo.53  KFOR soldiers and Kosovo police have come under attack from 
these groups whilst attempting to exercise control over Kosovo’s northern borders, 
and discussions between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo over the terms on 
which the Republic of Kosovo, which claimed independence in 2009, will establish 
formal state-to-state relations with its northern neighbour have effectively ground 
to a halt without resolution.54   
 
Across the whole of Kosovo, while it is clear that substantial  progress has been 
made to increase access to services, establish representative government, and 
implement a system of rule of law (ICG, 2012:i), there remains considerable conflict 
between Kosovo’s two major ethnic groups (identified by Vickers (1998) and 
Mertus (1999) as perhaps the key dimension of the conflict). In contexts which 
were affected less by the war and where there is a history of coexistence, on the 
surface at least, relations between groups are tolerable.55  In others, where the 
                                                       
53 Observed and experienced by the author on numerous occasions over recent years and 
particularly since the declaration of independence by the government in Pristina. 
54 For an analysis of the current security situation in Kosovo see ICG (2012) Setting Kosovo Free: 
Remaining Challenges.   
55 Field research for this thesis in Gjilan and Brezovica in 2011, which are both mixed areas which 
were relatively lightly affected by the war, observed local Serbian owned shops and cafés which had 
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effects of war are still close to the surface, tensions are more visible, and in the 
majority Serb municipalities in the north of the country, where the mandate of 
UNMIK or of the succeeding Kosovo Government has never been accepted, there is 
open and very visible hostility which continues to manifest itself in acts of 
violence.56   
 
In these contexts it is clear that many of the peacebuilding needs anticipated by 
UNSC 1244, and elaborated by UNMIK and many others in the succeeding years 
have not been met.  There are many potential reasons for this57 which are 
discussed above and are often framed in terms of the failure either of the liberal 
model or of the failure to implement it effectively. However, one specific 
contention made by the International Crisis Group in 2001 regarding the differing 
sets of priorities for Kosovars and international powers is useful in that many of the 
points made at the time focus to some significant extent on the relationships 
between security, development and governance, all of which are of critical 
importance to the focus of this thesis.   
 
ICG argued that the priorities of the international community and Kosovo Albanian 
decision makers were not always in alignment in the early phases of post-war 
planning and operations.  They state that for the international community, during 
the period of its administration of Kosovo, and arguably to this day, its priority was 
not the final status of the territory, but establishing security both domestically and 
more importantly, regionally and internationally.  However, for Albanians living in 
Kosovo, whilst domestic security has always been desired, avoiding the rule of 
Belgrade through achieving independence was of greater importance (ICG, 2001).  
                                                                                                                                                         
been recently opened to take advantage of increased business arising from greater interaction 
between Albanian and Serbian people.  
56 See for instance BBC online news article:  Blast Kills 1 in Divided City of Mitrovica.  2nd July 2012.  
Retrieved 15/12/2012. 
57 In a paper for the Kosovo Centre for Security Studies Kallabi and Ferati (2012) discuss these 
reasons.  These range from the compromise between the US, UK and France on one side and Russia 
and China on the other regarding the future independence or otherwise of Kosovo, which led to the 
wording of UNCS Resolution 1244 not setting out explicitly what Kosovo’s final status would be or 
how it would be decided, and the failure of UNMIK and other international actors to place enough 
emphasis quickly enough on ensuring that nascent Kosovo government  institutions were given the 
authority and encouragement to tackle challenging issues which still remain unaddressed.  
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This difference of perspective has arguably shaped the policy and programmatic 
priorities of the two actors to the present day:  NATO continues in 2013 to have a 
significant military presence in Kosovo, which together with diplomatic and 
commercial activity, has helped to ensure that Kosovo’s problems do not spill over 
its borders significantly and that the process of recovery from violent conflict across 
the western Balkans has been sustained.   
 
Although there were obvious exceptions such as the early and sustained 
commitment to DDR for KLA cadres (Barakat and Ozerdem 2005) and the effort 
involved in establishing the Kosovo Police Service (Bayley 2005; Wilson 2006), 
internal security was not prioritized to the same extent, particularly in the initial 
period following the end of the war.  Whilst there have been significant efforts 
aimed at resolving outstanding conflicts with Serbia in particular, it is also clear that 
these have only really come to the fore in recent years, when arguably the threat of 
large scale violence triggered by ongoing tensions in Kosovo and between Kosovo 
and its neighbours has dissipated and once the opportunity had been lost to involve 
Kosovo Serbs in political processes (Heathershaw and Lambach, 2008) and avoid 
the ‘Albanianisation’ of Kosovo (Vickers, 1998). 
 
In the early days of the UN mandate in Kosovo, despite the existence of the NATO 
force and UN Police with responsibility for peacekeeping and law enforcement, 
they were often seen to be ineffective in preventing or addressing violence, 
including that between Serbs and Albanians - specifically revenge attacks by 
Albanians on Serbs.  This came into sharp relief in March 2004 when international 
actors took almost two days to respond effectively to widespread rioting and 
violence which led to the death of 19 people and widespread destruction of 
property (HRW 2004).  The reasons for this are various but are likely to include the 
following:  the lack of clarity regarding the future direction of Kosovo’s criminal 
justice sector at the time; and the existence of very weak institutions - if indeed 
they existed at all - meant that it was often hard to bring a case to a satisfactory 
conclusion (ICG, 2001: 87).   
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The inability of the international presence to impose rule of law as a consequence 
of its limited mandate, the requirement to work within internationally recognised 
human rights frameworks, and the paucity of local capacity to prosecute and punish 
offenders within a recognised system of rule of law meant that in many cases, those 
caught or suspected of carrying out acts of violence were warned and then 
released, with no obvious sanction for the activities that they had undertaken.58    
4.4.2 Additional important peacebuilding activities  
In addition to the peacebuilding framework set out by UNSCR 1244 and the UN 
mission in Kosovo, in the initial years following the end of the war, there was a 
great profusion of activity that was either labelled as peace-building or which had a 
distinct peacebuilding dimension.  This section describes and analyses these 
processes and interventions, categorising them for ease of analysis into three 
groups: 
 
 Community-led activities 
 Internationally led, locally-focussed activities 
 Internationally led nationally-focussed activities. 
It concludes with establishing a chronology of major peacebuilding processes and 
initiatives before turning to an analysis of SALW, their role in the conflict and efforts 
to place them under greater control since its end in 1999. 
 
Community-led activities.  A great many of these activities took place, particularly 
between 1999 and 2002 (see Llamazares and Reynolds-Levy 2003).  They were 
typically locally focussed in nature and targeted social interactions between 
community groups within a defined geographic area.  They were often 
internationally supported and included inter-ethnic sports events (such as those 
                                                       
58 In interviews in 2006 for the SALW Survey of Kosovo, the author spoke to police commanders 
across Kosovo who reported that when they arrested someone for a crime, their best option for 
punishment was often to incarcerate the ‘guilty’ party for the maximum 3 day period that they could 
be held in police detention before being charged as there was very little likelihood that they would 
ever be prosecuted and face sentencing by the courts.  This situation was much more pronounced in 
the northern municipalities where the Kosovo courts have no reach.  
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organised in Gjakova by the Kosovo International Centre59), accompanied visits to 
local markets, joint business development and rehabilitation or establishment of 
local municipal facilities (such as those organised by local community activists in 
Obilic to establish a public radio station that broadcast in all the languages spoken 
in the municipality60).    
 
To an extent, these activities were driven by the requirements of donor 
organisations (Llamazares and Reynolds-Levy, 2003) which followed a model which 
suggested that if interactions between different groups of people could be 
facilitated, then relations would become normalised, and peaceful coexistence 
could be achieved.  Where there does appear to be a difference in the focus of 
these community-led activities is where the funds were entirely locally derived.  
Where this was the case (for instance in Ferizaj where local organisations raised 
money from local businesses to renovate a public space61), there was no specific 
dimension promoting peace between Albanian and Serbian communities (in this 
particular case, the local organisers in Ferizaj believed that they needed to 
contribute to increasing social cohesion amongst those who lived in Ferizaj – 
including a large returnee and IDP population – before the community would be 
able to address its differences with others62). However, where an outside donor 
was involved, it was much more likely that an inter-ethnic dimension would be 
visible in the way the project was described (see for instance Belloni 2001; Franks 
and Richmond 2008).   
 
Finally, in the last few years (since 2005), a new form of locally-led, community-
focussed activities have been attempted which have a significant peacebuilding 
dimension.  These have been attempted by a network of locally focussed 
community groups drawn together by the Forum for Civic Initiatives (initially based 
in Ferizaj, now headquartered in Pristina).  The premise of the work was that local 
                                                       
59 Interview with Enver Kolokoci June 2011 
60 Interview by the author in 2005 as part of an assessment of local activities aimed at promoting 
community safety  
61 Interview with Ferdinand Nikola, June 2011 
62 Interviews with Haki Abazi and Astrit Istrefi, Ferizaj December 2010 
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people should both identify their peace and security problems, and be responsible 
for developing and implementing responses.  Undertaking this work over a period 
of months facilitated interactions between communities and individuals, built up 
relations between citizens and local service providers and improved both social 
cohesion and perceived and real security.63   
 
Internationally-led locally focussed initiatives:  
Local Public Safety Councils (LPSCs) were initially an OSCE initiative, which in many 
ways were similar to CSATS (see below) although they claim to focus at a more 
local-level that at that of the municipality.  In 2010 there were 24 municipalities in 
which LPSCs were active.  Like CSATS they were intended as a contribution to 
promoting community-based approaches to policing, drawing together local people 
and law enforcement agencies to identify and address common problems.  The 
similarity of LPSCs and CSATs is a feature of the crowded terrain on which 
international agencies with an interest in supporting security building activities, 
particularly those with a peacebuilding component operate.  CSATs were essentially 
a US government initiative, whereas LPSCs were OSCE-led.  At the point at which 
they were established, the US Government and the UN Mission, which included the 
OSCE as the leaders of the pillar relating to policing were experiencing considerable 
differences of opinion regarding the speed of Kosovo’s transition and the scale of 
the UN operation.   
 
Municipal Community Safety Councils have for most of Kosovo’s post-war period 
been a function of local municipal government.  Established to bring together 
decision makers and local people to encourage participation and oversight of local 
decision making, they remain today an important conduit between local 
government and representatives of local communities.64 
 
                                                       
63 See Helly, D (2006) for an overview of lessons learned through undertaking community security 
activities in Kosovo 
64 See for instance the “Action Plan of the Republic of Kosovo on Crime Prevention” which focuses 
strongly on the role of MCSCs: http://www.mpb-ks.org/repository/docs/ACTION_English.pdf.  
Accessed 11 January 2012 
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Community Safety Action Teams (CSATS) were established as a joint programme by 
the OSCE and the US Department for Justice International Criminal Investigations 
Training Programme (ICITAP) in 2003 to complement work led by the OSCE which 
aimed to introduce community-based approaches to policing in Kosovo.  Initially 
focussing on four municipalities, at its peak the programme covered over 20 
municipalities.  CSATs provided a forum for local people, decision makers, police 
and other law enforcement agencies to meet to identify and address security and 
safety related problems at the municipal level (OSCE 2007:5). 
 
Internationally led national initiatives: 
Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR).  Launched officially in 2005, the ISSR was a 
major internationally supported attempt to map the existing security sector in 
Kosovo and identify its shape for the future.  Funded largely by the UK government 
and working to the Office of Public Safety in the office of the Prime Minister of 
Kosovo the ISSR team was supported through UNDP, which seconded staff to help 
manage the delivery of the project.  The ISSR published its final report in 2006 
(Cleland-Welch et al (eds) 2006). 
 
Whilst it undoubtedly played a role in bringing together an understanding of the 
nature of the security sector as it existed at the time, and identifying some its needs 
for the future, the ISSR was not viewed as particularly insightful in its analysis or far 
reaching in its recommendations.  In 2005, the present author co-wrote a review of 
the ISSR which sought to identify some of its weaknesses and suggest remedies for 
the future.  These included a failure to comprehensively analyse existing security 
issues, policies and programmes or to take into account the political culture that 
existed in the country at the time, and identified flaws in the research methodology 
which included a rushed timescale, a lack of public consultation and a failure to 
include regional dynamics and actors (Rynn and Smith 2007). 
 
Standards for Status: In 2002, in response to calls for a framework within which the 
final status of Kosovo would be agreed, the Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary General (SRSG) for Kosovo, Michael Steiner developed what he called the 
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‘Standards before Status’ policy by which the new Kosovar institutions would be 
required to meet certain standards on a range of different areas of governance and 
development prior to any decision being made as to the eventual status of the 
territory (see Visoka 2011 for a detailed discussion of the development and 
implementation of the ‘Standards’).   
 
What was initially a local policy was supported in 2003 by the international 
community through the mechanism of the Contact Group which had been 
established as part of the initial agreement at the UN to engage in Kosovo.  These 
eight standards were further elaborated through a series of agreed benchmarks by 
which Kosovo’s development would be judged leading up to a decision in 2005 on 
Final Status should sufficient progress be made.  To meet these goals, Kosovo's 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) created a series of working 
groups that met regularly to drive forwards progress on the Standards. In 2005, a 
UN-commissioned report by Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide assessed that further 
progress on the Standards would not be possible until Kosovo had clarity about its 
future status, and that the transfer of greater powers from the UN to the 
Provisional Institutions of Self Government was the only way in which this could be 
achieved (ICG 2001).  The decision to develop benchmarks without a clear agreed 
sense of the direction and final goal in which development was intended to take 
Kosovo is discussed in detail in (Knol 2005), where he argues that:  
 
The roadmap drawn up for Kosovo indicated mile markers, but no 
directions. The policy of ‘standards before status’ was framed in the 
context of an idea that has garnered increased academic following 
under the terms of ‘earned sovereignty’. Its operational elements seek 
to formulate indicators of good governance through which progress of a 
polis is measured; local institutions are then to be shepherded from one 
mile marker to the next, from the intermediate phase to the discussion 
of final status.  
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The Ahtisaari Roadmap: The inability of the ‘Standards’ framework to make 
significant progress towards a final status decision led the UN to commission a 
further report to examine and table specific proposals for a final settlement, which 
was led by Finnish diplomat, Marti Ahtisaari.  His draft proposal, presented in 2007, 
was formally titled the Comprehensive Proposal for the Status of Kosovo 
Settlement.65 The draft which would in effect have granted Kosovo independence 
(although Ahtisaari was careful not to state this explicitly66) included proposals on 
the following areas, all of which are of great interest from a peacebuilding 
perspective: 
 Constitutional provisions 
 Rights of Communities and their Members 
 Decentralization of local government 
 Justice system 
 Religious and cultural heritage 
 International debt 
 Property and archives 
 Kosovo security sector 
 International Civilian Representative 
 European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) Rule of Law mission 
 International Military Presence (e.g., continuation of KFOR) 
 Legislative agenda 
Reponses to the proposal were mixed: the Kosovo government stated that this was 
in effect a vote for independence; Serbia and Russia rejected the settlement 
proposal out of hand, and the US, UK and others strongly supported them.  Initially 
there was an attempt to formulate a UN SC resolution which would have replaced 
1244.  However after several weeks of negotiation it was clear that Russia would 
not support proposals which gave Kosovo de-facto independence (see Perritt 
                                                       
65 The full report can be retrieved at: http://www.unosek.org/unosek/statusproposal.html.  
Accessed 9 January 2012. 
66 For example, the draft Settlement would give Kosovo the right to apply for membership in 
international organizations, create a Kosovo Security Force and adopt national symbols.[30] 
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(2009) for a detailed analysis of the Ahtisaari Plan and of the positions of major 
international actors). 
Following this failure to achieve a Security Council backed outcome to the status 
question, on 17 February 2009, the Government of Kosovo declared independence 
from Serbia unilaterally, a move which was quickly condemned by Serbia, Russia 
and a number of EU countries and equally quickly supported by the US, UK, France, 
Germany and a number of other EU states.67  At the time of writing, Kosovo is 
recognized as an independent country by 86 UN member states.   
Figure 8: Chronology of major peacebuilding efforts 
 
Date Peacebuilding effort or 
activity 
Comments and notes on content and 
contingency 
1999 UN Resolution 1244 
 
Deployment of UNMIK and KFOR.  1244 
established the framework for all significant 
peace and state building activities since. 
2000 First municipal elections 
held in Kosovo 
Highly contentious and differing turn-outs with 
high Kosovo Albanian participation and very low 
Kosovo Serb involvement.  Reinforced 
perceptions, particularly Serbs that the post-war 
settlement was biased in favour of majority rule. 
2001 Violent Conflict breaks out 
in Macedonia.  
Conflict affects Kosovo’s border areas with 
Macedonia.  Peace agreement reached.  Ethnic 
Albanian groups surrender 4,000 weapons to 
NATO.  Leads to negotiations over the borders 
between Serbia and Macedonia. 
2002 Ibrahim Rugova elected 
President by Kosovo 
Assembly 
Following compromise by different Albanian 
political parties, Rugova, who had led the LDK 
from the early 1990s when it operated parallel 
                                                       
67 See for instance Kosovo Declares its Independence from Serbia.  New York Times, 18th February 
2008;   Kosovo MPs Proclaim Independence.  BBC web news 17the February 2008 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7249034.stm).  Accessed 16/12/2012 
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governance and service provision in Kosovo 
became Kosovo’s first post-war elected head of 
state. 
2003 Standards for Kosovo 
presented by SRSG in 
December 
13 Standards covering a wide range of areas from 
functioning democratic institutions to the role 
and function of the Kosovo Protection Corps, 
which superseded the KLA and performed a civil 
contingency role in support of emergency 
services68 
2004 Major riots 19 people killed and widespread violence across 
Kosovo.  Acted as a wake-up call for international 
administrators and others that Final Status 
discussions had to be taken forwards and 
resolved. 
2005 Eide report on status 
progress published 
UNSG Special Envoy to Kosovo Kai Eide reported 
that further progress on the Standards would not 
be possible until Kosovo had clarity about its 
future status.   
2005 Internal Security Sector 
Review (ISSR) 
Internationally supported and UK-led programme 
to assist the government in identifying its future 
security challenges and to begin the process of 
establishing a security sector that would be 
appropriate to the task. Includes SALW control 
dimension, with focus on importance of 
regulating weapons ownership as well as 
recommendations on wider institutional 
development and reform. 
 
2005 Contact Group calls for a Discord in Security Council makes it impossible to 
                                                       
68 See Standards for Kosovo 2003.  Accessed at: 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kos%20Standards.pdf.  Accessed on 5 April 2012 
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new UN Resolution on 
Kosovo Status. 
 
 
agree a new resolution on Kosovo’s final status.  
 
UNSG asks Marti Ahtisaari to prepare a plan for 
the future status of Kosovo. 
2006 EU Planning Team  EUPT established to identify how the EU could 
provide support in Kosovo in crisis management 
and transition. 
2007 UN Special Envoy Marti 
Ahtisaari publishes his 
Comprehensive Proposal 
for the Kosovo Status 
Settlement.  Published in 
February 
Without explicitly calling for independence, the 
road map set out a path through which this would 
be reached, whilst recommending significant 
decentralisation of powers to which would allow 
areas dominated by Kosovo-Serbs significant local 
government powers. The proposal also 
recommended the transformation of the KPC into 
a Kosovo security force. 
2008 17 February.  Kosovo 
Assembly adopt 
independence resolution.  
Decision referred to 
International Court of 
Justice by UN General 
Assembly in October 
which determined that 
declaration was not in 
breach of international 
law 
 
EULEX becomes 
operational in Kosovo – 
the largest civilian EU 
mission to date. In August, 
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MoU signed with UNMIK 
for transfer of most of 
UNMIKs remaining 
functions 
 
4.5 SALW and conflict in Kosovo 
This section introduces and assesses the role of SALW in the lead up to and during 
the armed conflict of 1998-9. It then analyses the nature of the SALW control 
challenge in the post-war period and the efforts undertaken both nationally and 
locally to tackle it.  This is then followed by an analysis of the effects of contingency 
and complementarity on efforts to control SALW, on peacebuilding efforts, and on 
the interrelationships between the two sets of activities.   
 
"Albanians, turn over the weapons in time which you were forced to 
take up. We will turn them against those who want to harm us all.  
 
We are demanding from the gangs of the so-called Kosovo Liberation 
Army to hand over their arms unconditionally.  
 
All those who turn over their guns, and have not bloodied their hands, 
will be free. Use this opportunity. Tomorrow it might be too late. 
Ruthless and rigorous measures will be taken against those who do not 
do so.” 
 
Serbian State Radio 31 March 
199969 
 
                                                       
69 Translated by BBC Monitoring 1 April 1999.  Retrieved from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/monitoring/309298.stm 11 November 2011 
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4.5.1 SALW in the period leading up to and during the war 
There can be no doubt that the availability of SALW was a factor in the 
intensification of the existing social and political conflict between the Serbian 
dominated government of Yugoslavia on the one hand and the ethnic Albanian KLA 
and associated political movements on the other.  Weapons were brought into 
Kosovo from Belgrade for distribution amongst the Serbian population (Ripley, 
2000:22) and from Albania, Macedonia (Heinemann-Gruder and Paes, 2001:13), 
Croatia (Hedges, 1999:39) and from much further afield in contravention of a UN 
arms embargo (Bromley, 2007) for use by the KLA and others associated with self-
defence and the ‘liberation’ of Kosovo.  Although over ten years since the end of 
the conflict, there are still no accurate figures for the numbers of people killed, it is 
undoubtedly the case that SALW were used by both sides to intimidate and kill 
large numbers of civilians, as well as combatants. 
 
Beyond this, the role of SALW in Kosovo’s recent history and contemporary life is 
more complex.  Some observers claim that Kosovo, and Albanian culture within 
Kosovo specifically is infused with a ‘gun culture’.  This claim is often substantiated 
with connections to the existence in some places of aspects of the ancient Albanian 
system of law called the Kanun, a set of rules and penalties by which Albanian clans 
have in the past maintained and organised their relations with each other.  
Following the collapse of the Albanian state in 1997, and consequently following 
the end of the rule of Kosovo by Belgrade in 1999 there were claims that in certain 
parts of Albania and Kosovo the Kanun was being reinstated by families who had no 
other effective means to resolve their disputes within a system of state 
administered rule of law.70  This issue, along with the wider topic of the existence or 
otherwise of a gun culture in the Balkans is explored in depth by Guenev et al in 
their publication The Rifle Has the Devil Inside (2006: 35).  Guenev finds little 
evidence that this practice was widespread and less that it signifies a particular 
connection to guns and personal weapons more generally. 
 
                                                       
70 See for instance “Blood feuds blight Albanian lives”.  BBC News. 23 September 2005.  Accessed at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4273020.stm.  Retrieved 1 February 2012. 
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He does though argue that following the incorporation of Kosovo into Serbia, (and 
subsequently Yugoslavia) following the Balkan wars of 1912/13 many Albanians in 
Kosovo considered themselves under occupation until the conclusion of the NATO 
intervention in 1999.71  He states that generations of people grew up in Kosovo who 
were used to seeing armed and uniformed men on the streets and knew that the 
presence of weapons signified power and authority (Guenev 2006: 35).  However, 
until the establishment of the Kosovo Liberation Army in the late 1990s, and their 
policy of targeting Serbian institutions and representatives, there were very few 
recorded significant instances of weapons being used to further political views, or in 
the commission on wide spread social violence.   
 
The availability of SALW in Kosovo was probably low in the decades preceding the 
1990s, and those weapons that did exist were likely old, rudimentary and used for 
hunting and agricultural purposes.  The most recent data available from prior to the 
war recording numbers of civilian registered weapons is from 1989.  It shows that at 
the time, 65,540 weapons were registered to civilians in Kosovo – or an average of 
4.1 per 100 residents, which was the lowest total recorded in any Yugoslav Republic 
or Province (Gorjanc, 2000; Table 2 in Khakee and Florquin, 2003:16).  However, the 
increased tensions brought on by a combination of civil war in parts of Yugoslavia, 
increased suppression of ethnic Albanian Kosovars by Belgrade and the emergence 
of a resistance movement willing to take up arms against its perceived aggressors 
did lead to an increase in the numbers and types of weapons reaching Kosovo.  
 
These weapons came from a variety of contexts.  Many were transferred directly 
from Albania.  Quite how they arrived is a matter of contention.  The Prime Minister 
of Albania at the time of the collapse of the pyramid saving schemes which gave 
rise to wide spread looting of state weapons stockpiles in 2007 was Sali Berisha.  A 
stated goal of Mr Berisha’s government at the time was the unification of Albanian 
populations in Western Macedonia and Kosovo with Albania (ICG 2001).  Whilst he 
                                                       
71 This claim was substantiated in interviews for this thesis, including an interview with a former 
Yugoslav army General who defected to the KLA in the run up to 1998 who claimed that for him the 
decision to enlist was taken to end ‘a hundred years of occupation’.  Author interview, July 2011, 
Pristina. 
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maintained his silence for many years on the relationships between the stockpile 
collapses and transfers of weapons to Kosovo and possibly Macedonia, in recent 
years there have been claims that he was instrumental in the transfer of weapons 
into Kosovo prior to the outbreak of conflict between the Yugoslav national Army 
and the KLA.72  The numbers of weapons transferred are a matter of conjecture.  
The UNDP claimed in 2006 that based on estimates of numbers of looted weapons 
transited out of Albania into Kosovo by returning refugees, that it is possible that 
something of the order of 39,000 were brought into the territory (Holtom et al, 
2005:41). 
 
In addition, during the research for this thesis, the author was presented with 
compelling testimony73 by those involved which substantiated long-held claims that 
as the situation in Kosovo became more tense towards the end of the 1990s, 
Serbian and other Slavic minority people in Kosovo were armed by the Serbian 
Ministry of Public Order – ostensibly to protect themselves, and to help in the 
process in putting down any Albanian uprising74 (Ripley, 2000:22). 
 
Finally, as the governance system in Kosovo broke down in the years prior to the 
conflict and as it took place, the role of organised crime became much more 
significant which included facilitating the movement of weapons into and through 
Kosovo.  The pervasive nature of organised crime and its links with the KLA and its 
commanders in particular has given rise to much speculation over recent years.  For 
instance, in 2010, the Swiss Senator, Dick Marty published a report on behalf of the 
Council of Europe which claimed that senior KLA commanders including the current 
                                                       
72 See for instance: “Albania's Berisha denies allegations of weapons dealing”.  SETimes 28/12/2010. 
Accessed at: 
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/bg/newsbriefs/setimes/newsbriefs/2010/12/28/n
b-04 on 30/01/2012 
73 Including by villagers in two different locations: one group of whom as Slavs were handed 
weapons by the MUP; and the second, an Albanian majority village that had uncovered and stolen 
weapons given to Serb members of their village before the war but which were left when they left 
the village fearing reprisals. 
74 See for instance the profile of Lubijne in Annex A in which local Bosniak men describe being given 
weapons by Ministry of Public Order officials and then giving them back, believing that the risks 
involved in doing so were less significant than accepting the weapons and then being accused by 
Albanian residents in the post-war period of being Serb sympathisers. 
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Prime Minister of Kosovo and leader of the ruling PDK political party, Hashim Thaci 
had colluded in organ harvesting, gun running and other criminal acts during the 
war in Kosovo (Marty, 2010). 
4.5.2 SALW in the post-war context and national-level attempts 
to control them 
The first SALW control activities took place as part of the ceasefire agreement 
brokered by NATO in 1999 which saw the KLA committing to surrendering a large 
proportion of the weapons it possessed within the territory of Kosovo, and 
continue to this day, with the incorporation of SALW control into various national-
level strategies and action plans (see Hvidemose, Istrefi, Marzouk et al (2009: 1-2) 
for an overview of major SALW control activities since 2009).  During this period, a 
wide variety of different types of activity which aim to control SALW more 
effectively have been attempted.  These include: 
 
Surveys and assessments:  The UNMIK/UNDP and others commissioned two surveys 
prior to the development of SALW control programmes.  The first was undertaken 
in 2003 by researchers from the Small Arms Survey prior to the first UNDP 
programme, which was known as ISAC I.  The second was conducted in 2006 by 
researchers from Saferworld in advance of the KOSSAC SALW control programme, 
which succeeded earlier programmes, ISAC I and ISAC II.  The 2003 research 
summarised some of the main characteristics of the post-war SALW control 
problematic in Kosovo at the time as follows: (from Khakee and Florquin, 2003: vii-
ix) 
 
 “There are an estimated 330,000-460,000 civilian owned small arms in 
Kosovo today” 
 “The most common weapons in circulation and pistols and assault rifles” 
 “Small arms are owned and used by a wide variety of actors” 
 “Attitudes towards security providers vary among Kosovans” 
 “Kosovans do not appear to be as attached to their weapons as commonly 
believed” 
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 “SALW are trafficked primarily from Serbia and Albania and the trade is 
relatively low in comparison with other Balkan states” 
 “Fatal and non-fatal firearms injuries have decreased since the latter half of 
1999” 
 “Criminality, particularly crime involving SALW is prevalent in Kosovo” 
 “Firearm-related incidents tend to be rare in schools and colleges” 
Of the statistics that were available at the time in the first years following the end 
of the conflict, most suggested that Kosovo was not an especially violent society. 
For instance, in 2001 UNMIK Police recorded 89 homicides (slightly higher than 
Slovenia and slightly fewer than Croatia), and 186 serious assaults (around half the 
number recorded in Macedonia or Slovenia). (Khakee and Florquin, 2003: 7).  The 
weak state of the criminal justice system and the likely reticence of at least some of 
those affected to report crimes to either an international police force or to a largely 
mono-ethnic local police mean that these figures should be treated with caution.  
However, the perception that large numbers of weapons remained in the country, 
ostensibly as a result of illicit transfers during the war was of great concern to 
international policy makers and others.   
 
Whilst by their nature it is difficult to assess accurately illicitly held SALW holdings, 
the Small Arms Survey did estimate between 330,000 – 460,000 civilian owned 
SALW in Kosovo in 2003 (Khakee and Florquin, 2003: viii).  This number was later 
revised by UNDP following the second survey researched by the present author and 
others for Saferworld, which suggested that 400,000 weapons may have been held 
by civilians in Kosovo (Sokolova, Richards and Smith, 2006: iii).  Given that official 
Kosovo Protection Core (KPC) holdings post- disarmament and transition from KLA 
to KPC were 2000, and registered weapons less than 50,000, any number close to 
the those estimated by Small Arms Survey or Saferworld in a population of around 
two million people just emerging from significant violent conflict could be seen as 
worrying to those with an interest in peacekeeping, peacebuilding and 
reconstruction. 
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Official disarmament of the KLA:  This was undertaken in 1999 and resulted in the 
transfer of around 10,000 weapons (including over 8,500 SALW) to KFOR control 
from the Kosovo Liberation Army.  This action was requested and supported by 
KFOR and other international actors but was undertaken voluntarily by KLA 
commanders.  The action was very controversial amongst Kosovo Albanians and 
specifically KLA fighters who raised questions asking why the perceived victor in a 
war should disarm when the vanquished Serbian forces who were accused of 
initiating the violent conflict were not expected to undertake comprehensive 
disarmament75 (see analysis later in this chapter of the decision by the KLA to enter 
into a DDR process).    
 
Search and seize operations aimed at removing weapons caches held by KLA, other 
armed groups and criminals:  These were undertaken regularly by KFOR in the years 
immediately following the end of the war, although KFOR has never published 
information regarding the total numbers of weapons that it seized.  Weapons were 
also seized from members of the public by UNMIK and Kosovo police, activities 
which are ongoing as part of KP activities targeting serious and organised crime.  
See table in Figure 10 below for an overview of seizures by the police since the end 
of the war. 
 
Weapons amnesty periods targeting civilians and ex-fighters who owned weapons 
illegally.  Initially these periods were organised by UNMIK/KFOR in the period 
immediately following the end of the conflict.  Weapons surrender was not 
compensated.  There were no direct financial incentives offered and surrendered 
weapons were destroyed by KFOR. 
 
Incentive programmes to persuade civilians to surrender weapons.  The 
UNMIK/UNDP-led attempt to persuade civilians to surrender weapons, initially in 
competition for development benefits and then in exchange for development took 
place in 2003 as part of the wider Internal Small Arms Control (ISAC) project.  It was 
                                                       
75 See Heinemann-Gruder and Paes (2001), and interviews with former JNA and KLA Commanders 
July 2011 and March 2012 
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highly unsuccessful in terms of the numbers of weapons it removed from the 
civilian population for reasons described elsewhere in this chapter, and has not 
been repeated since.76 
Figure 9:  Numbers of weapons and ammunition collected during voluntary 
surrender programmes since 1999 (adapted from Sokolova, Richards and 
Smith 2006: 9) 
 
Period and activity  Weapons collected Rounds of ammunition 
KLA disarmament 
(21/6/99-19/09/99 
9,978 Approx. 5,000,000 
KFOR Amnesty (2001) 777 Approx. 31,000 
KFOR Amnesty (2002) 496 Approx. 59,200 
UNDP Weapons for 
Development (2003) 
155 - 
Total 11,406 5,090,200 
 
Weapons registration programmes to provide a framework within which certain 
weapons could be held legally by certain groups.  Establishing a system by which 
certain types of weapons could be legalised for specific purposes formed a part of 
several other SALW control activities.  These included development of the Weapons 
Authorisation Card (WAC) system and later transfer of licensing authority from the 
police to the Ministry of the Interior (Sokolova, Richards and Smith 2006:69). 
 
Legislative and administrative changes to clarify laws and procedures, and to 
provide a basis for law enforcement.  Under UNMIK, administrative orders and 
procedures were promulgated which provided a legal basis for SALW ownership 
and control efforts.  Following transfer of law making competence to Kosovo’s 
institutions, in 2009 the new Law on Weapons came into force (Gashi and Musliu  
2012:5).  
 
                                                       
76 See Willie (2006) in Nicholls (eds) (2006) for the only published review of the ISAC I programme. 
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Public education campaigns targeting specific aspects of SALW ownership and 
misuse.  These were formally organised as part of the ISAC I and ISAC II 
programmes and have been undertaken on an ad-hoc basis at the local level by a 
variety of civil society organisations in recent years in response to local SALW-
related problems.   
 
Destruction of collected and surplus SALW and ammunition to prevent re-entry into 
society.  KFOR regularly destroyed quantities of seized weaponry and ammunition, 
particularly in the early period following the end of the war.  Unexploded ordnance, 
land-mines and other explosive material was also destroyed, either in-situ or taken 
to KFOR’s destruction sites in Obilic and Janjevo, where UNDP had provided funding 
to establish suitable disposal facilities (Sokolova, Richards and Smith 2006: 79). 
 
Efforts to improve stockpile management and security to reduce the risk of 
pilferage.   Following the stockpiling of KLA weaponry, the main concern facing the 
international administrators regarding the safety of SALW holdings at the time were 
the evidence rooms of police stations.  When weapons were seized or collected by 
the police they were held at police stations pending their submission to court as 
evidence in a trial.  Given the significant backlogs of cases and the consequent 
delays that these caused between the initial crime and the prosecution of those 
charged, these weapons often remained in police stations for several months and in 
some cases, years.77  The conditions in which they were held were often highly 
insecure:  in rooms with doors that did not lock, with windows opening onto the 
street, on ground floor level; and in piles on the floor and on shelves, often with no 
secure markings to guarantee effective retrieval.  Various international agencies, 
particularly in the initial years following the war the OSCE and UN Police, attempted 
to improve and secure evidence rooms as part of a programme of building police 
stations.  However as late as 2006, the author visited the main police station 
evidence room in Mitrovica where large quantities of weapons were stored without 
                                                       
77 Interview with UNMIK Police Commander, and KPS Commander – Mitrovica North in 2006 as part 
of research for Sokolova, Richards and Smith (2006). 
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effective markings in a room with no secure door or lock and with a broken window 
open onto an alleyway to the side of the police station.78 
 
Improved policing techniques which aim to tackle crimes involving the use of SALW.  
A large quantity of support has been provided since the end of the war to support 
the establishment and then the effectiveness of the police in Kosovo.  This was led 
by the OSCE for many years, although there was also considerable bilateral and 
other multilateral support. In some limited cases, improvements in policing were 
identified as elements of SALW control activities (see ISAC I for instance where a 
pillar of the project strategy was to enhance community-based policing capacity to 
improve local level crime prevention and investigation) (Willie, 2006).  However, in 
most cases this relationship was not explicit.   
 
Following intense capacity development in the three years immediately following 
the end of the war, and the transfer of responsibilities from International UN Police 
to the Kosovo Police Service, the numbers of weapons seized by the police 
remained fairly constant for much of the post-war period (see table in Figure 10 
below) which might suggest that capacity to tackle crime in which SALW were used 
did not increase significantly.  However the available statistics do not demonstrate 
whether this trend was consistent with total numbers of crimes recorded or 
investigated, or with any useful estimates as to whether the consistent seizure 
numbers represented more effective methods given an overall reduction in the 
number of weapons that could potentially be seized. 
Figure 10:  Weapons seized or confiscated by the Kosovo police 2000-2011 (Gashi 
and Musliu, 2012) 
Year 2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
Conf. 586 776 1127 1610 1515 1919 1754 1610 1613 1477 1613 1542 
 
 
                                                       
78 Author interview with Marko Milosevic, Police Commander for Mitrovica North in February 2006. 
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Enhanced border control which aims in part to reduce the movement of SALW and 
ammunition across international borders.  Kosovo’s borders have remained areas of 
contention since the end of the war in 1999:  A short period of violence erupted in 
the border areas between Kosovo and Macedonia in 1999 and 2001 (see section on 
Debellder); the border between Kosovo and Montenegro in the Peja region 
remained land-mined and contested until after Montenegrin Independence from 
Serbia; and conflict over the right to police the northern border with Serbia ended 
in wide-spread violence and a small number of deaths in late 2011.79   
 
Whilst significant activities were undertaken in the early years following the end of 
the war to establish more effective border management and customs control, this 
did not yield large numbers of weapons seizures (see table in Figure 11 below), 
which may suggest either that relatively few weapons were being moved across 
Kosovo’s borders at the time, or that detection and interception was not effective. 
Figure 11:  SALW and associated materiel seized by Kosovo Customs Service 
2002-2006 (Adapted from Sokolova, Richards and Smith 2006: 16) 
Year Seizure 
2002 141 SALW; 10,111 rounds of ammunition 
2003 2 rifles 
2004 No records kept 
2005 1 Pistol; 1138 rounds of ammunition; 63 lasers; 95 rifle scopes 
2006 750 rounds; 3 gun sights 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
79 See ‘Serb Police, Nato boost forces after Kosovo violence’ Reuters 28/7/2011. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/29/us-kosovo-violence-idUSTRE76R82Y20110729.  
Retrieved 28/03/12 
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Figure 12: Chronology of activities to control SALW in Kosovo since 1999 
 
Date Activity Comments 
20 June 1999 Decommissioning 
of KLA weapons 
Around 8,500 SALW plus 1,500 other 
weapons including RPGs and machine 
guns surrendered and secured by KFOR  
1999 onwards KFOR-led ‘Search 
and Seize’ 
operations  
Precise numbers of weapons not 
published systematically by KFOR.  
However as an indication, even as late as 
2004 it was estimated that KFOR was 
averaging over 4 weapons per seizure 
operation and in that year it has seized 
over 2,000 weapons and over 85,000 
rounds of ammunition in more than 450 
operations.80  And between January and 
April 2006 the average daily reported 
seizure figure for SALW was 5.4.81 
2000 onwards Ongoing police and 
border seizures 
See Figure 11 for an indication of the 
numbers of weapons seized as part of 
border management operations 
1 May – 3 June 
2001 
KFOR-led general 
amnesty 
777 weapons surrendered 
15 March – 15 
April 
KFOR-led general 
amnesty 
1249 weapons surrendered 
May 2001 – 
December 2003 
ISAC I Included first SALW survey, institutional 
capacity building including support to 
community based policing, development 
of a weapons destruction facility for KFOR 
and support for the establishment of a 
                                                       
80 Interview with Colonel Yves Kermorvant (French Army), Chief of Public Information Office, KFOR 
HQ, Pristina 17 Feb 2005 during research for SALW Survey of Kosovo (Sokolova, Richards and Smith 
2006) 
81 Sokolova, Richards and Smith (2006:10) 
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weapons authorisation capacity, public 
awareness raising – mainly focussing on 
civil society led campaigns in specific 
locations, weapons collection for 
development. 
155 weapons surrendered, 26,000 
weapons registered and legalised. 
 ISAC II Ongoing support for the weapons 
authorisation office; financial support to 
enhance facilities at Pristina hospital for 
firearms injuries; funding for limited civil 
society awareness activities. 
2005 onwards Community 
Security 
programming  
Initiated by Saferworld and Forum for 
Civic Initiatives in Viti municipality  
2006 onwards Kosovo Small Arms 
Control 
Programme 
(KOSSAC) 
Led by UNDP – a programme of activities 
targeting SALW control which included a 
SALW survey, the development of a 
national SALW control strategy for the 
government and new legislation and 
associated administrative orders. 
2009 Law on Weapons 
promulgated 
Kosovo clarifies its legal position on a 
wide range of SALW control related 
issues. 
2011 onwards Community 
Security Action 
Plan, Schools 
Safety Strategy and 
Concept on 
Community-based 
Policing designed 
Additional legislation and action plans 
instigated by the Government of Kosovo 
that make explicit reference to SALW 
control 
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4.6 Analysing contingency, complementarity and context 
This section applies and tests the framework emerging from Chapters Two and 
Three in particular for describing the interrelationships between efforts to control 
SALW and activities to build peace in countries emerging from periods of violent 
conflict.  It does this this through analysing the effects of contingency, 
complementarity and context. It begins with an exploration of how these factors 
affect interrelationships between SALW control efforts and peacebuilding activities 
as sector-specific initiatives before analysing how they affect interrelationships 
between peacebuilding and SALW control together. It concludes by analysing how, 
using the case of Kosovo, the framework might be improved and enhanced and 
suggests further developments which will then be considered in Chapter 5. 
4.6.1 The significance of Contingency  
This section explores the following questions: How does the ordering of 
peacebuilding and SALW control affect their interrelationships, and effectiveness.  
And are there particular sequences where opportunities for positive interrelations 
exist. 
 
It is first important to consider two different but highly related aspects of this 
dimension before analysing them together:  contingencies that exist between 
different activities to control SALW and those which aim to build peace separately; 
and those which address SALW control and peacebuilding collectively.  This section 
begins by exploring contingencies between SALW and peacebuilding activities 
separately before analysing them together. 
4.6.1.1 Analysis of effects of contingency on interrelationships between different 
SALW control activities 
There are two distinct aspects of contingency between SALW control efforts that 
require analysis:  the effects of contingency on interrelationships between SALW 
control activities that were planned from a contingency perspective; and those that 
were not.  This section analyses the role of contingency in planned activities first, 
then assesses its effects on unplanned activities.  It is then followed by a section 
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which analyses the role of contingency on peacebuilding efforts before analysing 
how contingency affected the interrelationships between peacebuilding and SALW 
control activities.  
 
Effects of contingency on interrelationships between planned SALW control 
activities 
One of the characteristics of attempts to promote greater control over SALW in 
Kosovo is that they have been grouped into programmes of work which individually 
are intended to build a comprehensive approach to addressing a particular 
problem: these programmes have not however been consciously connected, thus 
reducing the opportunities for contingency to be a positive factor in overall SALW 
control efforts.   
 
This programmatic approach is more visible from 2001 onwards following the 
transfer of responsibility for SALW control from the military KFOR operation to the 
civilian UN Mission.  ISAC I (2001-2003) sought to combine different elements of a 
programme of SALW control activities in such a way that the activities would 
reinforce and support each other over time. For example, a new system of weapons 
authorisation and registration was designed, which was followed by a period of 
public education and awareness raising which was intended to draw public 
attention to the changes and to a forthcoming amnesty and weapons collection 
period during which people would be encouraged to register their weapons if they 
were of a permitted category, or surrender them in exchange for development 
projects if not.  ISAC II focused significantly on maintaining support for weapons 
authorisation and supporting community-level developments in policing, building 
on the intended outcomes from ISAC I.  
 
Similarly, the KOSSAC programme, which followed ISAC I and II began with a new 
survey of SALW in Kosovo from which a programme of administrative and 
legislative priorities were identified which would culminate in the promulgation of a 
new Law on Weapons which would for the first time, set out the legal 
arrangements for controlling SALW in Kosovo.   
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At this individual programmatic level it is clear that there was effort invested in 
thinking through potential contingencies and their benefits.  However, in reality 
these were not often realised or maximised.  For instance, in ISAC I a public 
education campaign that focused on a small number of municipalities and for less 
than two months prior to the weapons amnesty and collection was neither 
comprehensive, nor long enough in duration to prepare the ground for a national-
wide weapons collection programme.82   
 
The main weakness however in how contingency was understood and consequently 
how it affected interrelationships between SALW efforts was that between the 
different programme approaches described above. There is no evidence to suggest 
that ISAC I aimed to learn from and build upon the previous KFOR-organised 
amnesty periods, and limited connection between ISAC I and ISAC II other than ISAC 
II was in part designed to spend the funds earmarked for community development 
grants during  ISAC I, none of which were spent as no grants were allocated.   
 
In the research for this thesis a number of reasons were offered and examined as to 
why these different programmes of SALW control activities didn’t seem to link or 
attempt to make the most of the potential benefits to be accrued through building 
on positive contingencies.  These included the high turn-over of lead staff in 
international agencies, principally the UNDP, which meant that those who had been 
involved in one programme were no longer in Kosovo at the time of planning or 
executing subsequent programmes;83 the lack of willingness to review, evaluate and 
learn lessons as this might reflect badly on agencies, departments and individuals;84 
and a pressure to move on and to initiate new activities aimed at bringing stability 
to Kosovo.85 
 
                                                       
82 Interview with civil society leader responsible for coordinating the public awareness campaign in 
Gjilan,  July 2011. 
83 Interview with ex-UNDP employee, July 2012. 
84 NGO leader who participated in ISAC I and II, interview July 2011. Pristina. 
85 Discussion with former senior UNMIK administrator.  London. March 2012.   
225 
 
Effects of contingency on interrelationships between unplanned SALW control 
activities 
In numerous interviews it was apparent that respondents conditioned their 
perspectives regarding opportunities for, and participation in, SALW control 
activities at least in part on the basis of their perception of the success or otherwise 
of previous efforts.86  This relationship was most obvious as regards civilian-
focussed weapons surrender or collection efforts, but it was still clear regarding 
administrative, policy and strategic dimensions as well. 
 
The nature of the KFOR search-and-seize operations in 2000 and 2001 were 
identified by FGD respondents in Gracanica as a significant reason for why they 
decided not to participate in the 2001 and 2002 KFOR amnesties, or the 2003 UN-
led weapons for development project.87  They reported a perception held at the 
time, which has still not entirely dissipated, that as Kosovo Serbs, they were 
targeted more aggressively and more regularly. They felt that their community had 
been put at a disadvantage in terms of its ability to defend itself as a consequence 
of more of its weapons being seized than they imagined was the case with Kosovo 
Albanian people living nearby.  They also reported that the methods that were 
employed by KFOR were significant in shaping their willingness to trust, and engage 
with KFOR and that a lack of trust consequent to negative experiences of search-
and-seize operations in part shaped their collective decision not to participate in 
the KFOR amnesty periods that followed.   
 
“The way they acted was different and it made you feel different towards them.  First 
came the Swedish KFOR and they were polite and had coffee, did their work and 
then left.  Then came the others, [German KFOR] and they pushed themselves in, 
they broke furniture and shouted. We didn’t want to trust them or help them after 
that.”88    
 
                                                       
86 Interviews inter-alia with community members in Germova, Djakova, Peja and Mitrovica, July 
2011. 
87 Contributions from Focus Group Discussion in Gracanica, March 2012. 
88 Male FDG respondent, Gracanica. 
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In Germova these unplanned contingencies worked both positively and negatively.  
Initially, the villagers participated in the first KFOR amnesty and surrendered 
ammunition to US KFOR soldiers.  They did this because they wanted to 
demonstrate good will to the KFOR contingent in their region.  They felt that the 
response that they received from the Americans was courteous and helped them to 
establish a relationship which they reported made them feel more comfortable 
with the KFOR presence, which was at the time, highly visible.89  This positive 
experience helped them decide to participate in the UN weapons-for-development 
programme which followed in 2003.  They expected a similar approach which they 
characterised as transparent, cooperative and clear.  However, in interviews and 
FGDs for this thesis, they reported a very different experience. They surrendered a 
proportion of their weapons to the local municipal leaders, who acted as 
coordinators for the Programme.   
 
The municipality, in common with all others in Kosovo, was not willing or able to 
persuade enough people to surrender weapons, and therefore missed the 200 
SALW threshold over which development grants would be awarded.  Consequently, 
the villagers lost their weapons, and failed to receive the compensation which they 
believed they were due for delivering on their side of the bargain: 
 
“In our culture, if you say you will do something you should do it.  It is your honour.  
We gave them weapons.  They took them and gave us nothing in return.  Afterwards 
we didn’t trust them.”90  
 
Germova is also interesting in that the nature as well as the operation of the 
2003 UN collection effort had contingency-related implications.  Despite not 
receiving what they saw as their reward for fulfilling their end of their bargain 
with the local municipality and UNDP, the ‘reward’ dimension of the activity 
appears to have conditioned the way in which the village leaders have 
approached the issue of SALW control subsequently:  Whereas in the period 
                                                       
89 Focus Group Discussion.  Germova, July 2011. 
90 Male FDG participant, Germova, July 2011. 
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immediately following the end of the war, they identified SALW surrender as a 
means by which they could demonstrate good faith to KFOR, whom they saw as 
potential protectors, and possible aggressors, in later years, they came to see 
their SALW as items of financial value that the UN thought important enough to 
try to exchange with them for financial benefit.  This change of perception is 
borne out in the way in which the village leaders have approached subsequent 
SALW control initiatives.   
 
Due to their involvement in important community security-building activities 
described elsewhere in this thesis, village leaders from Germova have had the 
opportunity to participate in various national-level conferences on SALW related 
issues organised both by the Government and by NGOs including the Forum for 
Civic Initiatives.  In these fora, which have been regularly attended by the 
author, the village representatives frequently suggest that they have numbers of 
SALW that they would be keen to surrender to the authorities, but that as 
representatives of their people, the village council leaders would need to be able 
to demonstrate that they had converted the value that others had placed on 
these weapons into material benefit of some kind.   
 
A leading Kosovar NGO Director who has worked closely with the community in 
Germova for several years claimed that what the villagers were trying to do was 
natural in a poor community in which there are not significant opportunities to 
generate money: 
 
“You can’t blame them.  They are representatives of their people – their families.  It 
is important for them to be able to show that they have done their best and that 
they have come back with something.  UNDP showed them that what they have is 
worth something.  You can’t really blame them for wanting to cash in.”91 
 
The partial failure of the ISAC I and ISAC II projects had interesting implications 
for the way in which future SALW control activities were conceived. Since the 
                                                       
91 Male KII, Pristina, March 2012. 
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end of ISAC II the main national-level attempt to control SALW has been 
organised through the KOSSAC programme, itself a UNDP supported activity.  
KOSSAC has placed considerable effort on the policy and legislative agenda, and 
on the development of strategies and action plans for how SALW problems could 
be addressed through wider reforms to public policy and policing.  Despite no 
formal detailed evaluation having been undertaken of ISAC I and II, it appears 
that their relative failure has played a role in the decision to focus on other 
aspects of the problematic.   
 
There have been no nation-wide efforts to encourage surrender of weapons, and 
no attempt to link disarmament with financial or other material community 
benefit.  Thus, whilst there is a lack of definitive evidence to demonstrate the 
effects of contingency on the interrelationships between different SALW control 
efforts, there is a compelling case for suggesting that the failure of one set of 
activities has clearly influenced future decision making regarding others.  This is 
further supported by the fact that in 2011 the Ministry of Interior requested that 
UNDP prepare a draft law for an amnesty period to facilitate another period of 
voluntary surrender.  This was done, but UNDP also recommended that three 
criteria should be met before a decision to go to an amnesty is made.  These 
include a solution being found to the ongoing and seemingly intractable conflict 
situation in the north of the country, in effect, suggesting that an amnesty and 
voluntary collection period be ‘mothballed’ until a date some distance into the 
future.92 
4.6.1.2 Contingencies between different aspects of peacebuilding 
Contingencies between aspects of peacebuilding organised through NATO/KFOR 
and the UN are in many cases both clear and important in terms of the effects that 
a given set of activities had on later efforts.  
 
                                                       
92 Criteria described at a conference on SALW control challenges on 21 March 2011 in Pristina 
organised by the non-governmental Forum for Security and attended by the relevant MoI minister 
and officials and lead UNDP SALW control advisor at which the author described some of the 
emerging findings arising from research for this thesis. 
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Perhaps the first important contingencies are obvious between the transition from 
peace-making through military action coordinated through NATO, to peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding efforts organised under the auspices of the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244.  The resolution sanctioned a wide ranging peace support 
operation that included international military, police and civilian aspects and which 
framed the transition from a combination of a primarily kinetic military operation 
and intense international diplomacy - both with the government in Belgrade but 
also with representatives of the KLA and other Albanian pro-Kosovo political groups 
and militias - to a civilian-led peacekeeping engagement.93  This decision was driven 
by a sense that the levels of violence that Kosovo had suffered in 1999 had been 
reduced and that there was increasingly little likelihood of it recurring, providing an 
effective peacebuilding and peacekeeping operation was established.  
 
Thus the first transition between peace-making and peacekeeping took place 
effectively with the establishment of the UN/NATO hybrid Kosovo Force – KFOR in 
which the initial success of the NATO engagement in the eyes of many local people, 
as well as militarily in terms of its impact on the decisions taken in Belgrade to 
continue to prosecute the conflict acted as a positive contingency.   
 
Further, as the international operation became established and the peacekeeping 
dimension of its engagement began to register success in preventing the re-ignition 
of violence on a wide scale, the international presence began to transition from an 
essentially humanitarian and peacekeeping role into what could be described as a 
more mixed, or multi-mandate operation (in line with intent set out by Eveerts 
(2001) – see earlier in this chapter).  This placed important focus on aspects of 
longer-term peacebuilding in addition to maintaining a significant military 
peacekeeping presence (16,000 KFOR peace-keepers in a county of less than 2 
million people in a small geographic area). 
 
                                                       
93 See Resolution 1244 (1999) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 
1999.    Accessible via: http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement.  Accessed 5 April 2012 
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This is perhaps referenced most easily by the reframing of the UN mission through 
the replacement of one of its initial foundation pillars which focussed explicitly on 
humanitarian provision to internally displaced people, returning refugees and other 
vulnerable groups with one which aimed specifically to build security and justice 
institutions as a contribution to long term peace and security in Kosovo (see also 
Llamazares and Reynolds-Levy’s translation of this new pillar structure into a 
phased approach to peacebuilding discussed previously).  Given that the security 
and humanitarian situation in Kosovo had begun to stabilise by this time and the 
requirements and perspectives of local leaders and others began to move from 
humanitarian support to questions of longer-term governance, it is appropriate that 
this transition took place.  The initial work on public security, law and order 
undertaken by KFOR transitioned to a combination of international police and 
nascent local police.  And at this stage, it would appear that the transition was 
aided by the benefits of contingency over time, with the international presence 
being able to demonstrate a transition in authority and actors at a point where it 
still enjoyed a largely positive reputation with local populations. 
 
As the Kosovo peace-support operation matured and as time passed since the 
formal end of the war, louder calls were made for the transfer of some of the 
reserved powers which had been held by the UN Secretary General’s Special 
Representative. This contributed to the establishment of nascent government 
institutions that were able to shadow the work of relevant international 
administrators, and over time to take on aspects of their work, with UNMIK 
retaining the right to veto certain sorts of decisions and activities.  The decision 
internationally to proceed with these Provisional Institutions of Self Government, as 
they were officially known was in part at least an attempt to balance the demands - 
of the mostly Kosovo Albanian majority population - for greater control of the 
functions of government, with a strong reticence amongst numerous UN and EU 
member states not to in effect legitimise an independence process through giving 
the green light to the establishment of governance institutions common to an 
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independent and sovereign state.94  This decision was later described by SRSG 
Petersen as ‘one of UNMIKs greatest successes’ (Petersen 2005).    
 
This uncomfortable arrangement was useful for a period in that it bought time for 
the UN Security Council and its Contact Group of actively involved states to try to 
reach agreement on what should follow. However, demands from local politicians 
in Pristina, civil society groups both from within and outside Kosovo, and 
importantly, key UN member states including the US ensured that this arrangement 
only had a limited period in which it was considered legitimate.  In an attempt 
variously to provide a sense of direction and momentum, to maintain control over 
the transfer of power and to buy time,95 the UN SRSG at the time established a new 
process of Standards for Kosovo which set out a range of standards that the PISGs 
would need to meet before further transfers of power took place.   
 
Because of the sensitivities involved in not establishing a de-facto independence 
process, these were difficult to quantify and so whilst there was considerable 
energy invested in attempting to make progress, by 2006 a sense of drift and 
dissatisfaction on the part of a range of different formal and informal, local and 
international actors required that a new plan would be required to frame the 
international peace–building operation in Kosovo.  This duly arrived in the form of a 
report by former Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari, which quickly became known as 
the Ahtisaari Roadmap.  
 
Whilst it is clear that in terms of the international peace-support operation in 
Kosovo, there were attempts to identify and maximise the benefits of contingency, 
there are also examples of where contingency has been much less beneficial in 
terms of the implications of actions on longer-term peacebuilding. Perhaps the 
                                                       
94 See Forum for Civic Initiatives and Saferworld (2007) Kosovo at the Crossroads: Perceptions of 
conflict, access to justice and peace in Kosovo for a review of the PISG and public attitudes and 
opinions towards their performance. 
95 Franks and Richmond (2008) and Heathershaw and Lamback (2008) consider this symptomatic of 
the inability of international actors to protect the peacebuilding agenda and the means by which, in 
the absence of a political settlement, it became instrumentalised for concentrating majority 
Albanian political power and setting a trajectory towards independence. 
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most obvious examples of this are some of the decisions in the early period 
following the end of the war in the northern part of Kosovo.   
 
The main northern city, Mitrovica straddles the River Ibar.  For many generations 
this has been a mixed ethnic population, with large numbers of Kosovo Serbs loving 
predominantly in the northern part of the city, along with several different minority 
communities including those of Roma and Bosniak descent and a small Kosovo 
Albanian population.  The southern part of the city was populated mostly by Kosovo 
Albanians with a small number of those from minority communities, including 
Kosovo-Serbs.  Following the formal end to the war, there was considerable and 
justifiable fear in some parts of the country that there would be attacks against 
Kosovo-Serb communities by Kosovo-Albanian groups seeking retribution for the 
violence that they themselves had suffered.  This fear was particularly potent in 
Mitrovica given the symbolic position of the city and the mixed ethnic makeup.   
 
In February 2000, in response to growing levels of violence, the KFOR Commander 
at the time who commanded the French-led Northern Sector decided that the best 
course of action to prevent further escalation would be to close the main bridge 
connecting south and north Mitrovica and to place KFOR soldiers on the bridge as a 
physical deterrent (Matveeva and Paes, 2003:26).  This played a large part in the 
bridge becoming a symbolic barrier between north and south Mitrovica, between 
Serbs and Albanians and between northern Kosovo and the rest of the country.96  In 
short time, the bridge became a focus of protest, with shots, grenades and other 
missiles often reported, and with the ‘Bridge Watchers’ community-defence group 
established on the northern side of the River in view of the bridge which acted as a 
deterrent, an intelligence gathering operation and a quick responder to perceived 
or real incidents of aggression from the south side of the River (Matveeva and Paes, 
2003:29).  In 2013, the bridge remains probably the most potent symbol of 
difference in Kosovo, a place a regular protest, where barricades were established 
                                                       
96 Interviews with a former regional UNMIK administrator (March 2012); and a current senior OSCE 
official (July 2011). 
233 
 
in late 2011 which prevented the free movement of people, including international 
administrators between the north and the rest of Kosovo.97   
 
There have been many peacebuilding attempts in the 13 years since the bridge was 
effectively closed to local people.  These have all failed in one important sense: the 
physical boundary remains and the ‘northern problem’ (Gashi and Musliu, 2012:1) 
remains the greatest challenge to the territorial integrity of Kosovo and its greatest 
barrier to integration with its neighbours, the EU and UN.  In this case, the 
opportunities offered by contingency which have been beneficial in other cases, 
have not been recognised.  Rather, the effects of what was initially an attempt to 
make and keep peace have been to prevent peacebuilding in any significant sense 
in the years that have followed. 
 
Outside the formal structures of government and international administration there 
have been a great number of peacebuilding activities in Kosovo. Some of the key 
characteristics of these activities are described earlier in this chapter.   
 
As Llamazares and Levy (2003) have demonstrated, it is possible to categorise 
different forms of peacebuilding according to how they relate to different aspects 
of a conflict cycle as described in Chapter 2 (see Dudouet (2006) for a review of the 
origins and use of the conflict cycle concept), and these can be related to factors 
which are consistent with the Hourglass Model described by Ramsbotham et al 
(2005:12).  However, whilst it is possible retrospectively to construct these 
categories, at the point at which they were conceived there was much lower 
awareness of likely sequences or of the potential benefits to be derived from 
understanding opportunities for positive contingency. Consequently, in most cases, 
the benefits of contingency were not factored into planning, and have not often 
been recognised in terms of enhancing outcomes over time.  There are several 
likely reasons arising from the research for this thesis for why this may be the case:  
 
                                                       
97 See BBC Serb Man Killed and Two Injured in Kosovo Violence.  10th November 2011.   
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15672555.  Retrieved 14/12/2012. 
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The challenges for local organisations working within the programming time-frames 
of donor organisations:  Large amounts of money were spent in Kosovo by donor 
organisations on civil society and specifically NGO capacity building activities.  In the 
early years following the end of the conflict there were many NGOs and other 
groups registered in Kosovo undertaking a wide range of different activities (see 
Llamazares and Reynolds-Levy 2003).  A large proportion of these organisations and 
the activities that they raised funds to undertake had a peacebuilding dimension.  
The challenge faced by many however, which is a common characteristic of post-
war funding, is that funding was often project-specific.  This supported the delivery 
of specific activities but did not explicitly support core organisational functions such 
as funding, finance and administration, all of which are essential to organisational 
sustainability.98   
 
A fundamental difference of perspective between local groups and their 
international supporters in terms of the sorts of activities that they should 
prioritise:   A major focus of post-war support for peacebuilding activities was the 
promotion of inter-ethnic communication – or more precisely, communication 
between Kosovo-Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs.  In the author’s experience, travelling 
to Kosovo on a very regular basis between 2002 and 2006, and working extensively 
with local NGOs and other civil society groups from around the country it was often 
a requirement of funders that local organisations demonstrate how their proposed 
activities would encourage inter-ethnic dialogue and exchange.  It is clear that this 
lack of dialogue was, and indeed still is, a significant challenge for Kosovo in its 
attempts to move on from its period of war.  But this explicit focus on ethnicity has 
been criticised by Kosovo-Serb and Kosovo-Albanian organisations alike during 
research for this thesis.99  Whilst their perspectives are sometimes subtly different, 
they have a similar narrative, in this case expressed by a former NGO leader from 
Ferizaj:  
                                                       
98 For a substantial analysis of civil society capacity building efforts and sector needs, see Sterland 
(2006). 
99 FDGs in Ferizaj and Gracanica and interviews in Mitrovica, Pristina and Gjilane 
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“How can we be expected to find peace with the Serbs when we haven’t even found 
our own peace as Albanians.”100 
 
Further, the same interviewee stated: 
 
“At the time at the end of war the internationals wanted us all to come together and 
for us to forgive the Serbs and join together.  It was too soon, but it was also wrong.  
We can live side by side but it doesn’t mean we have to be together all the time, 
doing things together and being the same.  We are not the same.  We are Albanians 
and they are Serbs.  This is our ethnicity – Serbs don’t want to be Albanians and we 
don’t want to be Serbs.  We can live together in the same state, that’s fine but that’s 
political, not social.”  
 
Despite there being little evidence to suggest that the benefits of activities building 
on, and reinforcing each other over time were widely understood or reflected in 
design or planning, there are nonetheless a small number of examples of where this 
is both the case, and was intended.  For example, in 2006 a Kosovar organisation 
established a process that they termed community safety building.  
 
The organisation in question, the Forum for Civic Initiatives, based at the time in 
Ferizaj – and supported for many years in different ways by the author of this thesis 
- developed an approach which they thought would increase in impact over time as 
the benefits from a given phase reinforced future activities to enhance both the 
scale and depth of projects.  Beginning with one community in which approaches 
and methods were tested, over the succeeding years since 2006 the approach has 
been taken forwards directly by the Forum and its local community organisation 
networks in 10 different municipalities and has also formed the basis of advocacy 
targeting decision makers at the national level based in Pristina.  This resulted in 
aspects of the methodology and the actors involved being included in national-level 
government strategies on issues including school safety, community-based policing 
and community safety. The benefits from contingency are clear:  establishing pilot 
                                                       
100 Interview.  Former NGO Director,  Ferizaj,  July 2011. 
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approaches in which progress can be demonstrated provided an excellent 
foundation on which further direct support for communities could be based, 
demonstrating that what worked in one place could also work at a greater level of 
scale, which in turn could be used as evidence of progress with which to engage 
and influence government decision makers.  
4.6.1.3 Analysing the effects of contingency on interrelationships between SALW 
control and peacebuilding activities  
This section analyses the effect of contingency on interrelationships between 
efforts to control SALW and peacebuilding activities.  It draws on the analysis from 
previous sections, which examines how different SALW control and peacebuilding 
efforts have interrelated as sector specific activities.  It begins by exploring how 
activities interrelate from a contingency perspective and identifies a small number 
of interrelationships which appear to be particularly significant.  It then assesses the 
role of contingency, both at the national level in Kosovo and in two specific 
localities in which SALW control and peacebuilding have taken place during similar 
periods.  Finally, it analyses the role of context in helping to shape, and understand 
the nature of interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding. 
 
The effect of contingency on interrelationships 
Contingency has played a significant role in determining the nature of 
interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding efforts in Kosovo.  
From the data introduced and discussed in this chapter, the following aspects are of 
particular interest: 
 
The relationship between a lack of willingness to disarm and a lack of clarity over 
the future status of Kosovo: At the macro-level, by far the most likely reason for 
individuals not surrendering their weapons in the initial years following the end of 
the war was the unresolved status of Kosovo and the implications that this had for 
the provision of security both nationally and locally.101  As time has progressed, and 
                                                       
101 For instance, in 2005, in response to a multiple-choice question in a national household survey 
which asked in which circumstances respondents would own a firearm, 76.8% and 24.6%  
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certainly following the declaration of independence in February 2008 this factor is 
less significant as a justification for weapons ownership – with the exception of 
those living in the north of Kosovo or in the majority Kosovo-Albanian areas in the 
border municipalities (Reeve, 2012:17).  But in the early years, there was significant 
concern amongst many Albanians and others that Kosovo might not in the end be 
able to control its own destiny and that its future would be decided by international 
administrators or directly by the UN Security Council.   
 
In this context, where initiatives such as the Standards for Kosovo were seen by 
many as a means by which independence could be held off, there were real fears 
both that the population may have to take up arms again in the future to protect 
itself, or that a decision would be made on the future of the country which would 
endanger the physical security of people at the community level. All this 
uncertainty regarding how the initial peace-making and peacekeeping would 
translate into a long term peace for Kosovo created an environment in which it was 
very unlikely that significant proportions of the population would decide to disarm.  
 
The positive relationship between perceptions of KFOR and the effectiveness of 
amnesty periods in 2001 and 2002:  At first glance, the amnesty periods do not 
appear to have been major successes in their own right in terms of the overall 
numbers of weapons that were surrendered.  However, in comparison to efforts 
that followed and, with hindsight, the real difficulties of persuading a population to 
disarm in a context in which the future status of the country is effectively on hold, 
they were in reality positive and important contributions to reducing the overall 
numbers of weapons held in Kosovo at the time.  
 
Following the end of the war in 1999, KFOR was seen by many as a positive 
contributor to peace and security. This pertains to Kosovo-Serbs as well as those of 
Albanian ethnicity who one might have imagined would have been inherently 
hostile to KFOR involvement following the decisive role of NATO in prosecuting and 
                                                                                                                                                         
respectively claimed that would be ‘To protect myself/family’ and ‘For fear of conflict/war’. 
(Richards, Sokolova and Smith 2006:56). 
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ending the war.  However, in studies since 1999 KFOR has often been identified as 
the only international security provider which is trusted to any significant degree by 
the Serbian population in Kosovo – although this trust remains qualified and is 
significantly weaker than that held by the corresponding majority Albanian 
population.102   
 
This generally positive perception of KFOR contributed over time to a perception 
that it was both important to engage with KFOR to demonstrate willingness and 
openness to the agency most likely to provide protection in time of need, and that 
KFOR was an honest broker and would deliver on its commitments.  Interviewees 
for this thesis claimed that the decision to participate in the amnesty periods was 
conditioned by their perceptions of the behaviour and role of KFOR previously.103 In 
this context, contingency was an important factor in the development of a positive 
interrelationship between SALW control and peacebuilding efforts. 
 
The relationship between frustration with the role and performance of the UN 
mission and the lack of participation in the UN-led ISAC I and II projects: Whilst it 
was initially welcomed, the UN mission in Kosovo quickly became the source of 
public dissatisfaction with the speed and direction that the territory was taking.  
Unjustly, in some cases, many of those living in Kosovo felt that UNMIK was 
directionless, bureaucratic and inefficient (Richards, Sokolova and Smith 2006:44-
46).  Many people didn’t trust it and believed that as an agency responsible 
ultimately to the UN Security Council, which featured at least one permanent 
member which was implacably opposed to Kosovo independence and was still at 
the time a major armorer and supporter of President Milosevic, it was inevitably a 
product of compromise that couldn’t provide the direction that the majority of the 
population supported.   
 
                                                       
102 See for instance Bennett (2011:7) for an analysis of nationwide  attitudes towards security and 
security providers which claims that KFOR is the only international actor in Kosovo in which the 
Serbian population have any trust. 
103 FGD Germova July 2011 (see Germova section in Annex A). 
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More specifically, the reputations of the UN Police and Prosecutors, UNDP, UN 
Habitat and other agencies compared to KFOR were very poor.  In this context, 
which played out at the local levels as much as nationally and in Pristina, the 
perceptions of UNMIK by many Kosovars had a strong effect on their willingness to 
trust and engage on sensitive topics with UNMIK and its representatives.  It is clear 
from interviews and focus group discussions described elsewhere in this thesis that 
the ownership, use and potential surrender of weapons was one such topic.  In this 
context, public perceptions of UNMIK, and at a local level, of UNDP in certain 
contexts (see Germova below) was significant in shaping attitudes towards the 
weapons collection plans contained in ISAC I.104  In this case, the effects of 
contingency were negative in terms of the opportunities of interrelationships 
between peacebuilding activities and SALW control efforts to promote and 
reinforce each other. 
 
The effect of peacebuilding institutions in creating the context in which SALW 
control was attempted: The weakness of internationally-led attempts to enhance 
SALW control has not been tested through a thorough evaluation and this is a 
reality that runs through the Kosovo-related material in this thesis.  However, from 
interviews with those involved and commentators active at the time, it appears that 
with the exception of KFOR, there was relatively little interest in the issue of SALW 
control above that relating to the collection of weapons from civilians.   
 
The recent experiences of weapons collection in Albania and to some extent, Bosnia 
and Croatia may have played a role in the decision to focus on civilian weapons 
collection.105  But is does appear to be the case that at the time of ISAC I and II 
when a range of different initiatives were attempted which included, but were not 
limited to weapons collection, one of the factors that contributed to failure was the 
lack of clarity regarding the legislative and procedural arrangements covering SALW 
                                                       
104 KIIs in Gracanica, Germova and Gjakova, July 2011. 
105 The UNDP, under the auspices of the Regional Stability Pact, organised weapons collection 
activities in numerous countries in the Western Balkans which drew heavily on a ‘weapons for 
development’ methodology that was developed in Albania in the late 1990’s. See Western Balkans 
study in Chapter 3 and Rynn et al (2004) for further detail. 
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control. For example in 2006, over 7 years following the establishment of 
international administration in Kosovo there were 54 pieces of law and 
administrative procedure that related to SALW control generally (Richards, 
Sokolova and Smith 2006: 62).  Further, it was not until 2009 when the new Law on 
Weapons106 came into force that the legislative context was clarified in line with 
regional and international best practice (Gashi and Musliu, 2012: 9).   
 
In research for a study that examined this in detail (Richards, Smith and Sokolova, 
2006) it was clear that there was very little awareness on the part of administrators, 
let alone responsible departments of the Police (local or national) regarding the 
legislative basis for controlling SALW.  The lack of clarity around who could own 
weapons, on what terms and how and for what they could be used (relating to 
civilians as well as other groups such as private security guards) was cited as a real 
factor in the confusion which surrounded the SALW control efforts.  Why this is the 
case is unclear, although to the author working closely with UNMIK at the time, and 
in the view of some commentators, it appears that there was not sufficient focus on 
SALW as an issue prior to the development of ISAC-I and not enough preparation in 
the project’s early stages to ensure that the rules and procedures were clear. 
Subsequently the confusion at the centre was echoed in the targeted communities 
where people report that they did not know when and how they could surrender 
weapons, didn’t believe that they wouldn’t be prosecuted, did not understand the 
nature of the incentive programmes on offer or the role of different actors.107   
 
It appears that this lack of focus by the organisations responsible for leading 
peacebuilding efforts in Kosovo contributed to the development of a situation in 
which the institutions, as well as the public, were not prepared for SALW control 
efforts when they were initiated.  In this example, the interrelationships between 
the functions of an institution responsible for peacebuilding and SALW control were 
not positive in the sense of the contingency linking one set of priorities and 
                                                       
106 Law on Weapons.  Law number 03/L-143.  Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo.  17 
September 2009. 
107 KIIs from Germova, Peja and Gracanica, July 2011 and February 2012. 
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approaches to a later decision to attempt a major national SALW control 
programme. However in so much as the failure to provide clarity as part of overall 
efforts to establish rule of law in Kosovo affected negatively the success of 
subsequent SALW control efforts, there was a contingent relationship, which in this 
case was negative. 
 
The relationships between well-intentioned attempts to control SALW and their 
consequent impacts on security: To some of those who supported and played an 
active part in the 2001-2003 ISAC I programme, the failure to collect significant 
numbers of weapons during the amnesty period in 2003 was seen as slightly 
misleading in the way in which it shaped opinions and perspectives regarding the 
success or otherwise of the whole ISAC programme.108   They pointed to the fact 
that over 26,000 SALW had been brought under greater control by the government 
as a consequence of them being registered as part of the programme.  However, 
closer inspection of the system for ‘legalising’ weapons suggests that the offer to 
bring weapons under greater control might in itself indirectly have helped to 
stimulate the transfer of additional weapons into the country.   
 
The motivation behind the offer to legalise existing ownership was based on an 
assumption that there were large quantities of SALW in Kosovo and it supposes that 
not all of these weapons posed a direct threat to life or security, and that in many 
cases, individuals would be unwilling to surrender weapons, but might be 
persuaded to legalise them, thus bringing them under a great level of control than 
they would otherwise have been if they had remained in personal ownership 
without being either surrendered or registered.   
 
As the registration programme was being designed the decision was taken not to 
require owners to be able to demonstrate where they got their weapons from 
                                                       
108 Interviews with the author during research for the SALW Survey of Kosovo (Sokolova, Richards 
and Smith 2006) and the SALW Monitor (Rynn et al 2004) by UNDP project staff and UNMIK officials. 
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initially.109  The primary reason for this was a belief that there would be a large 
number of people who had owned their weapons for long periods and knew where 
they originated, but that they wouldn’t be able to prove it.  This was due to a 
combination of people’s personal papers often getting lost as they moved around 
the country to avoid the fighting; and the fact that when they had taken ownership 
of their weapons many years ago – possibly inherited from family members - there 
were no accompanying papers.110  
 
This decision brought a considerable element of doubt into the registration process:  
whose weapons were being registered; how long had they been in Kosovo; and 
what might they have been used for previously?  In an interview for this thesis, a 
senior police officer at the time, who led the department responsible for 
conducting background checks into those seeking to own weapons legally, reported 
that a significant proportion of the weapons that were legalised through ISAC I 
were newly made and often expensive.  Further, many of them were made in 
Turkey and in some cases Germany and Austria, and not in any of the countries of 
the former Yugoslavia.  During the time before the war in 1999, weapons that 
people could own and access in Kosovo were made within Yugoslavia, mostly at the 
Zastava factories in Serbia: it was not possible to import weapons from other 
countries without enjoying significant privileges or having a particular use for them 
as part of the security apparatus at the time.  Therefore, the interviewee claims, the 
registration process was used as a method through which significant numbers of 
weapons were brought into the country via the black market and then legalised, 
possibly after they had been used in the commission of violent crime, or to facilitate 
trafficking or other illicit activities.111 
 
                                                       
109 KII former senior police commander with responsibility for SALW licencing and tracking illicit 
weapons.  Pristina July 2011. 
110 This was substantiated by a male KII (Ferizaj, July 2011), who claimed that during the war his 
family fled first from Ferizaj to northern Albania and then to Macedonia where they stayed until 
after the war ended.  They moved with what they could carry and many of their personal papers 
including birth and marriage certificates were lost.  In this context he believed it highly likely that 
those who did have official papers for their weapons would have lost them as they moved. 
111 Interview with former senior police officer responsible for background-checking firearms license 
applicants 
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Due to the lack of information recorded at the time of registration, and poor record 
keeping relating to current crime data, the information is not available which would 
be able to prove whether or not any of these weapons that seemingly had been 
brought into the country to take advantage of a weakness in the registration system 
have been used in crime. And so it is ultimately unclear how strong the 
interrelationship is between poorly executed but well intentioned SALW control 
efforts and negative impacts on peace and security.   
 
However the premise underpinning the registration process, that people would not 
surrender weapons but they might register them, and the likelihood that some of 
the registered weapons were imported illegally (there was no legal means by which 
SALW could be imported into Kosovo at the time), suggest that at best, the 
registration process did little to place SALW under greater control, and that in 
reality it might have helped criminals to ‘clean’ weapons that had been used in 
armed violence. 
 
4.6.2 Analysis of complementarity between efforts to control 
SALW and peacebuilding activities  
This section examines how activities to enhance SALW control interact with 
peacebuilding efforts taking place in the same time and space.  Consequently it is 
organised to focus on two areas that are of most importance to this thesis:  
interrelationships at the national-level; and those at the subnational and 
community levels.  There is considerable overlap between these two dimensions 
and where this is important it has been identified below.   
 
Examining local-level interrelationships across the whole of Kosovo is not possible 
within the constraints of this thesis.  Therefore a small number of examples were 
chosen to provide depth in the analysis.  These were selected on the basis of 
fulfilling a small number of criteria: contexts where a significant amount of 
peacebuilding and SALW control was attempted; representativeness of the context 
(rural/urban/geographic location/ethnic makeup); the existence of especially 
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interesting outcomes that in themselves demonstrate particular interrelationships.  
Using these criteria, two locations were selected – Germova and Debellder.  Both 
contexts are introduced and justified as examples and analysed in section 4.3, 
which follows an initial exploration of interrelationships at the national level in the 
section below. 
4.6.2.1 Description and analysis of complementarity at the national level 
There are two distinct periods since the end of the war where major international 
peacebuilding efforts have occurred at the same time and in the same geographic 
space as activities to control SALW (see Figure 12 for a chronology of peacebuilding 
efforts in Kosovo since 1999).  The first of these took place from 1999 until 2007 
when UNMIK had executive responsibility for decisions relating to security and 
Kosovo-level governance.  During this time, KFOR organised three weapons 
amnesty periods and undertook regular search and seize operations, the KLA (as it 
was at the time) disarmed many of its weapons, and the UNDP coordinated ISAC I 
and ISAC II, which are all described in detail earlier in this chapter and involved a 
wide range of local and international bodies and institutions.  The second period 
was from 2007 onwards when the EU began to play a more central role during 
planning for, and then deployment of, the EULEX mission.  During this time, the 
UNDP and others developed and supported the KOSSAC programme in partnership 
with various ministries and other bodies, most notably the Ministry of Interior.  This 
section addresses these two periods in turn, drawing out where interrelationships 
existed and whether the outcomes of either were positively or negatively affected 
by their interrelationships. 
 
Interrelationships differed over time during this period and between different 
actors.  However, overall it is probably best characterised as largely positive in the 
early period and probably largely negative in the later.  This contention is justified 
below: 
 
Positive interrelationships: NATO and then its successor, KFOR, helped to provide a 
sense of security and of possible transitions to a more peaceful future.  In this light, 
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limited but tangible progress was made with SALW control, including importantly 
reducing a little the numbers of illicit weapons in the country at the time112 and 
making progress with DDR (Barakat, 2005).  The role of KFOR as enforcer of UNSCR 
1244 and protector on one hand, and as the agency responsible for administering 
the initial amnesty periods on the other, made institutional operationalization of 
commitments to both peacebuilding and SALW control more manageable, with less 
of a requirement for consultation and inter-agency debate on competency issues.  
The perception of many of Kosovo’s residents that KFOR was to be trusted was very 
important in the limited success of SALW control programmes. 
 
Negative interrelationships: The perception of UNMIK was not positive and its role 
in ISAC I in particular did not engender a sense of engagement by the public or 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. Furthermore, the weaknesses of the 
programme were negative in terms of the impact that this in turn had on the 
perception of the ability of UNMIK to manage the delivery of projects and 
programmes.113  There were institutional problems relating to UNMIK and its pillar 
system and to the focus and success of different aspects of peace- and state- 
building, including the development of the police and courts system.  But overall 
the most negative interrelationship was between the lack of clarity over the final 
status of Kosovo and the means by which it would get there, and creating the public 
and institutional confidence that would have created the conditions in which SALW 
numbers could be reduced and those that remained placed under greater control.  
This tension, which attended the UN Mission from its initial engagement in 1999 
until its mandate was significantly reduced in 2006/7, was important in sustaining 
public attitudes to weapons possession.114 
 
                                                       
112 Whilst the UN-led voluntary collection efforts yielded few weapons, KFOR seized quantities of 
illicit weapons on a monthly basis. 
113 KIIs in Gracanica and Germova in July 2011 and discussions between the author and the former 
Head of SEESAC in 2005. 
114 Several surveys including Richards, Sokolova and Smith (2006), Hvidemose, Istrefi and Marzouk 
(2009) and Bennett (2011) identify weak public trust in UNMIK and other international actors and 
dissatisfaction with the lack of direction over Kosovo’s future status and relationships with its 
neighbours. 
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Interrelationships at the national level from 2007  
The arrival of the EULEX mission and the drawdown by UNMIK coincided with the 
most significant period of activity for the KOSSAC programme.  This presented both 
opportunities and threats to the effectiveness of SALW control efforts. On the 
positive side, the change in international leadership was initially strongly supported 
by many Kosovars and helped to create an atmosphere in which renewed 
engagement and trust was possible, and was perceived by many in Kosovo as a 
stepping stone towards international recognition, which if forthcoming would have 
reduced one of the most significant barriers to disarmament across the country. 
The KOSSAC programme was still new and was located within the Ministry of 
Interior which itself was enjoying additional powers and responsibilities with many 
of UNMIKs executive roles not taken on by EULEX.  However on the negative side, 
the change in international leadership ran the risk of what lessons that had been 
learned from previous efforts being diluted and potentially lost.  In reality, the 
picture was mixed and thus the outcomes of the interrelationships were mixed. 
 
Positive aspects of interrelationships: On the positive side, KOSSAC was able to 
engage more systematically than previous efforts, from an initial understanding of 
the remaining problem to the selection of a set of activities which were both 
achievable and in line with the wishes of politicians and officials at the Ministry of 
Interior in particular.115  Thus, a new Law on Weapons was promulgated, a SALW 
control strategy developed and SALW control integrated into the strategies and 
work programmes of a range of different national actors.  The greater capacity at 
the Ministry was essential in facilitating much of the KOSSAC programme and for 
providing political leadership within government.  The reduction in the scale of the 
international presence meant that coordination challenges were reduced, alongside 
debates over which agency had competence on specific issues.  However, whilst 
these interrelationships were largely positive and should be acknowledged, it is also 
the case that during this period there was no specific activity to reduce SALW 
numbers; rather, the emphasis was placed on administrative arrangements and 
                                                       
115 KII, UNDP KOSSAC Programme Manager, Pristina February 2012. 
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capacity with the intention of reducing the impacts of illicit weapons rather than 
numbers of weapons per se.116 
 
Negative aspects of interrelationships:  It is not clear that interrelationships were 
negative in terms of tangible SALW control efforts and specific peacebuilding 
activities.  However, interviewees did claim that during this period more could have 
been done if there had been more political will on the part of government and a 
clearer sense on the part of EULEX in particular that addressing SALW problems was 
an important part of addressing wider security and justice issues.117  As EULEX 
developed in Kosovo its popularity began to fall in the eyes of many (Marzouk, 
2007).  This served to damage the perception of international actors performing a 
useful role, which was negative for the KOSSAC programme in the sense that whilst 
officially it was led by the Government, in reality the funding and at least some of 
the expertise came from the UNDP.  Perhaps the most important mitigating factor 
in this case was that as there wasn’t a significant public education or awareness 
raising component to the programme at the time, there was very little public 
awareness of its existence. 
4.6.2.2 Analysis of interrelationships at specific periods and in particular places 
The two locations analysed below were identified using the criteria introduced 
earlier in this chapter to examine the extent and nature of local-level 
complementarities and interrelationships and were introduced in the section above 
which analysed the profiles of the selected research locations.   
Germova 
As described earlier, Germova has been the subject of various SALW control related 
activities and numerous peacebuilding efforts since 1999.  It is therefore an 
interesting example from the perspective of the potential interrelationships that 
may exist between efforts to control SALW and build peace within the same periods 
                                                       
116 For official project documents and objectives see the UNDP website for Kosovo: 
http://www.kosovo.undp.org/en/Democratic-Governance1/Kosovo-Small-Arms-Control-Initiative-
KOSSAC-226.  Accessed 15/12/2012. 
117 KIIs, FIQ Director and Saferworld Programme Manager in Kosovo. Pristina, July 2011. 
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of time and space.  There are two important periods during which it is useful to 
explore potential complementarities: 
 
The immediate aftermath of the formal end to the war:  At this time, villagers in 
Germova which was at this stage following the departure of Kosovo-Serb residents, 
mono-ethnic, were fearful about the potential for further attacks and at one point 
fired on an advancing group of soldiers, imaging that they were JNU forces 
returning to fight. These soldiers turned out to be American KFOR troops. Realising 
their error, and being keen to develop positive relations with the Americans they 
offered to disarm a portion of their weapons and surrender a quantity of 
ammunition.  This was accepted and formed an important element of local-level 
relationship - and confidence - building which villagers claim helped them to begin 
the process of rebuilding their community.  The act of surrendering SALW and 
through this act, placing them under greater control, contributed in a small and 
very local way to enhanced relationships and a greater confidence on the part of 
villagers to face the future.  In this example interrelationships can be seen as 
beneficial to both SALW control and peacebuilding aims.118 
 
The period surrounding the UNDP SALW collection in 2003:  As with Debellder (see 
below), Germova was targeted by the UNDP SALW collection effort.  However 
unlike Debellder, villages did surrender weapons, although this was done without 
enthusiasm, and as is demonstrated in the section focussing on contingency above, 
the experience of the community at this time negatively shaped their willingness to 
engage in subsequent SALW control or internationally-led peacebuilding activities.   
 
At the same time that preparations were underway for the weapons collection 
activities, there were three substantial peace-building related efforts underway.   
The first were the ongoing attempts by the American KFOR contingent to promote 
good community relations and to respond to the security concerns of communities 
to help encourage transitions towards development and away from fears of 
                                                       
118 FGD Germova, July 2011. 
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renewed conflict.  Relations between the villagers and KFOR remained positive and 
to a large degree, it appears from the responses provided by interviewees that their 
efforts were generally well received.119  An important element of the decision to 
participate in the SALW collection effort was in part shaped by positive previous 
experiences (see contingency section above) but also by the fact that KFOR in which 
the villagers had developed a level of trust since the end of the war were involved 
in supporting the collection. KFOR was involved in official communications 
regarding the SALW collection efforts, which included using its logo and branding 
on posters, leaflets and other communications products. 
 
The second set of peacebuilding efforts centred on the efforts of UNDP and UN 
HABITAT.  These agencies had responsibility within the UN Mission for supporting 
the renovation of houses damaged during the war in order to facilitate the return of 
IDPs and refugees.  In the same period that the SALW collection programme was 
being discussed and communicated, UNDP and UN HABITAT began discussions with 
the villagers in Germova regarding the reconstruction of houses, including those 
previously occupied by Kosovo-Serbs as part of a process of encouraging their 
return.  After much debate within the community, the residents of Germova agreed 
to this suggestion, judging that they would be willing for Serbian families to return if 
they were collectively able to benefit from the building works undertaken.  To the 
residents, they believed that they had agreed a deal with the representatives of the 
UN agencies.   
 
However, in the end, the work did not begin, Germova was not selected for a 
returns project and the villagers felt that they had been badly let down.  In their 
minds, they had agreed to allow Kosovo-Serbs back into their village despite the 
fact that the war and its effects were still fresh in the mind and were ready to fulfil 
their side of the bargain.120   
 
                                                       
119 FGD and KII, Germova, February 2010 and July 2011. 
120 KII, male Germova village council member, February 2010. 
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The failure of the UN agencies to deliver on what the community saw as their 
commitment made them very distrustful of outsiders offering what one respondent 
described as ‘trades’.121  This perceived failure of the UN system was cited by focus 
group participants as a major factor in their reticence to participate in the planned 
UNDP-led SALW collection effort which took place in the same period and 
location.122 
 
Thirdly, significant resources were at the time being invested in the role and 
capacity of municipal government and in the provision of basic municipal services.  
In an echo of their decision to show good will to the KFOR contingent through 
partial disarmament, the villagers thought that participation in the SALW collection 
project would demonstrate their willingness to work with the municipal authorities 
and to build relationships which would result in enhanced cooperation and 
consequently bring greater benefit to the community.123   
 
In this example, the development of local government which was framed as part of 
the Kosovo-wide process of peace-building and recovery was a contributory factor 
in the decision to participate in the disarmament process.  However, the failure of 
the municipality to collect enough weapons from neighbouring communities and 
trigger the release of development funds from UNDP was damaging to the standing 
of local leaders in Germova, and consequently to relations between Germova and 
the municipal authorities.124  The interrelationships between peacebuilding efforts 
and SALW control activities were clearly apparent at this time, with peacebuilding 
activities stimulating a willingness to disarm, but also with the failure of the 
weapons collection activities having an impact on the perception of the local 
peacebuilding activity.   
 
As a post-script, when the author first visited Germova in 2005 (in the context of 
NGO programme development work), the village leaders were hostile towards what 
                                                       
121 KII, male Germova village council member, July 2011. 
122 FGD, Germova, July 2011. 
123 FDG, Germova, July 2011. 
124 KII Germova village council head, Pristina 2011.  
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they perceived to be another foreigner arriving in their village to ask questions and 
the leave with vague promises that they were sceptical would be fulfilled.  Once 
relationships had been established they claimed that they had been abandoned by 
the municipal government, in part as a consequence of the fallout from the SALW 
collection process. They claimed that they were not provided with police patrols 
despite requests based on real safety fears, and did not receive basic services in line 
with those enjoyed by other villages in the municipality. Together these two factors 
suggest that the impact of the SALW collection effort and the peacebuilding 
activities that had taken place in the same time and space had been negative, at 
least in terms of the perception village leaders had of foreigners and in terms of the 
relationships between the village and its municipal leaders.125 
 
Debellder 
Debellder was significantly affected not just by the conflict involving the KLA, the 
Yugoslav National Army, Serbian security forces and KFOR.  It was also heavily 
affected by border conflicts with Macedonia and by the Albanian uprising in 
Macedonia in 2001.  Tensions remain in Debellder, in large part due to the failure 
to-date to find a lasting solution to the problem of residents being able to access 
their lands which now lie across the border in Macedonia, and residual fears over 
landmines and other explosive remnants of war.   
 
Immediately following the end of the KLA/JNA war, KLA fighters from the village 
who had enlisted and gone to fight in other parts of the country began to come 
home.  Some of them participated in the KLA disarmament exercise, but many 
didn’t, preferring instead to take off their uniform, keep their weapons and return 
home to civilian life.126 Whilst the conflict had been active, landmines had been 
used in Debellder to prevent residents repairing telephone lines.  Due to the 
remote nature of the village, some of those who remained behind armed 
themselves for self-defence purposes.  In 1999 therefore, following the formal end 
                                                       
125 From regular meetings and interviews between the author and village council representatives in 
2005 in Germova as part of research conducted in causes and effects of community insecurity in the 
village and surrounding area (Rynn and Smith 2005).  
126 KIIs with former KLA fighters from Debellder in Viti town centre, July 2011. 
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of the war, there was a considerable quantity of SALW and associated ammunition 
and explosives in the village.  Following the outbreak of conflict in Macedonia in 
2001, the village was shelled repeatedly from Macedonia and properties were 
attacked, both by Macedonian forces, and by local residents, some of whom 
targeted Macedonian properties in the village. This further increased the amount of 
SALW and the tensions and fears which may have encouraged their use.   
 
Efforts were undertaken to resolve the border dispute with Macedonia, which did 
end the violence and which has held to this day (Attree 2011:13).  However to many 
in Debellder, the cessation of hostilities represents what Galtung (1969) referred to 
as a ‘negative peace’ which, whilst ensuring an absence of violence, has not created 
the context in which residents can look forwards to the future.   
 
This is evidenced in the responses from interviewees who reported that the 
majority of people who lived in Debellder prior to the conflicts now live in the main 
municipal town of Viti in the valley, and that they are still fearful of the proximity of 
the village to the border.127  The village, an outlying part of Viti Municipality, has 
been subject to the governance arrangements that the rest of Kosovo has 
experienced since 1999, including the establishment of the Kosovo Police, the 
transformation of the KLA and the development of municipal government. 
However, villagers participating in the focus group discussions for this research 
claimed that they had not been significantly affected by these developments from a 
peacebuilding perspective as they rarely saw police patrols, didn’t suffer 
significantly from criminal violence and had minimal contact with the Municipal 
government.   Therefore it was difficult to demonstrate that there were significant 
opportunities for complementarity between recent SALW control efforts and 
contemporary peacebuilding activities in Debellder specifically. 
 
However, in the years following the end of the KLA/JNA conflict these opportunities 
were much more significant.  During the early attempts by KFOR in 1999 and 2000 
                                                       
127 KIIs and FGD, Debellder and Viti Town, July 2011. 
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to remove weaponry from communities, local residents claim that they cooperated 
well with KFOR troops, who helped them to collect and dispose of unexploded 
ordinance and ammunition that they no longer required.128 Further, in the period 
following the end of the conflict in Macedonia’s borderlands between the 
Macedonian army and Albanian insurgent groups, KFOR played an important role in 
helping to remove unexploded shells and other material; one interviewee claimed: 
 
 “In the beginning they were helpful and came to see what we needed.  They helped 
take away mines and shells.  Then later they didn’t come any more and private 
companies came instead.”129 
 
In both cases, villagers report that these activities were seen positively and that 
they did help to reduce tensions and to encourage some people to return home.130  
However, they also state that this support for controlling arms and ammunition did 
not facilitate a return to the existence that they had previously enjoyed.  They claim 
that whilst it did make them more willing to consider picking up their previous 
occupations, and it did help them build trust in KFOR and other international forces, 
other factors were more powerful in their decision making regarding whether to 
return.  These included the fear of attack if they crossed the border into Macedonia 
to use their lands; and the ongoing fear of attack and remaining UXO which 
prevented them from re-cultivating their lands on the Kosovo side of the border 
were cited as the most critical factors.   
 
Therefore, whilst the activities of KFOR were complementary in terms of the 
changes in attitudes towards the international presence, and in villagers’ 
willingness to engage with the changes that were taking place within Kosovo, these 
complementarities were not strong enough to encourage a return to previous 
occupations and livelihoods, or to persuade residents to return to the village to live 
full-time.  There are additional reasons for this, including the reality that during the 
conflict when many residents moved to the municipal capital and elsewhere they 
                                                       
128 FGD Debellder, July 2011. 
129 KII, Debellder, July 2011. 
130 KIIs and FGD Debellder, 2011. 
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established new homes and livelihoods which were hard to give up as 
circumstances changed. However the significant remaining security issues outlined 
above were most explicitly and consistently raised by interviewees.131 
 
Potential complementarities were more obvious however in the period leading up 
to the UNDP-organised SALW collection project embedded within the broader ISAC 
I programme.  Viti was one of the Municipalities which were prioritised by the 
central Government in Pristina and considerable effort was invested by the UNDP 
and its agents in promoting the forthcoming activities.  This took place at a time 
when significant investment was being made by the government and international 
agencies to promote peace and reconstruction, which included promoting the 
return of IDPs to their former villages, increasing the presence and activity of the 
nascent Kosovo Police Service (KPS), and supporting a range of municipal-level 
initiatives including the Local Public Safety Councils introduced earlier.  However, 
despite Viti being prioritised and being one of the only Municipalities that collected 
any weapons, none were surrendered by residents of Debellder.  The reasons given 
for this differ, but a dominant response during research for this thesis was that 
SALW owners were not convinced of the need to surrender their weapons: 
 
“We had the weapons at home, sure.  But we didn’t use them.  Everyone has their 
reasons for why they had them.  I had mine from the war and didn’t want to give it 
up.  It reminded me of the previous times.”132 
 
For others, fear of further conflict or the perceived financial value of their weapons, 
were important factors in retaining and not surrendering them when they had the 
opportunity.133   Even in a context in which peace-building efforts were underway 
within the territory of Kosovo, and where these were mostly viewed positively by 
communities, their existence did not have a significant influence on SALW control 
efforts at the time, and therefore potential complementarities were not realised in 
terms of facilitating positive outcomes.  
                                                       
131 KIIs and FGDs, July 2011. 
132 Male Interviewee, Debellder, July 2011. 
133 FGD Gracanica, March 2012. 
255 
 
 
In both the initial phase in which KFOR demining efforts didn’t play a great role in 
facilitating significant transitions to peace, and in the latter case where the 
existence of positively perceived peacebuilding activities did not facilitate 
participation in SALW control efforts, it would appear that the potential 
interrelationships that exist within the dimension of shared time and space, were 
not from a positive perspective realised fully.  However, from a negative 
perspective, these interrelationships were probably catalytic in shaping the 
behaviours of the various actors concerned. 
4.6.3 Effects of context on interrelationships 
4.6.3.1 Introduction 
The third dimension of the analytical framework for describing the 
interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and peacebuilding activities 
focuses on the effects of the context in which the activities take place.  In particular 
it assesses how different attitudes towards peace and conflict and the role that 
SALW and SALW control can play in either stimulating conflict or promoting peace 
affect how the two issues interrelate.  Chapter 2 of this thesis identified Lederach’s 
Actors and Approaches model as important for describing the different 
contributions that can be made to transformative peacebuilding activities (Lederach 
1997).  The Model claims that the process of moving beyond an absence of violence 
and towards what Ramsbotham et al (2005) describe as ‘cultural peace’ requires 
the involvement of a wide group of actors, from elites who are involved in peace 
deals and agreements at the national level through to community members whose 
attitudes and behaviours require transformation in terms of how they deal with 
those with whom they have been in conflict. Fisher and Zimina use this model to 
substantiate a claim that often international actors and others involved in 
‘professional’ peacebuilding work substantially with elites and less with 
communities, and that consequently the opportunities for activities to have a 
transformative effect are often missed (Fisher and Zimina, 2008). 
 
256 
 
This section begins with an analysis of different groups’ attitudes to conflict, peace 
and SALW, beginning with those at the bottom of Lederach’s Model (those who 
often play a transformative approach in peacebuilding). It then reviews other 
factors which might have a significant role to play in shaping the context in which 
SALW and peacebuilding efforts are attempted, and thus impact on how they 
interrelate.  The framework used for this analysis draws on factors commonly used 
in conflict analysis models to categorise the different dimensions of the conflict that 
the analysis seeks to describe (conflict/security, political, economic, social, cultural 
and environmental factors).134 
4.6.3.2 Community perspectives regarding peace and conflict 
Interviewees offered two dominant perspectives regarding their views on conflict 
and peace in Kosovo, and it appears that these are linked closely to the age of 
respondents and, by implication, to how closely the individual experienced the 
period of violent conflict.   
 
The first group of perspectives belonged to young people, who often stated that 
the war was something that happened before their time and was therefore, more a 
matter of folklore than something that they felt had a direct relation to them.  
Amongst this group, which did not seem to be affected significantly by ethnicity, 
two issues were most often raised.  The first was Kosovo’s absence in the regional 
visa liberalisation regime which means that with the exception of Kosovars, 
nationals from western Balkan countries can move freely across their collective 
borders.  To these people, this means that to travel anywhere apart from Albania, 
Kosovars need to have a visa.  Visas are often hard to obtain and for countries that 
don’t recognise Kosovo, impossible.  This gave rise in interviews with young 
people135 to a view that they were prisoners in their own country and that until 
they were able to move they would never feel comfortable and peaceful in Kosovo.   
 
                                                       
134 For example, the UK government has developed two models since 1997 which are now widely 
used:  the Strategic Conflict Assessment and the Joint Assessment of Conflict and Stability.  In both 
cases, contextual factors are grouped as above. 
135 FGD Ferizaj; KIIs Pristina and Peja. 
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The second, closely related issue was a fear of unemployment and a desire for 
opportunities to work or study, either in Kosovo or further afield.  They stated that 
they felt there was nothing for them in the newly independent Kosovo, even 
though they often expressed themselves as Kosovars, or Albanians or Serbs with a 
strong attachment to their country.136 For these people, peace appears not to be a 
concept linked to fear of violence; rather one which is expressed in terms of the 
social, economic and cultural impact of restricted movement. For example, one 
young female respondent in the focus group discussion in Ferizaj stated:  
 
“I speak English, I am well educated.  I want to do something - to do a good job and 
make a contribution.  But here you have to know the right people, and anyway if you 
want to leave, you can’t because it’s impossible to get a visa.  We are stuck here and 
there’s nothing for us.”137   
 
The second group of perspectives which differed from the views expressed by 
government officials and other national figures who had personal experience of 
conflict were those offered by older people in villages and towns, which as with the 
views of young people, (although the reasons given were different) didn’t seem to 
be affected significantly by the ethnicity of the interviewee.  Older people of 
Albanian ethnicity in this group felt that the relative physical security that they 
currently experience is in itself analogous to a state of peace.  Their experience of 
the conflict that culminated in 1999 was much longer by virtue of their age than 
those who were active combatants as 1999 approached.  The sentiment contained 
in the response of the village head in Germova was representative of views from 
other towns and villages.  He said: 
 
“Kosovars have been under occupation for a hundred years.  We have never been 
able to make our own decisions and we were always fearful of others in our own 
country.  Now we have our own government and can make our own decisions things 
are better.  Things are not perfect, there are still many problems but it is totally 
                                                       
136 KIIs with young men in Mitrovica who believed that their best chance of work was to leave 
Kosovo as soon as they could afford to.  
137 Female FGD participant, Ferizaj, June 2011. 
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different. There is no chance of going back to conflict as the memories of what it was 
like before are still too strong to take that risk.”138   
 
This perspective is symptomatic of the concept of negative peace described in 
Chapter 2 whereby the absence of violence is taken as a proxy for real and lasting 
peace.  This concept is criticised as a representing a different state from that which 
is captured by the concept of positive peace (Galtung, 1969; Boulding, 1992; 
Lederach, 1997).  However, in Germova, as elsewhere in Kosovo, these feelings that 
could be described as equating to an absence of violence were perceived positively 
by respondents.  To them peace was characterised by a combination of an absence 
of violence and an absence of occupying forces, which taken together mitigated 
against thoughts of a return to conflict. 
 
A return to widespread and large scale violence is not something that is anticipated 
by many Kosovars in the foreseeable future.  The threats to peace are seen as 
linked to issues of work, education, freedom of movement and political expression 
rather than organised physical violence.139  As such, the perceived relationship 
between concepts of peace and routes to achieving it, and the availability of SALW 
is weaker now than in other post-conflict contexts examined in this thesis.140  This is 
to some extent conditioned by the length of time that has elapsed since the end of 
the war in 1999 and by the fact that enough seems to have been done to increase 
personal and community security to the point where economic, political and 
cultural issues are now more pressing for most people.  Whereas in the early years 
following the end of the war, a return to violence was genuinely feared, and where 
the interrelationships between efforts to build peace and to promote more 
effective control over SALW were clearer and potentially more beneficial, they are 
now much less significant.  For instance, responses to the question “do you think a 
                                                       
138 Male FGD participant, Germova June 2011. 
139 For instance, in its widely respected annual population survey, in 2011 Saferworld reported that 
when asked what their most serious safety and security issues were, over 36% cited traffic problems, 
greater than the 14.4% (30% in the Serb sample) who identified fear of crime as a serious crime. See 
Bennett (2011: 20-31). 
140 For example in South Sudan (see Chapter 3) where reducing SALW availability was seen by many 
as synonymous with the development of the State and the transformation from war to peace. 
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recurrence of violent conflict is likely” asked by Saferworld in its annual tracker 
survey show a year-on-year change in perceptions, with 38.1% claiming it is in 2010 
compared to 44.1% in 2009, 51% in 2008 (Bennett 2011:27).    
 
Despite a generally widespread belief that the threat of violent conflict is receding, 
there are nonetheless at least two different groups of perspectives articulated by 
the public for what peace looks like in Kosovo.  The physical boundary between 
these perspectives is the River Ibar which separates the northern third of Kosovo 
from the rest of the country.  In the south, which is dominated by people of 
Albanian ethnicity but which also includes significant minority and mixed 
communities the perspectives that were most associated with the concept of peace 
included being able to move freely, freedom of association, having a national 
government in Pristina, the absence of predatory police and other local officials, 
and the freedom to complain about grievances without fear of recourse.   
 
North of the Ibar, views of what constitutes peace were not radically different, 
although they were described in very different terms.  For instance the ability to 
move freely was perceived as the ability to be able to drive around Kosovo without 
having to register vehicles with Kosovo number plates.  Similarly, the importance of 
being able to select a government was articulated by many of those interviewed in 
Mitrovica as the ability for northern Kosovo to either achieve a form of 
independence from Kosovo or federation with Serbia.   
 
The stark difference however between the views expressed by interviewees and 
focus group participants in northern and southern Kosovo was the temporal nature 
of perspectives.  For many of those in the south, it was possible to look forwards 
into the future with optimism that the challenges that Kosovo still faces with regard 
to addressing the legacies of the conflict which culminated in the war at the turn of 
the century would be addressed: 
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“Yes we have problems. Yes there were bad times.  But now we are in the right road.  We 
can have relationships with our neighbours but exist by ourselves. Things will continue to 
improve.  We are going forwards.” (Young female FDG participant, Ferizaj) 
 
Whilst some respondents were more critical of government or international 
involvement than others most could see a future for Kosovo and its people that was 
better than is currently the case. This perspective was common to different 
ethnicities, ages, genders and income groups.  For instance, the Chair of the 
Students’ Council in Ferizaj said: 
   
“Making Kosovo successful is our duty.  We all have to work for this, and then things 
will improve.”  
 
In the north however, it was hard to identify a sense of how and when things might 
improve.  The overwhelming view was that the best that could be hoped for was 
that there would be a few more jobs created and that the activities of the organised 
crime networks operating in Mitrovica and the northern municipalities would be 
curtailed.  There was no sense in any of the interviews conducted in the north that 
a political solution was possible that would be of benefit to people of Serbian 
ethnicity in terms of their future within an independent Kosovo.  Therefore whilst 
for the majority of those who participated in this survey in the south of the country, 
a vision of peace was both possible and positive as well as long term, for those 
residing in the north, the most positive image described was one of a negative 
peace in which the absence of violence was almost the most positive outcome that 
could be expected: 
 
“We exist.  Some times are better than others.  We are waiting for something to change.”  
(Woman NGO representative. December 2010) 
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4.6.3.3 Community-level attitudes to SALW  
In each of the focus group areas respondents stated that SALW are perceived in 
different ways and that these perceptions change over time.  It was not possible to 
observe a clear overall pattern to these perceptions.  However from the results of 
the focus groups and interviews, there is evidence that  in a contemporary context, 
the more physically insecure a particular community felt (Mitrovica being the most 
obvious example), the more strongly respondents felt about SALW, both positively 
and negatively.  Whereas in communities that felt more at risk from other forms of 
insecurity (livelihood security being the most often cited example) the role of small 
arms and light weapons was not seen as such a significant factor in either 
undermining or guaranteeing security.   
 
For example in Germova, the FDG participants related that during the lead-up to 
the war when they became aware of the Serbian community being provided with 
weapons from Belgrade, they became much more fearful of the impending conflict.  
However, when the Serbian families left the village leaving behind their weapons, 
the Albanian families quickly took possession of them as they saw them as a way of 
increasing their personal security.  As time has passed and the threat from the 
Serbian army has diminished, the respondents all stated that weapons were no 
longer relevant to their lives.  The lack of jobs for young people, the cost of basic 
supplies and the perceived corruption of the government was viewed as much 
more important than the physical security which might be enhanced through the 
ownership of a weapon. 
 
In Lubinje however, the FDG participants felt strongly that the presence of weapons 
in their community during the war was more threatening than any benefit that they 
might have derived from their existence.  The Bosniac majority in the community 
quickly returned their weapons to the Yugoslav ministry of public order officials 
who distributed them as they felt that owning them made them more 
vulnerable.141  Living in an isolated and small village they felt that the perception 
                                                       
141 Focus Group Discussion, Lubinje-Prizren, June 2011. 
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that they were aligned with the JNA that would have come from them accepting 
the weapons would have posed a greater threat than that which they thought they 
could address through weapons ownership.   
 
In Gjakova and Peja in the west of the country where the fighting had been 
particularly hard, interviewees were of the opinion that weapons ownership was 
important during the conflict as a means of defence.  One respondent in Gjakova 
felt strongly that the reason they had suffered during the conflict was that they 
were not well armed enough.  He felt that there was still a threat from Serbia and 
believed strongly that increasing weapons ownership was important in preventing 
future attacks.  This interviewee had opinions that were not typical of other 
interviews conducted across the country, but his views were repeated by others in 
Gjakova.  He said: 
 
“We definitely shouldn’t hand in any weapons.  We need a lot more weapons if we 
are going to survive.  We have learned to trust no-one to help us.  We have always to 
be ready.  We are surrounded.  We need more weapons and more training.  The 
American’s won’t be able to help us in the future, they have their own problems.”142  
 
Views as to the role of SALW in terms of their role in peace-making differed across 
the country.  As stated above, in Lubinje respondents felt that the absence of 
weapons made their integration into a new country with an Albanian majority and 
themselves as a Slavic minority more manageable. However in Debellder, residents 
felt that the threat of violence from the other side of the border, which was derived 
from their experience of being shelled by the Macedonian army, was a block to 
reconciliation.  They felt that they were part of a negative peace with Macedonia; 
there was no violence, but this was because they had in all but name given up their 
rights to their land. 
 
In Germova, village leaders have from time to time offered to surrender portions of 
the weapons looted from Serbian families as a goodwill gesture in exchange for 
                                                       
142 Key informant interview with Male NGO leader, Gjakova, June 2011. 
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development cooperation.  They understand that the existence of SALW is a 
concern for others and that volunteering to surrender some of them will be seen as 
a willingness to move on from the conflict period.  However, in Mitrovica, where 
SALW are much more readily visible and are used more often, the perception of 
their role is slightly different.  Interviewees in northern Mitrovica in particular 
report that the continued ownership of SALW is an essential strategy for self- and 
family- protection.   
 
The material value of SALW in cash poor cultures is an oft-cited factor in the 
reticence of owners to disarm and in the design of SALW control programmes.143 In 
Germova the willingness of the community to hand over weapons in exchange for 
development cooperation could be perceived as an example of the role that SALW 
can have as a tradable commodity.  In the eyes of the local residents, they were 
promised an exchange and over seven years on they are willing still to deliver their 
part of the bargain they think they entered in to.  They claim that the reason they 
have not yet surrendered their weapons is that the conditions have not been in 
place to allow them to do this without fear of prosecution.  However, it is also clear 
that the senior members of the village council understand that to some 
international actors and Pristina politicians, the SALW that they have retain an 
important value.  The village head is responsible to his residents and believes that 
at some point he will be able to trade the weapons for a development benefit of 
some sort for his people.144 
 
The results of the 2003 UNDP project are also interesting in understanding the 
value placed on SALW by their owners.  Whilst the total numbers of weapons 
surrendered voluntarily through municipalities was extremely low (155), the 
numbers of weapons that were legalised through registration (26,000) was for 
many years held up as an indicator of success (Richards, Sokolova and Smith. 2006).  
To obtain a registration for a firearm, an individual had to surrender it to the police 
                                                       
143 Weapons in exchange for goods, services or cash are often justified by the perceived need to 
compensate owners for giving up an item of value. 
144 KII Head of Germova Village Council, July 2011. 
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for inspection where, providing the weapon fitted into the categories of firearms 
permitted for civilian ownership, a ballistics fingerprint and the owner’s details 
were taken and the owner was issued with a Weapons Authorisation Card. They 
were not asked to provide any documentation regarding where the weapon came 
from.  An ex-senior policeman responsible for aspects of weapons registration at 
the time claims that large numbers of weapons that were registered were new, and 
that the majority of them had been imported from Turkey.145  
4.6.3.4 Perceptions of government officials and other national ‘elites’ regarding 
‘peace’ and its relationship with SALW   
For government officials interviewed for this study, the interrelationships between 
SALW and SALW control and peace and security were conditioned by (a) personal 
experience of the conflict; (b) the extent to which concepts of peace and security 
were linked to resolution on ongoing conflict in the north of the country, and to 
normalising relationships with Serbia; and (c) the extent to which individuals felt 
that Kosovo had moved beyond the likelihood of renewed armed conflict.  
 
On the basis of our interviews, the personal experience of the war was regularly 
used to explain and justify positions and perspectives in interviews with 
government officials.  For example, one senior official in the Office of Public 
Security, Law and Order stated that for him peace was the existence of self-
government.146  This official had been an active member of the KLA in the lead up to 
and during the conflict in 1999.  His perspective of what constitutes peace is 
strongly conditioned by the reasons for which he joined the KLA initially.  He readily 
accepts that Kosovo faces many problems, but for him, the ability of Kosovars to 
manage their affairs, including their conflicts is a strong indicator of peace.  This 
perspective is personal to the individual, however it was a sentiment often 
repeated by officials in informal and formal contexts during the research for this 
thesis.   
                                                       
145 Key Informant Interview with former Kosovo Police official responsible for weapons licensing.  
Pristina,  June 2011. 
146 Interview with a director-level government official in the Kosovo Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
Pristina. July 2011. 
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As regards what Muslieu (2011) describes as the ‘Northern Question’, there is no 
single document which sets out exactly what constitutes peace for the government 
of Kosovo.  However, for the Prime Minister, his stated priority is recognition of 
Kosovo’s independent status by other countries. The biggest block to this in his 
eyes, is recognition on the part of the government of Serbia and a normalisation of 
relations between the two states.  For instance, in an interview in September 2010 
he stated: 
 
“I think it's time for Serbia to accept the reality and to take a historical decision to 
recognize the independence of Kosovo because it is the only solution for the better 
future for Kosovo and for the region, for stability and regional cooperation...”147 
 
To understand the interrelationships between peacebuilding and SALW control 
efforts, it is important to consider how Government officials perceive the presence 
of SALW as a factor determining the role and functioning of the state.  In this case it 
appears from interviews that it is not the SALW as a physical object that gives rise 
to concern.  Rather, it is the actors and actions associated with weapons ownership 
which are seen as the threat to the effectiveness and reach of the state.   
 
Respondents grouped this threat into two distinct areas: ownership, use and 
potential use of SALW by criminals and those associated with organised crime 
activities; and SALW held by individuals and groups in northern Kosovo in particular, 
which pose a direct threat to the ability of the Government to exercise control over 
its territory.  The first group of concerns are common to most countries and as such 
it is not surprising that this dimension of the SALW control problem is present in 
Kosovo.  The second however is of particular concern to government and 
international actors alike.  The testimony of those involved in SALW control efforts 
and responsible for supporting public security, law and order suggests that 
weapons are readily available and on display in northern Kosovo and in particular in 
                                                       
147 Interview for Radio Free Europe with Hashim Thaci, 10 September 2010. 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Interview_PM_Thaci_Talks_About_The_UNs_Kosovo_Resolution/215
4499.html.  Accessed 2 January 2012. 
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northern Mitrovica.  One senior Kosovo-Serb who has lived in northern Mitrovica 
since the end of the war working on a variety of peacebuilding initiatives recounted 
an experience that he had in 2010: 
 
“We organised an event for Europe Day. It was a music festival and not at all political.  
In the evening a young guy came on the stage with a hand-grenade.  He was also 
armed with a pistol.  He told us to take the Europe flag down which was on the stage 
and replace it with a Serbian flag otherwise he would throw the grenade.”148 
 
Finally, the most common reason given in focus groups for why Kosovo will not 
return to war is that it has emerged from a period of violent conflict in which most 
people were significantly affected, and that it is not in the interests of anyone to 
precipitate a return to violence again in the future.  The same people also often 
cited the perceived rise in violent crime, including shootings as a major threat to 
public safety, law and order.  A local NGO leader on Peja reported to the author 
that the night before their planned meeting, a shooting had taken place: 
 
“This very place last night, some of the big guys got arguing and shots were fired.  
One of them was killed and others were injured.  This is very regular.  Now we are 
here in the same place some few hours later and there’s nothing to show anything 
happened.  For us it is normal.”149 
 
As such, they described the importance of more effective SALW control in the 
context of reducing armed crime and promoting more effective rule of law.  Whilst 
in the past, international agencies in particular had promoted SALW control as a 
means by which peace could be attained and sustained as relates to the war 
between KLA, NATO and the Yugoslav security forces150, this was not necessarily a 
                                                       
148 Male, interview with the author, Mitrovica, June 2011. 
149 Male, interview with the author, Hotel Mogador, Peja. June 2011. 
150 In Kosovo previous national-level attempts led by a combination of the Government of Kosovo 
and the UN to control SALW have been based on an assumption that a reduction in the volumes of 
weapons will lead directly to a reduction in the likelihood of a further outbreak of violent conflict, 
and further that the process of surrendering weapons will have a positive peacebuilding and 
reconciliatory effect. The ISAC project aims were “…to sensitise the population to the small arms 
problem, remove illicit weapons from society, reduce the negative effects of small arms, foster 
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logic which held with members of the public in the interviews conducted for this 
thesis.   
 
There are however important exceptions to this statement. For example, Kosovo-
Serb respondents felt that the availability of SALW was both a reason not to disarm, 
and a driver of criminality.  In Mitrovica, residents made it clear that they would not 
consider participating in a voluntary weapons collection process as they did not 
believe that the Albanian population would do the same in good faith.  This 
reflected both a sense of disenfranchisement with the development of the State of 
Kosovo as well as a deep distrust of the Albanian majority in the southern part of 
the city.151  
4.6.3.5 Other contextual factors which affect the nature of interrelationships 
between SALW control and peacebuilding activities 
In addition to the perceptions of the public and decision makers and influencers 
regarding SALW and their relationship to peace and conflict, there are a small 
number of other factors which arose from the case study research.  Each of these 
factors closely relates to the perceptions discussed above and their effect on how 
communities and decision makers have conceived problems and responses.  
However, they are distinct and of value given the impact that these factors are 
likely to have on how the broader context interacts with SALW and peacebuilding 
challenges and opportunities.  
 
Using the analytical framework often employed as part of conflict analyses (see for 
instance the UK Strategic Conflict Analysis or Joint Assessment of Conflict and 
Stability methodologies introduced in Chapter 2) the following are of particular 
importance to addressing the focus of this thesis. 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
popular participation in political decision making, while at the same time promoting development at 
the local level” (Kharkee and Florquin, 2003:3). 
151 Key informant interviews in Mitrovica, Zubin Potok and Leposavic, December 2010 and June 
2011. 
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Economic factors: Earlier in this section the change in how a particular community 
perceived the value of their weapons, from an initial focus on the goodwill that 
surrender could engender to one in which the financial value was recognised, and 
the way in which this shaped their attitudes towards SALW collection efforts, was 
described.152  In other locations, whilst the nature of this understanding was 
different, the economic dimension was similarly catalytic in how it affected 
interrelationships.   
 
In Debbelder for instance, weapons were not surrendered by ex-KLA fighters at the 
end of the war when requested.  One reason was that the individuals had had to 
purchase their own weapons when they joined up.  At the time that disarmament 
was requested there was still considerable fear that conflict would reignite and that 
the soldiers would be required to return to combat in some form.  They were 
concerned that if this were the case, they would have to buy new weapons.  It was 
their perception that avoiding this cost was a significant factor in their decision not 
to disarm.  Similarly, the initial cost of buying weapons, following a four day walk to 
Albania and back was a factor cited by a senior KLA commander for the difficulties 
that many former fighters had in surrendering them.153 
 
In interviews in several locations including Peja, Gracanica, and Pristina, 
respondents claimed that there was a significant relationship between the financial 
value of weapons and the importance of renewed efforts to control them.  In 
Gracanica for instance, focus group participants stated that with the passage of 
time since the end of the war, owning weapons for personal protection was less a 
driver, and that consequently there was a greater danger that owners would 
consider selling to maximise the “return on their investments”.154 
 
Further, they believed that as the desire for people to purchase weapons for their 
own security or to join a defence force in the event of renewed conflict had 
                                                       
152 Germova. 
153 Key informant interview, Pristina, March 2012. 
154 Male FDG participant, Gracanica, February 2012. 
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dissipated, and as there was no incentive provided to surrender weapons for some 
form of benefit by the State, sales into the criminal market were the only realistic 
option for someone interested in selling their weapon.   For these FGD participants 
the changing dynamics driving ownership were a cause of real concern: 
 
“Most of us have weapons.  Most of them are in a field or something. We needed 
them before but not now.  So they are not any danger to anyone.  But if in these 
times people have to sell them to make some money to buy what they need then the 
criminals will buy them and they will become dangerous again.”155 
 
Security factors: Perceptions of who the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ were in the conflict 
were often cited as helping to shape decisions regarding weapons surrender.  
Kosovo-Serb people in northern Mitrovica for instance stated that as the minority 
population who had suffered reprisals at the end of the war, they needed their 
weapons for personal protection as they had no trust in the State of Kosovo to 
extend them impartial and effective protection from violence.156  In Gjakova, one of 
the places most affected by the war, interviewees claimed that the threat from 
others would never fully recede and that as time passed the interest of current 
protectors would wane and this would place them in peril once again.157  For this 
reason they should use the opportunity of relative peace to arm themselves so that 
they are better prepared in future.  These perceptions are important in that they 
suggest that for some, weapons and weapons ownership remain in one way at least 
closely connected to conflict, fear of conflict and peace.   
 
Individual and community experiences of insecurity and conflict appear to condition 
how they perceive SALW to relate to peace and peace-building, and whether, and 
to what extent they would see SALW control activities as commensurate with 
building peace.  In Gjakova for instance, interviewees were clear that attempts to 
reduce SALW ownership would be contrary to their visions for what peace might 
look like, and were explicit in stating that SALW activities would not be seen as a 
                                                       
155 FGD participant, Gracanica. 
156 KII, Mitrovica, July 2011. 
157 KII, Gjakova, July 2011. 
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peacebuilding contribution, unless they took place at the regional level.158  
Whereas, in Peja, interviewees thought that further SALW control activities could 
be beneficial to enhanced peace if they were undertaken in a way which was 
sympathetic to the citizens’ experience of conflict.159  
 
Social factors: Saferworld has conducted regular population surveys in Kosovo since 
2006 which aim to record and analyse the perspectives of members of the public 
with regard to public security and SALW possession and use.  As the distance from 
the war has grown, people have reported improved feelings of personal and 
national security.  Concurrently, there has also been a similar change in the 
perspectives of respondents regarding their requirement to own or access 
weaponry.  This trend suggests that there is an interrelationship between greater 
peace and a reduced interest in owning weapons for the purposes of protection; 
and conversely between perceptions of insecurity and the desire for weapons.   
 
In recent years however, despite a reduction in the perceptions by members of the 
public who believe that renewed conflict with Kosovo’s neighbours is unlikely, there 
remains a significant proportion of the population who are fearful of local crime 
and its effects.  This fear is supported by low levels of trust in security and justice 
providers and in the ability of politicians to provide solutions to political problems.  
But it is not attended by a significantly enhanced desire to own weapons specifically 
to address fear of crime. 
 
It would appear from the available data that social factors, particularly fear of crime 
are not major drivers of SALW ownership.  The clearest connection that people 
make between SALW and crime is with the criminals who are armed and who may 
traffic weapons along with other illegal goods and services. 
   
Political Factors: The concepts of peace and SALW ownership and use have been 
part of the dominant political narratives in Kosovo for several decades.  Since the 
                                                       
158 Op cit. 
159 KII, local community leader, Peja town, July 2011. 
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early 1990s when Kosovo’s position within Serbia and the wider Yugoslavia began 
to be challenged by the movement which became the LDK, this has been 
particularly evident.  The demands for better service provision and greater 
autonomy within Yugoslavia, which later became an all-out independence and 
liberation movement were framed around a claim that with independence would 
come peace and development.  
 
In the early and mid-1990s the dominant movement within Kosovo promoted a 
non-violent approach to reaching this goal.  As the situation for Kosovo-Albanians 
deteriorated, calls for an approach predicated on violent resistance gained more 
traction, resulting in the mobilisation of the KLA.  The KLA promoted its armed 
struggle in part through an effective use of symbolism, perhaps best demonstrated 
by the figure of the lone warrior carrying an AK47 to defend his people and of the 
mule trains that crossed back and forth into northern Albania to bring SALW and 
ammunition into Kosovo to supply the KLA fighters.160  Following the end of the war 
in 1999, the ex-KLA commanders became the leaders of several political parties, 
most powerful amongst them the PDK, the party of the current Prime Minister 
Hashim Thaci.  The heroes of the revolution were commemorated in statues and 
memorials, often holding their weapons and the most poignant symbol of the 
armed resistance, Ardem Jeshari remains ever present in public life, with a 
photograph of him in uniform holding his AK47 over 20 meters high in the centre of 
Pristina. 
Against this backdrop, contemporary politics in Kosovo remains heavily influenced 
by the legacy of armed conflict.  For Kosovo-Albanians and some minorities, 
weapons and particularly SALW are explicitly linked with the struggle for 
independence, against oppression and for peace and development.  The role of the 
KLA – now Kosovo Security Force (KSF) is still significant, veterans associations 
maintain a high profile in public life and politics continues to be dominated by those 
who were centrally involved in the conflict.  This relationship is reinforced by the 
                                                       
160 The person depicted in this imagery is Ardem Jashari, a KLA commander who was killed during 
the war following the massacre of his family by Serbian internal security forces in the Drenica area of 
Kosovo – which is generally perceived to have been the heart of the KLA resistance.  
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continued political (and sometimes violent) conflict over the future of the north of 
the country.   
 
The current government in Pristina is accused by some of focussing on the north to 
deflect attention away from what are seen as failed social and economic policies.  
The ‘northern problem’ (Musliu 2012) is seen by many Kosovo Albanians as 
unfinished business; only when this is resolved can the country finally find peace.  
The combination of political rhetoric, the iconography of the 1999 war and the 
relationships of current leaders to the conflict all contribute to a context where 
SALW are connected closely to the struggle for peace and the ownership of the 
legacy of 1999. 
 
For Kosovo-Serbs, and particularly their political leaders, although the political goals 
are very different from their Kosovo-Albanian counterparts, the relationship 
between politics, struggle, peace and SALW is similar.  Following the end of the war, 
large numbers of Serbs fled the country or were displaced into the northern 
municipalities where many remain today.  Despite the origins of the conflict and the 
Kosovo-Albanian struggle for independence, many Kosovo-Serbs feel aggrieved at 
their current situation and feel under considerable threat from politicians in 
Pristina, who are considered weak, criminalised and predatory.  Since the end of 
the war, Kosovo-Serbs in the northern municipalities have been led by politicians 
who take a hard and uncompromising line on the legitimacy of Pristina rule.  This is 
combined with a narrative from politicians and other leading figures that self-
protection is the only means by which Kosovo-Serbs can defend themselves and 
their cultures and traditions.  In this context, SALW availability and ownership is 
seen by Kosovo-Serbs as part of their self-defence, a perception reinforced regularly 
by mainstream politics which asserts the need for struggle, self-defence and 
rejection of rule by Pristina. 
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Environmental factors: In at least two locations the link between weapons 
ownership and the natural environment was explicit (Germova and Peja161).  In 
regular surveys conducted by Saferworld since 2006, the most common aspect of 
the environmental context raised by members of the public are the perceived 
dangers posed by wild dogs.  People living in rural areas in particular appear 
genuinely fearful of wild dogs as a threat both to public health generally and to 
children specifically.   
 
The contemporary origins of this fear are unclear, however there are indicators: 
Prior to the war, many people particularly rural dwellers kept dogs for security and 
for their work (shepherds, farm dogs and hunting dogs).  During the war, many of 
these animals were abandoned and those that survived often did so by scavenging 
around human settlements; they were able to breed and this gave rise to significant 
numbers of dogs living in packs around the peripheries of villages and towns.  
Villagers in Germova for instance identified the fear of, and dangers posed by, wild 
dogs as one of their most significant safety and security fears when asked in 
2006.162  They claim that the movement of people away from the village and the 
decision taken by most remaining residents not to work their land due to a fear of 
attack caused by the conflict led to significant numbers of livestock dying.  Further 
they claim that as a consequence of fighting in and around the village, people were 
killed and their bodies were not always recovered.  The combination of livestock 
and human remains attracted wild dogs and wolves from the surrounding hills to 
the village in search of food.  They believe that in addition to the real potential 
dangers of dogs attacking people, that the association that local people had with 
the presence of the animals had a strong psychological effect.  Thus, as late as 
2005, when asked what actions could be taken to address local security concerns, 
                                                       
161 FDG in Germova for this thesis (July 2011) and previous research by the author (see footnote 
below); KIIs in Peja, July 2011. 
162 Rynn and Smith (2006). 
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the issue of controlling wild dogs was identified as one which could make a 
significant contribution to the development and recovery of the village.163 
 
The only other reference to the natural environment raised by interviewees was the 
remoteness of particular settlements and the fear that this caused in the past in 
relation to the ability of local people to protect themselves if they came under 
attack.  The most remote parts of Kosovo include the mountainous border areas 
with Montenegro in the west, Albania in the south, Macedonia in the east and 
Serbia in the north and east.  The distance from the municipal centre164, the 
amount of time it would take for help to arrive165, and the feeling that being out of 
sight equated with being out of the minds of local security providers166 were all 
identified in focus group discussions.  However, these issues, whilst having an 
environmental dimension are also strongly related to security provision and 
governance and as such have been addressed in the social and political section 
above. 
 
Cultural factors: In Kosovo, as with Albania and Albanian communities in western 
Macedonia and southern Serbia, academics and commentators have claimed that 
aspects of the Kanun system introduced in the early part of this chapter still prevail.  
The Kanun is not well understood outside the wider Albanian community and is 
sometimes characterised as a system of resolving disputes based on the principal of 
revenge.  Whilst this is a very crude caricature, aspects can be interpreted as 
permitting forms of retaliatory action against the family of those who have 
transgressed accepted rules and behaviours.  This helps in establishing a 
perspective amongst some that there is a gun culture in existence in Albanian 
society which promotes self-defence, and the ability of the male family members to 
protect their clan and take up arms as warriors when required to do so in defence 
of their people.  
                                                       
163 Interviews between the author and Germova village council, 2005-6 as part of initial research and 
programme design for a Community Safety project in Germova. See Sokolova and Smith (2006) for 
example of how wild dogs were raised as an issue of concern. 
164 FGD Debellder, July 2012. 
165 FGD Germova, July 2012. 
166 FGD Lubinje, July 2012. 
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Research conducted for UNDP in 2007 found no evidence that there is in reality 
specifically a gun culture either in Kosovo, or amongst either Albanians or Serbs 
(Guenev et al 2007).  The continued existence and presence of weapons in society 
was instead attributed to the legacy of the war, and the period leading up to it 
during which large numbers of weapons were brought into the country in 
readiness.  This would appear to be supported by the findings from population 
surveys undertaken in Kosovo over recent years.  When asked whether they would 
like to own to weapon and whether weapons made people safer, respondents 
regularly demonstrated both a disinclination to own weapons, and the recognition 
that ultimately ownership of a weapon is unlikely to have a material impact on 
personal security. 
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4.7 Chapter conclusions  
In addition to the Kosovo-specific analysis and findings contained in this chapter, in 
applying the analytical framework developed in previous chapters to the case of 
Kosovo, a small number of significant themes which draw together the various 
aspects of the interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and build peace 
in countries emerging from periods of violent conflict can be identified.  These are 
described in the following section, and are analysed as they apply across the range 
of different contexts included in Chapter 3 of this thesis in Chapter 5. 
 
The first of these themes has been described in the sections relating to contingency 
earlier in this chapter.  It is clear in the case of Kosovo that the importance of 
contingency is striking; the ways in which perceptions of the role and function of 
international agencies as peace builders and SALW controllers was heavily 
determined by how over time the performance of these institutions was assessed 
by those with whom they interacted.  There are two related dimensions to this 
issue: in addition to direct contingency between a given activity and that which 
followed, such as for instance between ISAC I and ISAC II, the cumulative impact of 
contingency over a period of time between numerous activities was particularly 
critical.  This manifested itself specifically in the way in which the activities and 
those with a role in undertaking them were perceived, and thus the extent to which 
these activities were supported by the public and others.   
 
Strongly related to the dimension of contingency, the length of time that had 
elapsed since the end of the war also seemed to be particularly important in terms 
of how contingency was perceived.  People’s motivations for engaging with 
peacebuilding and SALW control activities changed significantly over time.  In the 
initial period following the end of the war, whilst challenging in the sense that as 
first efforts they had to demonstrate a significant element of innovation, SALW 
control and to some extent, peacebuilding activities were not negatively affected by 
contingency to anywhere near the same extent to those which followed later.  
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Conversely, in later years, during which there was a greater requirement for 
planners and others to be cognisant of what had gone before, there was less of a 
requirement for innovation, partly as they were required to follow particular 
pathways as a consequence of the contingency of previous activities; for instance, 
following the failed 2003 attempt to collect SALW voluntarily, it was clear that there 
was very little appetite with the public and others to attempt similar activities in the 
near future, which in reality closed off one particular option for promoting SALW, 
and by implication directed those involved towards other areas of activity. 
 
Finally as relates to contingency, it is clear in the case of Kosovo that changes in 
context played a major role in the way that contingencies were judged.  For 
instance, the perceived failure of the UN Mission to enhance service delivery and 
provide clear direction with regards to Kosovo’s final status in 2003 changed the 
perception that it was both welcome generally and that it had a role to play in 
SALW control.  Similarly, prior to the UN Mission handover to the EU in 2007 there 
was great anticipation that this would bring forwards faster European integration 
and progress towards independence.  The EU had considerable political and social 
capital at this stage which could have been used to encourage specific aspects of 
peacebuilding, including SALW control.  However, today, with the EULEX widely 
discredited, its role has significantly diminished, and where a small number of years 
ago it would have been a positive factor in people’s decisions to disarm, this is 
clearly no longer the case. 
 
The second important theme - closely related to the effect of context on  
contingency described above - which emerges from the analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 
relates to the role of context  as a significant determining factor in affecting 
interrelationships (as opposed to context affecting contingency which in turn 
affects interrelationships).  It is clear from the research for this thesis that people’s 
attitudes to SALW ownership and use, and particularly their relationship to peace or 
conflict are affected by three important interrelated contextual factors: local 
conflict dynamics; major national issues of identity, sovereignty and security; and 
significant political, social or cultural events or symbols.   
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The precise nature of the way in which a given community has experienced conflict, 
and particularly violent conflict, is critical to how they understand SALW and their 
different roles in society – in peacebuilding terms as well as drivers and sustainers 
of violence and insecurity.  This study shows in Gjakova and to some extent Peja, 
that the levels of violence during the period of KLA armed combat and the damage 
that was done to local communities and infrastructure was such that even today, 13 
years after the end of the conflict, people believe that it is essential that they 
increase their access to SALW in an attempt to provide protection against future 
attack.  In other places, for instance in Debellder or to some extent in Germova, 
where communities have been able to transition more successfully from the period 
of violent conflict, SALW are seen either as a trophy of a time past, or a tradable 
commodity.  And in Mitrovica, and to some extent Gracanica, where the fear of 
renewed violence is strong and members of the community feel both threatened 
and angry, SALW are much more explicitly linked to the day-to-day realities and 
narratives of people’s lives which are heavily conditioned by real (In Mitrovica and 
Kosovo’s northern municipalities) and perceived (in the case of Gracanica) 
insecurity.  
 
Linked to the experiences of conflict felt at the community level, in Kosovo it is clear 
that issues of nationality, sovereignty and security are also highly relevant to how 
SALW are perceived at all levels within society.  There is significant evidence which 
demonstrates that for much of the last decade, despite or in some cases as a result 
of, the best efforts of national and international policy makers and planners, very 
few weapons were put under official control.  During this period there was great 
confusion regarding the final status of Kosovo and this mattered both to the 
majority Albanian community and minority groups, specifically Kosovo Serbs.  The 
lack of clarity and the perception that the international community was 
prevaricating and had lost direction caused considerable tension and unease which 
contributed to a sense that the conflict might not be over, that Kosovo’s ‘national’ 
security had not been safeguarded, and that renewed conflict could break out.   
Taken together these perceptions had a significant impact on the ability of Kosovars 
to look beyond immediate needs and requirements, and contributed towards many 
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people thinking short-term and conservatively in terms of their willingness to 
undertake peace-building activities, including potentially placing SALW under 
greater control.   
 
Finally as relates to important contextual factors, the role of political, social and 
cultural events and icons is important in how people understand the 
interrelationships between controlling SALW and peace-building efforts.  The sight 
of Adem Jashari standing rugged against a mountain backdrop, heavily bearded 
with AK47 in hand is a highly emotive image for many Kosovo-Albanians, 
particularly those who were directly affected by the war, demonstrating heroic 
resistance and bravery closely paralleling the statues and paintings of Skanderbaj, 
King of the Albanians, who fought off the advancing Ottoman armies hundreds of 
years previously.  For Kosovo Serbs this iconography is disturbing, suggesting a 
connection to revolution and violence which brought about the current political 
dispensation which still gives rise to so much tension and upset today.  The small 
arm as an artefact is an appendage to both Serbian and Albanian tradition and 
culture, which places importance on the role of male family members as providers 
(hunters) and protectors (soldiers).  Finally, in the current post-war period, 
Albanians see small arms as a symbol of self-determination and struggle which they 
have reclaimed from the government of Slobodan Milosevic; during his time as 
Serbian President, weapons were associated by Albanians with oppression and 
cultural and ethnic violence. Thus the role of SALW in the cultures and social and 
political histories of both Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians is both significant and 
affective.  It conditions and is conditioned by people’s interpretations of the war 
and the periods before and since, and as such the relationships between efforts to 
control SALW and promote peace specifically. 
 
The third key theme relates to complementarity.  It appears that the role of 
complementarity is important from a programme design and coordination 
perspective.  For instance, recent efforts to improve the legal  basis for controlling 
SALW has taken place at the same time as related efforts to enhance the legislative 
base in related areas including the trade in controlled goods and the activities of 
280 
 
private security providers.  However, to the extent that local people often conflate 
all the different things that are happening in a given context (assessments to design 
SALW control activities and planning for house renovation in 2002/3 in Viti 
municipality for instance) which are undertaken by groups that have similar 
characteristics (in this case UN agencies with foreign staff who visit the village in 
white 4x4 vehicles and ask similar questions regarding village security and recovery 
from conflict), it is possible that they will make connections which might not be 
intended. And so the overall picture of an intervention formed by those it seeks to 
engage with seems highly important and at least as significant as interrelationships 
which might exist at a programme coordination or management level.  Further, 
analysis of the Kosovo case suggests that whilst these overall complementarities 
might be important, they are perhaps not as important or critical as how 
interrelationships are shaped by, and formed through contingency and context. 
 
The final theme which emerges from Chapter 4 relates directly to the role of public 
perceptions in determining the nature and extent of interrelationships.  When 
SALW control efforts have been perceived negatively as part of a weak or negative 
intervention, they can be seen as unrelated to peacebuilding activities, or indeed as 
a negative contribution (for instance the 2003 SALW collection efforts).  Likewise, 
poorly designed and implemented efforts to control SALW that aren’t firmly rooted 
in local context, traditions and behaviours can be counterproductive or even 
negative (for instance the methods chosen for how the 2003 collection was 
organised i.e. through politicians with no direct connection between those 
surrendering weapons and the benefits that followed).  And as described in the 
paragraph above, the perceptions of members of those targeted by multiple 
initiatives taking place in the same period of time and space relating to a specific 
activity or initiative can both effect perceptions of others, and establish overall 
impressions of initiatives with similar characteristics which can be either positive or 
negative and consequently significantly affect the extent to which target 
communities engage with them, and ultimately their success.   
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The issue of public perception and the role of perceptions in shaping realities is 
complex in Kosovo.  Whilst it is clear that the views of communities heavily shape 
their willingness to engage with peacebuilding and SALW control activities, care 
should be taken not to view perceptions as the only factor which drives the success 
or otherwise of these activities:  the weakness of security and justice organisations 
within government, particularly the police, a very weak legal framework, the lack of 
direction regarding the final status of Kosovo, ongoing and very tangible insecurities 
evidenced by regular clashes in the northern municipalities and rising crime across 
the whole of the country, and the effects of contingency and complementarity have 
also been demonstrated to play important roles.   
 
However, in Kosovo, where the injustices leading up to the war, its affects and 
aftermath are still so present in the public consciousness, and where there is such a 
strong narrative that claims that post-1999 international intervention has not 
engaged effectively with the needs and realities of communities, public perception 
and opinion does undoubtedly have a strong determining role and as such should 
be considered carefully in the conceptualisation and delivery of activities to 
promote peace or control SALW.   
 
Acknowledging the critique of the international intervention in Kosovo and its 
relationship with the concept of liberal peacebuilding, and approaching the analysis 
of SALW and peacebuilding efforts in Kosovo from a cosmopolitan conflict 
resolution perspective, the analysis in this chapter has demonstrated that 
interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding efforts in Kosovo exist. 
Further, it demonstrates that they have been affected by contingency, 
complementarity and context.  It has also revealed the significant role played by the 
effects of context on the extent to which SALW control and peacebuilding efforts 
are mutually beneficial.  It has made a contribution to validating the hypothesis 
which frames this thesis.  It has suggested that the framework of analysis which 
draws together models developed by Ramsbotham et al and Lederach amongst 
others has utility in combining concepts of transformational peacebuilding which 
focus on the wide participation of actors, with those which focus on the design and 
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management of initiatives and processes.  However, whilst this chapter presents 
evidence regarding the interrelationships between SALW control efforts and 
peacebuilding activities in Kosovo, further analysis is required to assess the 
generalizability of its findings.  Chapter 5 seeks to do this by drawing together and 
further analysing the findings emerging from this and previous chapters to present 
the overall  conclusions which can be drawn from the research for this thesis. 
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Chapter 5:  Findings and Conclusions  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings and conclusions from the research conducted for 
this thesis.  It follows the overarching research strategy, beginning with a summary 
and further analysis of the main findings, which are organised using the three 
categories of sub-questions set out in Chapter 2. 
   
This is then followed by a presentation of the main conclusions.  These relate both 
to the specific elements of the analytical framework (contingency, complementarity 
and context) as well as to cross-cutting themes and issues and to overall 
conclusions relating to the research approach and methods employed.  The 
chapter, and thus this thesis, concludes with a discussion of areas in which further 
research could be conducted in order to test the conclusions and establish the 
boundaries of their applicability. 
5.2 Summary of main findings 
This section is organised around the three sets of sub-questions posed in Chapters 1 
and 2 and the conceptual framework developed as this thesis has progressed.  It 
draws together findings from Chapters 3 and 4 and provides the basis for the 
conclusions section which follows, which is organised using the same analytical 
framework. It begins with findings most relevant to the effects of contingency on 
interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding activities. This is 
followed by findings which relate to the effect of complementarity, and then by 
those which are relevant to the role of context on interrelationships.  It concludes 
with a presentation of additional cross-cuttings findings which can be drawn from 
the research. 
5.2.1 Category 1: The effect of contingency on SALW - 
Peacebuilding interrelationships  
The questions posed in Chapters 1 and 2 that focus on contingency are as follows: 
 At what stages of de-escalation is the control of SALW particularly relevant 
to peacebuilding efforts, and to what extent are SALW control activities 
located within existing phases of post-conflict peacebuilding? 
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 How does the nature of SALW control activity change over different phases 
of post-conflict peacebuilding? 
 To what extent is the concept of nested paradigms appropriate to efforts to 
control SALW? 
 
Ramsbotham et al (2005:198) identify four stages of de-escalation in what they 
term post-war reconstruction.  These are used in the ‘hourglass model’ (introduced 
in Chapter 2) to categorise the different phases of conflict resolution activity which 
follow a ceasefire agreement.  They label these stages as Intervention, Stabilisation, 
Normalisation and Continuing Transformation.   They link each stage with a form of 
peacebuilding:  Elite peacemaking and peacekeeping for the intervention phase; 
structural peacebuilding for the stabilisation phase; and cultural peacebuilding for 
the normalisation and continuing transformation phases.  The categories used in 
this model are similar to others which work on the principle of conflict escalating 
and then deescalating over time. For instance, Dudouet (2006:15) uses the terms 
Conflict Settlement, Peace Implementation, Peace Consolidation and Peaceful 
Social Change; Lund (1996:38) uses Peacemaking, Peace Enforcement, 
Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding.  
 
It is apparent from the research of this thesis that aspects of SALW control have the 
potential to play an important role at each of these phases, although the nature of 
the activity, its objectives, the degree to which it is integrated or coordinated with 
other activities and the roles of those involved change over time.  The section 
below takes each of the four phases described by Ramsbotham et al, and identifies 
the different SALW control activities which appear from the evidence to be most 
likely and appropriate. 
 
Intervention phase - characterised by peacekeeping and elite peacemaking 
At the point at which agreement to cease armed conflict takes place it is apparent 
that activities to control SALW can play an important part in peacebuilding.  They 
can contribute to building confidence in peace processes through placing weapons 
under greater control, and when linked to other activities, such as disarmament, 
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demobilisation and reintegration, taking combatants and potential ‘spoilers’ off the 
streets and out of the public view.  Indeed, the evidence suggests that SALW 
control activities can be linked explicitly to early peacemaking activities, including 
the peace-agreements which framed peace processes in Sudan, Sierra Leone and 
Kosovo, and that these early links can have a significant impact on how later SALW 
control activities are designed and to the contributions that they are intended to 
make in later de-escalation phases.  
 
The mini-case studies present interesting findings in this regard.  In Macedonia, 
NATO-led disarmament and SALW collection activities were prioritised as part of 
security-building efforts in the immediate period following the Ohrid Agreement 
which brought to an end the armed violence between Albanian separatists and the 
Macedonian Government in 2001.  These were successful in that they brought 
under control several thousand weapons that were held illegally.  The activity also 
served an important purpose in that it demonstrated that the international 
presence in Macedonia was determined to act on its mandate and helped to 
cement the peace agreement in the short-term.  However, as with the KLA 
disarmament activities immediately following the ceasefire in Kosovo (see below), 
the total numbers of weapons collected are thought to be only a portion of what 
was held. Both Macedonia and Kosovo demonstrate that in this early period SALW 
control is of considerable value in establishing a process and opening up 
opportunities for other peacebuilding activity; the collection of large quantities of 
surplus weapons, whilst clearly desirable, is not always realistic given the likely 
nature of the political context.  Further, careful consideration should be given to 
the negative implications of efforts to reduce total holdings if the effects of doing 
so are to undermine public trust in the wider peace process or transition.  
 
From other examples analysed for this thesis the beneficial contribution of SALW 
control to peacebuilding efforts in the periods immediately following the cessation 
of violence is less clear.  For example, in Sudan despite the inclusion of DDR and 
SALW control in the CPA and its implementation plans, the international 
peacekeeping force which was authorised through the UN to supervise the 
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ceasefire agreement did little other than provide a deployable capacity given that it 
had no executive mandate or authorisation to engage proactively in peacebuilding 
activities related to SALW control. The DDR programme, whilst having a significant 
SALW control component, was not initially implemented.  The only initiatives with a 
SALW control dimension which were operationalized at this time were a range of 
different activities which aimed to remove unexploded ordinance and to undertake 
limited demining.  Whilst important, there is little evidence to suggest that this was 
significant in terms of large-scale peacebuilding efforts.   However, whilst the 
benefits of the SALW control aspects of DDR are hard to quantify, it did establish a 
process through which political dialogue was established and sustained between 
different conflicting groups (through the work of the DDR coordination and 
management architecture for instance).  This dialogue process helped to sustain 
confidence in the implementation of the wider peace plan and pave the way for the 
referendum on independence for the South which ultimately provided some clarity 
on the direction and outcomes of the overarching peace process.  
 
In Kosovo, the ceasefire agreement was between NATO and the Serbian armed 
forces.  The agreement included a commitment on behalf of NATO to ensure that 
the conflict within Kosovo would be brought under control and that Serbian lives 
would be protected.  The agreement that NATO entered into with the KLA and 
political representatives of the Kosovo Albanian community included a commitment 
on the part of the KLA to large scale disarmament.  This led to the permanent 
transfer of around 10,000 weapons to NATO control – with the KLA retaining a 
small capacity for ceremonial use under KFOR supervision.  Whilst ex-KLA 
commanders recall how hard this was to do on a personal level, they maintain that 
this decision was important for at least two reasons.  Firstly, this was part of the 
elite peace deal agreed with NATO which ensured a KFOR presence in the territory 
– seen at the time by many as an essential preventative measure against the return 
of Serbian/Yugoslav armed forces.  Secondly, KLA commanders and others both in 
and outside government claim that what they saw as a unilateral disarmament was 
important for demonstrating to Kosovar citizens that the war had ended and the 
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territory had entered a new phase on the pathway to peace, development and 
most importantly, independence. 
 
One of the important functions of the KFOR and UNMIK international policing 
presence was to protect the ceasefire agreement, protect civilians living within 
Kosovo from recurrence of violence and to establish basic security and law and 
order as a step towards the delivery of security and justice services by the state.  
For KFOR, this included finding and removing illegal weapons which remained from 
the conflict. To this end, it undertook regular ‘search and seize’ operations working 
on military intelligence and public ‘tip-off’s’.  Kosovo’s borders were also managed 
by the international presence, which included regular seizures of weapons coming 
into and out of the country. 
 
These activities appear for the most part to have been successful.  It is almost 
certainly the case that significant quantities of KLA weaponry was not surrendered 
as it was stored outside Kosovo and therefore outside the jurisdiction of KFOR.  It is 
also likely that the KFOR seizures only picked up a proportion of the illicit weapons 
and the investigation of weapons related crimes by UNMIK police dealt with only 
part of the problem.  But in interviews and focus group discussions, these activities 
were routinely supported and praised as having helped improve basic security and 
demonstrate that Kosovo was on a new path towards peace. As such, the SALW 
control components of the DDR and seizure-related activities which aimed to 
impose basic security can be seen to have made a useful contribution to the early 
intervention phase, characterised by elite peacemaking (the ceasefire 
arrangements agreed with the KLA) and peacekeeping (the role of KFOR in 
enforcing the agreement).    
 
Overall, this research finds that efforts to control SALW can constitute direct and 
important elements of peace agreements and early peacebuilding processes.  They 
can take a variety of different forms, including being incorporated into DDR 
programmes and confidence and security building activities; as well as entry points 
for wider peace-building activities (e.g. security-sector- community relations both 
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within this, and later phases).  At this stage of de-escalation, greater control of 
SALW can be seen as both symbolic of trust between conflicting sides and of trust in 
a peace process.  But it can also have a material benefit in terms of reducing 
tensions and the potential for further violence which may endanger both the public 
and the nascent peace processes through removing combatants and their weapons 
from the streets and placing them under greater control. 
 
Stabilisation phase characterised by structural peacebuilding activities 
Ramsbotham et al suggest that the goal of security building in the stabilisation 
phase is that “national forces [come] under home government control and [are] 
stronger than challengers” (2005:199).  This is consistent with the objectives of 
stabilisation as described by others167, which focus inter-alia on establishing the 
organisations (for instance, the police) and institutions (for instance rule of law) 
required for effective government which enable the state to consolidate the use of 
force and to begin to deliver services to the population.   
 
There is the potential for significant interrelationships between SALW control 
activities and other peacebuilding contributions at this phase in the recovery 
process.  The act of establishing the rule of law and a monopoly on the use of force 
both require that SALW are brought under the control of authorities, and that their 
agents of all types use SALW in a manner which is legal and accountable as well as 
effective.   
 
This is demonstrated through the Kosovo case study and several of the mini case-
studies.  In Kosovo, in addition to extending the ‘search and seize’ operations from 
the initial peacemaking to structural peacebuilding phases, considerable effort was 
invested in promoting SALW control as part of establishing and promoting the rule 
of law and the institutions responsible for its enforcement.  For instance, a weapons 
authorisation scheme, a precursor to a national system for regulating firearms 
ownership and use, was established.  This was done in part to begin to bring under 
                                                       
167 For example, see The UK Approach to Stabilisation: Stabilisation Unit Guidance Notes.  
Stabilisation Unit (2008). 
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greater control quantities of privately owned and illicit SALW, and partly as a way of 
demonstrating to the public that there was a means by which civilians could own 
weapons legally.  Similarly, early efforts were made to promote the surrender by 
civilians of particular types of weapons which could not be registered and therefore 
legalised.  This was attempted to encourage weapons reduction, but also through 
the means by which the programme was constructed, to promote community 
cohesion and municipal governance.  The new police service, the KPS, focussed on 
tackling aspects of gun crime, and the police officers were instructed in firearms use 
in an effort to minimise both the occasions in which they were used and the 
manner in which they were discharged.   
 
Evidence from the mini case-studies is similarly instructive in demonstrating 
interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and structural peacebuilding 
activities.  For instance, in Sierra Leone efforts to improve policing took place within 
the same framework as SALW control activities.  This approach has been followed in 
a number of different examples, including South Sudan or in Bosnia Herzegovina 
during the stabilisation phase in each case.  In each, the responsibility for 
overseeing SALW control efforts was vested in newly created ministries of internal 
affairs, and in each, the police was the executive agency responsible for the 
implementation of resulting policies.  It was also in each case part of a process of 
empowering ministries of internal affairs through wider programmes of institution 
building. These have included establishing national SALW control focal points or 
commissions responsible for developing and overseeing SALW control policy, 
developing the legislative basis including proscribing certain weapons, owners and 
uses, and enhancing police capacity to enforce laws and procedures. 
 
To differing degrees, there have been attempts to involve a wider cross-section of 
the population in these institutional development activities.  However they have 
met with mixed success.  Some have made positive contributions in certain areas.  
For instance the involvement of community focussed actions in Sri Lanka helped the 
National Commission engage in a nationwide grass-roots consultation with affected 
communities, significantly enhancing local confidence and providing the 
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Commission with clear insights into the problem in different parts of the Country.  
Similarly in Kenya and Uganda, whilst ultimately the impact of the multi-actor 
National Focal Points on addressing SALW problems has been limited (see below), 
the involvement of wider groups of actors has had positive implications: Civilian law 
enforcement agencies were provided with a role in Uganda which reduced what 
was until then a closed and unaccountable military leadership of the issue; and in 
Kenya, local government, Wildlife Service and NGO involvement led to greater 
coordination between sectors, and later helped establish interesting and innovative 
community approaches to SALW control.  
 
However, despite these at least partially positive examples, other attempts to 
involve a wider group of actors have been less successful. For instance, the 
establishment of national commissions to control SALW in contexts including Sri 
Lanka, Sierra Leone and Uganda has not had significant impact.  Well intentioned 
attempts to include civil society groups in committees largely comprising national 
security actors has contributed to their failure to play a meaningful role in the 
development and oversight of SALW control policies and strategy.  For instance, in 
Uganda, the mistrust felt towards the civil society representatives meant that in 
effect the national commission was side-lined and to this day plays no significant 
role on SALW control issues as they affect the post-conflict areas in the north of the 
country recovering from the armed conflict with the LRA and other armed groups.   
Where national commissions or focal points have included a wider cross-section of 
actors, this does not necessarily mean that a wider-cross section of the population 
was involved.  In Sri Lanka for instance, the allocation of two positions on the 
Commission were taken up by one government NGO appointee and the 
representative from the largest national NGO in the country: in both cases these 
individuals came from an elite group in society with little day-to-day experience of 
the effects of SALW on ongoing conflict and violence in affected parts of the 
country.   
 
Where SALW control activities have been attempted successfully as part of the 
stabilisation phase of peacebuilding efforts, this research suggests that they have 
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included a limited range of actors and have been beneficial to those directly 
involved.  For instance, law enforcement activities to remove illicit SALW from the 
public and from criminal groups as part of the state beginning to monopolise use of 
force were welcomed by those involved in states in the Western Balkans and Sri 
Lanka, namely the police and other internal security actors. 
 
Where SALW control has been attempted without significant clarity on the part of 
the Government and its agents, and where public consent has not been given, 
however implicitly, there have been significant and often damaging consequences.  
Perhaps most damagingly in the contexts examined for this thesis, this occurred in 
South Sudan:  poorly planned and executed coercive civilian SALW collection 
programmes led to the deaths of around 6,000 people in the years following the 
signing of the CPA.  The perception amongst the public that they would not be 
protected from others if they surrendered their weapons played a major part in 
this.  Simultaneous efforts to promote a community-led approach which combined 
the surrender of SALW with explicit public commitments from the State Governor 
that protection would be provided, coupled with an incentive programme offering 
development benefits, led to significant numbers of weapons being surrendered 
voluntarily with no major violence ensuing.  These events are similar, although on a 
larger scale to both northern Kenya and northern Uganda where coercive SALW 
control activities seen as part of the ‘stabilisation’ process of extending the reach of 
the state were widely rejected and many people (including government security 
officials) were killed. 
 
It would appear from this research that SALW control activities in this ‘structural’ 
phase of peacebuilding can play an important role.  They seem to be most 
successful in this regard when they are focussed on supporting the development of 
a given organisation and institution, particularly when it is set to benefit from the 
changes. However, where the consent of the public is required, or where the 
targets of the activity are those who do not stand to benefit immediately, then 
SALW control activities are higher risk and are more likely to have negative 
consequences if they are not carefully planned and implemented. 
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Normalisation, characterised by cultural peacebuilding 
The benefits that have been accrued in broad peacebuilding terms from SALW 
control efforts in post-conflict contexts can relatively easily be seen in the 
‘normalisation’ phase.  Activities at this time often display similar characteristics 
which set them apart from SALW control efforts during other phases. The 
conditions in which these activities are undertaken are more permissive, the 
security context allows for greater public participation, the ‘state’ is often more 
capable of providing security and access to justice for its citizenry, and the threat of 
immediate widespread violence has receded. In these contexts, SALW control 
efforts can have multiple purposes including reducing quantities of available 
weaponry, demonstrating public trust in peace and political processes, and 
encouraging local-level confidence building between and within communities.  
Consequently, they often feature significant levels of public participation, are 
incentive-based rather than coercive and involve a broader range of government 
actors, including the police, local government, and departments of education and 
health as well as military and peacekeeping actors. 
 
In Kosovo, these activities included public awareness campaigns encouraging SALW 
owners to register their weapons, warnings of the dangers of weapons being made 
accessible to children through poor storage at home and of the dangers of weapons 
being taken into schools, hospitals and other public institutions. Whilst wide-scale 
incentive programmes were not attempted again following earlier failures, 
considerable effort was invested by Kosovo institutions and international bodies in 
promoting municipal and community-based safety and security initiatives including 
establishing police/community forums and other public safety initiatives. In these 
cases, whilst the initiatives were not themselves framed around SALW control 
objectives, they were guided by a view that through encouraging local-level 
participation and accountability, the governance and effectiveness of local security 
actors, principally the police would be improved and the motivation for owning 
weapons would be reduced.   
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The mini case-studies are also instructive in helping to identify the 
interrelationships between SALW control efforts and ‘cultural’ peacebuilding 
activities. For example, incentivised voluntary SALW collection processes organised 
by governments in Macedonia, Bosnia and Sierra Leone yielded significant amounts 
of weapons in contrast to similarly incentivised efforts in earlier phases of de-
escalation which were complemented, and in the case of Macedonia, replaced, by 
coercive ‘search and seize’ activities.  Likewise, locally focused collection and 
disarmament activities led by local leaders in Kenya in particular tangibly reduced 
locally held weapons stocks and encouraged the reintegration of former armed 
groups back into their communities. In both state and locally organised cases, the 
success could be viewed as an indicator of an improving local conflict and security 
context in which personal weapons ownership was not perceived as central to 
personal security, and a willingness to place greater trust in authority and its ability 
to provide security and justice to the population.  It may also be symptomatic of 
improved understandings and positive relationships between different competing 
ethnic or social groups.   
 
These consent-based SALW control activities which have been attempted with 
varying degrees of success by national governments and UN agencies for a number 
of years have placed a significant premium on the role that SALW control can have 
on encouraging enhanced social interaction between effected populations.  For 
example, in Kenya and Uganda, in contrast to national government-led coercive 
SALW control activities which damaged local faith in the state’s commitment to 
their safety and security, community-led efforts to control SALW through 
addressing the motivations and behaviours of those misusing weapons focussed 
explicitly on the benefits to be derived from reintegrating former fighters back into 
their communities through giving them positive roles to play in community life.  In 
Bosnia Herzegovina and Sierra Leone during the normalisation phases of 
peacebuilding community development benefits, rather than coercive actions were 
used extensively to encourage the surrender of SALW    
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However, in the case of early efforts in the Western Balkans in particular (where the 
UNDP placed considerable focus in the late 1990’s and the early part of the first 
decade of 2000s), national, and to some extent, local government ownership was 
often weak and the successes that were achieved on a case-by-case basis often did 
not translate into national-level policies or ongoing commitments. For instance, 
despite ‘national action plans’ being developed in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Serbia there is no evidence to suggest that these were ever 
reviewed by government or that government bodies were held to account for their 
implementation and results.   
 
In addition to raising questions about the model of ‘national action plans’, the 
Western Balkans experience in this regard is interesting: it would appear that the 
lack of ownership nationally was significant – suggesting that in this case, there is 
little if any positive correlation between the degree of international control over 
local governance and national implementation.  
 
The analysis of the data relating to the interrelationships between SALW control 
efforts and cultural peacebuilding activities in the normalisation phase of 
peacebuilding shows that the benefits of participatory and often local-level SALW 
control efforts can be significant in terms of improving local-level community 
cohesion, bringing the police and other parts of the state into closer cooperation 
with communities, and in terms of addressing local-level perceptions of insecurity 
and of the perceived relationships between SALW and security.  
 
The case studies highlight the benefits which were accrued in Kosovo, Kenya and in 
Jonglei State in South Sudan in terms of changing attitudes and actions as regards 
SALW ownership.  They also demonstrate how SALW control activities can link 
closely and beneficially with other security and peacebuilding efforts, including 
police development and reform and other SSR activities. However, it is unclear to 
what extent this positive contribution translates into more sustainable and wide-
scale transformation.  This is particularly the case in terms of the extent to which 
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stand-alone, locally driven, activities can be replicated nationally in a way which 
contributes to, and reinforces efforts to promote structural peacebuilding.  
 
In none of the cases reviewed in this research is it clear that successful local 
initiatives were replicated successfully widely at a national level.  In some places, 
Viti Municipality in Kosovo or Jonglei in South Sudan for instance, there is some 
evidence that local governance structures attempted to frame and facilitate 
implementation across wider areas under their jurisdiction.  However it appears 
that where this was successful it was in areas of work directly under their control; 
district level meetings and events rather than community-based activity which 
required substantial local level engagement, trust and risk taking on the part of 
those involved.  
 
Continuing transformation 
This phase, sometimes characterised by the period following the withdrawal of a 
major international peacebuilding presence168 occurs sometime after the end of 
large-scale violence and at a time following initial peacebuilding and state-building 
efforts.   
 
It is clear from the evidence that efforts to control SALW do have a role in ongoing 
phases of peacebuilding.  However as the threat of armed violence recedes, it 
would appear that SALW control initiatives are more effective when they are 
embedded within other areas of transformation and peacebuilding, including 
ongoing efforts to improve community security and to develop police and criminal 
justice capacity. 
 
                                                       
168 Ramsbotham et al (2005) suggest that by this stage, international peacebuilding missions will 
have been handed over to national actors, and the Missions will have withdrawn.  This distinction is 
not made however by Lederach (1997) or Lund (1996) whose models are intended to cover a wider 
range of contexts which might never feature a major international peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
effort.  This more nuanced approach allows for the application of this model to contexts such as 
Uganda and Kenya where local actors or national government have always led peacebuilding and 
SALW control efforts, which international actors playing differing supporting roles.  
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This is perhaps because, at this stage, SALW are seen as less relevant to the direct 
security needs of the population than may be the case during earlier phases of 
peacebuilding.  Consequently, as insecurity has to some extent been addressed, the 
symbolism attached to SALW by members of the public changes, as do the 
perceptions of threat associated with the availability of SALW:  weapons may come 
to be seen as symbolic of a period of struggle rather than a necessary requirement 
for personal or community security, and the dangers posed by the use of weapons 
by organised crime groups and others may challenge previously held perceptions 
that widespread SALW ownership is a means by which security can be achieved. 
 
Of the examples analysed for this thesis, Kosovo is perhaps currently in this phase 
of its de-escalation.  As discussed in Chapter 4, Kosovo has over recent years been 
the location for the development of the concept of community security 
programmes.  These have the explicit goal of improving social interaction at a 
community level, including interaction between local service providers and the 
wider population in order to improve local human security and to contribute to 
similar efforts at the regional and national levels.  This concept has been proven to 
help create the conditions under which illegally held SALW may be surrendered by 
populations who feel that their security has improved and that they have enough 
oversight or control over its provision to place trust in others to provide it.  This 
concept has been applied with some success in other Western Balkan contexts169, 
and is explored in terms of its positive contribution in the mini case-studies of 
Kenya, Uganda and Sierra Leone.  However, this success is not apparent in the case 
of either South Sudan or Sri Lanka.  
 
From this research it is possible to demonstrate that one of the reasons for these 
differing experiences is the conflict and peacebuilding context in which they took 
place.  Kosovo and its neighbours, and the parts of Kenya and Uganda where 
                                                       
169 In Macedonia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia community security building activities have 
been attempted with some success by a combination of local and central government, NGOs and 
international agencies (principally the UNDP).  However, to date of the countries of the Western 
Balkans only the Government of Kosovo has developed a national Community Security Strategy 
which aims to apply the lessons of local level pilot projects across the country. 
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success is evident are currently in the later stages of de-escalation (‘normalisation 
and continuing transformation’ according to Ramsbotham et al, ‘Peaceful social 
change’ according to Dudouet, and ‘peacebuilding’ according to Lund).  South 
Sudan in 2006-8 and Sri Lanka following the end of the war in 2010 were both 
contexts in which there was an absence of large-scale political conflict, but where 
there was little interaction between conflicting groups, very poor service provision 
for affected populations and no obvious peacebuilding ‘processes’ which were 
owned by all sides. This suggests that an approach which focuses heavily on 
community involvement and interaction as a means of stimulating enhanced SALW 
control can work particularly well under conditions where ‘enough’ peace has been 
built as a precursor to such an intervention. 
5.2.2  Category 2: The effect of complementarity on 
interrelationships 
The main question which framed the research for this aspect of the analytical 
framework was as follows: 
 What are the relevant intra- and inter- sectoral relationships between 
efforts to control SALW and recognised post-conflict peacebuilding 
interventions? 
 
This section presents the findings and further develops the analysis arising from the 
research for this thesis.  It first examines inter-sectoral relationships and then 
proceeds to examine the roles that SALW control can have as a cross cutting issue.  
In both cases it is mindful of the positive and negative contributions that SALW 
control efforts can have on peacebuilding, as well as the positive and negative 
effects of peacebuilding activities on opportunities to improve SALW control.  
 
It is clear from this research that SALW control efforts are often embedded within 
sectoral interventions.  This appears to most often be the case in security sector 
interventions.  These differ over different phases of de-escalation and peace-
building activity.  For example, in Kosovo, the initial international intervention and 
peacemaking phase included SALW control within an agreement for the KLA to 
undergo a DDR programme.  During the stabilisation phase, SALW control was 
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located within efforts to impose the rule of law (search and seize of illicit weapons) 
as well as in the establishment of a new police service (improving policing standards 
and capacity, including non-lethal law enforcement techniques).   
 
During these phases, with close proximity to active violence, the SALW control 
component of security sector programmes was quite significant.  However, over 
time, it is possible to observe that ongoing security sector programmes focus more 
on accountability and oversight issues as well as ongoing organisational 
development, and rather less on either the impacts of uncontrolled SALW or the 
requirement to control them more effectively. 
 
Further, as phases of peacebuilding move away from periods of violent conflict, 
there is strong evidence SALW control issues become more enveloped within other 
sector-specific activities.  For instance, over recent years in Kosovo, efforts to 
control SALW have focussed on developing national legislation and policy as well as 
the capacity of government and public institutions to hold to account those 
responsible for their implementation.  These activities fall more easily within an 
approach to improving ‘governance’ in Kosovo, sometimes described as a separate 
intervention sector by planners and programmers.  In other contexts where SALW 
have had a significant impact on rising violent crime some time following the end of 
conflict, SALW control activities have focused on addressing the impacts of SALW 
violence on public health and in this case, are most easily located within health 
sector interventions.170 
 
SALW control activities can also be designed as stand-alone efforts.  In some cases 
these are intended to be separate from obvious sector interventions, whereas in 
                                                       
170 The public health impacts of criminal violence have been the focus of activities often linked to the 
Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development (discussed in Chapter 2).  A significant 
developing literature exists, much of which explores the issues in the context of Latin America where 
in some cases (for instance in El Salvador), it is estimated that more people have been killed in 
criminal violence following the end, than were killed during the war. It explores the relationships 
between SALW and criminal violence, including in post-war contexts. For an overview of the 
important issues in understanding and addressing this problem see Greene and Marsh (eds) (2012: 
77-138). 
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others there appears to be is less intention in this decision.  In both Uganda and 
Kenya, a decision was taken by the government not to incorporate national SALW 
control efforts within sectoral plans.  In both cases, justice, rule of law and security 
sector initiatives were significant. They were led by the government in each case 
and supported by the World Bank and a wide range of bilateral donors.  The 
activities undertaken under the rubric of the national action plans to control SALW 
would have fitted easily within these multi-sector strategies. However, in both 
cases the government made the decision that NAPs would not be linked to 
particular sector engagement arrangements.  The reasons for this are not entirely 
clear, but include a desire for SALW control activity to remain outside mainstream 
development efforts and therefore further from the abilities of donor bodies to 
influence directly, and a desire not to see SALW control efforts getting as enmeshed 
in the bureaucracy that hampered the sector-wide working groups and their 
activities.171  In South Sudan, the location of SALW within what was intended as a 
‘Comprehensive Peace Agreement’ meant that by design it was not sector specific. 
However in reality, the different SALW control activities (for example, disarmament 
as part of DDR activities) were linked strongly to sector-based interventions (in this 
case, the reform of the SPLA). 
 
Contexts in which SALW control efforts were stand-alone or cross-cutting by default 
rather than design include many of the universe of cases including Macedonia, 
Kenya and Sri Lanka.  In the case of Sri Lanka the main reason for this appears to be 
that at the time at which SALW control was identified as a priority and steps began 
to be taken to address the problem, Sri Lanka was not the focus of a major peace 
support operation. There was no major UN Mission with the international and 
multilateral agencies which might be expected to be attendant.  As such, the 
concept of ‘sector’ reforms or peacebuilding activities was not significant in Sri 
Lanka.  This was probably in part a response to the fact that the ceasefire 
agreement which brought to an end the violence between the Government and the 
LTTE was never followed up by a ‘peace’ agreement which could have identified the 
                                                       
171 Interviews with former National Focal Point staff members in Kenya and Uganda in June 2009 and 
February 2011. 
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areas in which change would take place (and thus by implication may have 
identified particular sectors of government or policy for reform and development). 
 
The extent to which SALW control problems, and thus efforts to tackle them, are 
embedded within a particular sector, or whether they are intended as stand-alone 
activities appears to some extent to be determined by two factors; how the 
problems are identified, and who actively leads the design of responses.  The 
evidence suggests that if SALW problems are seen as central elements of a violent 
conflict, then it is likely that they will be addressed in some form in the elite peace-
bargaining that brings the violence under control. For instance, many major peace 
agreements over recent years (Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Nepal and Libya) contain 
explicit reference to aspects of SALW control.  In these cases, the agreements 
usually stipulate what is intended. The process of seeking donor support for peace 
agreements, and for organising national government capacity to implement them 
requires that systems and processes are established.  These often take the form of 
thematic working groups, strategies, and action plans through which efforts are 
channelled.  
 
However, in environments where there may be geographically specific violence in 
an otherwise relatively peaceful environment (in Kenya for instance where large 
scale violence is located in relatively specific parts of the country) or where a major 
internationally supported peacebuilding effort has not been initiated (Sri Lanka), 
there is less evidence that sector-specific approaches to SALW control have been 
prioritised. 
 
Taken together, this research demonstrates that SALW can interrelate closely with 
peacebuilding activities both as a sector-specific and a cross-cutting intervention.  
The nature of a given peace agreement and the extent to which SALW are 
addressed within it is often instrumental in the way in which SALW control 
challenges are tackled.  Similarly, the existence of security building programmes 
such as DDR in early phases and SSR at later stages plays an important role:  Where 
SALW control is embedded within DDR it is intended specifically as an effort to 
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reduce numbers and access to weapons and therefore to make a direct 
contribution to security-building efforts.  Where cross-cutting SALW programmes, 
which often take place at later stages, are successful it appears that this is in terms 
of the social cohesion that it promotes and the re-engagement of citizens with 
government, often through the police and other law enforcement agencies. 
 
The second part of this section addresses the issue of nested approaches to SALW 
control as a contribution to peacebuilding activities.  The research has shown that it 
is quite common for SALW control activities to have nested qualities.  For example 
in the Sierra Leone case study, planning for the next phase of activity which was 
intended to build on previous efforts took place before the first activities 
concluded.  This is the same in the Kosovo and Macedonia case studies, and to 
some extent, those of Kenya and Uganda.  In each case it is clear that planners were 
aware of the value in initiatives overlapping, and that single engagements could 
aggregate with positive benefit if the methods and approach employed in one 
phase built on the lessons and successes arising from earlier phases.   
However, the research demonstrates across the universe of cases that there is 
substantial variation in the extent to which SALW control activities have been 
consciously nested within peacebuilding efforts in the contexts examined for this 
thesis and where they have, how effective they have been.  Sudan/South Sudan 
presents the most explicit example of conscious efforts to take a nested approach. 
The CPA implementation framework included an Integrated Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration Plan, which included civilian SALW control 
activities, SSR and community security initiatives.  These were sequenced over the 
five year period that the CPA covered and were linked to particular stages in the 
peace process.  For instance, DDR was intended to take place at an early stage prior 
to national elections and a future referendum on Southern succession; community 
security-building activities were intended to take place before civilian SALW 
collection efforts in order to establish enough basic security to facilitate a successful 
voluntary collection programme.   
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However, the enormous security, governance and development challenges that 
Sudan faced at the time, meant that in practice it would not be possible to establish 
rule of law and basic security across the country within a five year period which 
would enable the population to cohere enough behind a nascent national 
government to make SALW surrender a viable proposition.  Therefore, whilst the 
concept of nesting was important in the development of the CPA implementation 
framework, in reality, the implementation challenges prevented the potential 
benefits of nesting to be realised in terms of the contribution of SALW control to 
wider peacebuilding efforts in Sudan.172  
5.2.3 Category 3: The effect of context and actors 
The questions which frame the context dimension of the analytical framework are 
as follows: 
 How are different social groups involved in efforts to control SALW in 
countries emerging from periods of violent conflict – specifically what are 
the different roles played by those in the different tiers of Lederach’s Actors 
and  Approaches To Peacebuilding model?  
 What is the relationship between the involvement of different actors, 
specifically affected populations, and the role that SALW control plays in 
post-conflict peacebuilding, and how does this affect the contribution of 
SALW control towards longer term transformative peacebuilding? 
 How does the range of actors involved and the nature of their involvement 
in SALW control efforts change over different phases of post-conflict 
peacebuilding? 
 
This section begins with a summary of findings which relate first to how different 
groups were involved in decisions relating to efforts to improve SALW control 
before exploring the relationships between the involvement of different actor 
groups and the contribution that SALW control makes to transformational 
                                                       
172 Preston and Smith (2008) review the IDDRP in Sudan and the challenges it faced in its 
implementation.  
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peacebuilding.  It then assesses to what extent different actors tend to be involved 
in different phases of peacebuilding and SALW control. 
 
From the examples analysed for this thesis it is apparent the Lederach’s Actors and 
Approaches Pyramid can be applied to efforts to control SALW as contributions to 
peacebuilding efforts.  It is the case that most of the initiatives to control SALW 
reviewed in this research suggest that they were a product of decisions made by 
elites in the countries concerned – most often a combination of national 
government figures and senior officials from international agencies.  This is in large 
part due to the fact that many post-war SALW control efforts in the countries 
analysed have been agreed as part of peace deals of one form or another (for 
example, the NATO/JNA agreement on Kosovo or the CPA in South Sudan). These 
‘deals’ have been struck by a combination of senior government, commanders of 
military groups and external actors, and they are by their nature, top down in terms 
of how decisions are taken and then communicated.   
 
Whilst it is perhaps unsurprising that initial decisions are taken by a limited number 
of elite peacemakers, it could be expected that others may be involved in planning 
for the implementation of these agreements as they relate to SALW control.  The 
universe of cases demonstrates through the widespread establishment of national 
SALW commissions or focal points comprising both state and non-state actors that 
national implementation frameworks have involved wider groups than those 
involved in initial high level agreements and policy development.  However, the 
extent to which these different actors represent a broadening of elite participation 
or the involvement of non-elite groups is not always clear. There is evidence that 
broader participation was sought in Sierra Leone as local Chiefdom leaders were 
consulted and incentivised to determine on a case by case basis how they would 
implement their part of the SALW collection activities agreed nationally.   In 
Macedonia and Kosovo there was an attempt by those leading civilian SALW 
collection efforts nationally to encourage local municipal ownership of weapons 
collection activities.  However in both cases, and particularly as relates to Kosovo, 
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this translated into resentment on the part of local municipal leaders that they 
were being asked to implement a policy that they didn’t necessarily agree to.   
 
Whilst it is difficult to definitively establish the characteristics of elite led SALW 
control activities, the examples analysed in this thesis suggest that they include (a) 
reducing the immediate likelihood of a return to violence though reducing access to 
weapons by armed groups, and (b) helping the ‘state’ to achieve a monopoly of the 
use of force and begin to impose the rule of law.  As such they suggest a focus on 
establishing an absence of violence which would provide the political space and 
time for longer term peacebuilding and recovery processes to be established.  
 
There are some interesting, although limited examples of more locally generated 
SALW control efforts that have an intended peacebuilding dimension.  The 
community security activities in Kosovo and elsewhere in the Western Balkans, 
Sierra Leone and Kenya discussed elsewhere are relevant in this case.  Similarly, the 
Reformed Warriors Project and the Warrior Squad project in Uganda represent 
local efforts by communities – often led by the local elites – to tackle SALW control 
challenges.  The characteristics of these initiatives are interesting, and contrast to 
some extent with those of national-level initiatives identified above.  The methods 
were selected by local people rather than supplied from elsewhere, local leaders 
were responsible for overseeing their implementation and outside actors tended to 
fall into Lederach’s middle category of international NGOs, mid-ranking officials of 
international agencies and officials from local government, the police and other 
agencies. Perhaps most significantly though is how SALW appear to have been 
understood as part of these activities.  In Kosovo and Kenya in particular, the act of 
surrendering a weapon was seen as much as a signal of a willingness to reconcile 
and to move away from conflict than as a direct threat to individual or collective 
security.  In this sense they are perhaps seen as symbolic of a conflict 
transformation process, which is such a critical element of peace research and 
conflict theory discussed throughout this thesis.  
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The assertion by Rambotham et al (2005) that on security related issues a small 
number of actors may be involved in initial decisions and peace-deals, and that over 
time, more space may become available for a wider range of actors to participate 
also appears to apply to SALW control in post-war environments.  Initial peace deals 
in Kosovo, Sudan or Sierra Leone for instance involved small numbers of people and 
it was at this point in each case that some decisions with a SALW control dimension 
were taken.  But the implementation of these decisions require a broader range of 
actors, from local and mid-ranking officials to implementing agencies, law 
enforcement bodies, supportive NGOs and not least, the individuals and their 
communities who are the target of SALW control activities.  It is also apparent from 
this research that in addition to a larger number of actors participating in initiatives 
over different phases of peacebuilding, the role played may also evolve over time.  
For example, in the years following initial peace-deals and recovery from war, the 
role of public health professionals in addressing criminal related gun violence, the 
role of legislators and oversight bodies in developing and overseeing legislation and 
policy can become more significant.173 
5.3 Cross-cutting findings 
In addition to findings which relate directly to the analytical framework 
(Complementarity, Contingency and Context) a number of additional cross-cutting 
findings emerge from this research.  
5.3.1 The importance of interrelationships between SALW control 
and local ownership 
The extent to which SALW control efforts are consistent with, or co-opted by, local 
interests is important in determining the extent of their success.  This is further 
affected by the nature of local ownership. It would appear that linking with and 
supporting local national government ownership suggests a stronger relationship 
with state-building agendas, whereas links with affected communities and 
individuals are more closely linked to themes of social cohesion and development. 
                                                       
173 Krause (2007) and Laurence and Stohl (2002) chart some of the public policy and public health 
dimensions of SALW control in post war societies which demonstrates the different nature of the 
actors involved from the immediate post war peacebuilding phases where security actors and 
national and international elites play a much more dominant role.  
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Many commonly applied elements of SALW control activities are consistent with 
state-building activities (see Chapter 2; Chetail (2008); and Ghani and Lockhart 
2008). They focus on increasing institutional capacity and capability and enhancing 
the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the population.  This is attempted 
partly through demonstrating the ability to enforce the rule of law, and partly 
through the provision of services, including security and justice.  For example, the 
focus on national commissions and coordination structures in at least 30 of the 
cases in which SALW control has been attempted in countries affected by, or 
emerging, from violent conflict are explicitly aimed at increasing state coherence 
and management of SALW control challenges; the focus of activities (enhancing 
institutional capacity through planning, strategy development, organisational 
structure and operational effectiveness of police and other law enforcement 
agencies) in Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, Kosovo, Sri Lanka and the Western 
Balkans are consistent with institution building efforts; communications campaigns 
in Kosovo and Sri Lanka were closely aligned with attempts to promote government 
legitimacy; and arms reduction campaigns in Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan were 
primarily concerned with consolidating state monopoly on the use of lethal force.     
 
Given their apparent primary focus on improving institutional effectiveness and 
control, reducing violence and promoting peace appears to be a second order 
intended effect.  Often logic models or theories of change suggest that through 
increasing capacity, SALW violence or insecurity will be reduced.  Nevertheless, the 
direct effect of these programmes is often felt at the organisational level rather 
than in terms of reductions in the scale of conflict or insecurity faced by citizens.  
For example, despite using the language of peace and development, in Kenya, 
Uganda and South Sudan, programmes were explicitly intended to increase the 
capability of state institutions and to degrade the capability of those who could 
pose a threat to their authority.  
 
Therefore, where SALW control efforts appear to have been most effective it is in 
supporting governments to address areas in which they perceive weakness and 
which speak to their interests, or to those of specific institutions or organisations;  
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for example, establishing mechanisms for enhancing licencing civilian weapons in 
Sri Lanka or Kosovo, improving stockpile security and management across the 
Western Balkans and supporting government coordination bodies in numerous 
countries as part of the implementation of the UN SALW PoA.  
 
In this context, there are two areas of activity that appear to have had least success. 
The first of these are efforts to persuade civilian populations to reduce their arms 
holdings voluntarily.  Whilst Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan are perhaps extreme 
examples of the effects of failure, there are numerous other examples of voluntary 
civilian weapons collection efforts that have yielded few weapons; Kosovo, Sri 
Lanka and Sierra Leone are just three examples analysed in some depth in this 
thesis. There are exceptions to this, where it is apparent that citizens have 
constructed a narrative which encourages reduction in numbers of weapons 
(examples include in Serbia following the assassination of Prime Minister Djinjic and 
in the UK following the massacre of children at Dunblane primary school).  
However, in contexts where SALW are perceived to be beneficial for ongoing 
protection and security, and where the role of the state is either challenged, or 
clearly not capable of providing law and order and protection, there is much less 
evidence of success.     
 
The second area in which success appears to be particularly elusive is in achieving 
greater oversight and accountability of those permitted to hold and use SALW, 
particularly for the protection of the population and maintenance of the rule of law.  
Whilst the functions of national commissions and policies are in theory valuable for 
accountability purposes, in reality, there are very few examples in which this has 
been achieved.  Of the cases analysed here, perhaps Sierra Leone and to some 
extent Kosovo are the only examples in which accountability and transparency can 
be seen to have been enhanced on a significant scale through the implementation 
of SALW control programmes. 
 
This poses an interesting challenge to the scale and nature of effect that SALW 
control activities can claim in terms of their contribution to peacebuilding in a given 
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context. Almost by definition, many of the contexts in which SALW control and 
peacebuilding is attempted are characterised by political contest and challenges to 
the legitimacy of the state.  An approach which seeks primarily to support the state 
extend its reach and legitimacy by projecting its ability to monopolise force, whilst 
making a direct contribution to state-building, can also potentially have negative or 
unintended effects on conflict and thus on peacebuilding efforts.  Greater 
monopoly over the use of force can have the effect of reducing armed contest and 
providing space for longer term settlements and transitions to be reached.  But in 
effect, from the cases analysed for this thesis, it would appear that where they have 
been even moderately successful, whilst making a contribution to reducing 
violence, it is arguable whether they have made a significant contribution to 
positive or cultural peacebuilding. 
 
The apparent effects and contributions of SALW control efforts which are 
integrated within elite, government-led agendas are not always consistent with 
those resulting from activities that are led by affected communities and individuals 
at more local levels.  From the examples analysed here it would appear that locally 
driven SALW control efforts tend to focus more on process (transition in Sri Lanka, 
reconciliation in Kosovo, rehabilitation in northern Kenya and Uganda) and social 
output than on the existence or otherwise of weapons.   
 
In Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka it appears that weapons were viewed more in 
a transactional sense than in terms of their cultural value or use in providing 
protection.  Local communities were aware that engaging in SALW control activities 
would provide them with access to resources and in some cases, international 
support and solidarity.  Interviews from communities which participated in SALW 
control programmes in Kosovo are interesting in this regard; people acknowledged 
the social and material benefits that their communities had accrued through 
participating in SALW control activities, and were willing to surrender weapons in 
exchange for access to other goods and services. But they also regularly reported 
that they had surrendered only a proportion of their weapons, and retained others 
(for a variety of reasons including to take advantage of future reduction efforts, for 
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protection, or as memorabilia).  As such there is little evidence to suggest that a 
willingness to engage represented much more than good business or canny 
common sense.  In contexts in which surveys have been carried out into attitudes 
towards SALW ownership before and following efforts to reduce civilian holdings 
(Kosovo being the most developed in this regard), it appears that however 
successful the activity had been, it did not substantially alter attitudes towards 
weapons either positively or negatively.  However the research does suggest that 
where SALW control efforts have been seen as positive by communities that they 
have probably positively affected relations within these communities and that they 
have made a contribution towards reconciliation and to transformational 
peacebuilding. 
 
This peacebuilding potential of locally relevant SALW control efforts which place 
emphasis on wider processes and on community capacities and resilience is in 
contrast to national, elite-level statebuilding activities which appear less 
transformational.  However, even if this finding is further tested and proven, it is 
not clear to what extent internationally-supported activities could exist at local 
levels only. Perhaps national-level elite participation is critical to creating the space 
and acceptance required for local level activity to take place.  Certainly this would 
appear to be the case in Kosovo where national level activities including those 
which brought together government officials, police and NGOs have played an 
important role in creating the confidence to allow locally led SALW control activities 
to take place.  Further, the acknowledgement of SALW control challenges by 
national level actors helped incentivise local police and municipal leaders to 
respond to local community needs and requests for support. 
5.3.2 The effect of public perceptions and social construction on 
interrelationships 
The mini-case studies show that the role of perceptions regarding SALW in shaping 
how different groups regard the interrelationships between SALW and peace are 
important to the success or otherwise of SALW control efforts.  For instance, the 
differences in the ways in which SALW were perceived in parts of South Sudan or in 
the pastoralist communities of northern Uganda and Kenya and by those in 
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government in each country were very significant; those at the level of central 
government saw SALW as an instrument of violence used by communities to resist 
the efforts of the state to exercise its control over the use of force.  However, from 
the perspectives of the communities targeted by government disarmament 
campaigns, there was a perception held by many that weapons were required to 
protect themselves in the absence of effective security delivered by the state (see 
O’Brien (2009) for Sudan and Wepundi, NDung’U and Rynn (2011) for Kenya and 
Uganda).   
 
Different perceptions as to the role that SALW play in a given context is a significant 
determining factor in whether people perceive SALW control efforts as having a 
peacebuilding function at all, or indeed whether they are perceived in an opposing 
sense as a necessary tool to provide security within which people can live in a 
degree of peace.  Analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 of the ways in which SALW are 
viewed in particular societies, and the impacts that this has on how SALW control 
efforts are perceived in terms of their potential contribution to peace, is 
underpinned by the literatures reviewed in Chapter 2.  In particular it is relevant to 
concepts of social construction (See Searle (1995) and Burr (1995)) and to the 
different roles that different actors can play in peacebuilding processes (Lederach 
(1997) and Fisher (2006)).  
 
This research provides evidence to support this finding.  For example, as regards the 
role of contingency in affecting interrelationships, in Kosovo, perceptions of SALW 
as providing a measure of protection and security in the immediate post-war period 
contributed to a collective village-level reticence towards participating in weapons 
reduction activities.  The existence of these activities however and the incentives 
that were offered played a role in shaping collective perceptions as to the potential 
monetary value of SALW, which in turn contributed to decisions by weapons 
owners to hold back their participation in future activities until they had been 
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offered a ‘good price’.174  In Kenya and Uganda, whilst local-level activities 
demonstrate the value of weapons in peacemaking efforts, successive government-
led disarmament campaigns reinforced perceptions that surrendering weapons 
enabled greater government control, and therefore sustained their opposition. 
In terms of the effect of complementarity, the inclusion of SALW control efforts in 
early security sector interventions can be viewed as a reflection of the perception 
of the roles of SALW in both enhancing – and threatening – security.  In later stages 
of peacebuilding, where greater SALW control is anticipated as a consequence of 
community development or governance programmes, it suggests that SALW are 
perceived by owners and planners alike as less of a direct threat and more as a 
symbol of transition, and as a symptom rather than a cause of insecurity. 
 
Given that many SALW control activities which have a civilian weapons reduction 
dimension are implemented at the local levels, the methods and approaches by 
which ‘target’ communities are identified and communicated with is important to 
how they are perceived.  In Kenya, Uganda and Southern Sudan, communities were 
selected as they were perceived as a problem and targeted by the government 
authorities.  In the Western Balkans, and in some instances in Sri Lanka a variety of 
different incentives were offered to those who participated; and in Sierra Leone, 
significant effort was invested in empowering local leaders to play significant roles 
in peacemaking and SALW control processes.  The weaknesses in the ways in which 
various SALW control and peacebuilding activities are conceptualised and designed 
are identified in Chapter 2.  These include the weaknesses of SALW and DDR 
programmes in engaging effectively with host or target populations (Muggah, 
2006), and the importance of community involvement in incentive setting and local 
leadership (Ginifer, 2003). 
 
The different ways in which SALW are perceived is important not just in terms of 
how owners and users may be incentivised to put them under greater control.  
These perceptions can also play an important role in shaping engagement with 
                                                       
174 Author’s interviews with Germova village council leaders and Debellder residents, July 2011 – as 
discussed in chapter 4. 
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peacebuilding processes.  This is valid in terms of the effects of both 
complementarity and contingency.  For instance, Chapter 4 highlights the 
unwillingness of communities in Kosovo to engage with peacebuilding efforts as a 
consequence of poorly perceived earlier efforts to promote greater control over 
SALW.  Similarly, in South Sudan, whilst poorly executed SALW control efforts led to 
groups arming and rejecting efforts to implement the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement, in one particular state where weapons management was closely linked 
to peacebuilding and development efforts and managed through close community 
engagement, SALW provided a useful entry point into broader peacebuilding 
efforts. 
5.3.3 The effect of common SALW control and peacebuilding 
outcomes on interrelationships 
Finally, the extent to which SALW control and peacebuilding activities have 
common intended outcomes and if not, the extent to which differing desired 
outcomes are compatible also appears to be important in determining the nature of 
interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding activities.  
 
In the context of Sudan/Southern Sudan, SALW control was identified as an 
important element of an overarching peace process, and was designed into the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement from an early stage (Preston and Smith 2008).  
Similarly in the Western Balkans, efforts were made to address SALW control 
challenges as part of the regional stabilisation and recovery plan supported by the 
EU and others (Hirst, 2004).  In Sri Lanka, SALW control efforts were not explicitly 
dealt with as part of the initial ceasefire arrangements (Smith, 2003):  They were 
however perceived by policy makers as closely related to efforts to entrench 
opportunities for peace through addressing the likely impacts of SALW proliferation 
on criminal activity and violence.  In each case however, whilst the symbiotic nature 
of the two sets of outcomes (fewer, better controlled SALW and greater progress 
towards peace) was well established in the minds of those responsible for policy in 
this area, in each case, civilian populations were less easily resolved to the practical 
implications (weapons amnesty periods were routinely ignored by most people in 
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Sri Lanka and the countries of the Western Balkans, with the exception perhaps of 
Serbia).  
  
This analysis is supported by the relevant literatures analysed in Chapter 2:  The 
concepts of cultural (Ramsbotham et al, 2005) or positive (Galtung, 1969) peace are 
taken to mean more than just an absence of violence and to signify positive 
changes in behaviours and attitudes.  Laurence (1996), Greene (1999) and later 
Krause (2006)  all claim that SALW control can have a positive impact both on 
removing the tools of violence and the speed with which it can be (de)escalated, 
but also identify the longer term contribution to peacebuilding that acts of 
disarmament can have on attitudes towards security and to others (see also 
Guenev (2006) for an analysis of the relationship between SALW and cultures of 
violence in the Western Balkans). 
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5.4 Conclusions 
This section builds on the main findings described above.  It states the conclusions 
of this research, both as they relate to the research questions and more broadly to 
the framing hypothesis. 
 
The hypothesis that this thesis seeks to contribute to validating is as follows: 
 
Efforts to control SALW can have a positive or negative effect on post-conflict 
peacebuilding; conversely their success can be damaged or enhanced by 
peacebuilding activities.  The interrelationships that exist between SALW control 
and peacebuilding are both temporal and spatial and are conditioned by the extent 
to which affected populations are involved.  Therefore, the role and influence of 
local people, and the extent to which complementarity and contingency is 
understood and acted upon have a determining effect on the positive benefits of 
SALW control in post conflict peacebuilding. 
 
The overall conclusion is that efforts to reduce and more effectively control SALW 
can make an important contribution to conflict resolution and peacebuilding 
efforts.  This is easiest to identify in the early stages of peace-making and early 
recovery when reducing violence is of primary importance. In these cases, SALW 
control is often a direct and explicit goal, such as in DDR or amnesties and civilian 
weapons collection activities.  They are often led by local police or military, usually 
with UN or other international support and funding and are framed either as stand-
alone activities or as disarmament or arms management elements of other security 
and confidence building programmes. SALW control efforts also have the potential 
to contribute towards more transformative, positive or cultural peacebuilding. 
However in these cases, where social capital, reconciliation and community 
resilience are prioritised and highly valued, they are most effective as either 
processes or outcomes of processes involving wide ranges of actors and where they 
are relevant to local as well as national priorities. 
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It is also clear that efforts to control SALW can create or stimulate additional 
conflict and violence, and negatively affect peacebuilding efforts.  The approaches 
and methods employed, the extent to which conflict affected groups are involved, 
and the awareness of local attitudes towards SALW and their role in perceptions 
and attitudes appear critical to the extent to which their contributions are positive 
or negative.  These dimensions are explored further and conclusions drawn in the 
following sub-sections 
5.4.1 Contingency  
The role of contingency in determining and effecting interrelationships between 
SALW control activities and peacebuilding efforts is significant.  Contingency is an 
important factor in shaping the interrelationships between SALW control and 
peacebuilding efforts and can have a significant impact on the success of either.  
The case of Kosovo clearly demonstrates the negative impact that previous SALW 
control activities had on public perceptions regarding future efforts.  It also 
demonstrates the negative impact that prior peacebuilding efforts can have on 
future SALW control initiatives if they are perceived to be linked through those 
involved or the methods they use.  These negative effects were observed in Sri 
Lanka, Kenya and Uganda and appear to play a more significant role than other 
factors, including the role of complementarity. (This suggests that whilst the 
hypothesis remains valid, a future reformulation could reflect a differentiation in 
the weighting given to different variables.) Conversely, in Sierra Leone the success 
of SALW control efforts, and the extent to which they were perceived to have had a 
transformational effect, were to some extent influenced by previous positively 
regarded interventions. 
 
This conclusion contributes to and further develops previous analysis of SALW 
control efforts in Kosovo (Nichols 2006; Hvindemose et al 2008) which identify the 
cumulative effect of SALW control efforts but which do not identify the contingent 
relationships between SALW control efforts and previous- or future- peacebuilding 
activities: Kosovo demonstrates clearly that SALW control efforts, however well-
conceived can be undermined by weaknesses in, or failure of, earlier peacebuilding 
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activities; and that similarly, SALW control can have a negative effect on future 
peacebuilding efforts. 
 
Effective initiatives to control SALW are possible in all phases of de-escalation and 
peacebuilding and can be successful in each. The incorporation of SALW control into 
peace agreements and ceasefire arrangements in the form of decommissioning or 
DDR (for instance in Kosovo, Macedonia or South Sudan) can have an important 
peacemaking contribution.  However the transformational benefits of these 
activities are usually only felt at later stages of the recovery process.  This suggests 
that early thought should be given to linking different SALW control contributions 
to peacebuilding frameworks over multiple phases at an early stage.  In this regard, 
the concept of nesting is important and could ease the transition between phases, 
allowing the successes or failures in one phase to positively influence planning for 
future phases before they begin.   
 
This conclusion suggests that literature on peacebuilding and SALW control in 
Kosovo, the Western Balkans and Sudan/Southern Sudan could be further 
developed to reflect the impact of SALW control efforts on longer-term conflict 
transformation.  For example, in Kosovo, there is existing analysis of the short-term 
contributions of early peacebuilding and conflict prevention frameworks.  (L 
Llamazares and Reynolds-Levy (2003) identified and analysed major sectoral 
peacebuilding interventions – see Chapter 4).  However, these were relatively 
short-term in that they focussed on the early phases following the end of violent 
conflict, and whilst providing an important framework for analysing these initial 
phases of activity, they were limited to – and therefore hindered by – the lifetime 
of international peacebuilding interventions.  There has not to-date been an 
examination in Kosovo, Bosnia Herzegovina, Macedonia or Southern Sudan of the 
longer-term cumulative contribution of peacebuilding and SALW control efforts on 
their individual or collective aims.  
 
It is unclear whether activities that require wide-spread public involvement are 
possible at very early stages before trust is built and the public feels able to contract 
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the state to provide security at the expense of their ability to do so. Where SALW 
control activities are perceived to have faced significant difficulties, they often 
involve attempts to persuade the civilian population to hand-in weapons, or even 
disarm, at a point in the de-escalation phase in which there is still widespread 
uncertainty and insecurity.   In Kosovo, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Kenya and Uganda for 
instance, consensus-based civilian disarmament campaigns have returned few 
voluntarily surrendered SALW, even where incentive schemes have been employed.  
It is the case that in these very early phases following the cessation of violence, 
whilst it is possible for armed groups to take decisions from a position of 
organisational strength to take steps to reduce SALW, it is much harder for 
members of the public to take this decision in a context in which it is unclear who 
will provide them with the security which they desire if they surrender one of the 
only forms of protection they may have.  Therefore it is possible to conclude that 
voluntary SALW control initiatives are more suited to later stages of de-escalation, 
particularly if they are intended as a positive contribution to peacebuilding and 
conflict transformation.  
 
In Kosovo, local ownership and leadership are identified as being critical factors in 
the success or otherwise of peacebuilding efforts both by researchers taking a 
critical approach to assessing the role of the international peacebuilding effort, and 
those undertaking analysis from a more cosmopolitan perspective. For instance, 
Richmond et al (2008) includes the lack of local ownership and participation as part 
of a wider critique of the international approach to post war Kosovo; Bennett 
(2011) identifies it as a factor in the relative failure of SALW control activities.  
However, in both cases, the authors do not explicitly examine how and to what 
extent widespread public participation and ownership would be possible in a 
context in which there was no overarching peace agreement and where insecurity 
and uncertainty was widespread.  This research concludes that in the absence of a 
settlement and in the early period following war, where weapons are closely 
associated with personal and community protection, non-coercive SALW control 
activities which aim to remove weapons from the civilian population are likely to be 
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unrealistic and that a widespread failure to collect significant numbers of weapons 
is likely. 
 
Nesting SALW control activities within an overall SALW control strategy or within 
wider peacebuilding strategies can be beneficial but can also have negative 
consequences. The experience from Sudan illustrates the dilemma involved in fully 
integrating SALW control activities within a wider peacebuilding framework.  Whilst 
the CPA and its attendant implementation plans was conceptually strong and 
enabled international actors to coordinate and plan their interventions, it also 
subordinated the SALW control dimensions to the overall peacebuilding goals (Alila 
2007).  When the political context in Sudan effectively brought aspects of CPA 
implementation to a halt, the SALW control dimensions were also significantly 
affected.  Nesting requires a level of integration which is likely to be very beneficial 
within a stand-alone approach to SALW control, but which could mean SALW 
control activities becoming strongly linked to the success or otherwise of other 
initiatives if integrated within a wider peacebuilding agreement or framework. 
  
To some degree, this latter point was also evident in Kosovo where initial DDR was 
successful where it was deemed to be in the interests of the KLA175, but where 
civilian SALW control was not seen to be of sufficient benefit to the population to 
offset the perceived risks.  Existing analysis of the international peacebuilding effort 
situates SALW control within the UNMIK framework (see Nicholls 2006), which was 
widely publically criticised by Kosovo Albanians in particular for not moving quickly 
enough towards independence, and not addressing the overall lack of a political 
settlement; whereas the DDR programme which helped bring to an end the armed 
KLA activities was tightly nested with NATO-led activity and diplomatic 
engagement.  
 
                                                       
175 Author’s interview with former NATO Commander Brig. (rtd) Dennis Blease, March 2013 
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5.4.2 Complementarity 
The interrelationships between efforts to control SALW and build peace are 
determined by activities taking place within the same period of time.  This can have 
very positive or negative affects depending on how other activities are perceived 
and undertaken.  Further, this research concludes that the temporal dimension has 
considerable value in understanding interrelationships between SALW control and 
peacebuilding activities.  The case of Kosovo demonstrates effectively the 
importance of other contextual factors, including the existence of other SALW 
control or peacebuilding activities on interrelationships and on their chances of 
success.  The public in a given context will probably  not discriminate much in how 
they perceive and respond to between different activities if they take place at the 
same time, appear to have similar objectives and involve the same or similar actors.   
 
This conclusion contributes to existing literature on efforts to control SALW and 
build peace in several of the contexts analysed in this research:  In Kenya, and 
Sudan/South Sudan whilst activities have been examined in terms of their 
contribution to the failure or otherwise of efforts to control SALW, to-date, they 
have not analysed the positive and negative potential for other activities taking 
place at similar times and places to affect attitudes towards SALW and efforts to 
control them. 
 
The extent to which SALW control is designed into a peacebuilding intervention or 
vice-versa is not necessarily significant.  There is little evidence to suggest that the 
potential benefits of complementarity should be built into the design of SALW 
control or peacebuilding activities in the early design phase.   
 
In Sudan, where this was attempted, it was not successful, partly given the rapidly 
changing political and security context and the inability of the internationally 
supported peacebuilding framework to develop and adapt.  Whereas in Kenya and 
Uganda where a conscious effort was made to distinguish SALW control activities 
from wider sectoral reforms, whilst it probably meant that activities were 
undertaken faster and with less oversight, they also remained marginal to overall 
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government policy and governance priorities.  Therefore, it is possible to conclude 
that whilst structurally the interrelationships between SALW control and 
peacebuilding are affected by the extent to which they are integrated, the success 
of either is not significantly determined through this act alone.   
 
This conclusion does not confirm existing analysis on Sudan which focuses on the 
weaknesses of the CPA and its implementation programmes (see for instance see 
Antwi‐Boateng and O'Mahony, 2008) as reasons for the relative failure of its 
different elements.  Further, the relatively weak relationship between the nature of 
SALW control efforts and peacebuilding demonstrated in this research confirm that 
the hypothesis for this research, whilst remaining valid for the cases analysed, could 
be refined further; it appears from this research that contingency is a more 
significant factor than complementarity in affecting interrelationships. 
 
Therefore, SALW control efforts can work as a sector-specific or a cross-cutting 
activity:  The important element is that activities are closely coordinated and care is 
taken in planning and implementation to ensure that (a) there is enough support 
from those who matter – targets, implementers, leaders - to give it momentum and 
sufficient political support; (b) the opportunities and benefits of complementarity 
are understood from the outset and that the impact of decisions regarding post-
war peacebuilding priorities on the achievability of other objectives is fully 
understood (i.e. activities to create short-term security might make consensual 
SALW control more difficult or a decision to allow warlords to participate in the 
political process might damage confidence in ability of state to provide security). 
5.4.3 Context and conclusions relevant to the broader analytical 
framework 
This research shows that widespread public consent and participation is more likely 
the further from violent conflict they occur:  If as suggested in the section above, 
voluntary public disarmament activities are more likely to be successful if they take 
place as part of normalisation/cultural peacebuilding activities, consideration 
should be given to how they are located within other reform and development 
efforts.  
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This research shows that it can often be beneficial for this form of SALW control to 
be embedded in programmes to improve public security and reduce crime, or to 
improve public health rather than as a stand-alone intervention.  This reinforces a 
sectoral approach and to some extent supports the approaches taken in 
Macedonia, Bosnia Herzegovina and Sierra Leone where later-phase SALW control 
was embedded within wider-public security programmes.  
 
However, if the objective of voluntary civilian disarmament is to generate or 
demonstrate public willingness to engage in conflict transformation then a stand-
alone SALW control activity may be appropriate at an early stage. Post-war Sri 
Lanka and Serbia following the assassination of Prime Minister Djindic are both 
instructive in this regard where public, symbolic SALW control efforts generated 
significant public engagement and resulted in the collection of many thousands of 
SALW in each case.  Further, in this context there is no evidence to suggest that this 
should take the form of a sectoral intervention:  On the contrary, it might be more 
appropriate as a stand-alone and cross cutting activity given that confidence 
building measures are likely to have wide benefit and utility. 
 
It is unclear whether direct efforts to control SALW are the most appropriate or 
effective entry-point to achieving their stated goals: From a state-building 
perspective, focussing specifically on SALW has obvious benefits.  Weapons provide 
capability for those who oppose the government or are involved in serious criminal 
activity.  Therefore addressing the misuse of SALW is important from the 
perspective of monopolising the use of force, and enforcing the rule of law.  For 
these reasons, a focus on SALW as an instrument in the commission of violence and 
other criminal activity makes sense from a government perspective.  Similarly, 
there is value in focussing on SALW control as an issue which brings together 
various parts of government to address a common problem from the perspective of 
increasing government coherence and coordination at both police and operational 
levels.  
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From a civilian perspective the potential benefits are less clear.  This research has 
demonstrated that that participating in (often) internationally supported SALW 
control activities can be beneficial to communities in terms of the wider benefits 
that they generate.  However the lack of success of many SALW control 
programmes which have focussed on voluntary civilian weapons collection suggests 
that the potential benefits that participation can generate are not seen to outweigh 
the risks.  It is apparent that the extent and willingness of community participation 
in weapons reduction programmes is partly affected by the potential material 
benefits, but also strongly by other factors, such as the proximity to violence, levels 
of trust (or lack thereof) in the government to provide security, and judgements 
about the extent to which participation will mark a given community out as having 
taking sides in a context in which conflict is on-going or where it has only recently 
ended.  Where programmes which have focussed on SALW specifically have been 
successful it is where the process of reduction has created opportunities for 
communities to increase their confidence, social capital and their access to other 
goods and services.  This suggests that wider development, recovery or governance 
programmes which have an outcome related to reducing SALW availability and 
misuse may be more effective than programmes which focus explicitly on reducing 
numbers of weapons as their primary focus. 
 
Lederach’s Actors and Approaches Triangle is appropriate for application to SALW 
control activities:  SALW can make more or less substantial contributions to 
transformative peacebuilding, partly depending on when it takes place and partly 
on who is involved.  An activity in the early phases of peacemaking such as initial 
stages of DDR can have a very important role in setting the tone and direction of 
future peacebuilding. But an activity which involves a wide range of people, which 
is planned by those affected and which seeks to address their needs has the 
potential to be more transformational.  Community security building activities for 
example have this potential. However their nature makes them hard to plan and 
manage from a ‘national’ level and makes widespread implementation difficult. 
This conclusion is highly relevant to the cases examined during this research.  For 
instance, in Kosovo, whilst a focus has been put on the importance of local 
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participation (Llamazares and Reynolds-Levy. 2003), or on the failures of 
internationally supported elite peacemaking (Richmond, 2008; Pugh, 2008) there 
has to-date not been a systematic analysis of the different actors involved in 
peacebuilding and SALW control efforts and the roles that they have played.  In this 
regard, this research therefore makes a contribution to the development of the 
literature on SALW control and peacebuilding in Kosovo. 
 
Although consent and broad participation is important for SALW control activities to 
have a transformational benefit, it is also important that elites and those in the 
middle of Lederach’s triangle area also involved.  The role often played by elites in 
negotiating settlements and ceasefires almost always has a dimension of weapons 
control built in.  For instance, DDR efforts in Kosovo and Sudan/South Sudan were 
intended to remove the ‘tools’ that could sustain violence in order to enable peace 
processes to develop.  In both cases, these processes were relatively short in length 
and did not consider how potential benefits could make a longer term contribution 
to transformative peacebuilding efforts. It is therefore possible to conclude from 
this research that more could be done at this early stage to ensure that the actions 
that are taken to reduce or end violence also have their transformative potential 
considered and built-in from an early stage.   
 
There are considerable risks to peacebuilding goals posed by the integration of 
SALW control within local elites’ political agendas 
The political contest which is often at the heart of violent conflict, and which 
continues to significantly affect security until a political settlement is reached can 
result in considerable tension between elite groups and between elites and the 
wider population.  Allowing SALW control activities to be co-opted by particular 
groups of elites has the potential to significantly undermine their potential 
peacebuilding contribution.  Similarly, focussing exclusively on the participation of 
citizens from a particular location or representing particular ethnic, political or 
other affiliations increases the risks that activities will have differentiated 
outcomes; positive for some but negative for others.  Attention should therefore be 
paid in the design and implementation of SALW control activities to the range of 
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different actors who should be involved to increase the chances of them playing a 
positive role in reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts. 
      
Broad based programmes that are closely integrated or coordinated with wider 
state and peacebuilding efforts are important in post war environments where 
differences in perceptions of SALW and their potential threats and benefits and the 
weakness of government institutions are often significant. 
The analysis contained in this thesis argues that where successful SALW reduction 
occurs, it is a product of numerous different programmes and activities making 
contributions.  A web or network of controls might therefore be more effective 
than linear programmes which seek by themselves to achieve positive outcomes.  
Encouraging greater control of weapons in several coordinated ways might yield 
greatest results.  For example, tackling SALW across multiple fronts might be 
possible through more effective policing, better civilian weapons licencing, public 
education, more restrictive sales and improvements in public health.  None of these 
activities by themselves are likely to achieve significant success. But taken together 
they might mitigate against the weaknesses of a single approach.  
 
Cultural and social attitudes are important and whilst complementarity and 
contingency are important, a particular set of contextual conditions are required 
that provides the opportunities to focus on SALW control as part of peacebuilding 
efforts and to maximise the chances of success.  
The views and perceptions of those affected/involved regarding SALW control will 
have a major influence on whether and how they get involved in SALW control 
activities (see Sierra Leone, Kenya, Uganda and Sudan/South Sudan mini case-
studies in Chapter 3).  These attitudes and perceptions are shaped by a range of 
contextual factors including cultural attitudes to weapons, self-defence and security 
provision, social, political and economic factors.  These can shape constructions of 
reality and play a fundamental role in how SALW and therefore SALW control is 
perceived in relation to peace and conflict. 
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This conclusion is highly relevant to the development of the research hypothesis.  
The role of public perceptions and of local people is acknowledged as a significant 
determining factor in terms of their positive benefits on the success of SALW 
control and peacebuilding activities.  This could be further developed to explicitly 
reflect the potentially negative effects which can arise from a lack of contextual 
analysis and awareness, and a failure to understand and address public attitudes 
and perceptions regarding SALW as a central element of efforts to control them.  
 
Finally, this section draws conclusions on the suitability of the research approach 
and methods employed.   
 
A mixed-methods approach is appropriate to research in this area.   
Qualitative and quantitative data are both important, and whilst the emphasis is on 
qualitative data gathered from interviews, focus groups and documents, 
quantitative data, in particular those drawn from surveys on perceptions of 
security, crime and peace and conflict is important to triangulate and further 
deepen analysis.    
 
Within the overarching mixed methods approach, incorporating a soft social 
constructionist perspective appears highly beneficial.  It provides for a focus on 
social construction in the development of attitudes and perceptions which are 
particularly important for understanding the at times complex understandings that 
governments and affected communities alike have regarding the role of SALW in 
conflict and peacebuilding.   
 
The staged progression of analysis beginning with the identification of a universe of 
cases, the identification and then analysis of a small number of mini case studies, 
followed by researching and analysing a major case study helps identify, and then 
develop and deepen analysis and arguments.  For instance, analysis of the universe 
of cases helped establish the existence of contingency in at least some SALW 
control activities which was then explored through the mini cases.  They 
demonstrated that these contingencies did in fact exist in the contexts analysed, 
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and suggested that they could have both negative and positive effects on 
peacebuilding efforts, depending largely on how they were perceived by local 
communities and elites alike.  The Kosovo case study provided the opportunity to 
analyse this emerging finding in greater detail, establishing that not only did the 
nature of activities and their contingencies change through different phases of 
peacebuilding, but that attitudes and perceptions towards SALW and those who 
owned and used them changed too as the distance from violence lengthened. 
 
The Further Research section which follows discusses the value of looking at other 
forms of armed violence and their interrelationships with peacebuilding efforts.  If 
in future research, the parameters were indeed widened, then there would be 
value in a second major case study to accompany Kosovo to reflect the 
characteristics of the context being examined.  However, within the context of this 
research, a single case study appears to be appropriate, allowing as it does, for a 
detailed analysis of the interrelationships between SALW control efforts and 
peacebuilding activities in a country emerging from a period of large scale political 
armed violence, and a further elaboration and development of theories emerging 
from a less detailed analysis of a wide universe of cases.   
5.4.4 Further research  
This thesis has analysed in most detail efforts to control SALW and peacebuilding 
activities in the context of the early stages of recovery from large-scale violent 
conflict.  There are three further important dimensions of the problem that it will 
be important to address in further research in order to test the boundaries of the 
findings and conclusions arising.  
 
Firstly, although this research has examined this to some extent, more systematic 
and in-depth examinations would be useful of the longer-term transitional issues 
which can come to the fore several years following the end of large-scale political 
conflict.  As such, the phenomenon of wide spread armed crime which is prevalent 
in some societies where criminal gangs and others achieve the partial take-over of 
weak states (such as in Central America) is not explored in detail.  This omission was 
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intentional.  However the experience of some countries in Central and South 
America which emerged from violent conflict some years ago but which are 
severely affected by violent crime facilitated by weapons proliferation is important 
in understanding the long term effects that uncontrolled SALW may have on the 
transformation of societies.   
 
Secondly, contexts in which there is substantial armed violence, but where there 
has not been significant violent political conflict (for example, Brazil or South Africa) 
have not been a primary focus for this thesis, and have not been explored in detail.  
It would be useful to complement this research with similar work in countries which 
are not emerging from war. This thesis does bring insights on this issue. The Kenya 
example in Chapter 3 is partially appropriate to this area of enquiry, but the author 
contends that the governments of Kenya and Uganda were to all intents and 
purposes involved in a social/political conflict with armed groups in areas that were 
for the most out of their control.  However, regardless of the view of the reader in 
this particular case, Kenya may only represent one example in a much wider 
universe of cases which do not analyse in any depth the role of SALW control 
activities in promoting peace in these contexts. 
 
The third dimension where further research would be particularly desirable is how 
the interrelationships between SALW control and peacebuilding efforts may be 
affected in country contexts which are both violent and peaceful at different times 
and in different locations.  Kenya and Uganda are interesting examples of this 
phenomenon; others could include Nigeria, Pakistan and India.  In these cases, 
localised peacebuilding efforts, which may be supported nationally or even 
internationally, will likely contain elements which are relevant to SALW and SALW 
control.  Further, localised SALW control challenges may be addressed as part of 
national-level government policy and action in otherwise unaffected environments.  
The extent to which a mosaic of conflict intensity affects interrelationships and the 
ability of communities and government alike to build peace is important given the 
apparent reduction in inter-state conflicts and the upsurge of violent conflict within 
national boundaries. 
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Finally, further research could be important to test the boundaries of the contexts 
within which the conclusions are appropriate.  Whilst a wide range of contexts was 
analysed in Chapter 3, Kosovo represents the main case study examined in this 
literature: Differing contexts, such as for instance, those in which the state has 
collapsed either in entirety (Somalia), or in part (Afghanistan or DRC) may yield 
different interrelationships and therefore different conclusions.       
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Annex A: Profiles of research locations 
Germova 
Germova is in Viti Municipality in the South East of Kosovo and straddles the main 
highway from Pristina to Skopje in Macedonia. It is a linear rural village with no 
adjoining neighbours. It contains around 2000 people, many of whom are 
unemployed or work in the agricultural sector.  The main agricultural products are 
vegetables and grains which are grown by family concerns and then marketed 
elsewhere.     
 
Until the war began in 1999, Germova was a mixed Albanian and Serbian village, 
with a majority Albanian population.  Perhaps because of a combination of its 
proximity to the border and its strategic location on the Pristina/Skopje truck road 
Germova was affected significantly by the war.  Albanian people in the village were 
attacked by a contingent of JNA soldiers stationed nearby, abductions and arrests 
were commonplace and JNA tanks and other heavy weaponry were used to 
intimidate.  The Serbian community were also significantly affected – ultimately at 
least as much as their Albanian counterparts in that they were all compelled to 
leave the village during the war, relocating to areas with higher Serbian populations 
within Kosovo or to Serbia itself. When they departed, many they left weapons 
which had been distributed to them by Yugoslav Ministry of Interior Police in the 
late 1990s – officially for self-protection purposes, which were then taken over by 
the remaining Albanian population.   
 
The residents of Germova were amongst the first Kosovars to come into contact 
with British and American soldiers as they pushed into Kosovo from Skopje to the 
east.  In the confusion mistakes were made which the community feel might have 
prejudiced their interactions with KFOR following the end of the war.  For example, 
local residents fired weapons they claim that they had looted from Serbian families 
in the village at US KFOR troops when they first saw them, imagining that they must 
have been Yugoslav army as they did not know that allied group troops were 
operating within the borders of Kosovo at the time.  It is their contention that 
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subsequently in the immediate weeks following the end of the war when they 
would have been willing to disarm in return for security guarantees, their entreaties 
were unanswered.176 
 
Germova has been the subject of a wide variety of security and peace building 
activities.  These include efforts to control SALW led both by KFOR (which targeted 
Germova for search and seize operations in 2001) and then later, UNMIK/UNDP and 
a variety of peace-building efforts including a much vaunted but ultimately 
unsuccessful attempt to renovate houses belonging to Serbian families to 
encourage their return led by UN HABITAT and UNDP. 
 
The focus group discussion took place in the side room of a café in Germova.  It was 
convened in the early evening and was attended by 5 local residents who described 
themselves as the following: a housewife; the head of the village council; a former 
Director of Emergencies at the local municipal office, a former Director of Education 
in the municipal office, an unemployed father and a man working in the agricultural 
sector.  The focus group lasted for almost two hours and took place in Albanian 
with English translation. 
 
In addition to the focus group discussion, interviews took place with two key 
informants (two interviews each) which were conducted in Pristina during the 
second and third visits to Kosovo. Documents which described attempts to support 
improvements in community security published by the NGO Saferworld were 
examined.  And the author visited Germova twice during research for this thesis, 
visiting sites that had been particularly affected by the conflict, as well as buildings 
and other infrastructure built since the war.  
 
 
 
 
                                                       
176 Focus Group, Male, Germova, June 2011 
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Debellder 
Debellder is a village of approximately 400 people, also situated in the Viti 
Municipality.  It is located in the far east of the country and comprises part of the 
mountainous border with Macedonia.  It can only be reached by a single track road 
that leads several kilometres from Viti town on the plains below.  The road that 
used to run from the village into Macedonia is now blocked and villages still fear 
that mines planted during the KLA/JNA war may still be present. 
 
Debellder is particularly interesting as it was affected significantly by two of the 
wars of the late 1990s and early 2000s.  During the KJA/JNU conflict, Debellder 
which was a mixed community transformed into one which was heavily Albanian 
dominated with a small number of Macedonian residents.  As a strategic vantage 
point from which movement on the plains below could be tracked, the village was a 
particular target of the JNA; consequently phone and power lines were cut and 
communications routes were mined.  Out of a relatively small adult male Albanian 
population, 14 men enlisted as KLA ‘regular’ fighters, moving across Kosovo to fight 
as required.  In 2001, following the end of the conflict with Serbia, Debellder was 
again affected by conflict when the Albanian National Army was formed to 
challenge the government of Macedonia. During the conflict, Debellder was shelled 
by the Macedonian army and villagers were targeted from vantage points on the 
Macedonian side of the border.  An agreement between the then presidents of 
Yugoslavia and Macedonia in 2001 attempted to establish the border between 
Kosovo and Macedonia.  It stated that some land owned by villagers in Debellder 
was now part of Macedonia.  Whilst the villagers still had title to the land, they 
would need to cross an international border into an area with which they had 
recently being in armed conflict to work it. With the existing direct road blocked 
and mined, access to their lands would be long and difficult.  Since the agreement, 
villagers have not visited their property which has reduced the available income to 
residents, precipitating a drift in the population from the mountains into Viti Town 
some 40 minutes by car on the plain below.   
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Debellder has been subject to a wide variety of peace- and security- building efforts 
since 1999 by government and international actors alike as well as a target of UN 
and KFOR attempts to control SALW, including demining and efforts to promote 
civilian weapons surrender.  Demining was undertaken by KFOR and then by private 
contractors. Being in one of the focus municipalities, Debellder was targeted by 
ISAC I, although residents chose not to surrender weapons.  There were various 
reasons given for this ranging from a perceived need to keep them to protect their 
lands to claims that as ex-KLA fighters, they should maintain them in the event of a 
future need to mobilise again.  Being as remote as it is, Debellder does not have a 
police station or office and so has not been affected significantly by security 
building efforts or peacebuilding activities organised through law enforcement 
institutions per se.   
 
Two focus group discussions were organised with residents in Debellder.  The first 
took place in the local café and involved 15 local residents, all of whom own land on 
the Macedonian side of the border.  The second focus group took place several 
days later in Viti town and focussed very specifically on the issue of small arms and 
small arms control.  There were four participants, all male, including the village 
head, a local teacher and two farmers.  It was apparent that some, if not all the 
participants had been active KLA fighters. 
 
In addition to the two focus groups, the author was taken on a tour of the village by 
four village representatives to see amongst other things: the border with 
Macedonia; the road which was reportedly shelled during the 2001 conflict and 
which residents believe is still mined; the telegraph wires which the villagers 
claimed were sabotaged by JNA forces in 1999 and mined to prevent repair; 
abandoned houses which were inhabited by Macedonians until the outbreak of 
conflict in 2001.   
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Ferizaj 
Ferizaj is one of Kosovo’s main population centres, with over 150,000 residents. It is 
located in the centre of the country on the east/west highway between Macedonia 
and Montenegro and on the railway track that runs from Belgrade to Skopje via 
Mitrovica.  The population in the centre of the city is now almost exclusively 
Albanian, although there are a number of small Serbian villages that are included 
within the City boundaries.    
 
Ferizaj was affected significantly by the conflict with active fighting taking place 
around the city.  Many families fled the city during the conflict with Albanians 
moving to Albania or Macedonia and Serbs to Serbian population centres nearby or 
to Serbia itself.  Following the end of the war, there was a heavy KFOR presence 
stationed in the city, which amongst other things maintained a high profile and very 
visible role guarding an Orthodox church in the city centre. The city was the first 
major population centre reached by US and UK soldiers entering Kosovo from 
Macedonia and was the scene of active combat between NATO and JNA troops 
within the city boundaries. 
 
Ferizaj is now a heavily populated area and is the main market and business town in 
its region.  It suffers from high unemployment, a very high youth population and 
pockets of considerable poverty.  Over recent years the phenomenon of youth 
violence, involving guns and knives, including at school has gained considerable 
attention from police, government and media across the country.  Whilst in the 
early years following the war, there was considerable emphasis placed on 
peacebuilding activities between Albanians and Serbs which were organised by a 
range of different actors, the main focus of activities over recent years which have a 
security or peacebuilding dimension focus on issues related to promoting the rule 
of law, policing and access to justice.  
 
Ferizaj is interesting for the fact that following the end of the war, there were 
significant local-level community led peacebuilding efforts undertaken by a group 
of local community organisations, businesses and war veterans.  These included 
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renovating public spaces, opening a library, improving water and electricity supplies 
and improving road access.  Paid for in part by contributions from local business 
leaders, these outputs of these activities can still be seen today (for instance, the 
author visited the public park and the library in June 2011), and are often cited by 
local people as examples of how the city attempted to recover and promote peace 
in the immediate post-war period.177  
 
In recognition of this particular dimension of the small arms problem, the focus 
group in Ferizaj brought together young people from some of the city’s high 
schools.  There were six participants, three four young women and two young men 
from 16-18 years of age.  There have been various efforts over the last two years to 
address gun related violence in schools in Ferizaj, including a locally organised 
education campaign led by students titled ‘With wisdom not a Gun’ and a national 
government initiative under the auspices of a National Schools Safety strategy.  The 
focus group discussion took place in a function room in the main hotel in Ferizaj and 
last for two hours. 
 
In addition to the focus group discussion, a number of unstructured discussions 
took place with local residents, the mayor, a senior ex-KLA soldier and the head of 
the emergency planning department in the municipal office as part of a visit to the 
old KLA building, which was at the time of the authors visit, being transformed into 
a museum and gallery.  
Lubinje 
Lubinje is a mainly Bosniac village in the south of Kosovo in the municipality of 
Prizren in the border areas between Kosovo and the Albanian dominated eastern 
part of Macedonia around Tetovo and Gostivar.  In addition to people of Bosniac 
origin, Lubinje – which comprises two sister villages split by a steep mountain valley 
– is a mixed community with Albanian and Serbian residents and a small number of 
people of Turkish and Roma origin.  Lubinje, like Debellder is a very mountainous 
area and exists at over 1000 metres about sea level.  During the war, the village was 
                                                       
177 Informal interview with Municipal Mayor and former KLA commander, Ferizaj, June 2011  
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affected, but in a markedly different way from others in which focus group 
discussions were organised.  The Bosniac population were viewed by Belgrade in 
the period leading up to the war as allies and distinctly different from Albanian 
people.  As such, as with Serbian families, they were armed by the Yugoslav interior 
police – partly for self-protection and partly as a prospective defence militia 
capable of engaging with the KLA if required.  This arming of civilians by the state 
took place across Kosovo with non-Albanian populations.  The distinguishing 
characteristic of the case of the residents of Lubinje is that they returned the 
weapons they were given.  The interpretation of why this happened differs 
depending on the conversation and the discussants, but it contains a combination 
of two narratives:  firstly that Bosniaks are peaceful people who had no argument 
with the their Albanian contemporaries and therefore they returned the weapons 
from a principled position; the second is that they knew they were isolated and 
outnumbered, could see the way the conflict was likely to go and made the 
judgement call that the risk of being caught with the weapons in the event of an 
Albanian victory which would have marked them out as collaborators was greater 
than the risk of punishment by Serbian authorities for returning them immediately.     
 
During the war, Lubinje wasn’t as affected significantly by fighting as in other parts 
of Kosovo.  The villages’ isolation and their ethnic make-up probably contributed to 
this, but it also caused villagers problems: they were not able to access any fuel 
wood during the winters of 1999 and 2000 (their principal source of power), 
electricity was cut off and in the minds of FDG participants at least, they were not 
supported by the municipality in the first years of local government in the same 
way that their Albanian contemporaries were elsewhere.  Whilst the war affected 
the people of Lubinje differently, as with all parts of Kosovo visited for the research 
for this thesis, local people had attempted to organise activities to promote peace – 
in this case at the community level involving people from a number of different 
ethnic backgrounds.  In Lubinje these activities have included a twinning 
programme to link up with a village in Switzerland, and a locally highly regarded 
project to promote education and community cohesion through establishing a local 
football club. 
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The focus group discussion in Lubinje deviated from the original research plan in 
that the village council requested that residents from both villages attended.  As 
such, although the author visited the village on two separate occasions – in 
December 2010 and June 2011 to set up and then hold interviews, the focus group 
discussion took place just north of Prizren.  Fourteen people attended comprising 
men, women, residents from both villages, employed and unemployed, village 
heads, members of Community Safety Action Teams and young people.  The 
discussion took place in Bosian, Serbian and Albanian and was translated into 
English.  Due to the complicated linguistic challenge of this particular meeting, two 
interpreters were used. 
 
In addition to the focus group meeting and prior visit to Lubinje in December 2010 
during which the author met with a group of eight local residents to discuss safety 
and security issues in a semi structured context, a separate interview was organised 
with the village head whilst he was visiting Pristina in late May 2011. 
Additional visits and meeting locations 
 
Mitrovica 
Mitrovica is the locus of the remaining conflict in Kosovo today.  The city straddles 
the Ibar River and is divided between the south of the city, which is inhabited by 
those of Albanian ethnicity and the north, which sustains the highest concentration 
of people of ethnic Serbian background in Kosovo. Northern Mitrovica, which also 
contains significant Roma and Bosniak populations is, along with three northern 
Municipalities, (Leposavic, Zvecan and Zubin Potok) largely cut off from the rest of 
the country.  Whilst in principle it is possible to move between the north and the 
south – the author has done this many times for example – in reality it is extremely 
unusual for Albanian’s to visit the north or Serbs the south.  The Pristina 
government has no control over administration or security in the north, which is 
provided, where it is at all, by a combination of ‘parallel structures’ funded by the 
government in Belgrade and international agencies such as the OSCE, KFOR and the 
EU mission in Kosovo – EULEX.  One interviewee described the northern part of the 
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city as a pressure cooker – ‘no-one can get out, they have nothing to do except get 
angry’.  Gun violence in northern Mitrovica is a regular event, often involving young 
people affiliated to particular political or business figures.178  Whilst in theory the 
Kosovo Police has a presence in the north, in practice it performs no useful function 
and so those involved in intimidation and violence have little fear of investigation of 
prosecution. 
 
Whist there are no credible current statistics covering issues such as 
unemployment, crime, and economic activity, Mitrovica appears to the engaged 
outsider to be experiencing an ongoing decline.  For many young people the only 
opportunities are to be found either in Serbia or further afield in other countries.  
The absence of an accountable political class ensures that politics are heavily 
compromised by business affiliations, with a widely held perception amongst the 
public that the current elites benefit financially from the status quo and are 
therefore not incentivised to consider ways in which access to opportunities and 
services can be improved for the population of the northern part of the city.  The 
author has particular experience of this part of the country and has visited many 
times.  During 2010-11 he visited each of the northern municipalities, meeting 
representatives from parallel structures, civil society groups and in each case, the 
municipal Kosovo Police commander.   
 
In addition to these meetings, during the author’s third research visit to Kosovo, he 
visited Mitrovica specifically to meet with NGO representatives and a specific 
official working for the OSCE, of Serbian nationality who was originally from Pristina 
and who has worked in northern Mitrovica since the end of the war.  Discussions in 
Mitrovica were challenged by a heightened state of tension (the author’s visit 
coincided with the arrest of General Ratco Mladic in Serbia for alledged crimes 
against humanity committed in Bosnia in the mid 1990’s) as well as a more 
generalised suspicion of foreigners and importantly, of local people talking to them 
in public. 
                                                       
178 Interviews in Mitrovica and Pristina, December 2010 and June 2011 
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Mitrovica has been targeted by a wide variety of security and peacebuilding efforts 
since the end of the war in 1999.  These have included activities which have also 
been undertaken in other parts of Kosovo, including attempts to establish security 
and justice institutions and improve access to justice for citizens.  But they have 
also included a wide range of different activities which have sought to address 
perceptions that remaining tension is linked to the particular ethnic makeup of the 
northern part of the city and its relations with neighbouring Serbia.  A small number 
of locally-based organisations, mostly in the northern part of the city have 
undertaken a wide range of activities over recent years from those that have a 
substantive public awareness-raising function or which seek to promote 
reconciliation to those that use livelihood promotion as a means of promoting 
peace. Many of the early peacebuilding efforts were assessed by Diana Chigas et al 
in 2006 as part of an examination of the effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts in 
Kosovo in tackling violence following a specific outbreak of violence in 2004.  
Amongst the findings of the study, the authors claimed that peacebuilding activities 
to date had not had a significant impact on conflict prevention and that one of the 
key factors that contributed to this was that they had not often focussed on the 
main drivers of conflict  (Chigas, D et al 2006; 133-146).       
 
Gjakova 
Gjakova is located in the south west of Kosovo near the Albanian border to the 
South and the Montenegrin border to the north-west.  It is the main town in its 
region, and was a significant settlement during the Yugoslav period.   
 
Gjakova was very badly affected by the 1999 war.  It was seen as an Albanian 
stronghold, a recruitment point for fighters and as a transit destination for weapons 
by Belgrade.  Consequently a large proportion of the Albanian population fled 
across the border to Albania during the war.  KLA activity in Gjakova was significant 
and hard battles with many casualties took place in and around the town between 
the KLA and JNA forces that were able to move over the border from Montenegro 
with relative ease. Memories of the war in Gjakova remain strong and those 
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interviewed by the author had one unifying characteristic, they were the most 
hostile and aggressive towards people of Serbian ethnicity than anyone else 
interviewed by the author in the rest of the country.   
 
Gracanica 
Gracanica is a Serbian majority town, which was until recently located in the 
Pristina Municipality, however following the establishment of a number of new 
municipalities in 2009, Gracanica was granted Municipality status. As with many 
central Kosovan towns, it was heavily damaged by the conflict – both in terms of its 
population as well as its infrastructure. Gracanica is situated close to Kosovo’s only 
international airport and as such was affected by the competition for strategic 
locations between NATO and Russian Federation forces during the land 
engagement phase of the intervention, which led to the Russian military 
establishing a base outside the airport, where they remained for several years.  
Consequently, residents had little access to KFOR and to UNMIK-led peacebuilding 
efforts in the early period following the end of the war; some Gracanica residents 
report feeling left out of reconstruction efforts despite demonstrating a greater 
willingness to engage with the nascent Kosovo institutions than the majority of 
Serb-dominated areas in other parts of the country.179 
 
Leaders in Gracanica have been active over recent years in promoting peace and 
security for their citizens, including establishing an active Municipal Community 
Safety Council.  A local non-governmental organisation CSD, based in Gracanica has 
played an important role in the development of a Kosovo-wide civil society effort to 
promote activities to enhance community safety and security. 
 
Peja 
Peja is a significant town, the main population centre in the region dominated by 
the Rugova Mountains in the extreme west of the country which shares a border 
with Montenegro.  In Peja, during the war, many people were killed and the city 
was badly damaged; Human Rights Watch for instance claim that over 80% of the 
                                                       
179 Interview with LPC representative December 2010 
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buildings in the city were badly damaged by shell and mortar fire (Human Rights 
Watch 1999).  The city was also affected again in March 2004 when the most 
significant violence since the end of the 1999 war took place following the killing of 
a Serbian boy in contested circumstances a few kilometres outside Pristina (for a 
detailed report on the violence and its affects see Schenker, H. 2006).  The author 
visited Peja to interview the Director of the main civil society organisation in the 
region who for several years has been actively engaged on issues relating to 
controlling SALW and promoting community security and to observe the scene of a 
recent incidence of gun violence.  
 
Gjilan 
The town of Gjilan was not as badly affected by the war and its effects as some 
others in Kosovo in terms of human or infrastructural impact.  It was and remains a 
mixed community and is by Kosovo standards fairly prosperous, being centrally 
located on Kosovo’s main road network.  Gjilan was however, heavily affected by a 
localised earthquake on 24 April 2002180 which led to landslides and closure of the 
main through road and very significant damage to local buildings and businesses.  In 
addition to having its own story to tell of how it was affected by the conflict, Gjilan 
is interesting in that it was a local NGO from the town which was most active in 
participating in the two UNDP led attempts to control small arms, in 2003 and 2005. 
The Kosovo Centre for International Security was awarded a contract to run a public 
awareness and education campaign in advance of the 2003 weapons for 
development programme.  It was known to UNDP prior to this contract being 
offered as it had undertaken significant local activities in years immediately 
following the end of the war to encourage interaction between young people of 
different nationalities – which included sports tournaments and social activities.  
Later in 2005 it was also awarded a contract to run public education campaigns in 
four municipalities as part of an additional UNDP SALW control focussed project 
which was funded through money left over from the 2003 effort that was not 
awarded to municipalities. 
                                                       
180 Balkan Insight: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/earthquake-rocks-kosovo.  Retrieved 3 
January 2012  
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Pristina 
Pristina, for many years the capital city of Kosovo is centrally located and plays the 
central role in the administrative, commercial and cultural life of Kosovo today.  
Prior to the war, it was a mixed community with many Serbs living alongside the 
majority Albanian population.  Following the end of the war, the numbers of 
Kosovo-Serbian residents fell to just two people.  This has changed as the war has 
become more distant and it is once again a more mixed community with ethnic 
Albanians and a small number of ethnic Serbs living alongside people from a wide 
range of different nationalities from the Balkan region and much further afield.   
 
Pristina was the headquarters for UNMIK, the OSCE mission in Kosovo and those of 
most of the other international agencies that played a role supporting 
peacebuilding and SALW control efforts in the years following the end of the war.   
As well as being the most critical location  in the country in terms of government 
and services, Pristina was also affected heavily by the war and is today the arguably 
the area of the country which is most affected by the impact of SALW proliferation 
and misuse.  For instance, between 2000 and 2004, over 35% of all SALW seized by 
police were taken in Pristina (Kharkee and Florquin 2003:20) and between 2003 and 
2005, of all firearm related injuries recorded by hospitals in Kosovo, Pristina 
Municipality counted for over 25% of the total, which was almost three times that 
of the nearest municipality (Sokolova, Richards and Smith 2006:19). The majority of 
the interviews with government officials, both ex- and serving, took place in 
Pristina, as did several of the interviews with NGOs working at the national level, 
and those working for international organisations, including UNDP and the OSCE.  
During the field visits to Kosovo, the author was based in Pristina, travelling out 
daily to different parts of the country.  The main documents accessed for the 
research were obtained in Pristina and the author spent considerable time 
observing how government officials, and the police and ministry of internal affairs 
office of public safety in particular interacted with issues of safety, security and 
SALW control. 
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Over the course of the past ten years, the author has spent almost a year in Kosovo, 
spaced over 40 visits, much of which was based in Pristina.  This has encouraged a 
good understanding of how the city has recovered and developed since the war, 
the ways in which Kosovar institutions have gradually replaced the once 
overwhelming international presence, and how the population has changed over 
time, both in ethnic make-up and other important demographics such as age and 
wealth. 
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